The general remarks which I made before Question Time were necessarily vague because one does not wish to sound alarmist unless there are very good grounds for adopting such an attitude and, secondly, one should have regard to our proportion in a world community and in our own environment. I should hope that it was a sense of responsibility which prevented me from being more specific. However, it may be that an attempt at specification would have no further value than that of a mere academic discourse. But there is a broader aspect of responsibility in the field of defence and I shall be more specific now in relation to a few headings.
I mentioned the need from a staff point of view for foresight and co-ordination with energy development and requirements in transport and communications in the broad sense but I shall move on now to the question of the similar necessity in regard to the co-ordination of medical resources and supplies, hospitals and so on. These are areas in which certain alternative contingencies can be foreseen in a broad and general way and where at least information can be obtained and collated and contacts made with other elements in the community and other Departments of State that are likely to be involved in a deteriorating situation. Much of that had been more or less achieved accidentally before the last calamity but it is a matter which should not be left again to accident should the need arise.
To turn now to the question of what is required specifically in the area of defence, it goes without saying that there must be an adequate Department administratively to deal with this field of activity, and that there must be a defence force of sufficient strength and equipment. It is said that it is an ill wind that blows no good and the ill winds of the requirements of peace-keeping activities abroad in the fifties and sixties and of the disorders of the present day, have at least contributed to and determined to a large extent the strength at which our forces can be maintained. I recall in my early days in the House in the forties trying to convince Ministers of more than one government of the need to keep up the strength of the Army although it may have appeared then that there was very little to be done in the area of defence. However, the requirements of peace-keeping abroad in the first instance as well as the troubles nearer home have secured that we have a regular establishment. That is a vast improvement on what was the relevant position before the last calamity.
Those strengths should be regarded as a permanent feature of our Defence Forces and not merely as a temporary increase in numbers and equipment, that is, if we are to have a Defence force at all. I say that, too, from the point of view of those who make the Army a career, both on the military and civil side because within the Defence Forces they can have as much job satisfaction as is to be obtained in any other sphere. However, the greater problem of the moment is to supply all the necessary facilities to enable the defence units to function. I shall not attempt to go into the day-to-day matters or into detail regarding weaponry or organisation because I do not know anything about that but my experience as chairman of a committee of this House is very reassuring in regard to the existence of the same hard-headedness that prevailed, for instance, before the last war when our people, to take a minor example, took the independent decision, regardless of the decision of the British, to begin to equip the force with Bren guns. There was the enlightenment of the force when, for example, they got the 3.7 mm batteries or when they got the 81 mm mortar. I am glad to say that spirit of responsibility and initiative is still there. It would not be right for me to comment on any equipment the Army have or have not. I believe it is right to express confidence and to feel that our general staff, technical staff and the civil adjuncts are alive and responsible in getting equipment and the necessities in order that the Army may do their job. They are doing this in a responsible and businesslike way and can be utterly trusted to make the best use of the public funds put at their disposal. I am glad to be able to say that from a certain amount of experience of what I have seen as a Deputy in the House and in committees. That combination of enterprise and hard-headedness is to be encouraged. It would be unseeming to presume to offer the Minister advice in this matter because he has good advisers on both sides and the matter can be competently left to them.
I am very concerned about the Reserves. Tributes have been paid to the standard of the FCA and the Reserves, with which I join wholeheartedly. However, I feel that this is an area where one can put off things too long. When one has a regular Defence Force of a certain strength adequate and doing their job well we should have a proportionate number of Reserves to cope with the broader aspect. By this I mean Reserves having a certain basic training that enables them to come in as needed. I do not believe it is necessary to expand on this. On more than one occasion in the House I outlined that in 1939-40 we were fortunate in having two Reserves built up, one from the 1920s and the other in the 1930s. The first was sufficiently trained to take their place immediately and carry a load that would have been impossible even for local security in 1939. The second was so trained that they were able to take their places in the short time available before it came to the general recruitment of the emergency Army.
I would like to see as much attention as possible given to increasing the number of personnel, particularly the officer and leader Reserves and also the rank and file Reserves. This ensures that if the time arrives when they are wanted they are there to be quickly absorbed. They expand quickly the skeleton on which a wider mobilisation can be made. I believe that point is worthy of attention. This matter has given rise to certain anxiety because one feels that Reserve strength may not be adequate and also that some intermediate provision for something between the completely voluntary part-time Reserve like the FCA and the whole-time regiment is needed, particularly where commissioned ranks are concerned. That was there previously but I do not think it is there now.
One wants to condition the mentality of people to take part in a military organisation. I am talking about professional people, doctors, scientists, engineers, chemists, physicists and various other people whose services are needed both in peace and war. The advantage of having a Reserve Force with some of those people already there is that they are conditioned to military organisation and can fit in. During the last war many eminent surgeons were commissioned to be ready for a contingency. That type of Reserve needs consideration.
That is tied up with Civil Defence and the Garda. The Civil Defence end in turn goes back to the general staff concept, such as the Red Cross in relation to the medical reserves and fire fighting in relation to other matters. The question of Reserves should be considered under three headings. The first is increasing the strength of the FCA. The second is the provision of something more sophisticated and experienced, particularly where officers and leaders are concerned. This will require a certain modicum of full-time training, which is very difficult to achieve nowadays. The ideal is a short service and then retiring to civilian life with a commitment to being on the Reserve. The third heading is the professional tie-in, if I might call it that.
The last matter I want to refer to is the question of technology. It is very easy to be defeatist here especially in the modern, highly organised world but we must remember that our industry and technology are improving. When we were up against it the last time we were able to fill some gaps in a relatively amateurish way. We used contraptions of various sorts. However, we were able to harness our technical, scientific and industrial resources to fill some gaps. We should not forget that lesson.
I urge the Minister, as I urged his predecessors, to provide something on those lines. We could have specially trained people on reserve and we could have them interested in the Army apart from having people with sufficient technical knowhow in the Defence Forces. Experience justifies this even though it is very easy to take the defeatist attitude: "When one looks at computers and what modern rockets can do it seems a little silly to consider those things". There are a few good reasons for this. It is no harm to study a problem near one. It is surprising what results one can get when one is up against it. Another reason is one which I hesitate to mention. We can see in other places, with all the discouragement of an organised State, police forces, security forces and all the rest, what perverted ingenuity can do. I have a little interest in that because I was involved in that type of exercise the last time. I do not want to expand on that.
These are points I would commend to the Minister. I have asked for close co-ordination between the different Departments of State in the matter of food, fuel, transport, communications, energy, and specifically in regard to medical reserves, professional reserves and Civil Defence, and what I might call emergency improvisation. Let us not forget these things, while naturally being preoccupied with the task of the moment, that is, security. Because I have not commented on it I must not be taken as ignoring it. I do not want to minimise the importance and the value of the services given there. I have not spoken on this Estimate for quite some time. Now and then somebody should stand back and look at the overall picture and assess it. The Department of Defence always have to look ahead and be ready for contingencies.
My necessary vagueness in this initial attempt to analyse the problems will be understood, I hope. I do not want to be thought of as being fuzzy in my thinking. I hope my vagueness will be attributed charitably to an attempt to be prudent rather than being woolly and vague. That woolliness and vagueness were imposed on me by prudence. I would ask the Minister to spare a moment to consider the general points I have tried to make in all the hurly-burly of the present problems.
