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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 23 Apr 1980

Vol. 319 No. 10

Private Members' Business. - Civil Legal Aid Scheme: Motion (Resumed).

The following motion was moved on Tuesday 22 April by Deputy E. Desmond:
That Dáil Éireann rejects the administrative scheme for Civil Legal Aid which the Government is seeking to implement because
(i) it has no basis in legislation and therefore cannot create a right to legal aid and establish an independent Legal Aid Board to administer it,
(ii) it is not a comprehensive scheme.
(iii) it is not a free scheme.
(iv) it would deny a choice of solicitor to those seeking legal aid and introduce a dispensary system of legal services for them.
(v) it would discriminate against rural Ireland and those living in small towns
and calls upon the Government to introduce immediately the necessary legislation to establish a comprehensive scheme of legal aid along the lines recommended by the Pringle Committee.
Debate resumed on amendment No. 1;
To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and substitute the following:—"expresses its confidence in the Minister for Justice in relation to the exercise by him of his functions in regard to the Scheme of Civil Legal Aid and advice."
—(Minister for Justice)

Last night I was trying to make the point that the impression Deputy O'Keeffe's contribution gave was that he was primarily concerned for the legal profession rather than the people who will benefit under the scheme of civil legal aid and advice. People know that there must be some kind of control over expenditure. If free legal aid is to be given to almost every cause and if it is to be under a free choice of solicitor scheme there will be many people who will be advised on very flimsy grounds to seek free legal aid. In every profession there are a certain number of people that the profession would sooner be without and that includes the legal profession. The Incorporated Law Society have a job to do every year in bringing to task certain members of that profession who go outside the balance of what might be called professional standards. There may be members of the profession newly qualified and struggling to get on their feet who might be tempted to take on flimsy cases which, in the normal way, any seasoned lawyer, solicitor or barrister would not take.

One of the criticisms levelled was the lack of activity since 1977 in providing this scheme. The history of the scheme begins with the 1977 pre-election manifesto in which it was stated that a scheme of civil legal aid, to cover initially family law cases, would be provided by a Fianna Fáil Government. It is fair and interesting to note that the scheme introduced goes beyond what was promised as a first step in that manifesto.

The Minister for Justice received the Pringle Report in December 1977 and announced its receipt in a press release from the Government Information Bureau on 15 December 1977. It should be clear to any reasonable person that examination of that extensive report would take sometime to complete. It is fair to say that the Government have not been slow in coming forward with their proposals. We know substantial sums of money are involved in the recommendations, and we must know what kind of control we can exercise over the expenditure of such sums. Different options and approaches were considered in the report and policy decisions had to be reached in selecting among those options. The service which a scheme of civil legal aid would provide would be completely new. In other words, there were no real precedents or models on which to base assessments of the various options. There again we did not have a similar scheme in operation which we were updating or improving upon. We had something which was completely new and tailored for the way we conduct our affairs. Many other Government Departments had to be consulted since many of the matters raised in the Pringle Report came within their areas of responsibility.

Anyone who has been in Government knows it takes time to get back questionnaires or submissions which have been circulated in order to get the fullest information possible to prepare a report. In just over two-and-a-half years the Government have done very well to bring forward their scheme which will be monitored very carefully before the legislation is brought into formal law. The fact that they will be agreed practices of legal aid gives them the recognition from a legal point of view that they require.

From the Minister's point of view it is fair to say it was not simply a matter of taking the Pringle Report and accepting it. As I explained there were many other aspects. A lot of work had to be done during 1978 and the early part of 1979 before a decision could be taken by the Government on their recommendations. In fact during that period an intensive study of the contents and recommendations of the Pringle Report was taking place throughout most of the central organs of administration in the State. The Minister for Justice told Deputy O'Keeffe as much on 8 March 1979 in answer to a question and on that occasion he indicated the Government's commitment to introducing civil legal aid.

I think he has done well to fulfil that promise in the time available. From time to time the Opposition say we have not fulfilled our election promises but in my view we have done extremely well in that area, not least in presenting this piece of good news. We have experienced many difficulties in curtailing expenses generally but this scheme is still going ahead.

On 2 May 1979 the Government announced that they had approved the features of a civil legal aid scheme to be introduced by the Minister for Justice. The statement from the Government Information Bureau outlined the principal features of the scheme. In one important respect the Government in their scheme were able to improve upon the expectations of many of those who had been agitating for an immediate introduction of a scheme based on the Pringle Report by promising to deliver a comprehensive scheme rather than the interim one which had been suggested as an alternative in that report. Even those people responsible for drafting the Pringle Report did not expect so many of their recommendations to be brought in so speedily but because of the speedy manner in which the Minister got to work on this it was not necessary to introduce the interim one only.

Following the Government decision in principle which led to that statement—that the Government would have the scheme ready by the end of 1979—the Minister and his Department had to embark on the task of preparing the scheme itself based on the Government decision and designed—for the record again I would like to remind Deputy O'Keeffe— to provide a totally new, comprehensive and relatively complex service. The detailed scheme itself was approved by the Government and laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas in December 1979. About the same time the Minister for Justice appointed the legal aid board to administer the scheme. The board have made giant progress in recruiting staff, obtaining accommodation and completing the many essential administrative jobs which have to be done before they can open the doors of their law centres to the public. That work is almost completed and we do not expect that it will be very long before the first legal aid centre will be open to the public.

One of the criticisms of the scheme is that it gives the Minister too much control over the Legal Aid Board and, in particular, that the power to remove a member if it "appeared to be necessary for the effective performance by the board of its functions" was extreme and unique. That is not accurate because the powers given to the Minister are the same as those given to the Minister for the Environment over An Bord Pleanála. The relevant part of the legislation relating to the powers of the Department of the Environment over An Bord Pleanála says:

The Minister may remove from office an ordinary member of the Board who has become incapable through ill-health of effectively performing his duties, or who has committed stated misbehaviour, or whose removal appears to the Minister to be necessary for the effective performance by the Board of its functions, and in case a member of the Board is removed from office under this Article, the Minister shall cause to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas a statement in writing of the reasons for removal.

Obviously the Minister has to have some control over a board which will be spending vast sums of public money.

It has been suggested that the Pringle Committee recommended legislation.

That is not correct. It does not say anywhere in that report that in the view of the committee the scheme should be put on a statutory basis from the beginning. The committee envisaged that there would be legislation in due course, but so did the Minister, as he made clear last night. The Pringle Committee did point to the need for flexibility in the approach to the development of the service—page 29 of the report—and this is precisely what can be achieved by having a non-statutory scheme for an initial period during which operational experience can be obtained before the necessary rigidity of a statute is imposed upon the scheme.

Many Members of the House will accept that at some time in the foreseeable future legislation will be introduced on this matter. It can only benefit the Minister's scheme to give it a fair chance in operation rather than to introduce a Bill containing numerous items which later on would be seen to be unwieldy and which would have to be deleted in a new Bill which, due to pressure of work, might take years to be enacted.

Deputy O'Keeffe last night spoke at considerable length of the possible difficulty people who could not afford to travel would have in getting to the centres and that therefore they would be denied service under the scheme. I argue there is not a basis for that contention. As the Minister said, his scheme is designed to enable any person, no matter where he lives, to obtain legal services if he qualifies. The Deputy's point is aimed really at the feature of the scheme under which services are to be provided in centres to the exclusion of solicitors in private practice. It is true that persons who wish to attend in person may have to travel to a centre, but what about persons who would have to travel to see a solicitor in private practice?

The Pringle Report dealt with the inaccessibility of solicitors' offices. It is fair to point out that many of the services to be provided will not necessarily involve attendance at a centre. The postal service can be availed of. I do know what that would involve but I feel sure an adequate service could be provided by the post office. Moreover, there is not any reason why the board in due course should not make suitable arrangements for the provision of services at comparatively remote places as the scheme would progress.

The Pringle Report recommended that part-time services would be made available which would include some arrangement such as attendance by a legal aid solicitor, say for half a day per week, in small places. That would be an operational matter to be decided by the board.

Deputy O'Keeffe said he was not attacking the concept of legal aid centres—indeed he approved of them— but he went on to say that they would not provide the applicant with a choice of lawyer if private practice solicitors were not in the scheme. This lacks logic because if a sufficient number of centres become operational to meet all demand then clearly there would not be a need for private practitioners. Choice of solicitor and counsel within the centres is provided for in the Minister's scheme.

In other words, a person might go to a centre in which there would be half a dozen solicitors or a certain number of counsel to choose from. If they are not satisfied with the solicitors or barristers, they could go to another centre where they might find a solicitor or barrister whom they might wish to consult. Therefore, there is a reasonably wide range. We must remember that we are providing a service for the first time in this country. It is very important that the scheme will get off to a good start. It is welcomed even if it does not go as far as some people would like it to go, and it should be encouraged. There should not be attempts to denigrate it in the way that Deputy O'Keeffe appeared to do last night.

Deputy O'Keeffe said that private practitioners had been excluded because the Government could not find money to fund a scheme with them included. That is only partially true because a wide open scheme would undoubtedly create a risk of far greater expenditure in the long term than is either needed or justified. However, it is not so much a question of finding the money as drawing up a scheme which could be controlled properly, one which as the Minister said last night, would not take off on its own. The scheme does this and I think the taxpayer will be duly grateful for it. It does it without denying services to any person who qualifies for them.

A point was made that exclusions from the scheme amount to a defect in it. I have a few notes on that, which may be of interest to the House. The Opposition seem to be making the point that there should not be any exceptions and there should not be limitations. They object to all the exclusions, and they mentioned defamation and small civil bill claims of less than £20 for advice and £150 for legal aid. Deputy Desmond also complained that the services should not be confined to "natural persons" and that they should be available to groups for test actions.

These views are typical of a doctrinaire, extreme and indeed irresponsible approach to the subject. Our experience in Dublin has been that with even the slightest encouragement certain people seem to want to go to law over anything. If given carte blanche by the State it could cost the State enormous sums of money for people taking, for instance, Dublin Corporation to court or the Government to court. Perhaps some fellow might think he had a great case and might take to court every piece of legislation ever enacted here. That may be extreme, but there are people and groups who would try to break the back of the scheme and the taxpayers' backs. Consequently, we must proceed reasonably carefully in our approach to this matter.

Most reasonable people will agree that there must be limits. As I said, it sometimes suits Deputy Desmond to quote from the Pringle Report and to ask why it should not be implemented in its entirety. What about paragraph 2.10 of the report which comes down definitely against giving legal aid to groups and organisations for test actions? Although not favouring exclusions the Pringle Committee referred to that exclusion.

In addition, it is obviously sensible to have some monetary limit to the size of civil bills for which advice or aid would be sought. Otherwise there would be a situation in which the State would have to meet heavy legal expense in a case where a person might recover only an infinitesmal sum in a frivolous suit. It is a matter of drawing the line, and it seems to me the scheme draws the line justly and realistically.

Neither Deputy Desmond nor Deputy O'Keeffe offered an alternative scheme and I should like to hear Deputy Desmond on this point when she is replying. I know the Minister would respond favourably to any positive suggestions which would not result in certain groups having free access to the scheme.

It has to be remembered that legal advice where the limit is only £20 is the important thing in this context because this would include writing a solicitor's letter on behalf of the potential plaintiff or giving other assistance to enable him or her to obtain rights. It would also be clear from the advice in a case between £20 and £150 if there was a good case. In this event there would be no difficulty in the ordinary way in having the case taken by another solicitor since costs would be recoverable.

Regarding the exclusion of defamation, it has to be remembered that in the English scheme introduced over 30 years ago the same category has been excluded and in the light of their experience they have seen no reason to include it. Also it is fair to say that the Dublin Solicitor's Bar Association urged on the Pringle Commission such an exclusion. The exclusion was not recommended purely on the grounds recommended elsewhere that no case should be legally aided unless clearly meritorious.

I have dealt as constructively as possible with the criticisms of the scheme made by Deputy O'Keeffe and certain points made by Deputy Desmond. One thing we must guard against is that the solicitor who would not stand on his own feet should not suddenly find that he is being spoonfed by the State and have easy access to funds. There are instances in many countries of certain unscrupulous people of various professions cornering an easy market without any care as to the cost to the taxpayer. We have seen instances of that and I am not sure whether I should specify to what I am referring in talking about certain abuses under the present system. I feel there are abuses under the criminal legal aid system and most people in the legal profession connected with that system would be among the first to admit this fact. They deplore these abuses because they bring down their own profession.

We can be very pleased with this scheme and the Minister and the Government are to be congratulated for the speedy manner in which they have gone ahead with it.

I am lost in admiration at the ability of this administration to devise schemes which in their intention have the maximum possible publicity value at the minimum cost to the State and the taxpayer. This scheme, which we in the Labour Party reject as wholly inadequate, is a classic example of a scheme which has been devised under duress and whose main objective is to conceal from the general public, as much as from the person who might be expected to avail of it, the intensely strict limitations on its use.

This scheme of civil legal aid and advice—I like the word "advice" and will come back to that later—has two progenitors. The first of its parents was the Pringle Report on civil legal aid, a worthy report as far as it went, but we would quarrel with some of its aspects and might think that it does not necessarily meet the criteria we would advance for a reasonable, decent, properly funded legal aid scheme. The other parent of this unfortunate piece of paper was the decision in the Airey case in Europe. One does not have to be familiar with the inner workings of Government to know that if the Airey decision had not been handed down in Europe we might not be discussing this motion tonight. The Pringle Report, if we were to judge the present by the past, would still be on the shelf, to emerge finally and definitively as part of an election commitment by the outgoing administration in 1981 or 1982. Decently and logically they could not push it beyond that but in view of their other commitments and decisions and in view of the resource implications of their other decisions, it is fairly obvious that unpushed by the Airey decision we would not even be discussing today this inadequate and partial measure.

To the best of my knowledge—and I stand open to correction—there has been no indication from the Government side as to precisely how much the implementation of this measure will cost. Governments are great at costing measures put forward by the Opposition but they are altogether more reticent when it comes to costing measures put forward by themselves if such costings reveal the fundamentally inadequate nature of their proposals or provisions. If the Government implemented the Pringle Report in full it would cost about £2 million, according to the Pringle Report's own costings. Doubtless that scheme would cost more nowadays, not least because of the Government's splendid record in the field of inflation. We would like an indication as to what the Government expect the implementation of this scheme to cost and I would be glad to give a Government Minister three or four minutes at the end of my speech in order to reply, if he has that information.

In an area like this costs, while important, must be balanced against rights. The sum of £2 million, the Pringle Report estimation of costs, balanced against the expenditure of this State in all sorts of areas, not least the area of law and order, is a comparatively small amount. It is a function and characteristic of far too many modern States—no matter how democratic their constitution, no matter how open their mechanisms and no matter how much they wish their citizens to participate to the full in the life of their country—that they tend to spend far more money on protecting property than on establishing the rights of individuals. In the Consitiution, the rights of the family are actually given pre-eminence over those of the individual. However, neither the rights of the family nor the rights of the individual are given anything like reasonable recognition in this puny scheme.

We of the Labour Party accept that an adequate scheme would probably cost even more than the £2 million assessed by the Pringle Commission as the probable cost for the implementation of their recommendations. We are under no illusions about the difficulty that any Minister of Justice would have, in any administration, to get even this paltry amount out of the Minister for Finance for such a purpose, however worthy. We suspect, however, that the glaring absence of the Government costing on this scheme of theirs indicates certainly to us, and probably also to the man and the woman in the street, that this is undeniably a scheme on the cheap. It is a scheme which is being introduced because the Government have no option but to introduce a scheme. What they have done therefore is to introduce a scheme which will meet the demands which have been made on them by the Airey case, although even here there are problems to which I will refer later and which have restricted availability of the same kind of remedy to applicants whose circumstances are not the same as Josephine Airey's to the point at which the scheme becomes almost laughable.

There is another fundamental point of principle which we should look at here and which bears on everything I have to say about this scheme. The Government's scheme sets up a legal aid board. I have no quarrel with its decision to set up a legal aid board but if you set up a board you should give them reasonable responsibility and discretion. In the fine print of this scheme, the legal aid board are pinioned hand and foot. They have discretion to decide whether they will blow their collective nose at half past five or twenty to six, but very little more than that.

I am astonished, not just at this Government but at all Government —and I would include, in certain respects, the preceding Government— for the way in which they give with one hand and take away with the other—set up a board to administer a scheme but impose such conditions on that board that effectively they are a rubber stamp for the decisions of the Cabinet, the Minister for Justice and the Department of Justice. If I may draw an analogy very briefly, and I think it is relevant, I would like to mention the question of the RTE Authority. When I was in another place and not a member of this party I argued against the introduction of certain legislation governing what might or might not be broadcast by RTE. I did so fundamentally on the grounds that if the Government appoint an authority or a board as they are appointing here, they should leave to the competence of the board, within very broad limits, the decision or series of decisions about the area under discussion. To carry the parallel further, I would argue in the case of the RTE Authority that that authority should have total editorial control over the station and that Government legislation should be, by and large, unnecessary, just as I would argue that in the case of a legal aid board the Government should have the guts to give that board a reasonable discretion in the exercise of their function. In either case, the Government are not without a sanction. They can sack, as they did sack, on one occasion, the RTE Authority. They can sack, as they could sack, under this instrument here, the legal aid board if, in the opinion of the Government, that board are fundamentally and basically not doing the job that they were set up to do.

I am not one of those people who believe that Governments should set up boards, give them their head and never come back to them again—legal aid board, RTE Authority or whatever. I believe that democratically elected Governments are entitled to the final sanction but—and I would emphasise this—that is the only sanction that they should have. If they want to exercise that sanction, they do it and stand over that decision in this House, rather than interfere in a pettifogging way in the activities of the institution they set up, whether by legislation such as the Broadcasting Act or by regulations such as the ones which are advanced for our consideration in this legal aid advice scheme.

I now turn to some of the more detailed provisions of the scheme and to express criticisms which may have been made before but which I believe deserve and need to be made again. In the first case, as has already been mentioned, the scheme covers individuals only. It does not cover community groups such as residents' associations and tenants' associations and although I am very well aware of the fact that some residents' associations are fairly well-heeled and can well afford to pay their own solicitor and counsel and even though I am also aware that many lawyers are justifiably apprehensive about taking group action because of the possibility that the interests of all the members of these groups do not necessarily coincide and that they may find their client splitting into its component parts before their very eyes, I nevertheless would argue that the failure even to allow the legal aid board to consider such applications for legal advice is tying its hands in quite an unrealistic way and one which might ultimately waste money rather than save it.

I should like to give a concrete example of this. Some time ago—I believe it was last December—a tenant called Siney took a case against Dublin Corporation in relation to the maintenance of his flat. If it were not for the fact that the judge, at the beginning of the hearing, stated very positively that the case was of such importance as a test case that he thought the corporation should pay the plantiff's costs in any case, regardless of the outcome, that particular tenant might have been very seriously out of pocket as a result. As it happened, he won his case. As it happened he has established now a statutory right, as a tenant of Dublin Corporation, to have his premises maintained and repaired in a reasonable manner.

We are now to be asked to bring in and endorse a legal advice and legal aid scheme which will not only make it difficult for people like Mr. Siney to bring a test case as he brought it but in situations in which other tenants would like to bring similar cases based on the precedent established by Mr. Siney and on which they may be entitled to legal aid, but will mean that each of them have to obtain from the legal aid board a subsidised in getting legal aid, when a single group action in relation to the entire group of tenants might be achieved at half the cost and with half the trouble. I must ask the Government whether they have considered this possibility. By tying the hands of the legal aid and advice board in this respect, as they have done in so many other cases, are they not making a mockery of the thing?

If the Minister is going to appoint a legal aid board the sensible thing is to allow then to apply a merit test which they have to do in many of the areas and allow them to decide whether an applicant has a reasonable case for civil legal aid. For the purposes of this argument I am not even querying a means test. I am assuming the obligations of such a test are met. If the board are given the authority to be a real board and to decide whether an applicant is eligible for legal aid, in very broad terms—much broader than in this measure—that should be left to the board.

I do not know who the Minister plans to appoint to the board. They will not all be subversives. Not all of them will be red-haired revolutionaries, they will not be despoilers of society who want to tear down our institutions, to run away with our wives and children and sell them in the slave auctions in the Middle East. They will be sober, responsible, concerned citizens—just as concerned as the Minister to uphold the rule of law and the right of access to the law. If I were Minister I would not mind within very broad guidelines leaving the decisions on questions concerning group actions and so on to the group of citizens appointed by him and who can be removed from the board by him. The Minister must have the final sanction.

I have referred already to the fact that group actions are excluded. We have heard already from Deputy Desmond and Deputy Briscoe that test cases are excluded. Deputy Briscoe's argument seem to be that such cases must be excluded because wastrels, agitators and so on will bring test cases, morning, noon and night. All that has to be done to stop that happening is to give the board wide powers to dismiss, regardless of the means test, any application for a matter that they consider vexatious.

The concept of vexatious litigation is a very old one in law and I have no doubt that some of the members appointed to the legal aid board will be familiar with it. I would be happy to leave it to the general competence of such a board to decide whether a test case was vexatious. In passing, it is worth while nothing there is no appeal from the decision of the legal advice and aid board. Probably that is as it should be because we could not have appeals from everything all of the time. It makes sense to give the board broad powers and to allow them to dismiss vexatious appeals. The decision on what is vexatious will be made by the board and the character of their decisions will be influenced by the character of the members of the board and ultimately by the character of the Government who appoint them. I cannot see any Government appointing a board that would allow vexatious causes of action to be financed out of public funds. What I would like to see, and I make no apology for saying it, is a Government who would appoint a legal aid and advice board that would be rather more open to allocating public money to pay for legal argument in the cause of establishing important human and democratic rights than is the case with the Government now in office. In the past 15 years anybody who reads the newspapers can see that some of the most exciting, innovative and challenging developments in Irish law have been made not in this House but in the High Court and in the Supreme Court. Effectively we are denying to the ordinary citizen the right to climb that ladder in the pursuit of rights that he considers reasonable, whether or not the court finally decide that they are reasonable.

Another point is the fact that legal aid is not to be provided for cases in front of any tribunals. The importance of this for workers, and particularly for workers in dispute with their employers, cannot be emphasised enough. At the moment there is a laudable emphasis on the part of the Government and in the practices of the Department of Labour for tribunals to be as free as possible from legal jargon and argument, to be more accessible and to be more domestic in character. However, we must face the facts. When an employer feels at risk because of any action brought before a tribunal by an employee, the first thing he will do will be to hire an expensive lawyer or else to send one of his senior management staff who has a law degree or has legal training to confront the unfortunate worker who is attempting to argue the rights of his case. Not even the most sympathetic tribunal can be expected to offset this advantage to the employer—who has an advantage from the point of view of money, class, background, upbringing and who has access to resources of all kind.

Within this category of worker who is being discriminated against by this scheme there is another category of worker to whom I should refer. A very high proportion of workers in this country are unionised but there are also non-unionised workers and they have every right to remain as such. The unionised worker will be entitled to expert representation at the tribunal, at the very least by an official from his union. The worker who does not belong to a trade union is entitled to no such representation and his position is ten times worse because of that. If we are to be serious about safeguarding the rights of people, what area could be more important than the defence and protection of a person's employment? If we rule out these areas we might as well admit that the scheme is a shambles.

The scheme probably excludes planning as well. I would argue that it would be quite possible to include planning if there was a provision that allowed the board to dismiss what they considered to be vexatious requests for financial assistance.

There is another point in relation to the choice of solicitor—let us remember that the Airey case was a matrimonial matter. Let us remember also that we have not been told precisely how many legal aid centres there will be, that in certain cases the plaintiff, if he cannot get legal aid in his own town may visit a legal aid centre in another town. Consider a matrimonial case in a small country town where there may be only four or five solicitors, many of them overworked and where, even if somebody could be found to take a case for both parties, both eligible under the means test, the difficulty of confidentiality remains extraordinarily high. In this kind of situation, where a matrimonial case in a small town is being brought in a small understaffed legal aid centre with small resources, one of the partners, in order to maintain confidentiality, will have to travel 40 or 50 miles to get his or her free legal aid. What kind of legal aid scheme is that? What kind of choice does that give to anybody involved in such a situation?

Indeed, in relation to the supposed confidentiality between lawyer and client which the scheme purports to uphold there is another aspect which I feel I should bring to the attention of the House. When the solicitor who is acting on behalf of a legal aid client sends in the application for legal aid to the legal aid board he is required under the terms of this extraordinary instrument to tell the other party to the case, his client's opponent in this case, and to ask his client's opponent's solicitors whether they have any comments to make on the entitlement of his client to free legal aid and invite them to send any such comment to the legal aid board. In common with the Minister for Industry, Commerce and Tourism, Deputy O'Malley, I am not slow to criticise the practices of the legal profession and in particular their restrictive practices but I believe that the concept of the privilege that attaches to information and communication between solicitors and clients is most gravely infringed by this peeping-tom provision. If I mention this at the end of my speech it is only because it is a symbol of the arbitrary, mean-minded and totally inadequate spirit in which this piece of legislation or instrument has been drafted. There is a saver in one paragraph. Legal aid is to be granted under certain circumstances; legal advice is to be given free. When you work out the small print there the only legal advice a person will get for free is the advice he will get as to which solicitor he can go to with his money in his hand.

I should like to express my thanks to Deputies who contributed to the debate. The debate has proved conclusively that this scheme is hopelessly inadequate to meet even existing needs of which we are aware much less identifying and seeking to redress the hidden needs which must exist in a society which has confined the process of the law to those who can afford it up to now.

I should like to deal mainly in the limited time available with the response to or indeed the rejection by the Minister of the arguments made in this debate. His contribution was disappointing in the extreme. First, he chose to challenge with a considerable display of indignation our assertion, the assertion of this party, that this scheme would not create a right to legal aid in the same way as would one based on an Act of the Oireachtas. We must assume that the Minister knows there is a fundamental difference. A scheme such as the Minister's, not based on an Act of the Oireachtas could— and I am not being unduly suspicious or pessimistic or unduly sensitive in saying this—if the Minister and Government so decided be discontinued and dismantled as no scheme based on legislation could. It is not stretching the imagination too far to suggest that budget difficulties may arise. There are budgetary difficulties at present, difficulties not likely to improve in the next year or so and they could result in this scheme not expanding to the extent to which we are led to believe it could and should. We do not think this scheme is capable of expansion or of providing legal aid on the basis we require.

Given the Government's reluctance to introduce a scheme at all, their lack of commitment to justice for the financially deprived which is evident from the scheme itself and even more evident in the Minister's speech last night and evident also from many actions of the Government since they came into office, and given the absolutely minimal response which this scheme represents to the findings in the Airey case one cannot be over-confident, if not about its continuation, about its expansion and development into anything like an adequate scheme of legal aid for the people it purports to serve.

The main brake on that would be the Airey case itself in so far as if the scheme were discontinued another litigant such as Mrs. Airey could bring another case. The Minister must know that it has not the safeguards of a scheme based on legislation and it does not inspire the confidence that such a scheme would inspire.

Finally, one might also say that it is relegating to the Government a function which many feel should properly be exercised by the House as a whole. If we refer to the Pringle Report we find as regards other schemes in other countries which were examined by that committee, all such schemes are in fact based on legislation. The Minister in his speech, I think, concedes the point when he said that in due course he contemplated bringing in legislation. We believe that the scheme should initially have been based on an Act of this House and we stand firm on that.

I do not know how he could have done so but the Minister also made the case that the scheme is not confined to particular cases. One has only to refer to his scheme to find that tribunals are excluded, that social welfare appeals are excluded, that planning cases are excluded, that advice on civil bills under £20 is excluded, and that legal aid in the case of civil bills amounting to less than £150 is excluded. The Minister must concede that these matters are all in the areas most relevant to the underprivileged section of the community. They are all areas that were recommended strongly by the Pringle Committee, by FLAC who are possibly best equipped to advise in this area and by the Incorporated Law Society.

The Minister said he thought the scheme more generous than the scheme outlined in the Pringle Report. In support of that contention the Minister said that the spouse's income is excluded in family law cases, but the Minister has only to look at page 140 of the Pringle Report to find that they recommended that the spouse's income should be disregarded in family law cases. There were very strong recommendations from women's rights groups that this should be the case. So, the Minister is not doing anything extraordinary or generous or thinking of something not already thought of and strongly advocated when he includes in his scheme provision for the exclusion of a spouse's income in family law cases.

I have a query in relation to family law—it will be raised by way of Parliamentary Question by Deputy Barry Desmond—which concerns the Family Home Protection Act, 1976. It is that there is no clear indication to us that actions under this legislation are covered in the Minister's scheme. It is vitally important that they should be covered.

The Minister stated that the aspects we said were omitted from the scheme were inherently unimportant. That does not say much for the Minister's understanding of the needs of the underprivileged in our community. The people concerned consider those matters very relevant to their needs. The Minister also challenged our claim that a choice of solicitor would not be made available under this scheme. That matter was dealt with adequately by Deputies Horgan and O'Keeffe. Coming from a rural area and being aware of the needs of people in rural Ireland I am inclined to agree with what Deputy O'Keeffe said in relation to distance from the proposed law centres rather than what Deputy Horgan stated. It should be remembered that clients may have to travel up to 100 miles to a law centre to avail of a choice of solicitor. In areas where only one law centre exists only one of the parties to a dispute can avail of the services there with the result that the other party must make a journey of up to 50 miles to another centre. That puts the services of a law centre in rural areas outside the capacity of many people. Deputy Briscoe gave me the impression that his understanding of the scheme was that there would be a law centre in every major town and that these centres would be staffed by five or six solicitors. Such a choice will not exist under the Minister's scheme. With the constraints on money and the lack of commitment in this area by the Government we cannot see centres being established on the lines suggested by Deputy Briscoe. For some time there will be no effective choice for those who must rely on the legal aid scheme to bring cases to court.

The Minister sought to imply that the Labour Party were opposed to the establishment of law centres and gave the impression that we wanted this matter handed over to a panel of private lawyers. That is deliberately misleading. We are the first political party to place on record our concern and appreciation of the role of law centres. We have expressed our appreciation of the work done at the Coolock law centre and we were the first to make the case that law centres were essential for people in deprived areas. We also felt that law centres should be able to direct individual cases to solicitors on a panel. We expressed the view that such centres should have more freedom to concentrate on cases which have been excluded from the measures outlined by the Minister. They should be able to examine and organise with local people issues arising from the work carried out at such centres and make suggestions for law reform.

It is vital that properly equipped law centres should be available free to people in deprived areas. Those centres should be in a position to promote a knowledge of the law and an awareness of legal rights within the community. They should be able to give information on law relating to social welfare and give support at meetings of groups such as those concerned with deserted and battered wives. They should provide courses on labour and family law and social welfare entitlements. Those aspects have been covered at the Coolock Law Centre and the people in that area get an excellent service from those in charge of that centre. Such centres should be free from the day-to-day work load of giving a client a choice of solicitor because that is not available to a client under this meagre scheme. As I said, law centres are vital but they cannot reach their potential under the Minister's scheme as placed before the Houses of the Oireachtas. They cannot provide a choice to which the legal aided client is entitled.

I and my party are convinced that this is a miserable, inadequate scheme. Nobody knows the extent to which it will expand, because it has not been costed, and there has not been any projection as to what the cost will be. It is a bureaucratic scheme. It gives no real choice to the people who will have to depend on it for redress before the law. It invades the privacy of the needy client to an outrageous extent. That case was made by Deputy Horgan this evening. I made it last evening. The need to notify the other side that you are applying for legal aid, and that legal aid has been granted, is an invasion of the client's privacy. As it stands, the scheme is geared more to prevent than to assist a client in getting legal aid. The whole emphasis is punitive. It is designed to make it as difficult as possible for a person who has not the means to have recourse to law himself to avail of its services.

The scheme is meant to cost as little as possible. In so far as it will cost money, that money will be spent on bureaucracy rather than to meet the actual needs of clients. In all respects it is a second-rate scheme. That is not good enough for the people who have been denied justice for so long. I have no hesitation in asking the House to reject it and to bring in a proper scheme of legal aid based roughly on the lines outlined in the Pringle Report.

Amendment put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 66; Níl, 44.

  • Ahern, Kit.
  • Andrews, David.
  • Andrews, Niall.
  • Aylward, Liam.
  • Barrett, Sylvester.
  • Brady, Gerard.
  • Briscoe, Ben.
  • Browne, Seán.
  • Burke, Raphael P.
  • Callanan, John.
  • Calleary, Seán.
  • Cogan, Barry.
  • Colley, George.
  • Conaghan, Hugh.
  • Connolly, Gerard.
  • Crinion, Brendan.
  • Cronin, Jerry.
  • Daly, Brendan.
  • Davern, Noel.
  • de Valera, Síle.
  • de Valera, Vivion.
  • Fahey, Jackie.
  • Farrell, Joe.
  • Filgate, Eddie.
  • Fitzgerald, Gene.
  • Fitzpatrick, Tom (Dublin South Central).
  • Fitzsimons, James N.
  • Flynn, Pádraig.
  • Fox, Christopher J.
  • French, Seán.
  • Gallagher, Dennis.
  • Gallagher, James.
  • Geoghegan-Quinn, Máire.
  • Haughey, Charles J.
  • Herbert, Michael.
  • Hussey, Thomas.
  • Kenneally, William.
  • Kileen, Tim.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Lawlor, Liam.
  • Lemass, Eileen.
  • Lenihan, Brian.
  • Leonard, Tom.
  • Leyden, Terry.
  • Loughnane, William.
  • McCreevy, Charlie.
  • McEllistrim, Thomas.
  • Meaney, Tom.
  • Molloy, Robert.
  • Moore, Seán.
  • Morley, P.J.
  • Nolan, Tom.
  • Noonan, Michael.
  • O'Donoghue, Martin.
  • O'Hanlon, Rory.
  • O'Kennedy, Michael.
  • O'Leary, John.
  • O'Malley, Desmond.
  • Power, Paddy.
  • Reynolds, Albert.
  • Smith, Michael.
  • Walsh, Joe.
  • Walsh, Seán.
  • Wilson, John P.
  • Woods, Michael J.
  • Wyse, Pearse.

Níl

  • Barry, Peter.
  • Barry, Richard.
  • Belton, Luke.
  • Bermingham, Joseph.
  • Boland, John.
  • Burke, Joan.
  • Burke, Liam.
  • Byrne, Hugh.
  • Cluskey, Frank.
  • Collins, Edward.
  • Conlan, John F.
  • Gilhawley, Eugene.
  • Griffin, Brendan.
  • Horgan, John.
  • Kavanagh, Liam.
  • Kenny, Enda.
  • L'Estrange, Gerry.
  • Lipper, Mick.
  • McMahon, Larry.
  • Mannion, John M.
  • Mitchell, Jim.
  • O'Brien, William.
  • Corish, Brendan.
  • Cosgrave, Liam.
  • Cosgrave, Michael J.
  • Creed, Donal.
  • Crotty, Kieran.
  • D'Arcy, Michael J.
  • Deasy, Martin A.
  • Desmond, Barry.
  • Desmond, Eileen.
  • Enright, Thomas W.
  • Fitzpatrick, Tom (Cavan-Monaghan).
  • O'Donnell, Tom.
  • O'Keeffe, Jim.
  • O'Leary, Michael.
  • O'Toole, Paddy.
  • Pattison, Séamus.
  • Quinn, Ruairí.
  • Ryan, John J.
  • Spring, Dan.
  • Taylor, Frank.
  • Treacy, Seán.
  • White, James.
Tellers: Tá, Deputies Moore and Briscoe; Nil, Deputies B. Desmond and L'Estrange.
Amendment declared carried.
Motion, as amended, agreed to.
Barr
Roinn