Amendments Nos. 7, 9 and 10 are related and may be taken together.
Courts Bill, 1980: Committee Stage (Resumed).
Section 13, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 14.
I move amendment No. 7:
In page 8, paragraph (b), line 18, after "District Court" to insert "and the Circuit Court, on appeal from the District Court.".
Amendments Nos. 7 and 10 ensure that the Circuit Court, when hearing an appeal from the District Court, as distinct from an original application made to the Circuit Court at first instance, relating to the grant or refusal of an order under the Illegitimate Children (Affiliation Orders) Act, 1930, or under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, will not have power to exceed the District Court's jurisdiction. This makes for consistency as between this provision and the provision at section 12(b) of the Bill, that is, the new section 23 of the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976. Amendment No. 9 is a drafting change necessary as a consequence of amendment No. 10.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 8 is in the name of the Minister and Deputy Keating.
I move amendment No. 8:
In page 8, paragraph (b), line 20 after "£30" to insert "per week".
I am pleased to see that the Minister has accepted at least one of our amendments.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 14, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 15.
I move amendment No. 9:
In page 9, subsection (1) (a), to delete lines 1 to 3 and to substitute the following:——
"5.—(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, the jurisdiction conferred on a court by this Part may be exercised by the Circuit Court or the District Court.”.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment No. 10:
In page 9, subsection (1) (a), line 4, after “District Court” to insert “and the Circuit Court, on appeal from the District Court,”.
Amendment agreed to.
Question proposed: "That section 15, as amended, stand part of the Bill."
This section relates to the proposal to grant jurisdiction under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, to the District Court. At present this court does not have jurisdiction in this area and, in our view, should not be given jurisdiction in relation to matters such as the guardianship of infants or wards of custody. The points made last week in relation to earlier sections that proposed the granting of family law jurisdiction to courts that do not at present have such jurisdiction apply equally in this case.
In our judgment questions relating to such important matters as the future of children and the legal response appropriate for their protection and welfare are not matters best dealt with by the District Courts as they are operated presently. Secondly, the court process and procedure generally which is based on the mutual adversary system is liable to do severe damage in some cases to the interests of children and those whose futures would be the subject of discussion and mutual hostility in that forum.
There is a fundamental and rooted difference of opinion between the Minister and ourselves with regard to this matter. I am convinced that the proposal in the Bill is extremely misguided and will do untold damage. I have already made a plea, which I reiterate, that subjects such as the guardianship of infants, wards of court and family law in general will best be dealt with by a different court process, what might be called a family tribunal or forum.
It is a strongly held view not just of some politicians or professional associations who are concerned about the welfare of families and young people but of members of the Judiciary and of organisations representing legal interests that as the courts are presently managed it would be very wrong to grant the jurisdiction now proposed. District Courts do good work in some cases, but in other cases perhaps they do not handle matters with as high a standard of excellence as one might like. I do not believe they are the best forum for dealing with matters now about to be put on their agenda.
I should like to read from a submission from the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland in relation to the matter we are discussing now. The submission states:
Ideally, the Society would wish that all family matters be dealt with by new and simplified procedures that would remove the necessity for duplicating proceedings on marital breakdown, maintenance of spouse and children, custody of children, property rights, etc. The Society notes that the Minister has referred this aspect to the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure. It hopes that a report will be available at an early date and that legislative action thereon will not be delayed.
The Incorporated Law Society comment favourably on the question of extending the barring order from three months to 12 months, which we support. The society go on to say:
The Society consider that family law cases should be dealt with only in situations which have adequate facilities for the private hearing of such cases, together with facilities for waiting in consultation rooms designed to preserve the confidentiality of the clients in such delicate matters. A number of court houses are seriously lacking in this regard.
The above professional association is not normally known for over-committing itself in matters that might cause embarrassment in any quarter. We must listen to what people in that association say about this matter. As recently as two weeks ago some eminent members of the Judiciary condemned outright the conditions under which they have to administer standards of justice. All of the comments made compel us to look askance at this proposal.
The Minister knows there are courtrooms throughout the country that are little better than hovels. The walls are covered with graffiti and there are no private rooms where consultations may be held. The seating in these buildings is ancient, chipped and broken, there is no heating and neither the staff, clients or judges can be comfortable working in such surroundings. I am not asking that there should be any new major resource commitment to build new courthouses but I ask that urgent consideration be given to the creation of court fora. By this I mean that existing buildings — public buildings, community buildings, school halls and so on — could be used for this purpose. The day when the court was thought of as a vast hall full of columns, before which people were dragged, screaming and shouting, to be dealt with before being sent away for long periods, has long gone.
It is misguided to send to the District Court matters dealing with the future of children. In many cases there has not been adequate representation on behalf of the children — one of the reasons they are in their present difficulty. These children could be children of broken homes or no homes. They could be waifs, urchins or children in care. It can truly be said that society owes them the best because they have not had the benefit of the best up to that point. We are giving them a system that is much speedier than a process in the High Court because it was the intention that it would be a more speedy and cheap process. We are giving them structures and facilities that have been condemned outright by judges, professional associations and anybody who has taken the trouble to visit the courts. We are giving them quick, rough legal treatment and damn little justice.
If this section is put through — obviously it will be if the Minister does not change his mind — if and when we get a chance the first thing we must do is to repeal it. I say that in the belief that this will become a priority with us because it deals with the welfare of children and peripheral matters. Children must get a special type of treatment not now available in the courts system and certainly not in the District Court. When you look at statistics dealing with cases in the Children's Court or the District Court generally, you are speaking about minutes on average. Is it expected that a tier of courts to whom the Minister does not propose to give even one extra secretary will now be able to take on the burden of family law and Guardianship of Infants Act cases and that they can deal with them justly and fairly?
We are talking about half terrified youngsters about whom nobody has given a damn so far. That is not good enough and the Minister knows it. Without going into further detail on this matter, I will say that we vehemently oppose this section. If it becomes law our intention is to ensure that it will be law only for the shortest possible length of time.
We should be saddened that a situation will arise under this section, in small country courts as well as in some city courtrooms, where we will witness husbands, wives and families being torn apart by well-meaning legal interests, judicial representatives who mean well but who are being asked to do a job in respect of which they have not had the training, the insight, the responsibility or the experience until now. I do not see how we can honestly expect, on average, anything other than miscarriages of justice in such situations. The fate of children is much too important an issue to be dealt with or decided by any one individual, and this is part of the fundamental change now being proposed.
I suggest that this should be in the hands of a type of tribunal with people who have expertise and an interest in the welfare of children. They could be given judicial functions and responsibilities if the Minister and the Government wish. What is needed is an instrument of justice that will be sensitive and compassionate, not an arrangement designed initially to deal with local matters quickly and cheaply. That type of court was never intended to deal with family law cases. To propose to squeeze such cases into District Court jurisdiction is wrong and it cries out to heaven to be corrected.
If this goes ahead I hope it will be corrected before long: I honestly believe that this cannot become operative anyway because the courts are already fully engaged and do not have the skills or the resources necessary to deal with these new cases. Therefore, I ask the Minister seriously to reconsider the misguided proposals in front of us in this section which uniquely in this part of the world sets out to grant the District Court power to decide cases in this most sensitive area of child welfare. The person who will be deciding these cases has not had, in his training or background, any reason to take cognisance of developments in this area. Perhaps I will be misinterpreted and accused of having a go at district justices. I do not wish to do so, but there is no point in trying to pretend that somebody whose job is X should be responsible for Y. They are two separate jobs.
This section should be re-thought. I have proposed its deletion from the Bill in the hope that the Minister will listen to what we have said and at least reconsider it for Report Stage. In the meantime he can get some guidance from people who, like many of us, are concerned about the implications of the section and who fear what may happen. I am not suggesting there will be a major outcry and that people will take to the streets, but the children who are in a mess are in it most likely because they have not had a lobby to represent them. Part of the mark of our civilisation is the way we deal with those who are weakest in our society. As I said, I do not suggest there will be a revolution if this section goes through, but those outsiders, boys and girls who languish in care because of archaic legislation, need special attention. They have not had the equal opportunity which the Constitution commends. I am not making this plea for political advantage or disadvantage but because, above any section in the Bill, this section will strike at the heart of the interests of young people.
This section gives the District Court new jurisdiction under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, and extends the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court under the same Act. At present the District Court has no jurisdiction under the Act and the Circuit Court has jurisdiction only in relation to Part II of the Act.
Section 5 of the 1964 Act gives jurisdiction under Part II of that Act, dealing with guardianship matters and awards of custody, to the High Court and the Circuit Court. The courts committee recommended in their 20th Report that the courts referred to in that part should be the Circuit and District Courts rather than the High and Circuit Courts. Accordingly, subsection (1)(a) of the section now proposed replaces the existing section 5 of the 1964 Act with a new section which makes no reference to the High Court and confers full jurisdiction under Part II on the Circuit Court and limited jurisdiction on the District Court.
As Part II of the Act gives a court power to make maintenance orders — sections 7 and 11 — the District Court's jurisdiction to make such orders is being limited by the new section to a maximum of £30 per week per child, in order to maintain consistency with the revised jurisdictions in affiliation cases and under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976, as set out in sections 12 and 14 of the Bill.
The replacement of section 5 effectively removes a somewhat anomalous reference in that section to the Fourth Schedule to the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961.
Part III of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, deals with the enforcement of the right to custody, and section 13 defines the court for the purpose of Part III as the High Court. The Courts Committee recommended in their 20th Report that jurisdiction under Part III be transferred to the District Court. It is considered, however, that there should be no distinction between Part II and Part III jurisdiction and, accordingly, the new section 15(1)(b) which makes no reference to the High Court redefines the court for the purpose of Part III as the Circuit Court or the District Court.
Section 18(1) of the 1964 Act provides that in any case where a decree for divorce a mensa et thoro is pronounced, the court — as the Act at present stands, the High Court — may thereby rule that the parent whose misconduct gave rise to the proceedings is not fit to have custody of the children of the marriage and that parent will therefore not be entitled as of right to custody when the other parent dies. As jurisdiction in divorce a mensa et thoro is being vested in the Circuit Court by section 5 of the Bill, the new section 15(1)(c) amends section 18(1) of the 1964 Act by changing the word “court”, which would as a result of the preceding paragraph of the new section otherwise mean the Circuit or District Court, to “Circuit Court”.
Subsection (2) of the new section now proposed prevents the District Court and the Circuit Court from making an order in any matter where a higher court has ruled, but with the exception that where the High Court has made an order before the commencement of this provision, the lower courts may vary or revoke the order if the circumstances under which it was made have changed and, in the case of the District Court, if the order is one which now falls within the new jurisdiction conferred by this section on the District Court.
That is a very necessary and desirable provision where the lower courts, after the commencement of this particular section, have power to revoke an order made by the High Court in a situation where circumstances have changed. That could mean that the circumstances of either parent maintaining a child could change because of ill health or a change in fortunes. We could then have a situation, as it stands at present, where a guardian or parent would have to go back to the High Court to seek revocation of that order. This is a typical example of the value of providing access to the District Court and the Circuit Court in this regard. It is appropriate and proper that this type of facility should be afforded to the aggrieved party in so far as they can go to these courts now rather than having to go back to the High Court in a situation where their circumstances have changed.
The provisions of this section are based on the recommendation of an eminently qualified committee chaired by a Supreme Court judge and have been very carefully considered, both by the Minister for Justice and by the Government, before being placed before this House. They are important provisions because they deal with matters of a very significant nature in the family context. It is in the context of family matters generally that the courts should be empowered to deal with questions of a child's welfare. It is unsatisfactory in many cases that a court should be able to make a maintenance award against a parent or to bar that parent from the family home, while it lacks the power to decide at the same time what rights and duties in relation to the child, other than the purely financial one, should or should not be exercised by that parent. It can be unsatisfactory because the court has power to deal with what may be only part of the family problem, and separate litigation, with all the concomitant expense, inconvenience and perhaps ill-feeling for the parties, must be undertaken in order to determine the important questions of guardianship and custody.
The Minister for Justice has stated before, and it is worth repeating here, that the aim of the family law jurisdiction proposals in this Bill is to provide a set of forums where families in difficulties can obtain the remedies provided by law in a convenient, inexpensive and prompt manner. We are providing for people who have family law difficulties acess to a court where the full package of family law matters can be dealt with. The Circuit Court will be able to provide a comprehensive package, including divorce a mensa et thoro, and the ancillary remedies recommended not only by the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure but also by Shatter in his work Family Law in the Republic of Ireland. The District Court will be able to provide all the remedies, with the exception of divorce a mensa et thoro.
The Circuit Court already has jurisdiction in the guardianship and custody of children by virtue of the 1964 Act. Deletion of this section will not alter that. It is important — even assuming that no other changes in family law jurisdiction were contemplated — that the District Court be given this jurisdiction, in order to make the exercise of its jurisdiction under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976, more effective.
In many cases where a barring order is sought or an application is made for maintenance of the spouse and children, or both, it is desirable that questions relating to the guardianship and custody of children be determined at the same time. The District Court cannot decide at present, for instance, what access to the children or measure of custody, if any, should be allowed to a parent who is barred from the home, though such matters may well be crucial to the effectiveness of the main remedy sought. This section gives the District Court the necessary jurisdiction to determine such questions, so that a broader view can be taken of the family difficulties coming before it and a more appropriate remedy or set of remedies can be ordered. I am surprised at Deputy Keating who I know has a definite interest in ensuring that the greatest possible protection and access be afforded to the families on these very traumatic occasions, in the type of environment and court situation which is envisaged in this Bill. We must, as far as possible, be in a position to ensure where the substantial remedy is being pursued that there may be related matters which arise and will also have to be dealt with. They can be dealt with in conjunction with the main remedy being sought.
As regards jurisdiction under Part III of the 1964 Act, relating to the enforcement of the right to custody which this section confers on the Circuit and District Courts for the first time, I see no reason for a distinction between these matters and the general question of guardianship and custody of children dealt with in Part II of the Act. Questions covered by Part III are equally likely to arise in relation to applications for divorce a mensa et thoro and under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976 as are those dealt with in Part II, and the same reasoning applies to the extension of jurisdiction under both parts.
I am aware that legal questions of extreme complexity can arise from time to time in cases under the 1964 Act, particularly where marriage took place or was dissolved outside this jurisdiction. Such knotty legal problems are not by any means confined to guardianship and custody issues and there is general provision for reference of such questions by way of case stated from the lower to the higher courts. I am satisfied, however, that the vast majority of cases which may arise in the lower courts as a result of this provision will be relatively straightforward and that these courts are competent to determine them.
I recall the Deputy making the point that much of what is proposed in section 15 was not accepted by the Judiciary on the basis — I presume I am right — of the inadequacy of the lower courts to deal with matters relating to children particularly.
I will read an extract from the Twentieth Interim Report of the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure, Increase of Jurisdiction of the District Court and the Circuit Court. They are a very eminent committee of very eminent persons. This extract relates to jurisdictions of the Circuit Court and the District Court in family law matters and is on page 9;
15. Among the important legal and social developments since the date of the Fifth Interim Report has been the considerable growth in the area of family law and the enactment of the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976. The latter Act largely followed the recommendations of the Nineteenth Report of this Committee. Another feature has been the considerable increase in the number of applications brought under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964. These cases are almost invariably initiated in the High Court although jurisdiction conferred on a court by Part II of that Act may be exercised by the High Court or by the Circuit Court. Part II of the Act deals with guardianship and contains section 11 which provides for applications to the court for its directions on any question affecting the welfare of an infant. The court may make such order as it thinks proper having regard to the provisions of the Act. Part III of the Act relates to the enforcement of right to custody and the original jurisdiction under that Part of the Act is confined to the High Court.
16. Experience has shown that the vast bulk of applications in relation to the custody of children tend to be interlocutory in character and many of the cases keep recurring in the High Court as the children grow older or the family circumstances change. These proceedings frequently last quite a long time in the High Court and prove extremely costly. Appeals then may be carried to the Supreme Court which has on occasions been compelled to enter into the hearing of evidence because of allegations made and changes which have occurred between the date of the High Court hearing and the date of the Supreme Court hearing. This has entailed considerable expense and takes up a lot of time.
17. The Committee have come to the conclusion that the courts referred to in Part II of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 should now be the Circuit Court and the District Court respectively rather than as currently the High Court and the Circuit Court. They are also of opinion that the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court conferred by Part III of the Act should be conferred on the District Court in lieu of the High Court. This Part of the Act deals particularly with such matters as allegations that a parent has abandoned or deserted the infant and these are matters which the District Court already deals with much more frequently than any other court by virtue of the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976. An additional advantage in transferring these jurisdictions to the Circuit Court and the District Court respectively as recommended is that these courts are better...
I note what the Deputy said in so far as he was not suggesting, as he put it, having a go at district justices, and I accept that. He did refer to the District Court's capacity to deal with family law matters and called that into question. I take it that on one level he is being critical of the accommodation. That appeared to be one direction he was taking. We agreed on the last day that we would deal with the matter of accommodation under sections 30 and 31 rather than be repeating ourselves. I reminded Deputy Keating that the court already deals with barring orders. He suggested that many family law matters are not dealt with in the District Court at the moment. That was the other point he made apart from the accommodation aspect. He realises that this Bill proposes to give extended jurisdiction to the District Court in relation to barring orders with which that court deals already. It deals also with the maintenance of spouses and children and affiliation matters and it is to complement its jurisdiction in these matters that it is proposed to give it a jurisdiction that it has not had before.
It all boils down to providing a comprehensive facility in the District Court and the Circuit Court to deal with matters in a non-fragmented manner, as I have mentioned. I am satisfied that the Deputy's opposition to the section on the basis that there is an incompetence in the court, based on its inability or lack of experience in the past to deal with family law matters, is not justifiable on the grounds that it has dealt and frequently does deal with family law matters. I am really ensuring that there is the facility to deal with all family law matters in the District Court except the one provision that was formerly in the High Court and is now being provided for in the Circuit Court, that is divorce a mensa et thoro.
In conclusion, I suggest that the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because these law courts would now have responsibility, based on what Deputy Keating has said, is something I cannot accept. He said "miscarriage of justice". He might like to have put it in different terms, but it would appear that there would be some specific reason or given motive for not being prepared to hear these cases or handle them properly. I do not accept that. Both the Circuit Court and the District Court will be adequate to deal with these matters. There is an experience there, as I have stated, and the fact that there has not been a total or extended jurisdiction in these areas in the past is not a justifiable argument that we should not have them in the future. We have reached the point where if we are to meet the wishes of the vast majority of people who unfortunately are finding themselves in this position — and there is a growing demand for seeking out remedies in family law matters in court — we should be ensuring that people who find they have to go to court should be in a position to get the maximum remedial opportunity in court and get it as conveniently and inexpensively as possible.
The Minister refuses to accept that there are a number of ways in which the ideals he put forward, worthy in themselves, can be met. I agree with him that access is important. That could be met in at least two other ways to which the Minister has not referred. First of all, a proper civil legal aid scheme would have facilitated such actions. Leaving that aside, does the Minister accept that access to the courts of justice in relation to cases which are now being proposed to be handled by the District Court could also be granted by the institution of what we might loosely call family courts or family tribunals which would ensure easy access, easy availability and inexpensiveness?
For the purpose of the matter we are dealing with, it must be accepted that it is a family court, because it is dealing with family law matters.
Now the Minister tells me that the District Court is a family law court when it is dealing with family law case. I do not accept the co-medial nature of the court. That is the point I am getting at. If the Minister accepts that a family law court is what it should be when dealing with family law cases it is asking too much of public credibility or of the people involved to somehow turn themselves on and off different types of cases. If access is our concern, it can be given; but it should be given not on the cheap or by a short cut, hoping to God that the District Court will take up the slack and it will be all right on the day. It will not be all right on the day. I will quote from a letter from a person whom I will describe as an eminent legal representative. He is referring to this section and the thoughts of many of us in relation to it. He says:
It depresses me to think of any form of justice being administered in many of these courts, but it depresses me even more to think that highly delicate family problems and civil actions for amounts up to £2,500 could be debated in such primitive environments. For example, in Rathfarnham you step off the footpath and into the courthouse. It is quite impossible to consult except either in the motor-car or at the pub across the way. Can anybody seriously suggest that in a civilised country those are proper facilities in which to conduct these cases?
That is accommodation the Deputy is talking about there and he has agreed to leave that until——
The letter goes on: "I remember doing a case in"— he names a town —"where the court clerk had to come in and put cardboard on the floor before the court so that the cardboard could soak up some of the rain water which was pouring through the roof. I have dealt with cases in dancehalls, rugby club pavilions and in a place outside"— he names a town —"which is rather like a cowshed".
I am not dealing in detail with the question of accommodation but it is inseparable from other concerns in relation to cases being handled in District Courts. The other concerns are cases which I quite deliberately said would be open to miscarriage of justice by virtue of the fact that the personnel involved in handling such cases, from the top down, were never intended to be so involved. They do not have the expertise or the knowledge of the background. It is enough in some cases for them to do what they are supposed to be doing without asking them to take on cases dealing with the guardianship of infants. If the Minister is truly concerned about access, there are other options. I admit that these cause more trouble and cost more money and there is the rub.
The Minister knows as well as anyone that the District Courts, as they are at present, or are likely to be for the foreseeable future, are not suitable environments for the transaction of these particular cases which it is now proposed to give them. To refer to barring orders being dealt with within that jurisdiction is neither here nor there. The Minister on two occasions said that he did not wish the thing to be fragmented. I do not know what that has to do with the case. There are levels of courts, there are courthouses, there is fragmentation in the system at the present time. What is more important than that is whether or not it is likely that a just decision will be arrived at. How does the Minister expect that to happen in the circumstances? I do not wish to be personal in relation to any of the members involved in the courts but one could be and the Minister knows what I am talking about as well as anyone. Have the district justices been consulted in relation to this proposed transfer of jurisdiction?
Of course, they have been.
What has been their response?
The decisions that have been made by the Minister for Justice have taken into consideration the committee's views, the views of the Garda Síochána and of members of the Judiciary. The preparation of this legislation and of this section was not done in isolation of all the valuable views that might be contributed. The weight of the Deputy's argument seems to be directed, on the one hand, towards court accommodation and, on the other, the Deputy said this afternoon that he was not having a go at the district justices, but apparently, now he is calling their competence or ability to deal with these matters into question, just because they have not been dealing with them heretofore. That is not a solid or a justifiable argument against our ensuring that there is a more enlightened step taken in this regard.
Would the Minister be good enough to tell us the observations, particularly in relation to the proposal to increase the jurisdiction of the District Courts to include these cases, in respect of district justices and the legal professional interests?
The Deputy realises that the Minister's consultations with members of the Judiciary and with members of the Garda Síochána in this connection are confidential. It would not be fair to expect me to reveal confidential discussions. What has emerged is a Bill containing exceptions to certain proposals and the merits and demerits which the Deputy mentions. The views of all these people were taken into consideration in preparing this legislation.
In the presence of a very much less than satisfactory response from the Minister, I am quite willing to conclude — as I know to be the case — that there has been widespread dissatisfaction and unease at these proposals amongst the interests previously referred to. I am stating that the people who are promoting this extension of jurisdiction primarily are the Government. They see this as being a way of handling family law cases on the cheap. The people who, day in day out, deal with the administration of law in the courts have, in general, and overwhelmingly, expressed grave dissatisfaction and unease about the proposal herein. That is undeniable. Certainly, it would be wrong for the Minister to divulge, or to be asked to divulge information about confidential discussions. I am asking for the burden of comment in that respect. I know it to be one of extreme unease about this proposal. It is not unreasonable to ask for an observation in that respect. After all, if those professionals who are active in that area, daily witnessing activities in the courts, are unhappy about it, why should we ignore those comments?
In relation to the capacity of district justices to deal with these cases. I do not wish to become embroiled in any controversy. There is no point in blaming a hammer for not being a nail. If you ask a judge to do a job which there was no expectation that he would be asked to do when he embarked on his career, undertook his training and practised throughout the courts, it is, in my view, only to be expected that the standards which would apply in that regard would not be those which would perhaps be appropriate.
It is only fair to say that the District Courts deal with matters with less gravity, less preparation, less analysis, less consideration, less consultation and in a much shorter time than is appropriate to family cases and than has been granted to those cases up to now. The type of adjudication involved is less suitable to the difficult questions which arise, for example, in relation to the custody of children. That is a statement of fact. District Courts were never meant to handle such cases and, leaving accommodation aside, the nature of the judicial process which operates in the District Courts is fundamentally unsuitable for cases concerning guardianship of infants. It is not an answer to pretend that one is giving greater access to people with lesser means. If access is the problem, there are a number of other options and ways of dealing with that. When the civil legal aid proposals, which never came before this House, were introduced, that was the time for the Minister to be concerned about access, or access could be guaranteed by an appropriate, sensitive, low level, largely confidential, non-adversary type of family tribunal which would genuinely try to bring a healing effect to the problems involved here.
The Minister takes refuge in referring to access and in underscoring our collective appreciation of the fine work of members of the Judiciary. That is all to the good and should not go unmentioned. At the same time we here have responsibility. It is not adequate to refer to the recommendations of committees at great length or to pass the buck in terms of responsibility to such committees. The responsibility is the Minister's. It is at his desk that the buck stops.
I contend that there is, at the very least, in view of the evidence of professional interested parties who have expressed concern about this proposal, a very good case for reviewing this section. I contend, from the available evidence of our eyes and our ears and the daily reading of the media in relation to the present operation of the courts at this level, some cause for concern about how this extra jurisdiction could be managed and handled. I contend very strongly that facilities are not available. Accordingly, for these reasons which have to do, not just with dealing with cases in relation to the guardianship of infants in the way they have always been dealt with, but dealing with them in a better way than in the past, more sensitively, more compassionately, ensuring that there is a better standard of justice for young people, this section is fundamentally misguided. Nothing the Minister has said has even dealt with the kernel of that case. He has spoken about access and about confidence in the system. Access is not at issue. We all agree that access should be greater than it is and there are ways of doing it. Let us leave that out of it. Nobody wishes either to imply criticism of many aspects of the way that a District Court person does his job. Let us leave that out of it also. The central question is whether it is the best place in which to transact, justly and fairly, matters relating to the future of children who are largely unrepresented and unprotected. The answer in that case, which screams at us from all the groups involved, the professional associations, members of the Judiciary and our own common sense, is unequivocably no. As far as I am concerned anybody who says to the contrary is not facing up to the facts. It will be the wrong forum.
How can the Minister expect the future of a child to be properly dealt with? What kind of effect will it have on the child to be the subject, like an inanimate object, of a fight across a courtroom, dismissed in a matter of minutes, as has been the traditional practice in the Children's Court or the District Court? That is not the way I want the children of the country to be dealt with when it comes to legal matters. I am surprised it should be presented to us as the right way to go about it. I would be ashamed to be a party to any system which would in 1981, instead of bringing children's legislation and family law legislation into the eighties, propose such a dismissive, fundamentally inefficient and profoundly wrong system of handling children's law and the guardianship of infants matters. Unless the Minister has some new evidence to throw on the case, which is pertinent to the essential capacity of those courts to deal with those cases and the essential propriety to deal with those cases at this level, I am not at all convinced. The Minister has not answered the question. His case has rested on evasions — I do not mean this in a hurtful way — or dealing with issues that are peripheral to the central case.
I gave a number of justifiable reasons why the provisions within this section should stand. I have heard Deputy Keating state that there were a number of objections from the Judiciary and the professional sector. He asked me to reveal the contents of discussions which took place in the preparation of this Bill. My information is that some judges and justices received this suggestion very enthusiastically. If there have been any feelings to the contrary about what is proposed in the section they have emanated from sections of professional interests. I accept that some of the professional interests have views to the contrary and I am not surprised that that should be the case. I am sure it does not surprise Deputy Keating either that certain sections of the professional interests would be opposed to the section.
The Deputy referred to civil legal aid. I am very satisfied, as stated by the Minister when introducing the civil legal aid scheme, that the constant reviewing and monitoring of that scheme is ongoing and will cater now and in the future for any situation which develops and requires to be covered by it. The Deputy said that what is proposed in this section is fundamentally misguided. The use of those words clearly reflects total rejection by him of the recommendations of the committee which, as I already stated, is comprised of very eminently qualified people and is chaired by a very eminently qualified member of the Judiciary. Deputy Keating has cast doubt on that committee who have representatives of both branches of the legal profession and of the Judiciary at all levels.
I quoted from the twentieth interim report this afternoon and I am satisfied that the grounds the Deputy has enumerated for rejection of what is in the section are not justifiable and do not show concern for what the Bill and the section we are debating attempts to do. I know the Deputy is not a callous man but I would describe his remarks as being tantamount to callousness in this respect. It appears that, for political opportunity, the Deputy is prepared to put at risk a very significant number——
That is not what I said.
I said the Deputy appeared to put at risk many of the opportunities which the Bill and this section will provide. I also accept that at many court venues the court accommodation is less than satisfactory but, as I indicated before, there is in preparation a set of proposals relating to court accommodation which will be put to the Government in the near future and which should pave the way for the upgrading of accommodation to an acceptable level. I also accept that many court venues lack facilities, such as separate waiting rooms and consultation areas which are considered desirable for dealing with family law business.
Does the Minister intend waiting until those provisions are before him before he enacts this Bill?
I told the Deputy that whatever requirements, accommodation or financial, or the provision of additional members of the Judiciary, are necessary to deal with aspects of what is proposed in this legislation, will be provided. I am stating that again now. I am not satisfied that the volume of family law business will ever be such as to justify the cost of providing those facilities at all court venues. A statistical analysis of the 1,744 family law cases in 1979 in the 257 out of 259 venues outside of the Dublin area, for which figures are available shows that in 116 venues no such case was heard, 34 had one case each, 85 had less than one case on an average per sitting and another 12 had an average of less than two cases per sitting. This leaves only ten venues throughout the country with two or more cases per sitting. One of the solutions to this problem might be to direct all family law cases to one or two venues in each district where the required facilities exist or can be provided without too much difficulty. This possibility is being looked at.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again.