Review of Anglo-Irish Agreement: Statements.

The Tánaiste

Yesterday was the third anniversary of the signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. At the outset of this discussion it is useful for a moment to remind ourselves of another anniversary that occurred a short time ago, 5 October was the 20th anniversary of the first civil rights march in Derry. The images of that scene on 5 October 1968 remain vivid in all our minds: people in Ireland and abroad were deeply shocked by the gravity of the wrongs to which the marchers drew attention, and struck by the reasonableness of their demands for the exercise of basic democratic rights.

It is salutary to recall the 20-year span of the "troubles". A great deal has changed over those years but a resolution of many of the fundamental problems has so far eluded us. The recollection of those years, far from inducing any sense of resignation, can only imbue us with a renewed sense of urgency. Today's 30-year olds in Northern Ireland have lived their adolescence and young adulthood in the shadows of the "troubles"; it would be intolerable if their entire adult lives were similarly blighted. One can only imagine the depression with which people in such circumstances greet theories of "containment" or suggestions of an "acceptable level of violence".

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was part of a process, initiated in 1980, designed to counter any such theory of containment. The Forum report of May 1984 was absolutely right in stating that "in political, moral and human terms, there is no acceptable level of violence". The report stressed the overriding urgency of action and underlined the need "not merely to arrest the cancer but to create the conditions for a new Ireland and a new society acceptable to all its people". Developments in the intervening years have confirmed the accuracy of the analysis contained in the Forum report.

In approaching the review, it is important to be clear about what the exercise involves and what it does not. It is worth restating Article 11 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. That Article provides that "at the end of three years from signature of this Agreement, or earlier if requested by either Government, the working of the Conference shall be reviewed by the two Governments to see whether any changes in the scope and nature of its activities are desirable".

This is quite precise language; the review clearly is not intended in any way to call into question the existence of the Agreement. The scope of the exercise is nevertheless quite extensive. Articles 2 to 10 of the Agreement all make reference to the Conference and its work and thus come within the scope of the review. Since the Conference is the operating mechanism — the engine so to speak — of the entire Agreement, we have a responsibility to assess the overall working of the Agreement, as well as of the individual articles I have mentioned.

As is clear from the joint statements of the last three meetings of the inter-governmental Conference, the two Governments have been considering their approach to the review for some time. The joint statement of 2 November sets out the approach agreed upon. In summary, the joint statement commits both Governments to a thorough and serious review, with the main emphasis on a positive programme of work for the future; each Government states their willingness to take careful account of views expressed to them; working parties of senior officials will be established; and both sides envisage that the review will be completed in early 1989.

Essentially, we see the review period as involving two separate but interwoven exercises. The first of these is the detailed assessment by the two Governments of developments to date and the mapping out of an agenda for future action. The second — which will take place in parallel with the first — is the hearing of views from interested parties as to their assessment of the past operation of the Agreement and their suggestions for the future. The precise interaction between these two exercises will obviously be a matter kept under review by both Governments. I might add that we look forward in due course to hearing the views of political parties here and, in this regard, we will be making contact with political party leaders in the near future, indeed, this debate can act as a launching pad for this process.

It is difficult to predict whether all interested parties in the North will in fact convey their views. It is our hope that procedural issues will not stand in the way of the widest possible dialogue. At this time of serious reflection on important issues, both communities in Northern Ireland will surely want their leadership to ensure that their viewpoints are represented and their voices heard.

However, realistically, one has to acknowledge the publicly stated position of the Unionist leadership that they will not contribute to the review process as such. We have noted their comments to the effect that they will not help to redesign a vehicle intended for their destruction, as they see it. Let me say as clearly as I can: this is not a vehicle designed to destroy anyone. For anyone critical of a lack of consultation three years ago, an invitation — a genuine and most sincere invitation — to have an input at this stage is surely not to be lightly cast aside.

I want to emphasise again our understanding of the situation in which Unionists find themselves. I made reference earlier to the Forum report. This was no one-sided treatment of the situation in Northern Ireland. We addressed ourselves also to the fears and insecurities of the Unionist community, and made clear our commitment to respecting and upholding their identity and ethos. More recently, the Taoiseach has repeatedly stressed that his door is open to the Unionist community. In order to facilitate any wish on the part of Unionists to make a contribution, our flexibility as to how views are conveyed, or to be conveyed, during the review period has been clearly signalled.

Having said this, however, there is an important balancing point to be made. With the present rightful emphasis on reassurance to Unionists, it is imperative that the importance of reassurance to Nationalists should in no way be diluted or down-played. It is the role and responsibility of any Irish Government to present the Nationalist viewpoint in a coherent and forceful way. The Agreement should and must enhance our effectiveness in fulfilling that role.

We have in particular to take account of the reality that, to some extent at least, the achievements of the Agreement have so far failed to fulfil the hopes and expectations of many members of the Nationalist community. Important as it is that a friendly and neighbourly relationship between Dublin and London be developed and sustained, the real test of the Agreement is the difference it makes on the ground in Northern Ireland. That is why all supporters of the Agreement must be sobered by findings which show that only a minority of Nationalists in Northern Ireland feel that the Agreement has made a difference to their daily lives.

It would, of course, be quite wrong to suggest that there have been no worth-while developments from the Nationalist viewpoint in the past three years. On the contrary, it is important that we give full weight to the positive developments that have taken place — improved policing of the marching season, an end to supergrass trials, a new code of conduct for the RUC, the beginnings of an economic programme for West Belfast, the preparation of new and, we hope, effective fair employment legislation — all these deserve recognition as developments that are beneficial, or potentially beneficial, to the Nationalist community.

Why then, despite the undoubted achievements of the past three years, is there such a degree of disappointment among Nationalists in Northern Ireland? This is a question which I believe deserves the most serious consideration during the review period. The argument is sometimes made that the Agreement has fallen victim to unrealistic expectations generated at the time of its signature, that any society adapts slowly to psychological and structural change and that a great deal should not be expected in a three year time span. According to this argument, supporters of the Agreement are simply showing an undue impatience for change.

In my view, that argument misses the point. The whole thrust of the Forum report was, as I have said, to stress the urgency of action. Stormont may have lasted for over 50 years, but we do not have the luxury of another 50 years to redress the damage. As realistic politicians, we know that society is not transformed overnight; at the same time, we cannot accept that change should come piecemeal, at its own pace, as might be acceptable in a more normal society. The Agreement envisaged an energetic and sustained programme of action, spanning all the crucial problem areas within Northern Ireland and it is both legitimate and necessary for us to measure the achievements of the Agreement against that standard.

If many members of the Nationalist community are disappointed, it is not because they seek too much but because they have seen too little by way of change. Constitutional Nationalists have a particular stake in the success of the Agreement because for them, involved as they are in the daily battle for hearts and minds in their communities, the Agreement represents — or should represent — a bulwark against the forces of extremism and violence. But for constitutional Nationalists, too, the Agreement has continually to earn its success; it must add substantive achievement to symbolic significance.

To develop a more detailed sense of the subject matter of the review, and to amplify some of the points I have made, I propose to comment briefly on the individual Articles of the Agreement which fall within the scope of the review. These brief comments on individual Articles will be supplemented in the course of today's discussion by other Government speakers.

Article 2 of the Agreement sets out the right of the Irish Government to "put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the fields of activity of the Conference" and states that "determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences". These are absolutely key commitments of the Agreement and it will be crucial for the review process to examine how they have operated in practice and how they might better operate in the future.

One of the strengths of the Agreement is that it provides a framework within which difficult issues can be discussed; it acts, if you like, as a kind of shock absorber at times of crisis in Anglo-Irish relations. I am very much in favour of the substitution of conference table discussions for megaphone diplomacy; in a friendly relationship between neighbours, one should obviously not need a megaphone to be heard. But that is the crucial point: that one's voice should be heard.

There have undoubtedly been times over the lifetime of the Agreement when the consultation process envisaged in Article 2 failed to operate at all — as was the case with the announcement in Westminster last January of the decision not to prosecute in the Stalker-Sampson affair — or failed to operate within the spirit of the Article. A strengthened commitment to the consultation procedures envisaged in Article 2 would be, in my view, one of the most important and helpful outcomes of the review exercise.

Article 3 of the Agreement relates to meetings of the Conference and the functioning of the secretariat. I might emphasise here that the Government are fully persuaded of the importance of regular, well prepared meetings of the Conference. I would point out that the Conference has met more frequently in 1988 than in any previous year: there have been nine meetings to date and a further meeting has been scheduled for early December. As is clear from the joint statements issued following each meeting of the Conference, discussions have been wide ranging, substantive and forward looking. Indeed, on taking office, the Government consciously sought to broaden the Conference agenda and to place a particular emphasis on economic and social issues which we felt had previously received inadequate attention. It is false and misleading to say that the Conference has been largely taken up this year with crisis management though, on occasion, responding to problems in this category can be an important part of our work.

The Secretariat performs a key role in servicing the Conference; the presence of Irish civil servants in Belfast 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, is an important reassurance to the Nationalist community. The work of the Secretariat will be examined in the course of the review, to see if there are ways in which it might be adapted and strengthened.

Article 4 of the Agreement refers, inter alia, to devolution. The appropriate role for the Irish Government in relation to devolution is a matter which frequently arises in discussions. The Taoiseach set out the Government's position on devolution clearly, and at considerable length, in reply to a parliamentary question on 9 March 1988. I would like to take this opportunity briefly to reiterate our position. Article 4 of the Agreement speaks of devolution “on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community”. Sub-paragraph (c) of that same article goes on to say that “both Governments recognise that devolution can be achieved only with the co-operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions there”. On the basis of the stated positions of the parties in Northern Ireland, I simply do not see that the prospects for this are very high at present.

Articles 5 and 6 of the Agreement are grouped under the heading "Political Matters". A cluster of extremely important issues is treated under this heading; issues of identity, protection of human rights and prevention of discrimination. Article 6 refers to the input of the Irish Government in relation to the role and composition of public bodies. During the review, we will be taking a searching look at the balance sheet of achievements under these articles and the scope for future action.

Fair employment deserves specific mention as an area where there is potential for very significant progress. I am heartened by the close consultations which have taken place within the Conference on this issue. I look forward to the tabling very shortly at Westminster of new legislation which, we hope, will bring to an end practices of employment discrimination which can have no place in any decent society.

Articles 7 and 9 of the Agreement deal with security and related matters in their Northern Ireland and cross-Border contexts respectively, as well as with the crucial and central issues of prison policy and confidence in the security forces in Northern Ireland. My colleague, the Minister for Justice, will comment in more detail on some of these issues when he speaks later in the discussion.

However, there is one fundamental point which cannot too often be emphasised. The commitment of the Irish Government and the Irish people to combating terrorism is consistent, comprehensive and effective. Our high expenditure on Border security is maintained at a time of financial stringency, when we have had to implement unparalleled cutbacks in a number of areas of the economy. As the Taoiseach said in this House last January, "our commitment in this area is freely given, in the common interest of society, North and South, to ensure that the forces of terrorism — whether of domestic or international origin — do not prevail".

One might sometimes infer from remarks by commentators that security issues are exclusively on the British agenda for the Conference and equality issues are exclusively on our agenda. This represents a fundamental misunderstanding. The fight against terrorism is on our common agenda, just as equality of treatment for the minority community also forms part of the common agenda. There is a moral and political imperative which compels both Governments to address both sets of issues. Indeed, as has been demonstrated in similar situations around the world, issues of peace and justice are inextricably intertwined. Strenuous efforts must, of course, be made to counter terrorism. But, as I said yesterday, in an interview in the Irish News, we must not fall into the error of believing that a security programme aimed at the suppression of terrorism can be a substitute for a policy which addresses the root causes of the problems of Northern Ireland.

The most important element in the whole area of confidence is the daily experience of ordinary people of the security forces. Three years after the Agreement complaints of harassment continue. It is clear that this must be a priority area for the Conference. Our challenge is to put measures in place which, without prejudice to the right of people to bring their complaints to the courts or to the formal machinery established in law, will closely monitor the problems of people with the security forces with a view to taking immediate action to deal with them.

Article 8 deals with legal matters, including confidence in the administration of justice. From the outset, this has been an area to which we attach particular importance. Confidence in the administration of justice is one of the touchstones of a decent society; an absence of confidence provides the space in which subversion thrives.

Doubts are sometimes expressed as to whether any substantial section of the National community genuinely lacks confidence in the administration of justice. In the face of the data, one may even wonder why this question is still being asked. For example, a survey published last year by the prestigious London-based Policy Studies Institute found that 38 per cent of Catholics lack confidence in the fairness of Northern Ireland courts in dealing with Catholics. Surely such a finding makes a compelling case for acceleration of work under Article 8 of the Agreement?

Change in the method of trial or other aspects of the political system is considered by all forward thinking societies from time to time; and it is no reflection on judges or those who have charge of the system to propose change. There is now, objectively, a more compelling case than ever for the introduction of three judge courts in the North. We have found from experience that our own three judge Special Criminal Court has not alone worked very effectively but has, if anything, served to strengthen and sustain confidence in the administration of justice under a common law system.

Article 8 also refers to extradition, a subject which, as we are all aware, has aroused considerable controversy. The present position is quite clear. Extradition, with safeguards, is in place. In addition, we are also considering with the British Government the use of the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act in appropriate cases.

Article 10 deals with cross-Border co-operation on economic, social and cultural issues. It is under this Article that the international fund was established. Article 10 makes clear that the focus of the fund's work is to be on "those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years". I am pleased to note that in recent months the fund, acting on advice of both Governments, has given increased emphasis to its work in disadvantaged areas, and indeed that a specific disadvantaged areas initiative has been adopted.

I am convinced that the full potential of Article 10 has still to be realised. The approach of 1992 presents us with an unprecedented challenge to re-examine existing attitudes. As national borders within Europe are effectively eroded by the process of European cohesion, there is surely an unarguable case for increased harmonisation between the economies of the two parts of this island. We would hope to emerge from the review process with a detailed programme of action which will prepare us for the opportunities and challenges of 1992.

This brief survey of the individual articles of the Agreement will have indicated our general approach to the review exercise. Our specific proposals will be made within the structures established by the Agreement. I would again stress that both sides are approaching this review in a positive manner, in a spirit of joint endeavour. The Agreement entitles — indeed almost obliges — us to be frank with one another but there will be no criticism for the sake of criticism. Our purpose is to revitalise the implementation of the Agreement; above all to rekindle that sense of urgency which informed the discussions between the two Governments in 1980-81 and, subsequently, the Forum discussions and the negotiations which led to signature of the Agreement.

It is my hope that the review exercise will engage the energies and creativity not alone of the two Governments, but of all who care about the fundamental issues affecting Northern Ireland, future relationships on this island and Anglo-Irish relations. It is particularly appropriate that this extensive discussion should take place in the Dáil at this early stage in the review period. I look forward to an open and constructive exchange of views.

Before concluding I would like to note and to read into the Dáil record a message which has been received by the Taoiseach from President Reagan to mark the third anniversary of the Agreement. I am sure I speak for all of us when I express deep appreciation of the interest and concern so consistently shown by the American Government and people in relation to Northern Ireland and the generosity demonstrated by their very substantial contribution to the International Fund. The letter states:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

On November 15, the UK and Ireland will observe the third anniversary of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and begin a mandated review of the working of the intergovernmental conference. I should like to take this occasion to salute the courageous efforts which both governments and people of goodwill on both sides are making to deal constructively and realistically with very difficult problems and offer you our encouragement and support for the future. The United States remains a firm supporter of the Agreement and the International Fund for Ireland and their objectives of promoting economic and social advance and encouraging reconciliation.

From the beginning, the United States has supported the Agreement and the Fund which we believed would enhance co-operation between British and Irish officials who were working for the benefit of the people of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The United States contributed $120 million to the Fund during its first three years and will make an additional contribution in 1989.

The Agreement has been especially effective in promoting co-operation between the British and Irish Governments in their efforts to eliminate discrimination and to combat terrorism. The International Fund is working effectively to create jobs and promote reconciliation projects.

As you begin the review, you will have a special opportunity to reflect on the solid accomplishments of the Agreement to date which have been made against difficult odds and strong opposition. You will also be able to consider how it can be used to further improve the quality of life for the people of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Progress in dealing with this issue has often been slow, but the seriousness of the problems compels all of us, particularly those in the United States with strong friendships and ties to both Ireland and the United Kingdom, to help and support your efforts.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan.

That is a very important and comprehensive message with a guarantee of continued help and backing for the Agreement from the United States Government and it is to be welcomed by the Government and the Dáil generally.

In conclusion, I look forward to a constructive debate. It is very appropriate that it is taking place today at the start of the period of examination. I am certain that the contributions made in the House will form the basis for solid contributions that can be made in greater detail possibly by political parties here in the House and by interested groups throughout the community, North and South, and in Britain, the United States and other countries where very great interest is focused on the constructive effort which is being made in Ireland between the two sovereign Governments concerned to deal with what has been a very intractable problem, not just over the years to which I have referred earlier, the past 20 years, but indeed for centuries.

Mr. Dukes

I would like at the outset to say that, like the Tánaiste, I regard President Reagan's message which the Tánaiste has just read out to us, as being a very important statement of support and encouragement for the process that we undertook with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement three years ago. It is a matter of some considerable satisfaction to this House to have a restatement of support in the terms that President Reagan has used.

The Tánaiste's approach to this debate and to the review has a great deal in common with the Government's approach to the Agreement. I find it — I have no intention of making a personal point here — very low key and very lack-lustre. I would like to look back at some of the events that led to the signing of the Agreement three years ago. That Agreement was the culmination of years of patient, careful and imaginative work by quite a number of people. Nobody in this House would under-estimate or deny Deputy Garret FitzGerald's role in that, nor could people under-estimate his passionate commitment to peace, justice and reconciliation that was evident to everybody involved in the discussions and the negotiations that led up to the signing of the Agreement.

As Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Peter Barry was intimately involved in every stage of the negotiations, in assessing each proposal and each development. As Tánaiste and leader of one of the partners in Government, Deputy Dick Spring was very closely involved in the process also. A great share of the credit is due to a number of other people. The role played by our own public service and in particular by the Taoiseach's office and the Department of Foreign Affairs was vital at all stages of the negotiations. I think it right to point out that the present Taoiseach played a role, in the talks which he had with the UK Prime Minister in 1980. He has seemed to prefer, up to today, to disavow that role but the fact remains that those talks were part of the background against which negotiations were initiated with the UK Government after the publication of the New Ireland Forum report. I note that the Tánaiste has mentioned this in the speech he has just delivered. As far as I can remember, and I stand open to correction, this is the first time that statement — it is a true statement — has been made by any member of the Fianna Fáil Party in this House in a debate on Anglo-Irish affairs and I am glad to hear it.

The New Ireland Forum contributed in a very significant way to the inspiration of the negotiations. For the first time, constitutional Nationalist parties had joined together with a common accord to examine all of the issues arising in examining "the manner in which lasting peace and stability could be achieved in a new Ireland through the democratic process" and in reporting "...on possible new structures and processes through which this objective might be achieved". That is all part of the background.

In the three years of its existence so far, the Agreement has proved its worth. It has clearly made the point that the Unionist parties can no longer say "No" to political developments which do not suit only them. The Nationalist community now have a mechanism through which they can be sure that their views, their needs and their identity can be expressed.

I was disappointed to find in the Tánaiste's speech a reference to findings which purport to show that only a minority of Nationalists in Northern Ireland feel that the Agreement has made a difference to their daily lives. I am surprised, disappointed and even astonished that the Tánaiste should fall into the trap of using that illustration.

Mr. S. Barrett

Hear, hear.

Mr. Dukes

There is absolutely no doubt that if we were to ask a similar question to the one that was asked in those surveys of the man-in-the-street about the usefulness to him of this present Government we would find that 80 per cent of them would say that it did not seem to have any beneficial effect on their daily lives. I find that kind of reference in this context to be utterly out of place and ill-judged.

There have been a number of other achievements of the agreement which I do not intend to dwell on at the moment. My colleagues will deal with them in more detail. Since March of last year there has been a marked slowing down in the pace of work under the Agreement. It is quite clear that during these last 18 months nothing like the same effort or dedication have been put into working the Agreement as were applied during its first 18 months. Indeed, the Tánaiste seems to accept that this is the case, otherwise why would he mention at the end of his spech a purpose to revitalise the implementation of the Agreement and above all to rekindle that sense of urgency? You do not revitalise something that is already vibrant; you do not rekindle a fire that is blazing. It may be that we should welcome the Tánaiste's statement that he is going to revitalise and rekindle. I am glad to hear it, but we should not have had 18 months of deceleration.

That deceleration has not been due to either Government alone. Each of the two Governments concerned must, in their own way, take responsibility for the failure to capitalise fully on the Agreement itself and on the work that was done during the first 18 months. Over the last 18 months the agreement could have been more fruitful. It could have produced greater progress in relation to the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. It could have produced greater strides in relation to the level of confidence that exists between the security forces and the Nationalist community. It could have played a greater role in promoting economic co-operation between North and South. Above all, it could have been used in a much more constructive way than it has been to develop political structures in Northern Ireland that would help the two communities there to live, to work and to develop together in harmony.

Responsibility for those missed opportunities is shared by the two Governments. The UK Government have concentrated, sometimes to the apparent exclusion of all else, on their concerns with security co-operation, and in doing so, they have succumbed to the very obvious temptation to confuse security with politics. I have no doubt whatever about the need for close cross-Border security co-operation, and I have made that clear in this House and elsewhere, time after time, but security co-operation alone will not solve even the security problem. It will not solve the problem that arises from lack of confidence in the administration of justice. It cannot solve the problem of relations between the Nationalist community and the security forces. It cannot solve the problem of unfair employment practices. It cannot reduce the alienation of the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland from the Government system in which they live. Security co-operation alone cannot strike at the reasons bombers, gunmen and terrorists of all descriptions still find support in what is undoubtedly a small minority of the communities in Northern Ireland, nevertheless a minority significant enough to provide shelter. Security co-operation can only be a complement to effective political and social action. The UK Government must realise this, and must broaden the scope of their action accordingly. They must take seriously and put into operation their obligations on consultation, because without that the Agreement cannot be fully effective.

In the last 18 months the Irish Government here, for reasons I intend to go into in a moment, have taken the focus of their attention away from the areas of action where most imagination, most skill and most courage are needed — the political areas. They have allowed themselves to become mesmerised by the UK Government's preoccupation with security co-operation. In the last 18 months, the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste, who wrongly accused the last Government of paying too much attention to security, have said little of substance about anything else.

This Government's approach to their obligations under the Agreement has been seriously deficient. The action they should have taken has been grossly hampered as a result. On this, the occasion of the review of the workings of the Inter-Governmental Conference, we must analyse what has happened so that we can see what is needed to rectify the situation and to make the Agreement the vehicle which it is designed to be — a vehicle for advancing the true human interests of all the people of Northern Ireland.

I have already referred to the present Taoiseach's talks with the UK Prime Minister in 1980. They were carried a certain distance and were productive, but the Taoiseach's involvement in those talks was interrupted in 1981 for very good and valid reasons which had nothing to do with those talks.

As I have already said, the work of the New Ireland Forum was crucial, but it was here that we saw, for the first time, the unwillingness or the inability of the present Taoiseach to commit himself fully to the real politics of making progress in Northern Ireland. No sooner was the ink dry on the Forum report than Deputy Haughey immediately put himself outside the circle of constitutional Nationalist parties who had worked so constructively together to lay the basis for real political action in relation to the future of Northern Ireland. Who can forget the shock and the very sharp sense of disappointment that we all felt when, on the day after the signing of that Forum report, Deputy Haughey said, in effect, that, whatever the other parties in the Forum said, he was going to plough his own furrow as if nothing had happened?

There followed the lengthy, often difficult but always dedicated negotiations between Deputy Garret FitzGerald's Government and the British Government. These led to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. When that Agreement was signed, the present Taoiseach could not even bring himself to claim, as he had a perfect right to do, that his work in 1980 had been a definite and positive factor in bringing about the Agreement. Instead of that, he took the safe, cute, unimaginative, unadventurous, utterly uncreative and fundamentally divisive route of voicing spurious constitutional doubts. He has never, to my knowledge, even attempted to test the validity of these doubts. Could it be that he knows in his heart of hearts that they are groundless?

On coming into Government, with these spurious doubts still apparently unresolved in his mind, he found himself faced with the responsibility of working the Agreement. Whether because of these alleged constitutional doubts or for other reasons, he failed to pay the proper attention to the working of the Agreement. The result was a lack of attention to the close and continuing contact between the two Governments through the mechanism of the secretariat and the Conference that is part of the very fabric of the Agreement. That inattention contributed largely to the heightening of tension between the two Governments as a result of the Stalker-Sampson affair, and the further deterioration in relations that came about at the beginning of this year as a result of the action of the British Government in relation to the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Those events, in turn, led to a series of extraordinary zigzags on this Government's part in relation to cross-Border security co-operations and extradition.

I must say regarding the passage of the Tánaiste's speech claiming that the commitment of the Irish Government and the Irish people to combating terrorism is consistent, comprehensive, effective and so on, that we all remember in this House and outside it suggestions that this Government would regard cross-Border security co-operation and, indeed, even extradition as being in some ways bargaining counters. All of that arose from a lack of attention by the two Governments to the proper contact that, as I have said, is part of the fabric of the Agreement itself.

Added to all that, we have the Government's persistent refusal to make any statement of any substance about their view on devolution. The only view the Government have expressed was enunciated again by the Tánaiste today. He referred to replies to questions in this House on 9 November and I quote what was said on the issue of devolution: "On the basis of the stated positions of the parties in Northern Ireland I do not see that the prospects for this are very high at present." That may very well be the case, but that is not the point. Article 4 of the Agreement states that devolution on the basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community is the policy of the UK Government, supported by the Irish Government. Each Government is, therefore, under an obligation to play its part in making devolution, on the basis set out, a reality. It is the job of this Government, together with the UK Government, to improve the prospects for devolution and not simply to stand idly by. This Government appear to have no policy on the issue, no ideas on how to bring it about and no understanding of its importance.

We must ask ourselves what the reasons are for this present unsatisfactory state of affairs in relation to the working of the Agreement. I believe that a pattern is discernible in all of this and that there is an explanation. Quite simply, it is that the present Taoiseach and Government have, like most other people, come to the conclusion that their preferred solution and the solution the New Ireland Forum would wish to see — the unitary state — is not achievable in the foreseeable future, but are afraid to say so or are prevented by their history from saying so. Further than that, and in spite of having come to that conclusion, they are either afraid or unwilling to contemplate any other arrangement no matter how permanent or how temporary, no matter how good for the people of Northern Ireland, no matter how conducive to bringing about peace, stability and political harmony, because they are still in the grip of their old household gods. They are the prisoners of 66 years of empty rhetoric. They are the hostages of the "sneaking regarders". They have neither the imagination nor the courage to rejoin the rest of us in the real world, which is the business of practical politics.

That is where our real problem lies. That is why this Government have gone no further in terms of creating real political debate than to issue vague and impersonal invitations to the leaders of the Unionist parties to come to talks at an unspecified date at an unnamed venue to discuss a non-existent agenda. As I have said before, such vague invitations are no substitute for clear thinking, realistic discussion and resolute political action.

It is time that this Government woke up to the realities of political life in Ireland in 1988. It is time for them to realise that, sooner or later, real aspirations have to give rise to political action. It is time for them to accept that the best cannot be the enemy of the good, especially when our brothers and sisters, Catholic, Protestant and dissenter are suffering because Fianna Fáil do not want to take a single step forward unless that step leads immediately to a goal which we all realise is beyond our present horizon.

We in Fine Gael, by contrast, have adopted a much more realistic and a much more compassionate view of how we should approach this problem. At the end of September I put forward four proposals which address the issues before us. The Tánaiste said today that he looks forward in due course to hearing the views of the political parties here and that he will be making contact with party leaders in the near future. I am glad to hear that because early in October I wrote to the leaders of all the other political parties and so far the only reaction I have had from the Government has been a gentle and a kind word from the Tánaiste in a corridor to say that they had received the letter and perhaps we could think about it. I am glad to see an advance on that and that something active may be done either as a result of today's debate or as a result of a more studied approach to the views expressed in this House during the course of today.

The first is that the two Governments must now state explicitly, in accordance with Article 4 of the Agreement, that they are determined to make devolution a reality. It is abundantly clear to me and to many others that whatever ultimate objective any one of us in this House may have, and whatever ultimate objective any other party elsewhere may have, there must necessarily be a phase, however short or long it may be, during which the two communities in Northern Ireland confront their political differences in a political structure, and work together on an agreed basis for the welare of their people. That is devolution.

That is why it is essential that the two Governments now state a firm commitment to making it a reality. Unless and until the two Governments do that, we will continue to have the situation, as the Tánaiste himself mentioned, where he will say time after time that the prospects for achieving it do not seem to be great. They will never be great if the two Governments do not make an effort.

My second proposal is that each of the two Governments involved in the Agreement should institute consultations with the constitutional political parties in their respective jurisdictions before each meeting of the Conference. These consultations should cover all the issues falling within the Conference's terms of reference, with the exception of operational matters arising in the context of cross-Border security co-operation. Let not the Tánaiste or any other member of the Government say to me today that the prospects for bringing that about do not seem to be too great. We know the difficulties, although I see reports today — I hope there is truth in them — that there appears to be a greater disposition among the Unionist parties in Northern Ireland now to discuss these issues with the Northern Ireland Secretary of State. Let us encourage that and let us not say that prospects do not seem great because that is an utterly unconstructive and useless way of approaching the problem.

The third change concerns a particular aspect of the promotion of cross-Border co-operation in relation to economic and social development. The achievement of the single market in the European Community by 1992 will have immediate and fundamental implications for economic relations between the two parts of this island and will, as a result, have significant social implications. The Agreement and the Conference provide an appropriate framework within which the two Governments can examine these issues, with particular reference to the effects on Northern Ireland and on our Border areas. I am very glad to see from the Tánaiste's speech today that he appears to have taken that proposal on board.

My fourth proposal is a simple and straightforward proposal that there be a regular schedule of Conference meetings — for example, ten per year. Over the last 18 months, too many of the meetings have been called as a response to increased tensions in Anglo-Irish relations, rather than as a deliberate step to bring constructive work forward. This is a totally unsatisfactory way of conducting the Conference business. Indeed, if there had been more regular meetings of the Conference, some of the occasions for urgently calling special meetings might well not have arisen. Because of the nature of its work, the Conference must become a normal and regular part of each Government's activity. Each Government must develop a sensitivity to and an awareness of the other's attitudes, requirements and difficulties. Regular meetings of the Conference are needed to ensure this.

Much of what the Tánaiste has presented as the review of the workings of the Agreement strikes me as being the proper work of the Conference itself under the terms of the Agreement and it is a misjudgment to present what should be the ordinary work of the Conference as being in any sense a review. It downgrades the ordinary work of the Conference to use it as part of a hype in a review process that we are now told is going to last for several months. That is not an appropriate way to go about this business.

Quite apart from the business of reviewing the operations of the Conference, there is another change in attitude which I believe we must all adopt if we really wish to see progress. While there is no doubt in the minds of the vast majority of the Nationalist population of Northern Ireland as to our bona fides and our constructive intent, it is clear that there is an important section of Unionist opinion which takes a different view.

We must make it clear, in all our words and actions, that we have the same concerns for the economic, social and political well-being of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland as we have for our Nationalist brothers. In many respects, we believe the Nationalist community is in greater need of support but our ultimate objectives are the same for all. Our Constitution requires us to cherish all the children of the Nation equally. Our convictions demand of us that we respect each and every one of our brothers and sisters in Northern Ireland equally, whatever their constitution and whatever their status in relation to our State. It is in that spirit, and with that respect for the rights and identities, the lives and liberties of everybody on this island, that we must approach this review of the workings of the Anglo-Irish Conference.

Miss Kennedy

I welcome this day-long debate on the review of the Anglo-Irish Agreement which I, as Whip of the Progressive Democrats, had sought at Whips' meetings in the last couple of weeks, supported, I must say, by the other parties. I want to put on record, at the start, what a great pity it is that the Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey, in whose hands the stewardship and development of the Agreement now lie, is not able to be present to contribute or listen to this debate in the Dáil today. I hope that the House can benefit from a contribution from the Irish signatory to the Agreement, Deputy Garret FitzGerald, later in the day.

The Progressive Democrats, first of all, believe that the Anglo-Irish Agreement holds the same potential for peaceful coexistence in Northern Ireland today as it did on the day it was signed. To those critics who undoubtedly will say that it has not accomplished its stated aim of achieving "lasting peace and stability", we would respond that three years is a short time in the long and bloody history of the divided communities in Northern Ireland.

The biggest achievement of the Agreement at this review period remains the fact that the Irish Government have been granted the right, for the first time in Irish history, to have a say in the affairs of the North. The biggest shortcoming of the Agreement, on the other hand, remains the failure of that Anglo-Irish framework to get the majority Unionist community in the North involved in the process.

It would be fair to say, from the perspective of any party in the Republic, that the Agreement has fallen far short of Nationalist expectations that it would deliver major changes in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. This, if anything, was the initial aim of the Agreement in the eyes of the Irish Government when it was signed three years ago.

The Agreement reached its lowest ebb in Nationalist terms — North and South of the Border — with the handling of the Stalker-Sampson affair earlier this year. The failure to follow up the Stalker-Sampson report with prosecutions, the failure to have the same rule of law seen to be applied to the security forces as to civilians in the North, has had implications on the public perception of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the Republic for most of this year. The Stalker-Sampson affair was followed by a number of associated but dissimilar events all questioning the impartiality of the application of the rule of law: Private Thain's release, the Birmingham Six case, the Gibraltar shootings, the withdrawal of the prosecution against a British soldier in the McAnespie case and, this week, the turmoil at the inquest into the deaths of Toman, Burns and McKerr.

The British assertion of the "public interest" in any of these singular cases militates against the long term interest of making the security forces more acceptable to Nationalists in Northern Ireland. In Ireland, where perceptions are often more important than the reality, it appears from this series of coincidental events that (i) there exists a high-level sanction or carelessness about a shoot-to-kill strategy regardless of its political consequences and (ii) there is a two-tier administration of justice.

In summary, the British handling of the succession of events during the year have conspired to create the public perception that those who are charged with enforcing the law in Northern Ireland are somehow insulated against the full rigour of that law. Apart altogether from the failure to secure the expected changes in the Diplock courts, this perception is damaging public confidence in the administration of justice on an ongoing basis.

What, then, is the main change brought about by the Anglo-Irish Agreement over the last three years? I believe that the Agreement, and the all-party forum for a new Ireland which preceded it, have brought about a fundamental change in attitudes towards Northern Ireland in the Republic. There is a solid consensus across all political parties that a united Ireland cannot, and will not, be achieved automatically as of right. Even Fianna Fáil, the party most reluctant historically to accept that Unionists cannot be forced into a united Ireland in their preferred form of a unitary state, have had to accept the status of Northern Ireland in Article 1 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the wake of the McGimpsey case testing Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution this year.

I will give the House a concrete example of the new political climate created by the Anglo-Irish Agreement in Ireland. The Progressive Democrats published a new draft Constitution in January of this year in which they proposed a change in Articles 2 and 3, to remove the Republic's territorial claim to the North. Contrary to expectations in many quarters, that proposal did not produce a political fall-out of any great importance, as it would have done a few years ago, in my view.

There is, since the Anglo-Irish Agreement, a growing realisation in the South of the realities of Northern Ireland: that a united Ireland, the aspiration of the majority of Nationalists on this island — which I share — is not achievable within most of our lifetimes and that a step by step approach to bring about a tolerant, democratic and plural society has to be the immediate Northern policy of any Government.

Side by side with the change in attitudes in the South, the whole Anglo-Irish Agreement process has brought fluidity into Northern political opinion for the first time in many years. Whatever the retrospective merits or demerits of the exercise, a long series of talks have concluded between the SDLP and Sinn Féin. A fundamental reappraisal has evidently been taking place within Unionism in the North for most of the year. Both of these moves would not have happened but for the fact that the Anglo-Irish Agreement has broken the political log-jam in Ireland.

Because of the fluid political situation, North and South, I believe that a unique opportunity for movement presents itself with the review of the Anglo-Irish Agreement now. I am encouraged by the signs that Unionists, for the very first time in their history, are beginning to look to themselves as the ultimate guarantors of their position.

Before looking to the future, which should be our focus point in this debate, and on which the opening speech of the Tánaiste was most disappointing, I would like to say a few words about the working of the Anglo-Irish Conference set up under the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Progressive Democrats have taken the view that the Anglo-Irish Conference has not been worked to its full potential for most of the last 20 months. Deputy Dukes seems to share that view. The down-playing of the role of the Conference has coincided with the change of Government here. The Conference itself met less frequently for the first nine months of this Government's term of office. For most of the last year its work has been re-active and confined to the "politics of the last atrocity". No long term political work of an exploratory nature is being done. I recognise that crises in Northern Ireland have to be managed but policies that consist only of crisis management on the security front are not the answer. This strategy has hamstrung the development of the Anglo-Irish Agreement during the last 20 months.

There are a few cogent examples of where the spirit, if not the letter, of the Anglo-Irish Agreement has not been adhered to by the two Governments in this period. These are: (i) the stop-start attitude to extradition by the Fianna Fáil Government and the ambivalence within the Fianna Fáil Party in relation to Ireland's pre-existing commitment, given in the joint communique to the Agreement, to ratify the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. There was also the thinly veiled threat last September to equivocate on the matter of extradition when it comes up for review in the Dáil this December; (ii) the reluctance of the British Government to live up to its implied commitment in Article 8 of the Agreement to consider changes in the Diplock courts by seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of securing public confidence in the administration of justice, "considering inter alia the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences”; (iii) the failure of the British Government to consult and inform the Irish Government about the Stalker-Sampson report before reaching the political decision not to proceed with prosecutions in their “public interest”; (iv) the failure of the Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey's Government to accept that it can play an initiating role in the working out of proposals for devolution, as provided in Article 4 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

The reason that the Anglo-Irish Conference has not realised its full potential is quite obvious. Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Haughey have adopted an attitude of detached indifference to the Agreement over the past 20 months. They have allowed the Conference to develop into a crisis centre dealing with day-to-day issues in Northern Ireland. The longer-term political perspective has not been addressed. Going by the Tánaiste's contribution to this debate this morning, there is no evidence that it will be addressed in a co-ordinated manner in the next couple of months during the review. There has been no Anglo-Irish summit meeting between the heads of Government since the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed at Hillsborough three years ago. I would argue that hurried, cosmetic, fringe meetings — there have been three or four — at European Council level are no substitute for structural and detailed diplomacy on the issue of Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations. It is difficult to see how the Anglo-Irish Agreement — described by both sides as a "process", not an end in itself — could develop without the benefit of a creative and constant political input to sustain it.

The effect of these developments overall is to allow the IRA to set the pace of politics in Northern Ireland. There is an urgent necessity now for the leaders of the two Governments to hold a full Anglo-Irish summit meeting to give developments in the North — particularly the reappraisal within Unionism — the benefit of political direction.

It is also regrettable that no work was carried out within the confines of the Anglo-Irish Conference until the meeting in mid-September of this year to address the opportunity presented with the scheduled review of the Agreement now. This has meant that no serious attempt has been made by either Government since Hillsborough three years ago to put forward proposals for political structures that might reconcile the two traditions in Northern Ireland.

I would go further and state that both Governments have been wilfully negligent in their primary responsibility of shifting the emphasis of the work of the Anglo-Irish Conference from crisis management to political change in the last number of months.

The thrust of the Northern policy being pursued by the Progressive Democrats has been careful and quiet over the last six to seven months in an effort to explore various avenues of accommodation in the general context of the review of the Anglo-Irish Agreement this month.

This private process was based on a recognition that the review provided the opportunity to take advantage of the greater fluidity in influential political opinion on both sides of the Border in Ireland.

Based on this work, the leader of the Progressive Democrats, Deputy Desmond O'Malley, put forward a carefully prepared formula first at our annual conference in Cork last May and again at our constitutional conference in Dublin in September that could be a small step on the way to ending the current political logjam in Northern Ireland. He suggested that the review of the operation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, now being undertaken, offered a glorious opportunity for dialogue between the British and Irish Governments which would involve the constitutional representatives of both communities in the North.

He proposed, that the British and Irish Governments should jointly invite the constitutional Unionists leaders to participate in a new round of talks under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Council, which for Nationalists remains within the ambit of the historic process devised in the early eighties, but which for Unionists lies outside the immediate structure of the Hillsborough Accord. We are repeating this proposal today since this formulae was the culmination of a process of quite exploration and consultation with many shades of political opinion by this party.

I will remind the House that the Anglo-Irish conference was established under Article 2 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Article 2 states that the Conference itself was set up "within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council of 1981". In our view that Inter-governmental Council now represents the key to progress.

It is a mechanism which provides both Nationalists and Unionists with a context which does no fundamental injustice to either side, but recognises the current political difficulties, especially of the Unionist leadership.

The key question that Nationalists politicians on this island must now ask themselves is whether we can find a way forward within the Dublin-London axis, leaving in place all those institutions which have been established after long and detailed consideration in the Hillsborough Agreement while, at the same time, facilitating Unionists who currently feel — incorrectly in my view — that they are excluded from the process. Politically it is not realistic for Unionists politicians to call on the Dublin and London Governments to set aside a solemn and binding international agreement as a pre-condition for talks.

That is why we are proposing, within the context of the Dublin-London axis, a parellel process to facilitate Unionist inclusion. The Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Council is the parent body of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and conference. It is the first product of that historic attempt in the early eighties to elevate Anglo-Irish relations onto a new plane which was started by the present Taoiseach.

Our fundamental message to both Governments in this debate is: give the most earnest consideration to this proposal. The time for talking about talking is long overdue. All democrats on both islands, whatever their view, are obliged to seize back the initiative from the men of violence.

I would draw the attention of the House to the fact that statements issued at leadership level by Northern Unionists no longer merely contain the usual ritual denunciation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and all its works and pomps. What is now apparent is that these statements are increasingly accompanied by references to the "totality of relationships" that were originally recognised at a summit meeting held in Dublin between Mrs. Thatcher and Deputy Haughey. More importantly, what is also acknowledged and accepted is the formalised structure which emerged from that meeting, namely the Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Council. As examples of the new thinking within Unionism I would refer the House to the speech made by the leader of the Official Unionists, James Molyneaux, M.P., in his address to the Friends of the Union recently and also to a live radio interview on RTE's "Morning Ireland" in which the Rev. Martin Smyth, M.P. acknowledged the positive aspects of the Progressive Democrats's proposal.

In view of Ulster's compulsion to continue saying no, in public at least, the importance of these acknowledgements and others has sometimes been lost on a public which understandably has become accustomed to a regular diet of denunciations.

Turning to future prospects for the development of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, it is worth stating that the review can be as great or as minimal as the two Governments decide. I was sorry to note that the Tánaiste did not make this point in his speech. Article 11 setting out the arrangements for the review, states: "At the end of three years from the signature of this Agreement, or earlier if requested by either Government, the working of the Conference shall be reviewed by the two Governments to see whether any change in the scope and nature of its activities are desirable." In this respect it is worth noting that "the working of the Conference" is covered in every single article of the Agreement with the exception of Article 1 covering "the status of Northern Ireland".

In this context, the Progressive Democrats believe that the two heads of Government are failing in their solemn duty to be the initiators of political change in the North, neglecting to give political direction at the start of the review process. There are still no plans, to my knowledge, for a full Anglo-Irish summit meeting between Mrs. Thatcher and Deputy Haughey to apply themselves to the review.

The Northern Secretary, Mr. Tom King, MP, appears, over the last few months, to be pursuing a unilateral initiative aimed at trying to get the constitutional parties within the North involved in talks on devolution.

The Taoiseach, at the same time, appears to be interested in a different form of political dialogue which he has left undefined. When Unionist leaders are focusing towards Dublin as much, if not more, than London, it behoves the Taoiseach, in particular, to set out his offer of talks to the Unionists in a position paper. There is a total contradiction in offering "talks without pre-conditions" to the Unionists, on the one hand, and setting out your desired goal of a unitary State, on the other hand — simultaneously in the same speech, as happened in New York some months ago.

We are confident from our regular contacts that an initiative along the lines we have suggested is the one most likely now to evoke a positive response. The review of the Anglo-Irish Agreement is the catalyst for a parallel but separate process under the aegis of the Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Council. The most disturbing aspect of the review, in my view, borne out by the speech made by the Tánaiste, this morning is that the British and Irish Governments do not appear to have any policy, separately or together, to build on the political dimension of the Agreement over the next three years.

In proposing a joint British-Irish initiative now under the aegis of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council we have had to make a few fundamental judgments as a party.

Unlike the Northern Secretary, Mr. King, we believe that proposals for devolution will not work in the North at the present time until Unionists accommodate themselves first in a parallel framework to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. If the Unionists were to get involved in the Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Council, then one of the first issues on the agenda should be devolution.

Furthermore, in the wake of the Agreement, it would appear that the only form of devolution which has a chance of succeeding among Nationalists in the short term would be a system with an Irish dimension to it. This will not succeed, in the short-term, until such devolution proposals are divested from any association with those referred to in Article 4 of the Agreement.

We are making three points at this time about the review of the Anglo-Irish Agreement: this is now the time to respond to a Unionist leadership that needs a way out of the cul-de-sac down which it finds itself; this is now the time also to respond to an alienated Nationalist community which still has little reason for confidence in the administration of justice in the North; this is now the time to respond to a greater threat posed by a heavily-armed Provisional IRA.

I was a political journalist at Hillsborough three years ago when the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed. I still hold the view, which I wrote about at that time, that Deputy Garret FitzGerald will go down in Irish history as the man who secured Mrs. Thatcher's interest and agreement to the most important political accommodation reached between these islands since independence. The significant feature of his role — and that of Deputy Peter Barry — was the perseverance and personal commitment which they applied to the negotiation of the Agreement. They knew that considerable political risks were involved.

This is the lesson that the Taoiseach has not learned. Deputy Haughey, as Taoiseach, has had an unrivalled opportunity to shape the Agreement into an image of his own making over the last 20 months in Government.

What we are saying to the Taoiseach today is that he is better-placed than any other political leader to foster a real initiative on Northern Ireland now. He is at the cross-roads of opportunity that may not come up again for some time. Has he the ingenuity to make the Anglo-Irish Agreement into something even greater? Has he the courage to acknowledge that he cannot achieve a unitary State during the life of this Dáil or, indeed, in his own lifetime? Has he the vision to realise that he can secure for himself the same place in history as Deputy FitzGerald by taking the personal initiative to abandon his party's sterile attachment to the empty sectarian nationalism favoured by Fianna Fáil since the Civil War? Does he not realise that in the current climate he can take advantage, without any loss of face whatsoever, of the structure originally initiated jointly by Mrs. Thatcher and himself — namely the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council in the early eighties? Has the Taoiseach the courage, at the end of the day, to take the risks involved? If he has that courage, a consensus as real and as powerful as presently exists on the economic management of this country will be forthcoming from this party.

Mr. Spring

At the outset I wish to state that it is my intention to make a short contribution to this debate at this stage. I am at present formulating a detailed submission on behalf of the Labour Party to the two Governments undertaking the review of the operations of the Agreement. It is my intention at present that the submission will be published, and that it will cover all aspects of the Agreement as well as its operations.

The theme I want to address in my remarks today is the administration of justice. It is impossible to talk about the Anglo-Irish Agreement without talking at length about the administration of justice. It is an area about which the Labour Party have expressed major concerns in the past two years, in common with members of other parties. But information that has come into the possession of my party in recent times has served to reinforce the concerns that we have expressed in the most fundamental way.

The information I am about to give the House came into the possession of the Justice spokesperson of the Labour Party, Deputy Taylor, within the last week. He and I have discussed it at some length, and we have decided that it is in the public interest that the information in our possession should be made public. We have no reason to doubt the authenticity of this information, and we will in due course, for the reasons I will outline, be supplying the documents in our possession to the Taoiseach.

Before going any further, I want to repeat a point I have made several times before in this House and elsewhere. We cannot defeat the forces of terrorism by abandoning the standards we have set ourselves as a democratic society. If we ignore the principles of due process, and equality before the law, if we decide as a society that there are certain people whom it is not necessary to arrest, or to put on trial, but that it is necessary and desirable simply to execute them, if we engage in covering up the truth, then we are guilty of giving aid and comfort to the forces that would seek to undermine the values that are fundamental to a democratic society. I hold no brief for terrorists. Rather I believe that the way to beat terrorists — and the only way — is to bring people together through democratic political action.

Three alleged terrorists were shot dead in Gibraltar on 6 March of this year. After a great deal of controversy, an inquest was held into those deaths. A decision was taken by the British Government that that inquest was to be the only form of public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding those deaths. Deputy Taylor and I now have sufficient information to believe that the jury at that inquest was seriously misled on a number of significant points. We believe that the information given to the jury was so suspect in relation to these points that we must now call on the British Government to reverse its earlier decision, and to arrange for a judicial sworn inquiry into these circumstances. We also believe, in the light of what we have learned about Gibraltar, that serious question marks must be raised about the handling of the present inquest into the deaths of Gervais McKerr, Eugene Toman, and Sean Burns. I will return to this subject later.

To put what I have to say in context, let me reiterate some of the basic facts of the Gibraltar operation. It commenced at 15.40 in the afternoon of 6 March, when the Police Commissioner in Gibraltar, signed a document which handed over control of the events to the military. Three minutes later, the three alleged terrorists involved were dead on the streets of Gibraltar.

According to some of those who were observing and analysing the events of those three minutes, one of the key factors which governed the events was the siren of a police car, which went off at 15.41. To some, this siren was seen as the signal for the start of the action. This theory was repudiated in the course of the inquest by the evidence given by the most senior officer in the car, an inspector of the Gibraltarian police who was named at the inquest. This inspector testified that his car was stuck in a traffic jam near the scene of the subsequent action, and that, as he sat in it, he was unaware of the operation going on all around him. In the words of the counsel examining him, he "thought that life in Gibraltar was totally normal, that what was happening between him and the Border was the same as happened any other day of the week".

The reason, according to his testimony, that he had turned on the siren was that he had got a radio message instructing him to return to headquarters urgently. On his way there — after activating the siren — he heard shots, he said, and saw people falling to the ground. Notwithstanding the fact that he had just witnessed what he could only have imagined to be a crime, he did not stop. Instead, he crouched down in the back of the car, and instructed his driver to speed up, away from the scene.

This is what he told the jury. What the jury was not told was that the same inspector had been named, in an operation order prepared and signed by the commissioner of police, as the officer in charge of two armed firearms teams whose role it was to support the SAS. He had also been involved in an extensive briefing about the operation on the previous day and could not possibly have been ignorant of what was happening.

The operation order was exhibit 167 at the inquest. It was shown to the coroner, but, because it was covered by a D-notice, it was not shown to the jury. A copy of that order is now in the possession of Deputy Taylor and myself. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that important information was withheld from the jury and that the jury were misled on a very important point.

Another important witness at the inquest was an off-duty policeman who testified that he heard shouts of "Police! Police!" before any shots were fired. This off-duty policeman was presented to the jury as an independent witness and accepted as such by them. His evidence was important in establishing that warnings were given before anyone was shot.

What the jury was not told, but what we have now discovered, was that the policeman in question was the brother of one of the armed policemen who was a member of the firearms team supporting the SAS. It is certain that in an Irish court — and I have no reason to believe otherwise of the Gibraltar inquest — such information would seriously inhibit a jury from accepting the independence of the testimony given.

Testimony was also given at the inquest by two soldiers, A and B, about their movements in the minutes immediately prior to the shootings, in which they were both involved. independent tests carried out after the inquest have established that it was not possible for those soldiers to have covered the ground they claimed to have covered in the time available. It can only be assumed that they were a good deal closer to the terrorists than they claimed when the operation started.

I should say in all of this that no evidence has come into our possession which proves the suspicion voiced by a number of people that this operation was conducted in accordance with a shoot to kill policy. Indeed, the evidence available to me is that if there was a shoot to kill policy, nothing about it was written down in any instructions to the Gibraltar police. But it is equally clear to me that a number of witnesses at that inquest felt they had something to hide, and hid it successfully. Knowing what I know now, I have been asking myself what other pieces of relevant information were hidden from that jury? I have not been able to satisfy myself, in the light of all this, that that inquest was a satisfactory attempt to get at the truth of what happened on the Rock of Gibraltar.

Our Government had an eminent lawyer watching the events that took place at the inquest. The Government may by now have a full account of his views. I am sending a copy of the document in my possession to the Taoiseach today. I will be asking him to have that document weighed against the evidence given at the trial. I will be asking our Government also to consider whether the interests of truth, justice, and democracy have been served in the course of that inquest. If they come to the conclusion that these interests have not been well-served they must take the necessary course of seeking a proper, judicial, sworn inquiry. All the relevant documents in this case will have to be examined. Unless and until we find out what really happened, a serious question mark must hang over the British attitude to the administration of justice.

The same question mark, it must be said, raises its head in relation to the inquest at present being conducted in Craigavon. It is abundantly clear already that a decision has been taken that will have the effect of ensuring that relevant information is denied to the coroner conducting that inquest. The parallels with Gibraltar, right down to the structure of the court-room, are uncanny. The coroner involved is unlikely to be able to come to a clear, unequivocal decision about how these people died.

This is an entirely unsatisfactory position, which cannot be regarded as tenable in the light of all the controversy that has surrounded the deaths of these men. A number of attempts have been made to unearth the truth. All of these attempts have foundered on the determined efforts of official sources to prevent the truth from getting out. The cost of these efforts has been enormous. It is long past time that a different attitude prevailed. There may well be a cost to be paid for revealing the truth but ultimately, the cost of hiding the truth will be far greater.

We cannot serve either community in the North by allowing the standards by which we live to be debased. There may be many who, when they hear of the death of an alleged terrorist, regardless of the circumstances, are glad. But in their heart of hearts, I do not believe there is anyone living in these islands who would welcome the disappearance of one of the most fundamental rights we enjoy — the right to a fair trial.

As I said earlier, I do not propose at this stage to go into other aspects of the relations between our two countries. However I do want to reiterate one fundamental point in which I believe very strongly.

When I spoke in New York last summer about the Anglo-Irish Agreement, I said that this was a time when it was worth taking risks to make progress. It appears from the reaction to my speech that there are still a great many politicians who would rather cling to entrenched positions than look forward, even if looking forward might lead to a greater chance of reconciliation among the two communities in the North.

Some of the reaction to what I had to say bordered on the hysterical. For that reason, perhaps it would be as well if I reminded the House of what I actually said. Perhaps I should begin by pointing out what I did not say. For instance, one newspaper headline at the time suggested that I was calling for the removal of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. This is nonsense. The Anglo-Irish Agreement is the most important instrument to have emerged in the developing relations between Britain and Ireland since the foundation of this State. To remove it, or to weaken it, would be an unforgivable act.

When people talk about the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they frequently refer to the effects it has had on the ground in Northern Ireland, or in terms of the effect it has had on cross-Border security. There is a tendency to judge the Agreement — to assess its achievements or failures — by reference to these criteria alone.

Sometimes the major historical achievement of the Agreement is overlooked in this kind of analysis. The day the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, the British Government, for the first time in the history of our relationship, agreed, in an internationally promulgated agreement, to leave Ireland. There was a condition, of course — the condition was that a majority of the people of Northern Ireland must wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland.

This affirmation by the British Government is now enshrined in the instrument formally lodged with the United Nations. Neither the British nor the Irish Government can unilaterally walk away from it. They cannot walk away from it, even if they wanted to, in the context of the review that has now begun. Talk of dismantling the Agreement, for this reason, is arrant nonsense. Anyone who has read the Agreement should know that.

But we cannot blind oursleves to the fact that progress in many areas has been slow and painful. We cannot ignore the fact that violence continues unabated, particularly the bestial violence of the IRA. We cannot forget that when major difficulties in Anglo-Irish relations emerged — caused, in the main, by arrogant and insensitive actions by the British establishment — the structures of the Anglo-Irish Agreement were unable to help in bringing those difficulties to a satisfactory conclusion.

However it is undeniable that the Agreement has forced Unionism to come to terms with reality. After spending a year in the belief — which turned out to be a delusion — that the Agreement could be brought down by the bully-boy tactics of old, many Unionists have been forced to analyse their position more coldly, and more realistically, than at any time in the past. And many of them have come to the belief that there is no future in isolation. That does not mean that they are now willing to countenance a united Ireland — to believe that they might would be totally unrealistic. Despite what he might say, the Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey knows this as well as I do. But many of them are willing, perhaps for the first time, to discuss the breaking down of barriers. I believe that dialogue now might hold the key to a major step forward.

I am not by any means the first politician to have said that now is that time for dialogue. Speaking in a televised discussion recently, Harold McCusker said that if the Anglo-Irish Agreement were got out of the way, Unionists would make a major effort to put something better in its place. If they failed, he said, they could not then object to the full rigours of the Agreement being imposed on them again. Writing in Fortnight magazine, John Taylor has said that he would not rule out a structure to encompass relationships on the whole island. Speaking on RTE Radio, John Hume has said that he looked forward to the day when something better could be put in place of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Even those politicians in the South who were most critical of my position earlier this year seem prepared to countenance change. Deputy Peter Barry said on RTE Radio that a concession to Unionism must be preceded by a concession by Unionists — he did not say there must never be any concession to Unionism. Deputy Geraldine Kennedy prefaced her personal attack on me by calling on the Taoiseach to put concrete proposals for dialogue with Unionism on the table. The Taoiseach, as we know, has said again and again that he is willing to talk, or at least to listen, to Unionists. Mr. Molyneaux has indicated several times that if the atmosphere was right, he would not be found wanting. The UDA have called on the Unionist leadership to enter into immediate dialogue with Dublin.

All of these "vibrations" have a number of things in common. First, they are all suggestive of goodwill towards the idea of dialogue. Second, they are all expressed in terms of generalities. Third, they are always coupled with some expression of the ritual position. For instance, Deputy Haughey always takes care to denigrate the idea of devolution every time he says that he wants to hear what the Unionists have to say. The Unionists talk about dialogue, but always say "no power-sharing" in the same breath. Other politicians talk about the flexibility of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, while being very careful to hold it up as a monument cast in bronze at the same time.

I did not feel that way about the Anglo-Irish Agreement the day it was signed, I said it was a framework to build on, and I have never departed from the view that the Agreement was a living, breathing thing, whose aims and objectives were every bit as important as its structures. On 8 March this year, in a speech which referred to the Agreement as a process, and not a monument, I said:

the operations of the Conference are due to be reviewed later this year. I do not believe that it is beyond the ingenuity of both Governments, if there is a will to do so, to ensure in the context of that review that the structure of the Conference is developed to a point where it does not inhibit further dialogue with Unionist opinion. Clearly, any review must ensure that it remains possible for the interests of the minority community to be fully and effectively represented — but that can be done, I feel sure, in a way that Unionist opinion can live with.

When I said that, there was no outcry. When other politicians talked about dialogue, there was no controversy. For my part, I believe strongly that dialogue is the only way forward. I believe if we want dialogue, we have to do more than talk about it — we have to do something to facilitate it. We all know that it will take a great deal to generate the trust and goodwill that will be necessary if dialogue is to succeed — or even if it is to be sustained for a reasonable period, so that people on all sides can come to see merit in talking. That is why I believe we should do something. What I suggested was modest, even though specific.

I suggested in the context of an unequivocal statement by Unionists about their attitude to power-sharing, the Irish Government should agree to a suspension, for a predetermined and limited period of time, of the Secretariat — not of the Agreement, not of the Conference, only the Secretariat. The proposal did not imply in any way that bilateral contacts between staff or between Ministers should cease. Neither did it imply that issues of concern to Nationalists should not be raised and dealt with. Neither did it imply any lack of faith in the aims and objectives of the Agreement in the overall sense.

The reason for making that proposal was a simple one. Its purpose would be to create a window, in which dialogue could take place in an atmosphere of greater trust. The reason for limiting the time would be precisely to counter the suspicion expressed by some that suspension would be seen by some Unionists as a victory, and that they would redouble their efforts to have the whole Agreement dismantled. In effect, what the Irish Government would be saying to Unionists, if they were to agree to my proposal, would be "for the next six months you will not have what you have described as the spectre of Maryfield hanging over you. We are taking this step because we do not want to have discussions with you under duress. We want to talk to you on a basis of equality, respecting your position and your commitment to your views. We want to show you that we are serious about dialogue, and we want to give you the opportunity to demonstrate your own seriousness."

That is the central issue — the issue of whether or not people are serious. It is up to us, all of us who care about peace and human life, to flush out those who are phony on this issue — those who are content to talk about dialogue, but in their hearts are not prepared to take the first step towards creating the framework for dialogue. Above all, we have to seek to flush out whatever seriousness is there and to build on it.

John Hume, for instance, is clearly one of those prepared to take risks for peace. He has taken an enormous personal risk in the dialogue he has undertaken with Provisional Sinn Féin and, clearly, he has done it in the interests of peace. I know many people, whose views I respect and admire, who disagree with his decision to take that risk. For my own part, I hope and pray that he succeeds. I do not believe that we can prejudge the issue — there will be great glory if those talks succeed, but there is great courage even in undertaking the risk. That sort of courage must be extended to the other half of the community in the North. We cannot wait until the Unionist population is browbeaten into talks. Their right to self-determination through the political process must be regarded as co-equal with that of Nationalists. Even if it were likely to happen in my political lifetime, what kind of victory would there be in it? The only victory I want to see is a victory for all the people of Northern Ireland. That will come when they all have an equal say in the shaping of their own future, in peace and with a prospect of prosperity. If politicians have to go out on a limb to try to move one step closer to that kind of victory, surely it is a step worth taking.

Proinsias De Rossa

There are many aspects of the Minister's speech which I would like to follow up on but unfortunately because of the time constraints I will only be able to refer to a number of them. Before going on to deal with the issues that I specifically wish to deal with I would like briefly to refer to a number of the points made by Deputy Spring in relation to the Gibraltar incident. Nobody in this House would quibble with the essential need to ensure that neither this State nor the British State descends to the level of the sectarian terrorists who are tearing Irish society apart and that it is absolutely essential that the law be applied scrupulously and fairly in all respects, be it in Gibraltar, Northern Ireland, Britain or in the Republic. However, a very clear distinction has to be made between our concern about and demand for that need and the suggestion that any such concern renders us sympathetic to or ambiguous or ambivalent about the campaign of terror which the Provisional IRA in particular are waging against the people of this island. It has to be made clear that they are waging a campaign of terror against the people on this island.

I am extremely concerned at the way in which public representatives and the media jumps on to the bandwagon of concern following the arrival at a verdict in a court case, be it in Northern Ireland, Britain or in Gibraltar. We should be extremely cautious about the way in which we respond to these events. We are, whether we like it or not, if we jump on this bandwagon without giving any serious thought to the consequences, lending indirect sympathy to the terror gangs. As I said earlier, I am not suggesting that we should not be concerned about this need or not insist on the rule of law, but we must avoid at all costs the State descending to the level of the terrorist and we must be extremely cautious about the way in which we express that view and how we condemn the Provisional IRA who have no hesitation whatsoever about shooting a family to bits without any effort being made to provide them with the right of appeal. I would make that point very strongly in responding to what Deputy Spring said.

I was very disappointed that in opening his remarks he referred to the three alleged terrorists in Gibraltar. The reality is that the Provisional IRA have claimed that the three people involved in the Gibraltar incident were an active service unit and I was quite concerned to hear RTE refer to them as an active service unit. I have yet to hear RTE declare the Provisional IRA to be a sectarian Nationalist terrorist gang. Rightly, they quite often refer to Loyalist terror gangs and Loyalist murder gangs but I have never heard them refer to the Provisional IRA as a sectarian terror gang. As I said, the media and public representatives have to be extremely careful about the way in which they address themselves to the very serious, entangled problems of this island.

I would like to refer briefly to the question of devolution because there is a great deal of ambiguity on the part of the Irish Government in relation to this issue. Article 4 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement states quite clearly in part (b) that it is the declared policy of the United Kingdom Government that responsibility in respect of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be devolved within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the Community. The Irish Government support that policy. I have repeatedly asked the Tánaiste and the Taoiseach in this House to make a statement on whether they support devolution but they have failed to do so.

The latest response was that it is not a realistic prospect but it will never be a realistic prospect until the British and Irish Governments seriously address themselves to the question of how devolution can be brought about. All the constitutional democratic parties in Northern Ireland, in principle at least, agree on the need for devolution and a Bill of Rights. Significantly, under Article 4 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement both the British and Irish Governments agree that there is a need for devolution and that it is necessary for progress, yet this matter has never once been discussed at any of the meetings of the Conference, either during the term of office of the Coalition Government or of the Fianna Fáil Government. The question has to be asked: why?

The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement raised many hopes and fears. Three years on, the hopes have not been met while the fears have not been assuaged. The principal hope, though it is an undeclared one, of the signatories was that the Agreement would help in reducing the alienation of the Roman Catholic community, thereby benefiting the SDLP electorally at the expense of Sinn Féin. This has not happened. On the contrary, Sinn Féin have maintained their share of the vote in Northern Ireland and have spent the best part of this year in formal discussions with the SDLP on the best way forward for Nationalists. This has been an extraordinary turn around during the past three years.

This in turn has confirmed the worst suspicions of the Unionists who were excluded from the discussions which led to the Agreement and who were then expected to accept it as a fait accompli. The Agreement weathered the “Ulster Says No” storm but the great bulk of the Unionist population are as fundamentally opposed to it as they were in 1985. The level of violence has increased despite the hopes and claims for improved security, while the principal source of that violence — the Provisional IRA — enjoys an enhanced status among Nationalists as a result of the talks between Sinn Féin and the SDLP.

There is little evidence then to suggest that the Agreement has brought about any positive changes in attitude among the mass of the population. People are more divided than they were in 1985 and there is greater pessimism about the future. This pessimism is reflected in recent opinion polls. In September a Marketing Research Consultancy poll found that 62 per cent of Catholics believe the Agreement has achieved little or nothing since its introduction. A poll carried out by the Belfast Telegraph last month found that 64 per cent of Catholics believe that it has not led to an improvement in the position of Nationalists. The same poll found that 26 per cent of Catholics were now less in favour of the agreement than in 1985. These findings do not, of course, tell the whole story. They need to be measured against the expectations which the Agreement and its advocates generated.

The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that some observers believe that in Northern Ireland today there exists a more sectarian and more brutally divided society than was the case three years ago. It is further believed that the agreement has encouraged people to identify their sectarian affilitations, and thereby weakened the position of those in favour of a secular and democratic society.

For their part the SDLP who had a major input into the creation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement have reverted to mainstream Nationalism and are openly distainful of effort to find a solution confined to Northern Ireland. Austin Curry of the SDLP has made it clear that they have no historical or ideological commitment to devolution within the existing constitutional framework. The Provisionals, who are dedicated to destroying the constitutional framework by force, have found common cause with the SDLP in seeking to further the Nationalist case and they are convinced that the basis of a pan-nationalist alliance, embracing Fianna Fáil, exists. The emerging Nationalist consensus puts national unity above all other considerations, including life itself. Thus, the SDLP have no qualms about talking to the Provisionals who continue to demonstrate that they have no qualms about murder.

The prospect of solving the Irish question has turned many heads in the past and it would seem that in this respect Mr. Hume has been caught with the idea that he will find a place in history. This would seem to be his reason for meeting the Provisionals. It is a strange paradox that the SDLP have met nearly every party in Northern Ireland, including the Provisionals, except the major elements in Northern Ireland which have to be brought into a democratic solution, that is, the Unionist parties. Perhaps at some stage Mr. Hume might get around to meeting them. I hope he is not going to leave it until after he has found a solution which suits him, the Provisionals and the Fianna Fáil Party.

It is time we accepted that the Provisionals are a racist, sectarian organisation and that they must be beaten not simply by making declarations of abhorrence whenever they engage in atrocities but by ensuring that the democratic parties in Northern Ireland get together to form a democratic devolved government in Northern Ireland backed by a Bill of Rights. There is no other way forward in Northern Ireland.

The greatest and most immediate need is peace. This requires the isolation of the terrorist and the defeat of terrorism. This is easier said than done but done it must be. Northern Ireland, and indeed the Republic, cannot afford another 18 years of chronic, unresolved conflict. The cost in human terms is too high and the violence must be ended before it is too late. This is an issue which might usefully be addressed by the parties to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The fight against terrorism needs a clear political direction and is not simply a question of security. The question, ultimately, is one of defending democracy and all democratic parties have a duty in this regard.

With regard to the current review of the workings of the Agreement, present circumstances demand a fundamental reappraisal and not just a tinkering around with how the Conference should meet or the terms of what they should discuss. It must consider whether radical changes are needed in the way the Agreement works. There is evidence to suggest that the Unionist leadership would be willing to enter into serious talks about the political reconstruction of Northern Ireland and the development of new institutional arrangements with the Republic. Any changes to the workings of the Agreement which would facilitate such talks should be made. For example — and this is a point The Workers' Party have made repeatedly — the Maryfield Secretariat inflames Unionist opinion and does so unnecessarily. The Secretariat should be relocated. The Minister in his speech said that he believed the location of the Maryfield Secretariat gave confidence and a feeling of security to the Nationalist community. That is not so. There is no evidence whatsoever to back up that view. In fact, the opinion poll to which I referred earlier clearly shows that this is not so.

Furthermore, provision should be made for a cessation of meetings of the Conference to allow for serious inter-party talks in Northern Ireland. A firm declaration from the British and Irish Governments in favour of democratic devolved government for Northern Ireland, together with agreement on a Bill of Rights, would do much to make progress possible. It would then be up to all the democratic parties to show how serious they are about bringing an end to the drift in which we are at present involved.

As I said, there were a number of points with which I wanted to deal with regard to the Minister's speech but there is not sufficient time for me to do so. Perhaps some other Member of my party will be allowed in on the debate during the day. I want to emphasise that there are certain basic principles which have to be adhered to if peace is to be established on this island. The first of these is that no paramilitary gang, regardless of how they may appeal to our instincts in relation to a united Ireland or anything else, have a right to kill in our name——

Mr. Barry

Hear, hear.

Proinsias De Rossa

——whether they be Loyalist gangs or Nationalist gangs. That has to be said loudly and clearly by every Deputy in this House. Progress will only be possible in Northern Ireland through dialogue and it is the responsibility of the British Government and the Irish Government to ensure that the conditions are created for that dialogue to take place. It is the height of folly for the SDLP or the Fianna Fáil Government to imagine that by refusing to budge they can in some way force the Unionists to accept an All-Ireland dimension. That is just not on. It is simply prolonging the agony of the people of Northern Ireland by insisting that they will not allow talks to take place because they have in some way decided that the Anglo-Irish Agreement has been set in stone.

Acting Chairman (Mr. Wyse)

I should remind Deputies that from here on all contributions must be confined to 15 minutes.

Minister for Health (Dr. O'Hanlon)

This is a very important debate and it is right and necessary that the Dáil should have an opportunity to look at the record of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The debate so far has been conducted in a very constructive manner, which is to be welcomed. I was surprised to hear Deputy Dukes refer to the run down in the process, having regard to the fact that the Conference has met on more occasions this year than in any previous year. The agenda has also been broadened. We on this side of the House are very pleased at the work of the Tánaiste and the Minister for Justice and appreciative of the amount of effort and energy they have put into working with the Conference.

In the joint statement issued after the last Conference on 2 November both Governments agreed that the emphasis in the review should be on a positive programme for the future and they reaffirmed their commitment to the Agreement. However, much as we may be concerned at the lack of progress since 1985 and the strains caused by a number of British Government decisions during the past difficult year, we must look to the future. It is important to have a realistic sense of what can be achieved by the Agreement. It is not in itself a panacea for all the ills of Northern Ireland, but it has the potential to make advances which will benefit all the people of Northern Ireland. The Government are determined to continue to imbue the review process with a sense of urgency and to continue their task in the Anglo-Irish Conference in a positive and determined spirit.

Our approach to the review is important for what the working of the Agreement represents i.e. the working of the Anglo-Irish relationship. The two Governments have agreed that the review should incorporate an overall assessment of the work of the Conference to date in terms of the stated objectives of the Agreement and the relationship between the two countries. I stress this point from the joint statement of the last Conference about the relationship between the two countries. Although the Agreement has its own institutions in the Conference and Secretariat, as well as its objectives in Articles 2 to 10, it is fundamentally about the Anglo-Irish relationship and it is important as a further step in the development of the relationship between the two Governments, which began with the communiqué issued from Dublin Castle in 1980 following the meeting between the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister.

I was surprised at Deputy Kennedy's criticism of the Taoiseach. No Taoiseach has put more effort into working to resolve the Northern Ireland problem and no Taoiseach has been more sensitive to what needs to be done. It is important to recognise that at that meeting in 1980 he was to be the first Taoiseach to raise to an international plane the whole context of Northern Ireland and the resolution of the difficulties which exist on this island. I have had personal experience of the Conference in the health area. In December and June last, I had very useful and constructive meetings with my counterpart in Northern Ireland, Mr. Richard Needham, MP. At those meetings we agreed on a number of measures for improved cross-Border co-operation in the area of health. Such measures include expanded arrangements for cross-Border referral of patients who would benefit from highly specialised medical treatment; joint assessment of the possibilities for major investment in highly specialised medical procedures which could be made available on a 32-county basis; co-operation in the production of public information material; and improved arrangements for co-operation in the event of major accidents and emergencies. Last month we agreed to launch in the same month the measles, mumps, rubella immunisation programme on both sides of the Border. These are just some of the areas of positive co-operation between the North and South which are being further developed. There is, I believe, scope for greater co-operation and I hope that the current review of the working of the agreement will provide an impetus for expanding the range of such co-operation.

We must all be concerned at the level of violence in Northern Ireland, going back well beyond the past 20 years. There is no such thing as an acceptable level of violence. Anything that damages or injures the individual or takes his life is entirely unacceptable and must be so to all right-thinking people on this island. We must be concerned about certain aspects of what is happening in Northern Ireland. I would refer to the administration of justice and the relations between the security forces and the community, which are of particular interest to the constituents I represent who live along the Border. Their concern is not only for those living on the northern side of the Border. Their concern is also for themselves because many of them have direct experience of the problems that the Conference is seeking to address and bring to an end.

The following is a quotation from the report by Lord Scarman into the civil disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969:

It is painfully clear from the evidence adduced before us that by July the Catholic minority no longer believed that the RUC was impartial...the effect of this hostility on the RUC themselves was unfortunate. They came to treat as their enemies, and accordingly also as the enemies of the public peace those who persisted in displaying hostility and distrust towards them.

Now, after 20 years, there is still a serious lack of confidence on the part of the Nationalist community in the administration of justice. Building that trust and confidence is a complicated and sensitive task. It will not be achieved by relying simply on new or tougher security measures. A political policy is also required and concrete measures are desperately needed to improve the present situation. Confidence in the institutions of State is fundamental to any normal society.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has already spoken about the continuing problem of harassment by the security forces of members of the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland. This is an every day problem experienced by ordinary people. It is a fundamental problem because it goes to the heart of Nationalist alienation. It is a very serious problem because harassment of youngsters by the security forces can cause them to turn in anger to the IRA. It is a problem which simply must be solved. The responsibility lies with the senior officers of the RUC, with the local commanders of the armed forces and with the British Government, who have failed to take sufficiently direct and co-ordinated action to monitor incidents of harassment and stop them recurring. Even after 20 years there appears to be a belief in the British Government that security is the answer to the problem. Nothing could be more unrealistic because security by itself will solve nothing.

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the original civil rights protest. The failure at that time to address the real grievances of the minority community has been compounded by subsequent failures which have been exploited by the men of violence on both sides and have led to the continuing instability of the past 20 years. Too often the British Government have sought to tackle the symptom of violence without at the same time addressing the underlying causes of instability in Northern Ireland. There is now in the Anglo-Irish Conference and Secretariat a serious attempt by both the British and Irish Governments to address those underlying causes.

It is important to stress that the role of the Irish Government is to put forward views and proposals. It is the British Government who in the final analysis take the decision and bear the responsibility for each specific action of Government, althought it is important to note that the Agreement requires that determined efforts should be made to resolve differences. There are certainly different approaches and there are frequently different views on matters that are discussed at the conference table and, indeed, on some matters that are decided without due regard for the prerogatives of the Conference and the necessity for prior consultation — the Tánaiste gave an example of the Stalker report. I know my colleagues, the Tánaiste and Minister for Justice have a difficult and sensitive task, but it is a vital one which deserves the appreciation of this House and of Nationalists throughout Ireland.

I would recall what the Taoiseach said in his opening statement to the New Ireland Forum in 1983:

It is common ground amongst us in the Forum that we are prepared to work in close co-operation with any British Government to bring forward a solution to the problem that continuously distorts Anglo-Irish relations and relations within this island because no British Government will be able to provide any solution to the problem other than in partnership with the Irish Government.

Those are words which we will do well to remember in assessing the controversies of the past year and what our attitude should be for the future. They represent the bedrock of Irish Nationalist views of our relationship with Britain in so far as Northern Ireland is concerned.

In recognition of this reality, the Government accepted the agreement on coming into office and we have committed every effort to making it work as effectively as possible through numerous meetings of the Conference — in 1988 there were more meetings than in any other year — through the constant channel of the Secretariat and through the diplomatic and informal contacts which are available to us.

We have pressed the agenda of reform in regard to the administration of justice and relations between the security forces and the community. We have committed our energy and resources to the task of saving life and property in both parts of this island, which is what security co-operation aims to do, and we have broadened the agenda to give high attention also to economic, social and cultural development, and especially to fair employment. It is encouraging to see that there is some move towards improving the economic situation in west Belfast. I would like to see this extended to other areas, especially to both sides of the Border.

It has been recognised that the Border has had a devastating effect on the economy of towns like Clones in my constitutency, which is surrounded on three sides by Fermanagh and has its hinterland not alone cut off by the Border but by road-blocks which do not give people access to the town. I would like to see more development through the International Fund set up under Article 10 of the Agreement.

There is need for urgent action. This morning the Tánaiste quoted the percentage of Nationalists who are dissatisfied with the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It is not that they are expecting too much but there has been too little by way of change to date, and we would like to see some improvement in this area.

This morning, Deputy Dukes referred to a unitary Ireland. I would not apologise to anyone for believing that a united Ireland is ultimately the right solution. Fianna Fáil still adhere to the thrust of the Forum report. It was disappointing to note this morning that the Leader of Fine Gael appeared to be effectively abandoning this agreed Nationalist position. The Government will use the present review to redouble those efforts in the Conference and secretariat to further develop the Anglo-Irish relationship.

Mr. Barry

I want to make a very brief reference to what Deputy Spring said today. My views on what happened in Gibraltar on 6 March are fairly well known. At the time I thought the security forces had the power to arrest and bring people to trial and that that should have been done. I agreed with Deputy De Rossa when he rebuked Deputy Spring for referring to alleged terrorists. These people were terrorists. They were sent to kill, maim and destroy property. However, I believe they should have been arrested and brought before a court and I was critical of the British Government's handling of the affair. For that reason, I will not be critical of the British Government when they arrest people and bring them before the court, because that is the way the rule of law should operate and I will not adopt a different standard when something happens outside the residence of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to that adopted when something happened in Gibraltar.

I do not know how authentic are the documents Deputy Spring says he has. In my view he has taken the right decision in submitting them to the Government, to let the Government process them and take the matter up with the British Government, if necessary. Whether Deputy Spring should have said this to the Government in private or in this House is a matter on which I will not adjudicate but if he has important evidence in this regard, then the right step to take was to give it to the Government. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was put before this House three years ago as a framework within which progress could be achieved in Northern Ireland in order to end sectarian divisions, counter discrimination and injustice and begin the process towards reconciliation and stabilisation. If the Agreement has not yet reached its potential, it is not because of any inherent defect in the Agreement itself but because it has not been worked in the past 18 months.

In the first 18 months the Agreement showed that it was capable of delivering on a number of levels. There was considerable progress in a number of areas: in housing — the destruction of the Divis flats in west Belfast and the flats in Derry — in laws relating to the handling of parades — a sensitive area and last year the marching season went off almost without incident for the first time in 100 years — in the law on incitement to hatred, in the policy on the Irish language, in prisons policy — the so-called "detained at the Secretary of State's pleasure"— in the laws on flags and emblems, in the law on the handling of police complaints, in the area of the supergrass trials, in the reform of the Emergency Provisions Act, in the accompaniment of the UDR by the police — when I was co-chairman I pushed this at every Conference meeting, even though there had been improvement. I fully appreciated the logistical difficulties faced by the Chief of the RUC in this regard, but progress was much too slow — in the most sensitive areas there was not a sufficiently high level of accompaniment of the UDR by the RUC — and most crucially of all, in relations between the police and the minority community in the administration of justice. We cannot underline too often the necessity for any community having confidence in the security and police forces. Otherwise it is a recipe for the destruction of democracy.

The fact that President Reagan in his last few months in office sent a further note of encouragement to both Governments to continue their work on the Anglo Irish Agreement is an indication of the value which our friends in America place on the Agreement and the potential they see for achieving the objective of bringing about peace and reconciliation. I am pleased that the President remembered the anniversary of the Agreement and encouraged us to work harder at it.

The cancer of discrimination in employment has been eating away in Northern Ireland for many years but the legislation which will, I hope, be passed within the next six months will change this. The slow pace of progress in Northern Ireland is directly attributable to the failure of the Dublin and London Governments to work the Agreement to the full. Both Governments are to blame in this regard. The Minister for Health spoke about the number of times the conference met this year and the Tánaiste said exactly the same thing. Unfortunately, too many of these meetings were not convened on a regular basis to do the ordinary work of the Conference but were called as a reaction to some insensitive handling of an issue by the British Government. The Anglo-Irish Conference should not operate on the basis of crisis management, it should be a practical working conference and firm in its purpose to pursue the objectives of the Agreement. Article 3 of the joint communique issued with the Agreement states that the Agreement has the aim of promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland; helping to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland; creating a new climate of friendship and co-operation between the people of the two countries and improving co-operation in combating terrorism.

In the past 18 months the momentum for change and progress has slowed to a halt. Article 7, which sets out the priority of tackling the relations between the security forces and the minority community and the identification of measures which would promote confidence in the administration of justice, has been ignored by both Governments with the result that the men of violence continue to dictate the agenda. We continue to have crisis meetings and it was only at the last meeting, after I had called attention to it numerous times, that they decided that these matters should be at the top of the agenda for next month's meeting of the Conference. The administration of justice and the issue of no confidence in the security forces should be at the top of the agenda of every meeting of the Conference. Now, when it comes to the review date, both Governments, belatedly realise the necessity for a practical programme of action. They also propose to take a number of months to complete the review. No satisfactory reason was given by the Tánaiste or the Minister for Health for taking four months to review the Agreement. The delay is totally unacceptable and only came about because of previous inactivity on the part of both Governments. Did they not know over the past three years that the Agreement had to be reviewed in November 1988? They have done nothing in the meantime.

Since last January we have been saying what is required and late in September the Leader of Fine Gael, Deputy Dukes, outlined our proposals for the next stage of the Anglo-Irish Conference. This delay encourages extremists on both sides to feel that they have another period of time in which to get rid of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Provisional IRA will continue their bombing campaign in the hope that they will disgust the British Government so much they will walk away from the Agreement. The Unionists must change their position — I do not say that in any sense of triumphalism as I do not wish to see them humiliated in any way — but they must not be given any further hope that this delay means that if they push harder the Agreement will become unbalanced and will not continue. It was an extremely silly decision by both Governments to take this long to review the working of the Agreement.

We accept and look forward to making a contribution towards bringing together the leaders of parties to which the Tánaiste referred and we will have an input: Over the last number of years people in both parts of the island have been forced to re-think their position and to confront the reality of the divisions and instability in Northern Ireland. I was disappointed to hear the Minister for Health talking about the old-fashioned Fianna Fáil unitary State because it is not in keeping with what is required at the end of the 20th century. I very much regret the intransigence of Fianna Fáil whose only option is a unitary State, whatever the cost to either or both communities in Northern Ireland.

I should like to remind the Taoiseach and Minister O'Hanlon that they put their names to the whole Forum report and not just to the part dealing with a unitary State, the only part which the Taoiseach seems to recall. During 1983-84 Nationalist politicians representing all the parties, with Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, Labour and the SDLP, participated in the New Ireland Forum. Our report demonstrated a radical re-think by constitutional Nationalists and by all the people who put their names to that report. The Forum report, Chapter 4.15 recognises the right of Unionists to effective, political, symbolic and administrative expression of their indentity, their ethos and their way of life in a new Ireland.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement of November 1985 recognised that a condition of genuine reconciliation and dialogue between Unionists and Nationalists is mutual recognition and acceptance of each other's rights. The Unionist community in Northern Ireland must recognise that we in our part of Ireland have made progress in meeting them, and that that progress is internationally recognised, in our acceptance of their rights as citizens of this island.

The Agreement represents a framework for progress. It is not a solution, nor was it ever intended to be. If real progress is to be made, then all sides will have to rethink their positions and consider options other than their first choice. Nationalists must be prepared to look at options other than a united Ireland and the Unionists must be prepared to consider a devolved power-sharing administration. The British Government have moved, the Irish Nationalists have moved and I believe — I do not want to say this in any triumphalist sense — that the Unionists must accept that they too have to move. The Agreement can facilitate that rethink as indeed it represented a change in the perception of the British Government of the role of the Irish Government in Northern Ireland. I will have to remind the House that just six years ago the British Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons that an Irish Government or an Irish Minister had no role and no function in anything relating to Northern Ireland. Now Ministers from both Governments sit at the conference table and discuss issues that directly affect the lives of the people in Northern Ireland. Irish Ministers know their point of view is and must, under this internationally binding agreement, be taken into consideration.

It is to the Unionist community that many politicians on both islands are looking for the final unlocking of the political impasse. There is evidence of an internal debate among the Unionist parties about the best way to proceed. Dialogue is crucial to the process of achieving peace and stability in Northern Ireland. However, as I have pointed out on many occasions, the kind of dialogue necessary for real progress requires all the parties involved and engaged in the process. The Taoiseach has indicated on a number of occasions his willingness, and indeed his desire, to engage in talks with the different parties in Northern Ireland. One wonders what strength of purpose lies behind these indications. I am not alone in wanting confirmation of the substantial policies which underlie these public statements — public statements do not constitute the dialogue itself. The potential for success in many talks which the Government may undertake in the coming months will depend on Mr. Haughey's ability to convince all parties that he has a clear, unambiguous and constructive vision of the future for all the people on this island.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Taoiseach.

Mr. Barry

I am sorry. Clarity of vision and firmness of purpose are essential and any kind of equivocation which hangs over the operation of the Extradition Act is hardly likely to inspire confidence in defeating terrorism. There has been some talk recently about the 1976 Act. That Act was meant to operate in cases where extradition did not work. It is not a substitution for extradition. Both Acts must be used in this regard. Extradition must be kept in place and the 1976 Act should be used after that if necessary.

The future of the country lies in the hands of those who are willing to commit their energies to the long and often difficult process of achieving peace, prosperity and equality on this island. In the Anglo-Irish Agreement we have the means of bringing that about. I have no hesitation in welcoming this debate and I hope that another three years will not elapse before we can review the Agreement again.

Minister for Justice (Mr. Collins)

I wish to comment on the issues, and particularly the allegations, raised by Deputy Spring. Any information he has, when it is received, will be very carefully examined.

It is important that the Dáil should have this opportunity to consider the record of the three years since it debated the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I think the House will agree that the debate should be conducted in a constructive spirit which will help assist the Government's conduct of the review of the Agreement with the British Government over the next few months.

In accordance with Article 11 of the agreement, this review is about the working of the Anglo-Irish Conference. In the joint statement issued after the last conference on 2 November, both Governments recognised the political importance of the review process as an opportuntiy at the end of three years to undertake a thorough and serious review of the working of the Conference under each of the headings of the Agreement. They also agreed that work would begin on an overall assessment of the work of the Conference to date in terms of the stated objective of the Agreement and the relationship between the two countries. They agreed that the emphasis should be on a positive programme for the future and they reaffirmed their commitment to the Agreement.

Deputies will recall that it was here in Dublin eight years ago that a British Prime Minister acknowledged for the first time that the problem of Northern Ireland could only be solved by the joint action of the two sovereign Governments. The establishment of the Anglo-Irish Conference and the Secretariat was a further step in the new relationship between the two Governments which was set in motion at that time by the Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey, and the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher.

Since the Agreement concerns the relationship between the two Governments, the review means more than stocktaking and internal processes, although these things are important. It means a serious assessment of the quality of the relationship that has been developing between the two Governments as well as the product of that relationship so far.

It is clear from the public debate that is already taking place on the third anniversary of the Agreement, that there is very wide support for the development of the relationship between the two Governments and for the efforts which this Government have made in that direction since taking office in March of 1987. We made it clear at once that we regarded the Agreement as legally binding and that we would work it vigorously and as effectively as we could. I believe the record shows that we have spared nothing in doing just that. We have held frequent, regular meetings and we have pressed forward with an agenda of economic and social development, fair employment, confidence in the administration of justice, including relations between the security forces and the community, and security co-operation.

Nor have we neglected the question of political progress. We would like to have a situation in which members of the Unionist community were also playing their full part in easing tensions and planning constructively for the future. Unionists now have an opportunity to take a step forward and I seriously hope that they will respond positively to the invitation of both Governments to convey their views on the review process.

I want to turn now to security co-operation for which I have specific responsibility. Article 9 of the Agreement says that with a view to enhancing cross-Border co-operation on security matters, the Conference shall put in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and, where appropriate, groups of officials in such areas as threat assessments, exchange of information, liaison structures, technical co-operation, training of personnel and operational resources. The Agreement also states, and I think it is important to stress this, that responsibility for police operations shall remain with the heads of the respective police forces.

The House will not expect me to go into the detail of discussions in the Conference on cross-Border security co-operation. Suffice it to say that it is acknowledged by both Governments that security co-operation is now the best it has ever been. Relations between the two police forces are close and constructive. Each force does things its own way within its own jurisdiction, while co-operating to meet the common objective of protecting the lives of all the people of this island.

I will not pretend that the two sides always agree on issues that arise in the security area. In security as in everything else, co-operation is a two-way street. Full co-operation is given to the British Government in their efforts to control the security situation, to prevent acts of violence and to bring violent offenders to justice. We expect the same, and we receive the same, in relation to threats from the North to peace and security in the South. Listening as well as talking is part of security co-operation. There are policies we will advise against and there are policies we believe should be adopted or pursued more actively. At the end of the day, I stress again, decisions are made by each Government in their own jurisdiction. Each Government are responsible in their own decisions and co-operation is pursued on that basis and only on that basis.

It sometimes appears that the Government are being pressed on a continuing basis in the British media and by British politicians to "do more" on security. I want to say that this view is not put forward by Mr. King or by his deputy, Mr. Stewart, with whom we have excellent and cordial relations, nor by responsible members of the British Government and the security forces, but it is still there.

Let me say that security co-operation is about the saving of life and property and the maintenance of peace and order. That is a duty of both Governments. Both Governments have firmly condemned violence and seek to bring it to an end. Both Governments seek to control the security situation in their own jurisdiction. Both Governments seek security co-operation to these ends and both Governments keep all aspects of security under review with a view to making improvements. That is a constant ongoing process. There is no question of one Government pressing the other to co-operate to act in the interest of saving lives. There is no question of either Government being reluctant to do so. What may be a question from time to time is the method of doing so. When we hear of more security co-operation being required, what is meant more often than not are measures which we on the Irish side believe will not only fail to bring an improvement to the security situation, but will actually make it worse.

The record of the Garda Síochána in recent times has been quite remarkable and I want to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to them. As the House will be aware, following the arrest of the Eksund in October of last year, a nationwide arms search was initiated by the Government and carried out by the Garda with the support of the Army. “Operation Mallard”, as it is known, was a decided success, but the record does not end there. It has a wider context. Since the beginning of 1986, the Garda have seized over 850 firearms, about 190,000 rounds of ammunition, almost 5,000 lbs. of home-made explosives, over 630 lbs. of semtex, large numbers of home-made pipe bombs, mortars and grenades, detonators, assorted bomb-making materials and various explosive and incendiary devices. These finds have been occurring regularly. As recently as last Monday, the Garda seized a major haul of nitrobenzine, a substance which is used to boost the detonating ability of home-made explosives. Much remains to be done to discover the other weapons and explosives which are concealed North and South. We are proud of the record of the past three years and proud too of the close support the Garda Síochána may rely on from our community in their efforts to protect life and property and counter subversion.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the RUC on their finds in Northern Ireland and, in particular, on the exceptional find this morning in Markethill, County Armagh.

Debate adjourned.

Sitting suspended at 1.30 p.m. and resumed at 2.30 p.m.

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht - Wednesday, 16 Nov 1988

Review of Anglo-Irish Agreement: Statements.

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 16 Nov 1988