Vol. 417 No. 2
13 Mr. Byrne asked the Minister for Energy if his attention has been drawn to the recent reported failure of computer controlled safety equipment at the Sellafield Nuclear Reprocessing Plant; if he has raised the matter with the UK authorities; if so, if he will outline the response, if any, he has received; and if he will make a statement on the matter.
I am, of course, aware of the incident referred to by the Deputy which was widely reported by the press both here and in the United Kingdom last September. The UK's Health and Safety Executive (HSE) provided full details of the matter in their quarterly statement of nuclear incidents.
This particular incident took place on 15 September 1991 following maintenance work on a monitoring cell at British Nuclear Fuel's (BNFL) Sellafield Waste Vitrification Plant. In order to facilitate this work two shield doors, normally closed during such operations, were opened to allow access. When operations were restarted, a container of vitrified waste was raised into the cell and it was then observed that the shield doors had remained open. Action was then taken to close them, thereby reinstating the shielding. No workers were in the area at the time, no-one was exposed to radiation and the incident was of no radiological significance for Ireland. Accordingly, I have not raised the matter with the UK authorities. The vitrification plant was shut down following this incident. The HSE's nuclear installations inspectorate granted BNFL permission to resume limited operations in the plant in January 1992.
Any significant incidents at nuclear plants in the UK are reported to my Department under informal procedures agreed at meetings of the Ireland-UK Contact Group on Nuclear Matters. I am fully satisfied that these arrangements provide for an adequate exchange of information between officials of both countries and provide me as Minister with precise and up-to-date data which is essential for our overall monitoring of these installations.
Will the Minister indicate if this particular incident was reported to the Department of Energy by the UK enterprise? Is he aware that the problem arose from a fault in the computer safety system in the new section of the Sellafield plant and that there is considerable concern in the United Kingdom about the fact that the safety control system at Sellafield is now virtually indistinguishable from the normal running systems of the plant which are also computerised — and I believe this is contrary to British regulations in any event? Is the Minister also aware that the Sizewell B plant which is under construction in Suffolk is being computerised to a degree greater than any other plant ever in the United Kingdom and that the HSE nuclear installations inspectorate have stated that it is impossible to check what way the computerised system will react if the reactor acts in a dangerous way? There are major safety gaps in the way we can expect these computer systems to operate in a dangerous situation.
The incident was not reported to the Department of Energy via agreed informal procedures because it was not of radiological significance. It did not involve human exposure to radiation nor did it involve a radioactive discharge. The computer-controlled steel and lead doors of a cell remained open for a short time — I do not know exactly how long, it may have been a matter of seconds — when the doors should have been closed. The incident occurred when a container of treated nuclear waste was put into a cell for a quality control check. No person was exposed to radiation.
My understanding of the incident — obviously the Minister would have an official report on the matter — is that the doors opened prematurely. It was not that they did not close following some operation but that they opened prematurely, and that in one of the chambers where these safety doors opened, there was a highly radioactive material. The Minister stated in his reply that that was in vitrified glass, which I am sure is correct, but surely, his Department should require that any incident, whether it results in a human being being exposed to radioactivity or not, should be reported to him, given that it is not a question of human error but an error in the computerised safety system. The concern must be whether the system which continues to operate in this plant, which was opened only in February last year, is still likely to be risky and whether a similar type of computerised system will be incorporated in the Sizewell B plant in Suffolk. Anything going wrong there would clearly have repercussions on this island.
I must confess that I am not familiar with these matters since I do not deal with them on a day-to-day basis. I am not quite clear whether the doors opened slightly prematurely or were closed slightly too late. There was a short period during which a piece of vitrified waste in a cell was not fully shielded by the double doors of lead and another substance. It was not reported because it was regarded as not being of radiological significance. That is probably true. It was of course of some considerable significance in terms of safety. There was not a specifically radiological incident and there was no contamination. Since this system began in January 1987 there have been 93 notifications.
The Minister's reply raises significant issues. Does the Minister not think that an incident which led to the closure of the plant from September to January is of very great significance? It clearly warranted concern within the industry. Does he know whether this matter was reported to the EC and examined at that level? It raises again the absolute urgency of some form of independent EC inspectorate in respect of nuclear installations to ensure that we are adequately safeguarded. Should we seek reporting not just of incidents of radiological significance but of substantial operational significance?
It was the slow closing of doors rather than the premature opening which caused the difficulty. While the incident was not of radiological importance in the sense that no person or property was contaminated, it was obviously a serious matter in that there was apparently a malfunction in the computer system. If the door closing mechanism could malfunction, however slightly, one's great fear would be that there might be a malfunction in some more basic part of the whole operation. That is why the British safety authorities closed this part of the plant for four months until they were satisfied in that regard. I have no information on the design of Sizewell B and I could not comment on the relative merits or otherwise.
I appreciate that the Minister is standing in for the Minister for Energy on this matter and could not be expected to have the same detailed understanding of the issues concerned. My point is not as to whether the Minister is aware of the adequacy of design of Sizewell B but whether he is satisfied that his Department have sufficient information and sufficient ability to monitor what is going on in the UK with regard to nuclear installations, in order to protect citizens of this State. National boundaries or seas do not protect us from an emission from Sizewell B or from Sellafield. It is absolutely important that we have some input into what is being planned and designed in the UK. Will the Minister undertake to request that all incidents at Sellafield or Sizewell B, whether they have radiological significance or not and whether human beings are affected or not, will be reported to the informal monitoring committee that operates in his Department? Will he also undertake to contact British Nuclear Fuels Limited regarding the computer design of the Sizewell B plant? It will be computerised to a far greater degree than any other nuclear plant in the UK. It is a totally new plant and no one knows how it will operate.
A very long question.
A very serious issue.
Everything is serious.
I agree. Will the Minister give undertakings to follow through on the reporting of incidents which do not necessarily have a radiological impact and to check on what precisely is being planned with regard to the computerisation of the Sizewell B plant?
The Government's view is that it would be very much better if the European Community would take over the monitoring of all nuclear activities within the Community.
They are not prepared to do that.
I understand that my colleague loses no opportunity to urge that on them. From our point of view it would be much more satisfactory because we are not in a position to provide the same type of monitoring service and safety arrangements as other countries which have major nuclear installations. We are somewhat in their hands as to what they report. If they fail to report something we may not know about it. We would prefer independent monitoring and inspection. I hope the Community, which has seen fit to involve itself in a great many activities which have no real Community dimension or great Community importance, will involve itself in this matter, which of its very nature is a Community-wide problem. We would very much like to see that and I hope it comes about.
It is desirable that we should have the best possible monitoring system so that other member states, including Ireland, would be alerted at the earliest possible moment.
