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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 27 Mar 2001

Vol. 533 No. 3

Other Questions. - Nuclear Waste.

Dick Spring

Ceist:

27 Mr. Spring asked the Minister for Public Enterprise the number of safety improvement recommendations contained in the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland's report of December 2000 regarding the storage of high level waste at Sellafield which have been implemented by BNFL; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [8708/01]

The RPII has been maintaining contact with the UK Nuclear Installation Inspectorate (NII) regarding the safety improvement recommendations contained in the RPII's report of December 2000 concerning the storage of high level waste at Sellafield.

The RPII has been informed by BNFL that it has carried out a number of actions on the safety improvement recommendations contained in the RPII report. The analysis of the risk of damage as a result of a severe accident has been substantially completed and some system improvements have been identified. BNFL has discussed and agreed the proposed system improvements with the NII and a programme has been established for their implementation.

BNFL has informed the RPII that a programme for the random checking of plant personnel for alcohol and drug abuse will be introduced at all BNFL installations from 1 April 2001. The RPII has also been informed by BNFL that a new procedure has been introduced which will reduce substantially the risk of hydrogen build-up in the high level radioactive waste tanks. Purging equipment has been installed and routine purging of the tanks with compressed air is being carried out. A number of improvements to the tanks cooling water systems have been identified and agreed with the NII. Some improvements have also been made to the data reliability of components and more will follow.

The response by BNFL to the RPII recommendations has been positive to the extent that several improvements have been made and work is still ongoing. The improvements carried out by BNFL to date are a direct result of the RPII's examination of the BNFL safety documentation relating to the storage of the high level waste and endorses the significance and importance of the RPII's examination. I have requested the RPII to keep me informed of any further improvements carried out by BNFL on foot of the RPII report.

I thank the Minister for his reply and welcome the progress made. However, I would have liked him to be more specific about the number of recommendations which have been acted on. Does the Minister agree that the public profile of the Government on the issue of Sellafield has been somewhat reduced of late and it is important that we keep this issue to the fore in our contacts with the British Government at Minister of State, departmental and Taoiseach level? Does he agree this high level of contact is desirable and that we should continue to seek peer examination rather than depending on the British to tell us what is happening?

I thank the Deputy for his comments and agree that getting this exercise done by the RPII was a major achievement. We have long endeavoured to get inside the doors of BNFL to carry out our risk assessment exercise. I acknowledge Deputy Stagg's efforts in this regard. It was only through dogged persistence by the Government that we managed to get the RPII to carry out this exercise. This portrays the Government's unabated efforts to deal with Sellafield and its desire to have the reprocessing and other activities at Sellafield terminated. Twelve months ago the Taoiseach publicly called for the closure of the installations at Sellafield. He has kept this issue to the fore in his contacts with the UK Prime Minister, as I do at Minister of State level. It is also kept to the fore at official level on an ongoing basis in the fora available to us. This is the most important issue and continues to be treated as such.

Does the Minister agree this highly active liquid waste is the greatest risk to Ireland from the British nuclear industry? Given the slipshod methods used by British officialdom which have given us mad cow disease, CJD and foot and mouth disease, does the Minister agree he has no confidence in its methods of controlling this area which is of high risk to us and that there is a danger of a big bang and a chain reaction from one of the storage tanks which will put foot and mouth, CJD and mad cow disease in the halfpenny place?

My confidence and that of all Members in the efficiency and safety standards in Sellafield has been long shaken. I agree this high level waste has been one of the main causes of concern to successive Governments over the years. This item has been at the top of the list for discussion at every meeting at ministerial and official level. The British authorities have referred to a process of vitrification which will take until 2015 to conclude. We have repeatedly exhorted the British authorities to expedite this process and to take whatever technical measures can be taken. When their independent inspectorate carried out its exercise last February it found major faults and safety lapses. It highlighted this issue and insisted that the timeframe be adhered to.

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