The position is that, on the advice of the Government, the individual concerned was retired, by the President, with effect from a date in June 1969. The retirement was effected pursuant to section 47(2) of the Defence Act, 1954, and paragraph 18(1)(f) of Defence Force Regulations A.15, which provide that an officer may be retired "in the interests of the service". In my reply to the Deputy in October 1997, the extract from Defence Force Regulations A.15 quoted, incorporated amendment No. 93, which was effected on 14 February 1985. However, in any event, the precise relevance, if indeed any, of the terms of the 1985 amendment referred to is not clear as regards the specifics of this particular case.
A decision to retire an officer "in the interests of the service" is only taken for the most compelling reasons. Given that the Government decision and advice to the President concerned military security, I am not in a position to comment in further detail. However, I can say that I am satisfied that the matter was handled in an entirely appropriate and proper manner and that the decision taken was taken only after very detailed and due consideration.
Moreover, the person concerned would have been fully aware at the time of the circumstances giving rise to his retirement in June 1969. He had been previously interviewed by officers of the intelligence section of the Army on three separate occasions in April 1969 in relation to a number of serious matters that had come to their attention.
At the third of these interviews, the person in question volunteered to submit a statement in relation to the matters raised, but did not do so. Given the serious nature of the situation presented to the military authorities, they were of the opinion that to retain the person in service would be contrary to the interests of the Defence Forces and the State.
The Deputy Judge Advocate General was requested to advise on the matter and he conducted a personal interview with the officer concerned in May 1969. The Deputy Judge Advocate General informed the officer that he had been asked to advise the general staff regarding the case and that he wished to give the officer concerned an opportunity to submit any statement he wished to make in relation to the issues raised in the April interviews. The officer advised the Deputy Judge Advocate General that, following the April interviews, he had consulted a solicitor who undertook to correspond with the military authorities on his behalf. The Deputy Judge Advocate General informed him that no such correspondence had been received.
The Deputy Judge Advocate General took the officer through the issues raised in the April interviews, explained the gravity of the situation, advised him to consider the situation, and arranged a further meeting for the following day, at which the officer was to submit a statement. The officer raised the question as to whether he could consult his solicitor and the Deputy Judge Advocate General made it clear to the officer that there was no objection to such a course of action. When the officer returned the following day, he then advised the Deputy Judge Advocate General that he would not in fact be making any statement.