I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
The Bill deals with three aspects of the payments made to leaders of parliamentary parties – how they are computed, how they are audited and how they are adjusted following a merger of parliamentary parties. I propose to deal with each of them but not in the order in which they occur in the Bill.
These allowances have been with us in one shape or another since 1938. When my first Fianna Fáil predecessor, Sean McEntee, introduced the concept of an allowance for the leader of the main Opposition party, it was not a popular move – particularly with his own supporters. He recognised that there was a price to be paid for parliamentary democracy and that one component of that price, at a time when public funds were small and imperative demands on them great, was some subvention of parliamentary Opposition. Subsequent Governments accepted and developed that approach and now allowances are paid to leaders of all parties represented in this House and to non-party members.
Sean McEntee made it clear that this allowance was not a salary for the leader and indicated to this House on what he saw this money being spent. Quite deliberately, he opted not to set his catalogue of leaders expenditure in the concrete of a statutory definition but to leave scope for its adjustment to the needs of different Opposition leaders, the culture of different parties and changing priorities over time.
Until today, there have been two qualifications of the McEntee doctrine since 1938. First, the allowance was specified as being for parliamentary purposes, including research, and following the McKenna judgment prohibited for use for electoral purposes. These remain the parameters for the use of the allowance and when this legislation was first mooted the representatives of all parties I consulted initially felt it should be left as it was. Effectively, what they told me was that we all know what "parliamentary purposes" mean and, if there had been any confusion about it years ago, it has long since been clarified through public discussion. Equally, breaching the ban on electoral use of the allowances carries such a practical risk of a result being challenged by a disappointed candidate that only a party leader with pronounced kamikaze tendencies would even contemplate it. These I accept are not unreasonable ways of looking at things.
However, it is equally valid to say that the propriety of this particular public expenditure is currently self-policed and that it is appropriate that normal audit procedures should be put in place to correct this. The Bill provides that each leader will be required to prepare a statement of his or her expenditure, have it audited by a public auditor – not an employee of any State institution – and to submit it with that auditor's report to the Public Officers Commission.
Section 1(11) sets out where the responsibility to carry out these obligations rests where a leader dies or resigns before he or she has complied with them. Its sanction for non-compliance is simple – fail to deliver and the cash flow dries up until one does. The documentation comes to the commission for its consideration. It may seek from a leader some clarification and then report to the Minister for Finance telling him or her whether the leader's statement and auditor's report came within the time specified, are adequate or inappropriate or disclose any expenditure which does not comply with the requirements of the relevant subsection. The commission's report is laid before the Oireachtas and the commission must retain in its office for three years the leader's statement and auditor's report freely accessible to the public. These arrangements are broadly in line with the arrangements applying to party funds provided under the Electoral Act.
A second criticism heard from time to time was that parliamentary activities could mean everything or nothing. I want a system which will stand the test of time, and none of us who joined this House in 1977 or others who came earlier would have won a prize for predicting the items of expenditure which would feature regularly in a parliamentary party's statement of expenditure. What I have done after serious consultations with all party leaders is set out a list of what we regard as proper categories on which a leader's allowance could be spent. However, if one looks at the subsection which lists these items, it states that the parliamentary activity includes them. This clearly signals that the list is intended to be a snapshot of what the party leaders collectively have seen in recent years and now see as activities and items that have to be financed from that allowance, and all of us in this House appreciate that equally legitimate categories of which we have not thought may arise in the future. They can be added to the list eventually if they come to be a regular feature.
The second new element in this Bill is to take account of mergers between parliamentary parties when fixing allowances. Where it was relevant since 1938, no account was taken in fixing leaders allowances of accretions his or her party acquired in this House during the life of a Dáil by defection from another party or the conversion of an Independent. This seemed reasonable. The electorate had provided votes which elected a Member on the basis of the badge he wore at a general or by-election and they were entitled to expect their party to enjoy that Deputy's support in the voting lobbies and financially. Deputy Quinn, when radically altering the basis of payment in 1996, held firmly to this position. The money stayed where the Deputy started and did not go where he or she moved – whether it was to another party or to non-party status. Most of us thought that was reasonable.
Mergers or take-overs of smaller parties have not been unknown since the Oireachtas was established. In the 1920s and 1930s what is now Fine Gael merged with several parties and the Labour Party did likewise in the 1940s and later. None of these exercises had any implications for the leaders allowance either because it did not exist or because the legal provisions then in place did not affect it.
The merger during the life of this Dáil of Labour and Democratic Left was different. Both had leaders who were paid on the basis of the Dáil strength of their parties. Democratic Left's stopped and Labour's was unaffected. This was because Deputy Quinn's Act of 1996 provided that the leaders allowance was based on the number of Deputies elected as "members of that party at the previous General Election or at a subsequent by-election". The Deputies involved felt hard done by. This was not a political smash and grab where a party captured a discontented Member of a rival party or led a lonely Independent astray. This was a different class of a thing altogether. Two parties with a long standing ideological affinity decided that they were after all compatible and both parliamentary parties and their parties at large decided democratically that they would together become the Labour Party. I am accepting the Labour Party approach and agreeing that the same facility should be available to any parties where all the Dáil and Seanad Members agree to merge in the future. I propose, however, to retain otherwise the arrangements where a defection would not cost funds to the parliamentary party to which the Member had belonged at election time, and would not travel into another party or direct to him or her in the case of opting for non-party status.
At the start of the Bill, the rates of allowances which I and the Government feel should be paid to parliamentary parties of varying strength are set out. In this we are following, with some adjustment, the approach taken by my predecessor, Deputy Quinn, when he decided to radicalise the leaders allowance system by removing the requirement that a party had to have seven Deputies elected before they got a share of cash allocated to parliamentary parties and by extending the allowances to the Independents. The adjustments we are making take account for the first time that Senators are members of var ious parliamentary parties and make demands, as Deputies do, on the services and facilities which a parliamentary party has to provide to all its members. These demands have been greater in recent years as the Seanad made greater use of specialised committees and as Senators took part with their colleagues from this House in joint committees – some of which have proved to impose heavy and contentious burdens. The sums this Bill would provide on their account are, like those for Dáil Members, tapered but only involve two rates for parties and one for Independents because the Seanad is smaller. Those sums are lower than for the general run of Deputies because of the wider function which Deputies have.
The second change we wish to make is in the tapering system as it applies to the Dáil. At present there are four categories – first five; six to ten; 11 to 60 and over 60. This is being reduced to three – first ten; 11 to 30 and over 31. Deputy Quinn took the view, not unreasonably, that the rates should be skewed in favour of the smaller parties on the grounds that a party with five or less members had to keep the party flag flying on several issues with a consequent higher necessary "spend" per member than a larger party or a non-party member. While I would not want to send that view up in flames, there has been a feeling around this House, at least from an early stage in the life of this Dáil, that larger parties have fared less than equitably under the scheme and that the same would be true in the future for parties with between five and ten Dáil Members. The new dispensation would involve treating the first ten Dáil Members in the same way as the first five are currently treated and the next 20 in the way six to ten are treated under the existing scheme. The rest, including parties with more than 60 members, will get the rate currently paid to parties with between 11 and 60 members.
For non-party Deputies, we propose to apply a straight formula – they will each receive the average of the payment made in respect of each party member. This represents a significant increase for them but still leaves them significantly behind the one man Dáil party leader. Some of the more dyed in the wool party members think this practice should not be continued but the fact is that any Minister or Government who wants to avoid becoming embroiled in constitutional litigation must be wary of any measure which could be interpreted as treating non-party members in a discriminatory way.
There is one point not strictly related to the Bill which I consider appropriate here because it relates to a select group of former leaders. Over recent Saturdays, RTE radio has broadcast programmes in which political events of particular epochs were recalled and picked over by academics whose focus was ex-Taoisigh. I have not yet formed a definitive view on the series because it has not dealt with the period or per sonalities in regard to which I claim a certain expertise and sufficient familiarity to know when the pundits have been sold a pup. For me, the fundamental point which came across from the programme was that our democracy has been led by a handful – far fewer than our neighbours or partners – of capable and hard-working men, to whom we owe an immense debt, for in excess of 80 years.
When a Taoiseach leaves office and subsequently leaves this House, elements of the burden of office remain. Constitutionally, he becomes a member of the Council of State and takes part in its formal duty of advising the President on contentious matters. In the nature of things, a Taoiseach becomes public property, a status less easy to shed than the office itself or the role of party leader. The public, or significant elements of it, are reluctant to give up their ownership of the person in question. Ex-Taoisigh are routinely invited to make appearances at events and openings, are expected to deal with representations from contemporaries as if they still held public office and may be required to offer delicate advice to their successors. They will invariably become targets for shoals of researchers in the fields of history, administration or political science or producers of television reminiscence slots. Some persistent editor is almost certain to ask them to contribute to Christmas or summer book reviews or write a short piece for an educational or exam supplement. Somebody else may ask them to join other notables in producing a self-made painting for a charity auction.
While there is no obligation on ex-Taoisigh to do any of these things, the badgering and entreaties will possibly not cease until they die. Dealing with correspondence or dealing with telephone calls makes increasing demands with advancing age. I take the view that this burden should be eased and I propose to deal with it outside this Bill by providing, under the Taoiseach's Vote, for each former Taoiseach to have a secretarial assistant remunerated at the same level as secretarial assistants in this House. I commend the Bill to the House.
