Vol. 553 No. 2
648 Mr. O'Dowd asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government the action his Department has taken to ensure that Sellafield is safe from attack by terrorists; the advice which has been offered to him by the Radiological Protection Institute; if he will publish this advice; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [13794/02]
Security arrangements at British nuclear power plants, including Sellafield, are a matter for the British authorities. Nevertheless, the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, RPII, has been in regular contact with the UK's nuclear installations inspectorate, NII, with a view to obtaining as much information as possible with regard to security measures at such facilities. Following the 11 September attacks, the Irish Embassy in London contacted the relevant Government Departments to ascertain the security measures in place at nuclear installations. The embassy was informed by the UK's Department of Trade and Industry, DTI, that it is not UK Government policy to disclose details of security measures taken at civil nuclear sites. However, the DTI indicated that stringent security measures applied and that these were regulated by the DTI's Office for Civil Nuclear Security, OCNS. The OCNS works closely with the UK's health and safety executive, which provides advice on the safety implications of events including external hazards such as plane crashes at nuclear installations. The DTI also confirmed that security and safety precautions at nuclear installations are kept under regular review and that the regulators were reviewing all relevant precautions in the light of the events of 11 September.
On 3 November 2001 the head of safety at BNFL, in a speech to a public forum on Sellafield in Drogheda, invited the RPII to assess the BNFL evaluation of the consequences of a large aircraft deliberately crashing into the high level radioactive liquid waste storage tanks at Sellafield. As a follow-up to the BNFL invitation, the RPII and BNFL met in Dublin on 14 January 2002. BNFL outlined its evaluation on a confidential basis, and assured the RPII that the storage tanks are robust enough to withstand such an attack. The issue of security at Sellafield was also raised at a meeting between the NII and the RPII on 30 November 2001. At this meeting the NII chief inspector indicated that he was under instruction not to discuss the details of these arrangements and that any request for such information should be directed to the DTI via the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The OCNS recently prepared a report for the DTI on the state of security in the civil nuclear industry and the effectiveness of security regulation. This concludes that, inter alia, “stringent security precautions are being taken to protect civil nuclear sites and material in the United Kingdom, commensurate with current threats to national security” and “satisfactory arrangements have also been made with the Ministry of Defence to protect civil nuclear sites from attacks from the air”. However, the RPII has advised my Department that due to UK security restrictions neither BNFL or NII briefings nor the OCNS report provide sufficient technical detail to enable the RPII to evaluate these conclusions.
