Vol. 712 No. 4
1 Deputy Kieran O’Donnell asked the Minister for Finance his views on the findings of the report by Professor Honohan that the Irish bank guarantee was cast too wide and took the question of loss-sharing with professional risk investors off the table; his further views on whether he did not obtain a sufficiently broad range of advice in formulating the guarantee; and if he will outline the approach he will adopt in the future. [25944/10]
In his report on the banking crisis the Governor of the Central Bank, Professor Honohan, is very clear that an extensive guarantee needed to be put in place. The Governor raises some questions regarding the scope of the guarantee relating to existing longer-term senior bonds and dated subordinated debt.
I have on a number of occasions discussed the question of the inclusion of dated subordinated debt in the guarantee and have been clear on the basis the decision was made. This was, in particular, the requirement to maintain access to wholesale capital markets and guard against the risk of a default for any of these liabilities which could arise from the non-payment of either principal or interest that would have had the effect of triggering the entire guarantee. It is important to note that none of the guaranteed subordinated debt in Anglo Irish Bank or Irish Nationwide Building Society matured for repayment during the period of the guarantee.
As far as opportunities for risk-sharing are concerned, I understand that holders of subordinated debt in the three largest banks have suffered losses of more than €5 billion so far. In addition, credit rating agencies have downgraded subordinated debt in some of the Irish institutions on the basis that they expect further costs to be imposed on these bondholders. I have consistently made clear there is no question of the guarantee for existing dated subordinated debt being extended beyond 29 September 2010.
Turning to the inclusion of the guarantee provided for existing senior debt on 30 September 2008, it is not straightforward to assess what options were available for burden sharing and how that burden sharing could be achieved in practice. Moreover, there were significant risks from excluding existing senior bonds from the guarantee, which could have resulted in the guarantee being called on other guaranteed securities with severe consequences for financial stability.
Apart from these issues, the fact remains that a comprehensive guarantee of bank liabilities was an established part of the standard toolkit for responding to systemic banking crises internationally. Sweden, which is often regarded as the template for successfully dealing with its banking crisis, provided a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities in the 1990s. In the current crisis Denmark, another small EU member state, provided an extensive guarantee, including existing bonds early in October 2008. The Deputy may wish to note that the UK authorities provided a broad guarantee to existing senior bondholders in Northern Rock.
In overall terms, as is evident from Professor Honohan's report, the guarantee preserved the stability of the entire banking system at a time that it was at serious risk of collapse. In the circumstances of September-October 2008, with markets characterised in the Governor's report as hysterical, it was essential that the commitment provided by the Government to stand behind the banking system was entirely credible, clear and consistent. In those circumstances, there were significant risks in an approach which sought to discriminate between different types of bank liabilities which resulted in the financial markets concluding that the guarantee was not market acceptable or indeed credible.
Very significant volumes of both short-term and longer-term funding were secured by the banks from wholesale capital markets in the weeks following the introduction of the guarantee. This has subsequently provided an important foundation to the funding of the banks and a bulwark against funding pressures that have arisen at various times since.
I am, therefore, satisfied that the Government's decision in this matter was at that time informed by a sufficiently broad range of advice on the formulation of the guarantee. It will be a priority for me to ensure that it remains the case that Government decision-making on returning our banking system to health is fully informed by expert advice from the Governor of the Central Bank, Financial Regulator and National Treasury Management Agency to which I have delegated significant roles in the restructuring of the banks.
The report by the Governor of the Central Bank, Professor Honohan, indicates that advisers to the Department from Merrill Lynch explicitly envisaged the exclusion of dated subordinated debt from the coverage of the guarantee. However, the two main banks requested that subordinated debt be included in the guarantee. Why, when advisers indicated to the Department that dated subordinated debt should be excluded, did the Department decide to accede to the request by the two main banks?
Professor Honohan's report states that notes were extremely sketchy at the time the bank guarantee was introduced. Will the Minister elaborate on the contradiction between the advice given by Merrill Lynch and the advice the Government eventually took? Will he make the Merrill Lynch report available to the House?
To clarify, there is not a Merrill Lynch report but a particular note referred to by the Governor of the Central Bank in his report. As I outlined earlier in the week, I would like to make available the entire file of the Department where the particular advice can be placed in an overall context. This context will show, in terms of the written record, that the note was but one element of the overall factors which were taken into account on the issue of subordinated debt.
It is fundamental to emphasise that when the Governor refers to the possible loss on foot of subordinated debt, it is not a loss which has materialised to date because no such subordinated bonds have been paid in Anglo Irish Bank or Irish Nationwide, the two institutions which, in the Governor's report, were failed institutions. I appreciate that the Fine Gael Party last year took the view that Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks were also failed institutions and wanted their bondholders of various descriptions to participate in some unspecified pain from next September. Markets have since judged otherwise. As far as subordinated debt of a dated character in the two institutions in question is concerned, the bonds and the principal in them have not fallen due for payment in the intervening period.
When the Minister made the decision to include in the guarantee dated subordinated debt — lower tier 2 — why did he go against the advice given in the note to which the Governor of the Central Bank refers in his report?
As I indicated, the note to which the Deputy refers was given at a particular stage of the discussions.
It was given several days before the guarantee was announced.
If the Oireachtas committee avails of the opportunity, as I am sure it will, to examine the file as a whole and read the various notes on file, it will become clear that the note was but one element of the advice received on the evening in question.
It was an important element of the advice.
It is of no importance because there has been no liability on foot of it. Let us be clear about this matter, no dated subordinated bonds have been repaid in Anglo Irish Bank or Irish Nationwide. I cannot see any reason it is of importance because there has been no actual exposure to the State on foot of these bonds since September 2008. I have made clear that guarantee cover in respect of these bonds will not take place after September next. The only question to which the Deputy may like an answer is whether any such bonds will be paid in the intervening period and the answer is "No".
2 Deputy Joan Burton asked the Minister for Finance his exit strategy from the credit institutions financial support and eligible liabilities guarantee bank guarantee schemes; his views on the ongoing EU state aid approval process for the extension of the ELG scheme beyond 30 June 2010; his plans to extend beyond 29 September 2010 the deadline for issuance of liabilities covered by the ELG scheme; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [25968/10]
5 Deputy Kieran O’Donnell asked the Minister for Finance the proposals he has developed for extending the bank guarantee beyond September 2010. [24741/10]
I propose to take Questions Nos. 2 and 5 together.
As the Deputies are aware, since 29 September 2008, the State has guaranteed certain liabilities of credit institutions in Ireland, initially under the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Scheme, known as the CIFS scheme, which was on foot of the 2008 legislation, and more recently under the more targeted Credit Institutions (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee) Scheme, known as the ELG scheme. The ELG scheme allows the participating institutions issue debt liabilities and take deposits under guarantee from the date the institution joins the scheme until 29 September 2010 subject to EU state aid approval. The duration of the guarantee under the eligible liabilities guarantee corresponds to the term of the relevant guaranteed liability, subject to a maximum term of five years. In contrast to the credit institutions financial support scheme, the existing liability scheme allows institutions to issue unguaranteed debt and take unguaranteed deposits.
The existing liability guarantee scheme was approved by the EU Commission under state aid rules from 1 December 2009. The scheme, in line with all schemes approved under state aid rules, is subject to ongoing six-monthly approval by the European Commission. The scheme was scheduled for review by the Commission before 1 June 2010 and in order to bring the review date in line with other European guarantee schemes, the Commission has approved the continuation of the scheme under existing terms to 30 June 2010. This means the formal review of the scheme by the Commission will now be completed before the end of this month.
Regarding the position after 30 June, discussions with the Commission are progressing and are close to conclusion. The terms of the prolongation of the ELG scheme being finalised with the Commission would see the scheme being extended under the currently applicable terms and conditions to 29 September 2010 as is provided for in national law. Beyond this, the guarantee would be modified to provide for a prolongation from end September to 31 December 2010 as an issuance window for liabilities of between three months and five years' duration. In addition the current provisions applicable to retail deposits would continue in their current form to 31 December 2010. That is an extension of slightly more than three months.
It is likely that the pricing of the guarantee will also change in line with the pricing structure outlined in the European Commission's staff working document on the application of state aid rules on government guarantee schemes covering bank debt to be issued after 30 June 2010.
Progress on the phasing out of the guarantee will be achieved consistent with any requirement for continued support of the funding conditions of the banks and the maintenance of financial stability overall. In my reply I made clear that the discussions and the decision by the Commission will be concluded by the end of this month and I have tried to give the House a sense of the direction of the discussions with the Commission at this stage.
The Minister is setting out a proposal to extend the two-year guarantee to 31 December, if he can get the European Union to agree. If the European Union agrees to an extension of the guarantee to 31 December, will that require further legislation coming before the House or can the Minister do that by order under the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act? Ordinary people understand that the guarantee ends at the end of September, but the Government has already taken two steps, an application to the European Commission to extend the guarantee to the end of December or as long as the Commission is willing to extend it, and to have what is called the eligible liabilities guarantee which allows new debt to be issued for a further five years under a Government guarantee. In that context can the Minister confirm the figure he gave me approximately two weeks ago that some €74 billion in guaranteed bank liabilities will mature before the end of September, when the original end of September guarantee comes up? Does the Minister propose to roll over the €74 billion into new debt at that time or does he propose to try to go to the end of the year? These are very important issues for Ireland because in many ways it will crystallise in the minds of international bond markets the level of the total indebtedness on the part of the Government regarding the guarantee.
I thank the Deputy for her questions which assist in clarifying these matters. I understand the matter can be dealt with by statutory instrument. However, that statutory instrument would be required to be brought before the House. In the event that changes are required to the terms of the current ELG scheme, the draft statutory instrument introducing any changes to the ELG scheme after 29 September 2010 will require Oireachtas approval under section 6 of the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008. I can, of course, implement any increase in guarantee fees from 1 July on an administrative basis under the current ELG schemes. However, changes in the terms of the ELG scheme would require approval in both Houses, but not fresh legislation.
The Deputy also asked about the precise sums and the difficulty of the cliff on 29 September. I understand that in terms of guaranteed issuance under the CIFS scheme — the old scheme if one likes as announced in 2008 — some €29 billion of longer-tem bank debt is due to be refinanced by the end of September 2010. Obviously a prolongation of the ELG scheme would provide a good basis for the refinancing of these liabilities. That said, Deputy Burton used a different figure. I will arrange for my Department to examine——
It was advised by departmental officials.
I will arrange to write to the Deputy about that figure. The information at my disposal this afternoon is that in terms of guaranteed issuance under the CIFS, some €29 billion of longer-term bank debt is due to be refinanced by the end of 2010. However, I will revert to the Deputy about the wider figure she mentioned,
Professor Honohan appeared before the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service earlier in the week. He stated that any renewal or extension of the bank guarantee scheme should only be in respect of new senior debt issued and not in respect of existing senior or subordinated debt or new subordinated debt. I ask the Minister to outline his views on the matter.
I made clear the position on subordinated debt in reply to a previous question. There is no proposal under discussion with the Commission and there is no intention to provide coverage for any class of subordinated debt after the guarantee period up to 29 September.
I know that.
The guarantee in respect of senior debt is due to lapse on 29 September but we are in discussion with the Commission on an extension to the end of the year. Regarding existing senior debt, the purpose of the ELG scheme is to provide its refinancing on a different basis.
For how long will existing senior debt be guaranteed under what the Minister now proposes? Does he envisage it just being guaranteed to the end of December?
That was the direction of my reply and that is my expectation of what the final assessment of the Commission and the national authorities will be.
What will happen thereafter?
Thereafter the ELG scheme will provide, and the ELG scheme already provides, for the possibility of refinancing under guarantee. Of course the banks are free to finance on an unguaranteed basis also. Deputies must appreciate the very difficult conditions that obtain in world markets at present in respect of which Ireland is not being singled out to any extent, but is participating as all other European states are participating in a very difficult international context.
Contrary to what Fianna Fáil claimed at the time, this guarantee is not the shortest, cheapest no-cost guarantee in the world. All of our banks remain on life support from the guarantee and continue to require that support. We were told yesterday that €14 billion of the €22 billion had already gone into Anglo Irish Bank. Mr. Anysley said that we need to face the fact that it is just gone.
There is nearly €60 billion of senior debt due for renewal on 1 October and there is a total of €141 billion, according to a reply given by the Minister, of wholesale funding. That is demand deposits, inter-bank lending and the senior debt. The sub-debt is very small for the reasons outlined by the Minister.
The promises made by the Minister and Fianna Fáil that this would be the cheapest, easiest, cleanest and quickest guarantee in the world is simply not true. It needs to be extended and €60 billion of debt is needed on 1 October to either be rolled over, extended or included in the eligible liabilities guarantee scheme. Along with the Honohan and Regling and Watson reports, that tells us everything.
When debts are rolled over — which is good in a way — the fact is that despite the austerity measures in Ireland, the bond spreads of Ireland compared to Germany and countries like Spain, which are also experiencing difficulties, remain awesomely high. At least €4 billion in this year's budget will need to be paid to cover the cost of servicing all these different debt requirements.
Deputy Burton is confusing a number of different markets. As far as the guarantee is concerned, the Government will receive substantial moneys from the banks. It will be shy of the €1 billion envisaged because the banks received substantial collateral support from the European Central Bank in respect of which the relevant fees could not be charged.
They would be dead except for that.
They would be dead but for the guarantee and a number of measures taken.
The bankers are not acting like that.
It is not on foot of the guarantee that steps were taken to capitalise Anglo Irish Bank, and that is an entirely separate matter. I do not quite understand the Deputy's argument in that respect. I understood the Deputy as saying recently that the reason the Labour Party opposed the guarantee was because of subordinated debt, which I dealt with today.
There was also senior debt, as described by Professor Honohan. Professor Honohan gives a good expression of our views.
Allow the Minister to answer the question.
When the matter was debated in the Houses in early October, there was no reference from any side of the House to senior debt. Nobody suggested that senior debt should be called into question or not guaranteed.
The Labour Party suggested——
Allow the Minister to reply.
Professor Honohan dealt with the question of existing senior debt in his report and has not drawn a firm conclusion on it.
The Minister is not quite right.
The Minister is wrong.
The Deputies were present. I was not present at the committee hearing because I would not be present at a hearing when the author of a report I commissioned was there. I read the transcript and my understanding is that Professor Honohan was extremely coy on the subject of senior debt and how any question of senior debt could have arisen in 2008 or 2009. He made it clear that to even mention such an idea in 2008 and 2009 could have accelerated a catastrophe.
We need to move on.
The question of senior debt is also in the realm of the potential after 2009.
3 Deputy Kieran O’Donnell asked the Minister for Finance the way he has arrived at the estimate of a further €10 billion cost for the taxpayer at Anglo Irish Bank; and if he expects this sum will be committed before the expiry of the guarantees. [25945/10]
As I pointed out in the banking statement on 30 March, the unavoidable reality is that the bank has incurred losses from its large-scale property lending and needs substantial further capital. I also made clear that unpalatable as it is, only the taxpayer can provide this capital and in view of the significant costs of an immediate liquidation or wind-down of the bank, which I set out in my statement, this was the least worst option in light of the imperative of continuing to maintain overall financial stability. I made it clear that there is simply no alternative that meets Anglo Irish Bank's unavoidable obligations at a lower cost consistent with the maintenance of the hard-won stability of the banking system in Ireland.
For that reason, in addition to the promissory note provided to the bank at that time, to take account of the bank's losses to date I confirmed that the bank will need further capital to cover future losses and accomplish the restructuring of the bank and its balance sheet and this was estimated at that time to be of the order of the figure referred to in the Deputy's question. In my statement I drew attention to the fact that notwithstanding very substantial work under way on the bank's restructuring plan, there are still significant uncertainties about this figure, including the size of the discount on all of its loans transferring to NAMA, the scale of future losses on its loans that are not transferred to NAMA and the exact nature and the scope of any split of the bank under its plans and the EU Commission decision on the plan.
I advise the Deputy that the estimate provided at end of March remains the bank's base case estimate of the additional capital required, taking into account the further capital support provided at the end of May. The figure was included as part of the bank's restructuring plan submitted to the European Commission at the end of May. Work is continuing with the bank involving the NTMA, the Financial Regulator and my Department to refine this estimate in the context of ongoing discussions with the Commission on the restructuring plan. However, the uncertainties I referred to in my banking statement remain with regard to, for example, the loan-by-loan assessment of the bank's loans transferred into NAMA.
I reiterate that whereas the sums required to rescue the bank are enormous, the costs of winding it down are even greater. The current bank strategy of seeking to devise a way to realise value for the taxpayer out of the remains of the old bank means the State could at least get some return, in time, recouping some of its assistance. I can again assure the House that the bank shares my overriding objective to maximise the potential return for the taxpayer in recognition of the State support.
We had the chairman and management of Anglo Irish Bank before the finance committee yesterday. The source of the €10 billion figure is the discounts provided by the bank itself on the NAMA-directed loans, with €36.4 billion at 28%. The first tranche went into NAMA at 55%, leading to the differential of €10 billion.
If between subordinated and senior debt in Anglo Irish Bank there is approximately €7 billion available, the bank has proposed a good bank to recapitalise in the order of €2.5 billion. An extra €8 billion is needed because €2 billion of the €10 billion has already gone into Anglo Irish Bank. May I take it from the Minister's response to the previous question that he feels that a case of existing senior debt would not be guaranteed? In the scenario of a good bank and bad bank in Anglo, are we effectively looking at €8 billion, with €2.5 billion of that going to the recapitalisation of the good bank, with €5.5 billion going to the bad bank? Should the bondholders take the pain rather than the taxpayer?
I am not willing at this stage to make a definitive statement on how that would be approached. Matters are with the Commission in Brussels and there are detailed and intensive discussions between the authorities at the Commission and my Department. Officials from the Department are also in liaison with the Central Bank and the NTMA with regard to these matters. It is important that the taxpayer be protected but I am not prepared to announce this afternoon in this House a default on senior debt.
It has clearly been an accepted feature of the Government's approach to this financial and banking crisis that subordinated bondholders have to share the pain and take appreciable discounts. With regard to that aspect of the question, I have made it clear that such debt will not be guaranteed after 29 September. The markets are making their own judgments in these matters and I will not speculate on how the question will be approached other than to set out the general approach taken to date.
With regard to senior debt and bonds, it is a far-reaching step for this country, given the amount of funding we require at the NTMA to fund the State and the amount of funding that Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland and the other financial institutions require, to signal at this stage that in any sense the State envisages a default on the repayment of the principal sums of the senior debt in any institution.
Some €14 billion has already gone into Anglo Irish Bank, which is effectively a black hole. The taxpayer will never again see that money. There is a strong argument that Anglo Irish Bank falls into a completely different category. With regard to opportunity cost for the taxpayer, I ask the Minister to look at the senior debt within Anglo Irish Bank in the context of saving €5.5 billion for the Irish taxpayer.
As Deputy O'Donnell has made the proposal, it will naturally be examined. I will arrange for that and a reply will issue to the Deputy.
However, as a small country which is dependent on international funding, Ireland must be extremely wary about any suggestion regarding a default on senior bonds. Under Irish law, those who hold such bonds rank equally with depositors.
Anglo Irish Bank is no longer of systemic importance.
If he will allow me to conclude, the Deputy will then be in a position to ask as many supplementary questions as he sees fit about this matter. However, I make the point that these payments rank equal in status with those relating to all classes of ordinary depositors. They relate to bonds which issue not just to some class of people which the Deputy's party chooses to characterise in a generic way but also to pension funds, credit unions and many other institutions, to which and in respect of which they provide a crucial source of finance.
4 Deputy Kieran O’Donnell asked the Minister for Finance if he intends to introduce a new approach to the presentation of budget 2011 to allow independent assessment of the proposed fiscal stance and an informed debate about the choices he proposes and the consideration of alternatives. [25946/10]
As the Deputy will be aware, there have been many improvements in recent years to the budgetary process, including the publication of a pre-budget outlook, usually in October, a more multi-annual focus, including the introduction of capital expenditure envelopes, and the presentation of a unified budget, whereby expenditure and taxation measures are announced together, thus ensuring a more coherent approach to budgeting. There are already a number of independent bodies, including the Economic and Social Research Institute and the Central Bank, which assess and comment on the economic and fiscal situation in Ireland. Assessment is also carried out by international bodies such as the European Commission, the OECD and the IMF. All of these contribute and help to inform the debate in Ireland.
I have worked to ensure more information is made publicly available than has been the case previously. The report of the special group on public service numbers and expenditure programmes is one example in this regard. In effect, it amounted to the early publication of expenditure plans and proposals well in advance of the budget. The interest shown in it was remarkable and well in excess of 1 million people accessed it on the Department's website. This is an example of how placing information in the public domain can induce a more realistic approach to the problems associated with public expenditure. The position on the report of the Commission on Taxation which was the subject of early and prompt publication is similar. Both reports will be important in identifying the future measures required to align more closely our tax revenues and expenditures in order that we can place the public finances on a more sustainable footing.
The work of the National Economic and Social Council and its publications have also added considerably to the information available and the discussions relating to the choices to be made. In November last year, following publication of the pre-budget outlook, the House engaged in a debate on budgetary options. There have also been numerous discussions in the Dáil on the economic and fiscal challenges we face and the very difficult choices that must be made.
Additional information not given on the floor of the House.
I am open to discussing further enhancements to the process of budget reform which I see as an evolving one. In the context of the recent publication of the preliminary scoping reports into the causes of Ireland's banking crisis, the Government has asked the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service to examine the key policy lessons in respect of macro-economic management as set out in the report by Mr. Regling and Mr. Watson. One of the areas on which the committee's views have been sought is the case for independent institutional sources for economic and fiscal projections.
There are also developments at EU level which are relevant. In the light of the financial and economic difficulties being experienced in virtually all European countries, there is widespread acknowledgement of the need for a strengthening of budgetary and economic surveillance and co-ordination so as to reduce the likelihood of future budgetary crises. A task force on improving budgetary discipline was mandated by the European Council in March to advance work on this issue. The recent European Commission's communication on reinforcing economic policy co-ordination is informing the discussion taking place at the task force which is chaired by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. The mandate of the task force is, inter alia, to propose measures for better budgetary discipline and an improved crisis resolution framework, particularly within the euro area. The President will present an interim report to the European Council today and present a final report in October.
I have attended the meetings of President Van Rompuy's task force and welcome its constructive work in this important area. We will need to see its specific recommendations in due course, but it is clear that closer economic governance and broader and deeper examination of budgetary policies, without prejudice to the role of national parliaments, are now being sought at EU level, particularly within the euro area. This will have implications for all member states, not just Ireland.
The UK Government recently established the Office for Budgetary Responsibility which has clearly bolstered confidence in the bond markets. Fine Gael has suggested an independent fiscal council, similar to the office in the United Kingdom to which I refer, should be established in this country. The same suggestion was contained in the Regling and Watson report. Will the Minister give consideration to establishing such a council? If a body of this nature had been in place previously, certain tax incentive schemes might have been curbed much earlier.
I am giving consideration to the establishment of such a body. That is one of the reasons the Government requested the Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service to engage in further arduous labour.
The Minister is keeping us busy.
I am aware that the joint committee has a sizeable work schedule, but I felt obliged to ask it to examine the three general economic questions posed by Messrs Regling and Watson in their report and revert to the Government with its views in this regard as soon as possible. We need to examine the possibility of establishing such a council.
I disagree, however, with the Deputy on one aspect of this matter. I am not sure whether we should pursue the United Kingdom's example in this regard. By virtue of our membership of the eurozone and the European Union, we are already under a surveillance obligation in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact. It is true that the United Kingdom is under a similar obligation. However, it is interesting that during the discussions engaged in by the Van Rompuy task force the UK representatives made clear their position that they did not perceive a need for intensification of that surveillance.
While, in formal terms, the Stability and Growth Pact may not distinguish between members of the eurozone and other member states, in the light of our experience in the past year, it is clear that there is a fundamental difference in respect of the appraisal that takes place on the fiscal front. The title "fiscal council", used by many people, borrows a view of the English language common in other EU member states. However, I remain open to suggestions regarding what might be the appropriate title for such a council.
An bord airgeadais or perhaps an bord easpa airgeadais.
Absolutely. I understand the review at European level is carried out in the context of parameters that are extremely broad. An independent fiscal council would be in a position to consider specific issues relating to the Irish context. How soon after the joint committee reverts to the Government on the matter will such a body be put in place?
The matter is under consideration in my Department. I am examining various options with my officials. I would welcome the views of the Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service as soon as possible. It was precisely for this reason that the Government set a deadline of September in respect of the joint committee concluding its deliberations. I would be happy if the joint committee reverted to me on the matter prior to the summer recess.
Will such a body be established before the next budget?
Yes, it needs to be put in place as—
Will it be established before the summer recess?
No. However, it would be of assistance if the joint committee were able to report its views before August. I would like to be in a position to make an announcement on the matter in the course of this year.
Question No. 5 answered with Questions No. 2.
