First, I will try to put this proposal for a directive on takeovers in context. All member states, with the exception of Luxembourg, currently have their own takeover codes which set out the procedures and rules on how takeovers of listed companies in their jurisdiction should be conducted and supervised. In Ireland, the takeover code is enshrined in the Takeover Panel Act 1997, which is implemented by the Irish Takeover Panel, a statutory body provided for in the 1997 Act.
The directive, if adopted, would require member states to absorb into their takeover codes certain common features. These features consist of certain general principles and a limited number of minimum requirements. Therefore, what is envisaged in this directive is a limited level of harmonisation, allowing member states to have more stringent or additional requirements provided, of course, the minimum requirements of the directive are complied with and that the additional requirements are in line with the general principles of the directive.
Why do we need a directive? The Commission sees this proposal as an important component of its action plan for completion of the Internal Market for financial services by 2005. The Commission considers that the level of harmonisation proposed in the directive is needed to strengthen the legal certainty of cross-border takeovers in the interests of all concerned and to ensure protection of minority shareholders in the course of such transactions. In the Commission's view, differences which currently exist between takeover codes in member states act as a constraint, at least, on the effective achievement of these objectives.
Before going on to outline the provisions of the directive in more detail, I will give a brief historical background to the proposal. There have been two previous attempts at having a directive on takeovers adopted prior to the current one. The first was as far back as 1989. This took the form of a detailed harmonisation measure which failed to command support and was subsequently abandoned by the Commission. The second proposal, in 1997, was a much less ambitious measure in terms of the level of harmonisation envisaged. This proposal was the subject of detailed negotiation over an extended period and a compromise was finally agreed unanimously at Council.
However, this was rejected by the European Parliament on a tied vote in July 2001. The Parliament's main concerns were the lack of a level playing field for European companies facing a takeover bid, the need for a common definition of equitable or fair price to be paid by a bidder in a mandatory bid situation and the need for a squeeze-out right, whereby a majority shareholder could require the remaining minority shareholders to sell their securities on specified terms. Following that rejection by the Parliament, the Commission appointed an expert group to examine the Parliament's concerns. This group reported to the Commission in January 2002, with recommendations on how these concerns should be addressed. Taking broad account of the expert group's recommendations, the Commission's latest proposal, published in October 2002, is what we are now concerned with.
I will now give a brief outline of the main proposals of the directive. As indicated at the outset, the proposal, which applies to listed companies, consists of certain general principles and a limited number of minimum requirements. The principles are set out at Article 3 and largely reflect what we have in our own takeover code. The minimum requirements are set out in subsequent articles and many of these are broadly in line with what we have in our code.
The main requirements of the directive are as follows. In respect of cross-border bids, Article 4 provides for the means of determining which competent authority will be responsible for supervising the bid and which member state law will apply. To ensure that minority shareholders are protected, Article 5 makes it mandatory on a bidder, every time they acquire control of a listed company, to address a bid to all holders of securities at an equitable or fair price. Articles 6 to 8 ensure a basic level of disclosure and information relating to the offer, thus guaranteeing transparency during the bid. Article 9 asserts an important principle that the board of the offeree company must have the approval of shareholders for defensive measures the board may wish to take against a bid and this approval must be given after the bid is announced.
Articles 10,11,13,14,15 and 17 are completely new provisions compared to the 2001 proposal. Articles 10 and 11 deal with the level playing field issue. Article 13 deals with information and consultation of employees. Articles 14 and 15 deal with squeeze-out and sell-out rights in a situation where the majority shareholder has acquired a specified percentage of the securities, while Article 17 deals with the limited application of the so-called committee procedure. Essentially, the committee procedure involves formally delegating to the Commission the power to make implementing rules relating to provisions of the directive to apply uniformly across member states.
Of the new provisions, compared to the 2001 proposal, the level playing field is by far the most contentious. It derives from the fact that, in various member states, legal defensive measures are available to companies to use particularly in the case of hostile bids. These mechanisms can be used as an instrument to maintain control over a company and thus hinder hostile bids or, at the very least, make them more difficult. The belief is that such mechanisms do not apply uniformly across member states, thereby giving rise to concerns in some member states that their companies would be more vulnerable to takeover, compared to similar companies in other member states which would be perceived to have disproportionate anti-takeover devices available. Articles 10 and 11 of the new proposal represent the Commission's response in this area.
Article 10 provides for greater transparency by requiring listed companies to publish, in their annual reports, specific information relating to the defensive mechanisms they have put in place and to provide a separate explanatory report on these matters to the AGM of shareholders. Article 11 provides for the so-called breakthrough rule, the purpose of which is to neutralise during the bid and to dismantle, if the bid is successful, at least some of the most common pre-bid defensive measures that can be regarded as hindering bids. Under the Commission's proposal, this rule would apply to restrictions on the transfer of securities, such as the imposition of a ceiling on shareholdings or restrictions on the transferability of shares, and restrictions on voting rights, such as restrictions on the exercise of voting rights and deferral of voting rights, provided for in a company's articles of association or in agreements between the company and third parties or between shareholders.
The negotiations at Council commenced in November 2002 under the Danish Presidency and have continued under the Greek Presidency. Discussions so far have focused on the new elements of the proposal to which I have referred. Some changes have been made to the text in the meantime and their extent is set out in the latest presidency compromise text which we circulated with an explanatory note.
While nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, good progress is being made on building consensus on a number of the new elements of the proposal. The key outstanding issue is the level playing field, but the latest presidency proposal on this is designed to break the deadlock. This proposal goes further than that of the Commission. Under the presidency proposal, so-called multiple voting rights, that is, where a security can have more than one vote, would also be made unenforceable in a takeover.
This proposal is in response to a blocking minority of member states, led by Germany, that considered the Commission's proposal for Article 11 as not going far enough towards addressing the level playing field issue. Multiple voting rights were abolished in Germany and that is its justification for adopting this approach. The proposal is being opposed vehemently by the Scandinavian countries, where the multiple voting rights are widely used. Nevertheless, the presidency hopes it will be able to command a qualified majority at the Council for its latest proposal. Its plan is to secure political agreement on the dossier before the end of its term of office.
Ireland is generally happy with the text as it stands. As already indicated, the principles and several other minimum requirements are broadly in line with what we have in our own code. We can go along with what the presidency is proposing in regard to the contentious level playing field issue. It is positive for a small, open economy like Ireland that there are no anti-takeover devices in other member states that might obstruct companies that want to expand.
We had concerns about the so-called squeeze-out and sell-out provisions of the directive but we are less concerned now that these represent a substantial departure from what we have in our own company law. Ireland is one of a number of member states that are strongly of the view that the application of the so-called committee procedure to the directive is inappropriate. We feel the case against comitology for this directive is based on the fact that this is a limited harmonisation measure, where the responsibility for implementing rules clearly rests with the member states. That is a very basic tenet of the directive. To be introducing the committee procedure, however limited, is not appropriate. That issue has not yet been resolved, but the debate favours us because the presidency has already deleted one of the two provisions relating to comitology from the directive.
We are also looking at the implications of the directive for schemes of arrangement. Section 201 of the Companies Act 1963 can be used to effect a takeover by a court sanctioned scheme of arrangement. A takeover scheme, which can be used only in voluntary bid circumstances, envisages a scheme of arrangement entered into between a company and its shareholders. We have received preliminary legal advice that schemes of arrangement, in so far as they are used for takeovers of listed companies, might be caught by the directive. We are examining our options to see how we can move forward.