Léim ar aghaidh chuig an bpríomhábhar
Gnáthamharc

JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 30 Nov 2005

European Union Neighbourhood Policy: Presentation.

Apologies have been received from Deputy Quinn. The President of Cyprus will attend at 3 p.m. and I have been informed that there will be "consequences and repercussions" if I do not clear the room by then.

The first item on our agenda is a presentation by Mr. Andreas Herdina of the European Commission on the European Union neighbourhood policy in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and the Caucasus, for which he has responsibility. He is very welcome. The format at this committee is as informal as we can make it. Mr. Herdina may make a presentation, following which we will open the floor to members.

I will explain how this debate was initiated. Over a course of months, since the rejection of the EU constitutional treaty, a number of members have raised concerns that the European Union and the European model are growing too fast. There are concerns about the process internally with regard to the induction of other countries into the framework. All EU parliaments have been asked to organise a period of reflection with regard to the European Union.

Members of this committee have regularly remarked on the speed at which accession seems to be happening. Mr. Herdina may not have intended to refer to this issue but it is a political reflection on how the European Union is growing. It may give him an idea of the approach being adopted by some members. I thank him for attending.

Mr. Andreas Herdina

I thank the Chairman and the Members of the Irish Parliament present. I will make a five or six minute presentation on the European Union neighbourhood policy as it developed and will then respond to questions.

Looking back over the history of the EU neighbourhood policy, the thinking started around 2002 or 2003 when Foreign Ministers Jack Straw and Anna Lindt sent a joint letter stating that since the political geography of Europe was about to change with the accession of the new member states and that the European Union would expand from 15 to 25 member states with new neighbours to the east, namely, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, we should think of how we should address this new neighbourhood. Later, Javier Solana's paper on the European security strategy encouraged everyone to include the southern Caucasus in that policy, which happened somewhat later.

While the initial so-called wider Europe initiative which later came to be called the European Union neighbourhood policy was directed at our neighbours to the east, perhaps also with the intention of providing an alternative to further enlargement, it suddenly embraced the southern Mediterranean countries. The initiative was taken rather surprisingly at the Copenhagen European Council meeting of December 2002. It is very difficult to indicate exactly how this decision came about but it was introduced by Romano Prodi, the then President of the European Commission.

Our Mediterranean member states were anxious that attention would focus mainly towards bilateral relations with our immediate neighbours. This myth put on the back burner our traditional relations and was supported by the Barcelona process towards the south. What the policy has tried to do is engage our neighbours in supporting and encouraging their reform towards good governance, the rule of law, institutional reform and building administrative capacity. We realise that the neighbours around us from Belarus to Morocco all need to improve. We face a number of common challenges, from illegal migration to organised crime. We must also have a keen interest in seeing to it that our external frontiers do not become new dividing lines in a geopolitical sense and that the disparities of wealth are also addressed so that, for example, eastern Slovakia does not become prosperous while western Ukraine remains in a poor state because certain pressures could arise as a result of such a scenario.

The European neighbourhood policy is new and was only devised recently. Members will find, in a strategy paper produced by the Commission in May 2004, the essential outline of the policy and, in the Thessaloniki conclusions, they will find an endorsement of the policy by the European Council. It is important to note, this comes back to the Chairman's question, that the European neighbourhood policy is distinct from enlargement. It is a policy that does not hold out to our partner countries an accession perspective, contrary to the stability and association agreements that are either discussed or already signed with the Balkan pre-candidate countries. Nevertheless, as I pointed out yesterday when speaking at the Institute of European Affairs, it is clear that this is a decision at this juncture.

Ukraine and Moldova have made it clear, and President Ushenka repeatedly states, that their intention is to bid for accession at a given time. When we started the policy, we had to persuade them that the time to apply was certainly not in 2004 and that they should concentrate on doing their homework on reform. We also had other preoccupations at the time, such as digesting the accession and enlargement in 2004 and the constitutional debate which was preoccupying the Union at that time. We could agree with the Ukrainians and Moldovans to have what are called ENP action plans for a three-year period. The question will then come back and it will have to be decided by the European Council as to whether the European neighbourhood policy that we describe as being distinct from enlargement is to be a permanent alternative to enlargement or a precursor of some type of pre-accession process later for these two or three countries.

That is exactly what members are inquiring about, namely, whether it is a permanent alternative or a precursor. I apologise for the interruption.

Mr. Herdina

That is fine. The decision is still out. We have devised this policy as something distinct from enlargement. It does not prejudge, in either way, the answer to this question. The question lies also in the Treaty of the European Union and not in this policy. The policy does not express an accession perspective. Against the background the Chairman mentioned, the farther west one goes within the European Union, the stronger feelings become that enlargement is moving too fast. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldnersees much merit in strengthening this policy because it is not an enlargement policy. When we present a policy, we sometimes tend to call it a partnership of reform with our neighbouring countries with which we have engaged and helped to reform.

I draw the attention of the joint committee to the so-called ENP action plans, which are joint agendas agreed, often after painstakingly long consultations, with our neighbouring countries on an agenda of what to do over the next three to five years. Our legal relationship with these countries is founded in the association agreements with the states to the south and the partnership and co-operation agreements with our eastern neighbours. These are political agendas that are negotiated by the Commission, the Council and the higher representative and the special representatives of the European Union are drawn in when such negotiations touch on partner countries affected by regional conflicts. I refer here to the difficulties between Moldova and Transinistria, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue or the Middle East peace process.

The policy, which is reform-oriented and which encompasses certain objectives and measures we have agreed with these countries to take forward in the coming years, touches upon three main groups of issues. The first is political dialogue and reform. This involves dialogue with these countries, particularly, the Ukraine, in terms of encouraging them to align with EU positions abroad in foreign policy matters. Such dialogue is reform-oriented towards the rule of law and the functioning of the judicial system and of election laws, freedom of the media, etc. The second major matter in respect of which we co-operate with the partner countries is sound macroeconomic management. The third is sectoral reform and institution-building in the areas of energy, transport, the environment, research and development and — particularly with regard to the southern neighbouring countries but also in respect of those to the east — education exchanges. Research is also carried out in respect of education systems in these countries in order to ensure that modern models of such systems are in place.

The entire policy aims to help the reform process that should provide more prosperity to the people, particularly in young countries such as our southern neighbours. It has been welcomed by most of our neighbours. Morocco and Jordan have their domestic reform programmes. In Jordan it has just been adopted by the Parliament and by the King as a national agenda. In Morocco there is also a reform programme. The Ukraine and Moldova did not welcome it at first because they were disappointed that it did not hold an accession perspective for them. They have, however, accepted it in the meantime. What was also rather difficult to set up was the action plan with Israel and the Palestinian Authority because of the Middle East peace process and conflict.

Where do we stand? We have set up such action plans with seven of our neighbouring countries, namely, the Ukraine, Moldova, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Morocco and Tunisia. We have begun consultations, for which we received a mandate from the European Council, with a further five countries. The first of these is Egypt, with which we have had one round of consultations and with which we will have another in December, the second is Lebanon, with which consultations were delayed because of the Syrians retreating and the new Government being formed, the third and fourth are Armenia and Georgia, with which consultations began yesterday and today, and the fifth is Azerbaijan, with which consultations will follow in the coming weeks. The aim is to eventually have such action plans with all 16 of our neighbours. The laggards in this area are Syria, Libya and Belorussia. The reasons for the delay in commencing consultations with them do not need further explanation.

To support the European neighbourhood policy, the Commission has proposed a European neighbourhood and partnership instrument for the Union's assistance in the period 2007 to 2013. The Commission proposes to increase the Union's assistance to approximately €15 billion to these countries for the seven-year period but that depends on the budget decision that is still outstanding. We are waiting for the regulation on the new instrument, called ENP, to be decided by the Council, possibly by March, but only on condition that the UK Presidency can bring about an agreement on the budget. This regulation should provide for a more flexible menu of assistance compared with the Tacis and MEDA programmes which are being replaced by it. We will also be able to apply some instruments we used in support of the transition of our new member states such as the twinning mechanism or the TAIEX. Just as Ireland supported transition in Lithuania and Latvia through taking part in Community-funded twinning projects it might also be interesting for it to have such engagement with other smaller countries such as Moldova and Armenia.

The Commissioner will report to the European Council on the state of play of the EU neighbourhood policy and will be available to the plenary session of the European Parliament in January when she will answer questions on the policy. The Commission intends to publish progress reports at the end of next year on how the various countries have implemented the commitments they have given in the action plans. It would be too early to do so now as we must give countries space to implement their commitments. They are generally on track. I apologise for taking slightly longer than I said I would.

We are under time constraints and need to complete our deliberations by 2.55 p.m. I thank Mr. Herdina for his comments.

I pay tribute to the Chairman for holding this important debate and thank Mr. Herdina for coming. I have been fascinated by what he has had to say. Two issues are involved: the general neighbourhood policy which goes east and south; and that of the countries and region involved, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and the Caucasus. By and large, the countries in north Africa and the Middle East come within the terms of the Barcelona Process, a working framework fully budgeted by the European Commission. I believe the Taoiseach attended the meeting held in Barcelona two days ago. It is operational and quite successful, although limited. While it has high objectives, it could do with more impetus and funding.

The issue of Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and the Caucasus is quite different as they were within the bosom of the former Soviet Union. The European Union has a specific relationship with Russia, involving two meetings each year and many working programmes. In addition to how the European Union views these countries and region, Russia's view of our involvement with them is very important. At some other time I would be interested to know — perhaps Mr. Herdina could tell us — what is the general reaction in Russia to this matter. This particularly applies to defence and common foreign policy issues where obviously Russia is nervous, unhappy and generally very sensitive to developments in these countries and region. This is the start of a process and we need to go further. What is the budget for the action plans? What has it been and what is it projected to be in the future? Obviously, these countries and region need considerable assistance. For example, in decommissioning their nuclear facilities some of them need huge amounts of money. Is the budget on track and increasing?

Mr. Herdina

The issue of the Barcelona process is raised repeatedly in the context of the neighbourhood policy. We regard it as a multilateral process — last weekend marked its tenth anniversary — aimed at many of the same goals of supporting reform in the member states concerned. In addition, it brings together Israel and its Arab neighbours and provides a forum to so do. What it has achieved can sometimes be regarded as a glass that is half full. The European Union neighbourhood policy can fill the other half by adopting a bilateral approach to complement the multilateral approach in bringing about bilateral accountability. In the sectoral sub-committees on transport, justice and home affairs, etc. we go through the homework done and set out a sequence of homework that should be done in the following year with the countries concerned individually. This makes for greater ownership and accountability. It is complementary to the Barcelona process and should not be seen as something that replaces it. It is based on the same association agreements.

Deputy Mulcahy asked about the east. Historically, the new member states went through their transition, revolution or whatever one wishes to call it from the old communist system in 1989. We are now dealing with other countries such as Ukraine or Georgia which did so in approximately 2004. I do not have an answer to the Deputy's question and it is not up to me, on my pay grade, to give an answer. He asked whether one would want to approach those countries which went through this transformation in 2004 with a similar enlargement policy or an alternative one, as was done with the new member states. With Belarus more than Ukraine one must differentiate between the Russian position on each. In the case of Ukraine's orange revolution Russia took a keen interest to keep Ukraine very much in its camp. It would be wrong, however, to see the neighbourhood policy as one of separate camps and having a Ribbentrop-Molotov Line in the middle.

It is viewed in that way.

Mr. Herdina

The Deputy is right. However, it is still possibly a mistake on the part of Mr. Putin to have viewed it like that more than we did. The basic question is whether we can help Ukraine to reform. If it is a stable democracy with a well regulated market economy, it will necessarily and automatically have good relations with Russia. It is in its essential interests to do so and it will benefit Russia to have a wealthy and well organised country which has gone through reform next to it.

It is a sensitive issue that the neighbourhood of Russia is identical to ours. Our engagement is one of supporting reform on a voluntary basis. We do not force any neighbour to take part in the neighbourhood policy. In the case of Belarus, we see that we are incapable of forcing such countries to undergo reform. The European Union seems to be at its wits' end as to what to do with Belarus, a country which thrives through the energy price differential and other benefits and is close to Russia. A zero sum game of zones of influence seems to apply even more.

We have become increasingly more engaged in Moldova. We also have been partly engaged in a dialogue — I would not call it a partnership — with Russia, which now feels that the EU is an observer in the quadripartite peace talks. The EU high representative, Mr. Solana, today opened the EU joint border mission to help to transform the border and customs service. The Ukraine's customs revenue has increased threefold since some reforms took place there in the first half of the year. The Ukrainian authorities put a bit more of a grip on what was a very corrupt border control system. The improvements can be partly — not entirely — attributed to the engagement of the Ukrainian authorities with the European Union.

I apologise for my delayed arrival. I was otherwise engaged at a meeting of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, which was attended by the President of the Republic of Cyprus.

I understand that the objective of the EU neighbourhood policy is to share, to some extent, its stability and prosperity with its neighbours. The policy is also being pursued to try to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. I wish to inquire about the expectations of the countries in question. As the western Balkan states are not among the countries that have been mentioned, I assume they are excluded from the neighbourhood policy. This suggests that they are primary candidates for accession to the European Union after some issues relating to Croatia have been dealt with. Are the members of the European Commission out of step with the citizens of the European Union, as presently constructed?

When I listen to people, rather than preach to or lecture them, as part of the process taking place during the current period of reflection on the EU constitutional treaty, I hear about their fears. Many people are concerned that the process of EU enlargement is moving too fast. They worry that the EU project will be derailed because its structures are not only unable to accommodate the 25 current member states but would also be unable to accommodate the further accession of states such as Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and possibly Turkey. People are concerned that jobs will drift from the west of the Union to the east. Their worries have been exacerbated, rightly or wrongly, by the recent riots in France. Can the western Balkan states, other than Croatia, be categorised as prime candidates for EU membership? What mandate has been given for the different classification of such states, compared to the states mentioned under the neighbourhood policy?

When I attended a meeting of the Crans Montana Forum in Zagreb some months ago, I learned that the Foreign Ministers of states such as Georgia and the Ukraine are in no doubt that their countries will be considered for membership of what they perceive as the European club. Is Mr. Herdina concerned about the expectations being raised in such countries? To what extent are those who favour further enlargement out of step with the people of the Union, as presently constituted? I honestly believe that following recent events in Ireland and other countries, which make it clear that people's fears are not being listened to, it will be difficult to achieve success with any referendum in the current member states. I have some concerns when I observe that the western Balkan states are being categorised differently to some other countries. Are we not being made aware of some of the things that are happening? What is the agenda?

Mr. Herdina

When the stability and association process started some years ago, the western Balkan states were categorised as pre-candidates.

That is fair enough. Does Mr. Herdina understand the sensibility referred to by Deputy Allen?

Mr. Herdina

Yes.

Some of the states with which the neighbourhood policy unit is concerned are characterised in a different manner to some of the Balkan states.

Mr. Herdina

Yes, I understand that. I must accept the fact that the European Council has categorised the western Balkan states as pre-candidates. The stability and association agreements hold out an accession perspective to them. Mr. Solana spoke at a meeting in Brussels last Friday about the ten years that have passed since the signing of the Dayton Agreement. He said that the accession perspective I have mentioned is necessary in the Balkans. Such comments highlight certain sensitivities about the EU's absorption capacities and its willingness to accept more member states. The European neighbourhood policy does not categorise its partner states as candidate or potential candidate countries. I do not agree that the neighbourhood policy will increase expectations in the Ukraine or Georgia, where the interlocutors have said they would like to join the European club. Such expectations existed before the EU neighbourhood policy was conceived. When the EU proposed the development of such a policy, the first reaction of countries such as the Ukraine and Georgia was one of utter disappointment. They felt that the policy did not contain any accession perspective for them.

My officials have been engaged in some very difficult consultations in Georgia over the past two days. The Georgian authorities told my officials that George Bush had called Georgia a beacon of democracy. Some interlocutors in Georgia believe that country can join the EU within three years but my officials told them that this will not be possible. The Georgian authorities have said they will not co-operate with the EU reform track as long as their hopes are disappointed. The reality in this instance may be the opposite of that suggested by Deputy Allen.

The Deputy also asked if the EU is in step with the people in this regard. The EU Commissioner responsible for the neighbourhood policy, Ms Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is well aware that there is some sensitivity about going too fast. She wants to emphasise the neighbourhood policy as something that can help the EU's neighbouring countries to reform. The EU wants to engage with such countries in a manner that does not involve an accession perspective. I believe the Ukraine will put pressure on the EU to make a clear decision in respect of it in advance of the review and possible revision of the partnership and co-operation agreement, which is due in 2008.

Perceptions of the European Union's neighbourhood are different among the people of the Union. The people of Poland and Lithuania, and their elected representatives, are very eager for the beacon of enlargement to be held out to their neighbours in the Ukraine. The further west one moves into the member states which were part of the 15-member Union, the less one encounters such an opinion. When the EU Council debated some years ago a Commission proposal to put in place an enhanced agreement, to be called the European neighbourhood agreement, a number of member states made it clear they were not in favour of such an agreement because they did not want to preclude a later accession perspective. Other member states were strongly in favour of the agreement because they were keen to preclude a later accession perspective. No verdict has yet been reached in this regard. It is obvious that Poland and Lithuania feel a certain affinity with Belarus and the Ukraine. They are interested in ensuring that the EU does something to help such countries, such as providing for an accession perspective. The interlocutors in some member states, such as France and Spain, are more focussed on the EU's southern neighbours than on its eastern neighbours.

Deputy Allen correctly stated that some member states are concerned that things are moving too fast. The EU Commissioner with whom I work, Ms Benita Ferrero-Waldner, believes that if we highlight the European neighbourhood policy to a greater extent, we will respond to the fears I have mentioned. We must make it clear to such member states that the policy being pursued in respect of the Ukraine, for example, is quite distinct from enlargement. We should emphasise that the neighbourhood policy is not an enlargement policy. I do not think we can hold the dam for too long, however. We must give answers to such countries.

I wish to ask a supplementary question about the manner in which the western Balkan states are being categorised separately to countries that are included under the neighbourhood policy. Who made the policy decision to categorise the countries to which I refer differently?

Mr. Herdina

It might have been made at the European Council meeting in December 2002. To be sure, I would have to look back at the stability and association agreements to determine when the policy was initiated but it was initiated approximately in the period in question. The Commission has responded by giving the portfolio for the western Balkans in the Barroso Commission to Mr. Rehn, the Commissioner for enlargement issues. In parallel, the neighbourhood policy has been established by providing the neighbourhood policy portfolio to Ms Ferrero-Waldner who is in charge of external relations. We have followed the decisions of our political masters in the Council. My best guess is that the policy was initiated in 2002, but I might be wrong.

My concern relates to the failure of states to behave in a civilised way unless they are made members or given the hope of becoming members. While it is a laudatory motive, it is not good enough to consider accession or enlargement because of those threats until we can be sure the current structure can accommodate the stresses of the most recent round of enlargement plus those countries coming on board in 2007, as well as, possibly, Croatia.

Are you suggesting the neighbourhood policies for Egypt, Lebanon, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan should be suspended?

My question relates to the western Balkans. Excluding Balkan states from the neighbourhood policy seems almost to imply they are prime candidates for membership. I do not know from where the policy has evolved.

Mr. Herdina

Having served with the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina for three years immediately after the war, I am also somewhat reserved in my optimism at the speed at which these countries will progress. On the other hand, I cannot give the Deputy an answer other than to say the train has already left. The European Council has already made its decision and would have to reverse it if it wanted to follow Deputy Allen's suggestion. According to Balkan hands, including Mr. Solana who I heard speak at the conference in Brussels on Friday to mark ten years of Dayton, the political wisdom is that the association and stability process is the one which is most helpful in underpinning the stabilisation and reform of these countries. That includes a pre-accession perspective.

What underpins the overall neighbourhood policy? Is a security element creeping into it? When one looks at it with a cold eye it is first and foremost economic and political, but a security aspect seems to be creeping into the policy as time goes on. Do you think that is increasingly becoming the case, Mr. Herdina?

Mr. Herdina

I forgot to answer Deputy Mulcahy's question on security. If one understands security in a very wide sense to encompass the exercise of soft power by the EU to overcome regional conflicts, the European neighbourhood policy action plans can be seen in that light. There are a number of commitments related to the diplomatic solutions to frozen or not-so-frozen conflicts. It is a way in which we can be helpful. The customs man on my team has been in Moldova to help establish border monitoring and has engaged in the preparations on the new agreement on the Rafah crossing between Egypt and the Gaza strip. If one regards the CSFP aspects of the policy as security related, then there is a connection in the soft and wide understanding of security issues. The EU has not engaged in this policy, of course, in anything related to harder security which is purely a matter for the CSFP and includes, for example, the UFOR mission in Bosnia. The mission is not directed in any way by the neighbourhood policy which I define, as we do sometimes, as a partnership for reform. In the sense that the policy is oriented towards reforming the countries, security does not really come into it.

If one considers security in parallel, which is not on our or the Irish patch, one sees that countries like the Ukraine and Georgia have ambitions to join NATO. Things are happening under the PfP heading and NATO pre-accession policies. I recall to the committee the interesting comments of the deputy chairman of the Czech senate at the conference on the neighbourhood policy in Prague in May this year. While he felt the Czech Republic was not ready to join NATO when it was preparing to do so, it was useful in the preparatory phase to expose Czech army officers to their western counterparts to see how an officer corps behaves in a democratically organised country. While in that sense soft NATO issues may be also valuable, it is neither my responsibility or patch nor an Irish responsibility.

What role do you see for national parliaments in the neighbourhood policy? Is it something for the future? You will have an idea as to members' perspectives on enlargement and the proven reticence of the public towards allowing the process to expand too greatly. Do we have a role in national parliaments as far as the neighbourhood policy specifically is concerned?

Mr. Herdina

We are aware of the democratic deficits in neighbouring countries and on the European side are interested in seeing interparliamentary groups between the European Parliament and the parliaments of various neighbouring countries function well and lead to an exchange of views. National parliaments could be equally helpful in the process, in which case it may be interesting to consider Egypt and Georgia. The Georgian Parliament believes, now that most of its members come from NGOs, that it does not need civil society any longer. It is an inverse role. We are very much encouraging them not to overlook civil society.

An exchange of views and experience on the democratic functioning of a parliament and an embracing attitude from national parliaments would be very welcome. A number of countries in the neighbourhood policy are willing on a voluntary rather than the mandatory basis which applies to enlargement policy to align their legislation with European best practice and the acquis communautaire. It would be helpful if Oireachtas Members could exchange experience with parliamentarians in neighbouring states on the transposition of certain acquis requirements into Irish law. Perhaps there are good and bad examples to share. The environmental acquis is so expensive, for example, that it would not be affordable to Armenia or Georgia at this stage. An exchange of views would help to give people perspectives which are closer to reality.

To the extent that parliamentarians have the mandate, as this committee does, to review decision-making on European policy, the European neighbourhood and partnership instrument regulation might be something for members to keep their eyes on. As a Commission, we want to see keen support for community assistance for the neighbourhood. To ensure the stability and prosperity of the EU neighbourhood it is in our enlightened self-interest to have sufficient Community funding.

I have been critical of the EU neighbourhood policy on Israel and have called for its suspension. If Israel is allowed to continue to act contrary to the policy, all new countries will take a lead from its example, making the policy meaningless. What steps can we take to ensure countries comply with its content?

Mr. Herdina

I have no specialist knowledge of how Israel is implementing the action plan. Nevertheless, I believe it is keeping to a number of its commitments. The more general question put by the Deputy is always current in regard to the two parties to the Middle East conflict. It was current when the EU neighbourhood policy was drawn up. It is a philosophical principle: does one have more influence when one has more means and avenues of dialogue and more exposure to the parties? The idea of including both parties in the neighbourhood policy was based on the philosophy that one has more influence if one has more exposure.

I understand that point. If other countries see that Israel has not been brought to account in the implementation of the EU neighbourhood policy, they will see they have an out in terms of being brought to account. Some parts of the policy are meaningless because members will not adhere to them. Countries which do not have a good record on human rights may decide to sign up to the policy on the basis that it will not be enforced, yet they will benefit from being part of the European neighbourhood group.

I apologise that Mr. Herdina will not have an opportunity to reply as we must finish now.

Mr. Herdina

I will forward the information to the Deputy by letter.

On behalf of the joint committee, I express our appreciation to Mr. Herdina for taking the time to attend this meeting and thank him for his impressive presentation.

Mr. Herdina

I thank the Chairman for extending the invitation to attend.

Sitting suspended at 2.55 p.m.and resumed at3 p.m.
Barr
Roinn