I am happy to be here and hope I can be of some assistance. As I was not sure what was expected of me, I propose to make some introductory remarks and position in a sense from where I come and how I view the European Union without getting into the nitty gritty of the role of the national parliament, assuming that the detail of this will come out in discussions. I am more than happy to answer questions and engage in dialogue with members of the sub-committee.
As long ago as 1974 Lord Denning, a well known and not uncontentious English Vice Chancellor during the second half of the last century, used a fairly dramatic metaphor to describe the effect of European law on national legal orders. He described European law as "an incoming tide" which flows into estuaries and up rivers and cannot be held back. An incoming tide is a highly suggestive metaphor, as the waves of an incoming tide are relentless and cannot be stopped. He was referring to the constant ebb and flow of European law and rules at the tidal margins of a legal system. When this metaphor was used some 30 years ago, one could still analyse the nature of the European Economic Community, as it was then known, as a specific kind of international organisation.
In 1992 a leap was made from the original economic union to what amounted to a nascent political union. In 2008 what is striking is the constant ebb and flow at the tidal margins not only of the national legal systems but of national political and administrative systems. The European Union has in practice evolved in ways that recall strongly national political and administrative systems, at least in part. This is not the same as saying it is evolving into a state or a would-be state in its own right, rather that it views its more recent evolution as a political system in its own right. The more neutral and abstract qualification of a political system also applies to non-state systems. As a self-standing political system, we can address to the European Union the questions that can be addressed to any political system. We can expect of it the standards of legitimacy and accountability expected of other political systems, yet when we compare the Union to other political systems in the post-industrial world, the most striking point is its non-responsiveness in terms of elections, parties and the conventional procedures of popular democracy.
A political scientist, Professor Vivien Schmidt, recently described the European Union as producing policy without politics. In this regard, what she refers to is democratic politics. At the same time, the Union is institutionally part of the national political systems of the member states. We only find the conditions for electoral and party democracy at national level. In this case, as stated by Professor Schmidt, we are left with the reverse, politics without policy. Moreover, in many countries European issues are depoliticised, even at national level.
Members will be aware that I am a citizen of the Netherlands and that my experience in this regard may be of some relevance to the sub-committee. A detailed study of the reasons the Dutch voted "No" to the constitutional treaty, the predecessor of the Lisbon treaty, concluded it was due in large part to the neglect of the national level. For Dutch and, I suspect, Irish citizens, the results of European policy have remained largely invisible. Dutch citizens felt inadequately represented and had major doubts about the manner in which the European Union rendered an account for its policy choices.
One of the major recommendations of a report published some years ago was the need to engage in public debate on the European Union as a political system. A political system evolves not only by virtue of what is formally laid down in international treaty texts concerning the powers and tasks of various institutions. What Jacques Delors referred to in 1992 as an unidentified political object has during the past 15 years taken further shape as a living object. Various actors and institutions have acquired and exercised legislative and executive powers in a broad range of policy areas.
The topic of executive power in the European Union is often overlooked. We hear much about the legislative and judicial power of the Union, but somehow its executive power seems to be left in the middle or the focus is only on the Commission. The Union was never meant to have its own executive power. It was to have the European Commission, but designed more as a public administration rather than as a political executive comparable to a national government. In the original design politics was deliberately organised out. For the rest, the executive power of the Union was, literally, the executive power of the member states.
The main decision-making institution, the Council of Ministers, is composed of national political executives. Underneath the ministerial level are scores of committees which have an important role to play. These unseen hands of European integration were populated not by so-called Eurocrats — European level civil servants — but by national civil servants. This national bureaucratic component of EU executive power is often overlooked. Much of the executive power of the Union is, in fact, composed by members of national executives, both political and bureaucratic. They exercise power and take decisions in a context other than that to which they were elected or appointed. They may take decisions at one level, with no forum able to hold them to account for their actions, either politically, as in a parliament or election procedure, or legally, as in a court. The national executive power has long operated outside of its own national political and constitutional level. It is actively engaged in decision-making at European level and at international or global level. It has, as a matter of practice, surmounted thinking in terms of hierarchical levels and may even be considered as being engaged in a more fluid and composite governance process.
The core problem is that outside the confines of the territorial nation states executives are, only to a very limited extent, held to account for their action or inaction. National parliaments, in particular, have not kept up with what their national executives are doing or not doing. They have stayed put within their own neatly nationally fenced-off compartments. The executive, however, has leaped over the fence and developed into a strongly interwoven complex administrative network, beyond the horizons of many, perhaps all, national parliaments. The Treaty of Lisbon makes the element of executive power more visible in the political system of the Union but does not create it. Failure to ratify the treaty will also not eliminate it. On the contrary, failure to ratify may well aggravate it and force it more underground unless it is subjected to checks and balances.
Looking to the future, parliaments must stop feeling trapped within enclosed national systems, must try to keep up with where power and rule-making has migrated and must play a role in holding it to account. How can we start thinking outside the box of our purely national constitutional and political systems and begin the process of reflecting on and adapting those systems to hold our own executive actors to account for their action and inaction at the international and European level of governance? This is a key and under-discussed question.
Thinking outside the box in the context of the next phase of European integration will involve national parliaments more proactively considering themselves part of a wider constitutional whole, rather than as a microcosm of the national constitutional system. From this more composite point of view, the role of national parliaments is potentially much greater. There is no reason for them to limit themselves to what governments send them for examination. If parliament is part of a greater constitutional whole, then it can also approach other institutions within that greater whole. There is no reason a national parliament should restrict itself to holding its own national representative to account. Why should only the Assemblée Nationale in France enjoy the privilege of a real and lively debate with the President of the European Commission? Why could there not be an annual debate on the state of the Union in the respective national parliaments in order to hold the European institutions to account?
None of these suggestions needs constitutional amendments or treaty revisions but could in most cases be effected as a matter of bottom-up proactive practice by national parliaments. In my view, this next stage of European integration needs to be brought about by actors in the national political systems. This is the biggest challenge the citizens of Europe face. In the wider perspective, the failure to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon is a window of opportunity rather than the definitive slamming of the door.
These introductory comments are intended to set out my position on the issue. While they do not address the nitty gritty of the protocol of the national parliaments and subsidiarity, I assume these issues will arise during the course of our discussion.