I will start with Deputy Costello's questions. At present, approximately 2,000 EU troops are in Bosnia as part of the EUFOR mission. The Deputy's question concerned the real danger to troops and the actual deterrent such troops could provide. The problem is that no one knows. The EUFOR troops are tasked with checking the numbers of weapons available to citizens, making random checks and so on, which they often do not perform. I am not an expert in this area but, according to serious analysts and players, it is more than obvious that weapons are available. These include the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, which states that more than 500,000 light weapons are available to citizens. There are also some security firms which are not accounted for. No one knows how many there are and what they do. This is a grey zone and there should not be a grey zone in a country such as Bosnia.
Regarding the question about reconstruction and technical aid, we are now in a post-reconstruction phase. We are starting a tradition and are now where, for example, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were in 1993-95. That does not mean the reconstruction has been completely and satisfactorily done but economically we are able to make our own decisions. Unfortunately, specific programmes for this do not exist because the Government deals with ethnic issues and for the most part thinks of how to devise new national rhetoric instead of thinking about how to bring about development plans, etc. For example, we have not had a development plan since 2007. In two years the present Government has not been able to draft a development plan for the country. That tells a great deal about its priorities.
The state of talks with the EU is post-SA. There are some people in the EU who have said that we cannot become a candidate unless the OHR is closed down. I do not see why those two should be tied but we are now probably a year to 18 months away from candidacy status if things turn out right.
With regard to elections, we have the ruling coalition which has five members. There is one formerly moderate party which, in my opinion, has turned into a far-right party and the other four are already known as nationalist parties. As things stand, these would probably not do as well as they did in 2006 but the opposition has some chance. The 2008 local elections would be a good indicator because they gave a fairly different picture of the country from that of 2006. There was an indication of change. The citizens did not quite send an elective signal to the ruling coalition but the big cities are ruled by multi-ethnic parties which are allied to the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party.
I would not regard election monitoring as a problem. There is not much contesting of election results. There are problems with voting stations here and there but in general the outcome of the elections is considered fair and legitimate by major political players, including the civil society groups.
Deputy Power asked whether the EU is ineffective, why I am so critical of the EU and what the opportunities are to educate EU decision makers. The problem is that the EU does not speak with one voice in Bosnia. Member states have different voices but there is one voice from Mr. Solana and Mr. Rehn tends to follow what Mr. Solana says. When one puts on one side what some member states say and on the other what Mr. Solana says, generally they are not the same. The key issue for Bosnia is that the EU should reach a consensus about what needs to be done. For example, if I were a person who had influence in the EU I would explain the importance of EU consensus for the players on the ground. Once a consensus is reached, whatever it may be, even if I might not agree with, it is better to have that than to have a divided European Union which, as now, sends different signals all over the place. A key point for EU decision makers to know is that Bosnia is a very serious challenge for EU foreign policy. If the EU corrects Bosnia and takes it forward by using the existing foreign policy mechanism, this will prove the EU actually has a foreign and security policy. However, failure to succeed would mean a great deal to Bosnian citizens. It would be playing with our lives again, because the situation on the ground is such that failure would cost us. I do not wish to talk about anything other than peace but I would not like to put a bet on it.
With regard to police versus constitution, police is a done deal. Police reform passed but it essentially was not a reform. The EU put in a set of conditions in 2005 and two years later the government adopted completely different laws and the EU said: "Okay, this is fine. This is what we meant in the first place." The government therefore realised that the conditions can be relaxed over time, as long as it sticks by what it wants to do. This is not on the agenda any more. The constitution is, of course, a priority but it is quite unrealistic to expect us to have anything close to a functional state by the end of this year. Next year should be left to the pre-election campaign and for socioeconomic issues to take over the agenda.
Senator Quinn asked about the OHR versus the EU and what Dr. Miroslav Lajcák said. Dr. Lajcák was referring, I believe, to the split in the EU. I was very critical of him, to be honest; I am not very positive about him. He had a problem with the people who gave him legitimacy, namely the Peace Implementation Council and the European Union as well. Some members of the European Union turned their backs on Dr. Lajcák in the middle of his mandate, and that is what he referred to when he said he does not want to be under that horse. In theory he has powers but it would be unwise to exercise them without the full support of member states, particularly key member states.
The new mission, the so-called European Union Special Representative, EUSR, would take over the present OHR, would merge with the European delegation mission and would have some increased powers. It would not be an ordinary EU mission as in a candidate country but would have more powers. However, the problem is that nobody knows what those powers will be. In a country such as Bosnia these things must be clear from the beginning. As matters stand, it appears that the people in the EU who make decisions on these issues are dead set on closing down the OHR. If one asks people what they want to achieve, they will say they wish to close down the OHR, which, in my opinion, by itself does not mean anything. It could potentially even be extremely dangerous. Before there is a clear mandate for the EUSR, I would not recommend it. The EU's key leverage over our government is the conditionality. It should be strict and not relax any of the conditions. Once they are set, they should be there until the government fulfils them.
Senator Hanafin asked how the EU can find a solution. As I just said, the answer is conditionality. Conditionality must be very strict on all countries because countries need change and reform. If the EU relaxes the conditions, countries will know the EU will not force them to change and that they can remain as they are and do whatever they wish. It is true the division of power is a functionality issue. In the past 12 months major analysts from the United States and the European Union have agreed on one thing, that before the OHR is closed down Bosnia must have a functional government. We need a government that can function without an outside arbiter.
The OHR was devised in 1997, a year and a half after the signing of the Dayton accords. In that first 18 months the state was so dysfunctional that people realised they needed an outside arbiter with what was called the "Bonn powers". At the Bonn conference it was agreed that the high representative would have the power to remove officials, impose laws and so forth. The system is not one made for governance but is a compromise from a time of extremely bloody war. Since then we have not moved forward. Most of the forward movement came through OHR decisions, laws and removals made by the high representative, be it Mr. Lajcák, Mr. Ashdown, Dr. Schwarz-Schilling or, before him, Mr. Petritsch.
We have still this Dayton structure which simply cannot function without the OHR. If the OHR were closed today I guarantee the committee that within six months we would have a significant constitutional crisis. The RS Government and the RS national assembly have openly stated — it is on the public record and perhaps I should have brought this to the committee as I have it translated — that it will disobey the constitution of the country once the OHR leaves under the present constitutional arrangement. It is difficult for me to understand how people who understand Bosnia, who have been there many times and who have made decisions on Bosnia can call for the closure of the OHR without the fulfilment of strategic goal 5.2 and, in my opinion, the making of a functional state.