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JOINT COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 2 Mar 2010

Irish Banking Reports: Discussion with Governor of Central Bank.

I welcome Professor Patrick Honohan to the meeting. Members will recall that the proposed Government approved framework of inquiry provides for two phases, the first for two separate reports to be prepared, one from independent international experts Mr. Regling and Mr. Watson, who appeared before us last week, and the second from the Governor of the Central Bank, on the performance of the functions of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator. The second phase will be the establishment of a statutory commission of investigation.

Our meetings last week with Mr. Regling and Mr. Watson, and today with the Governor of the Central Bank, provide an opportunity for the Oireachtas and, in particular, for members of the committee to have an input into the process and thereby the priorities of the members can be reflected in the work the Governor and Mr. Regling are undertaking.

Before commencing I wish to advise everyone that we will receive a short opening statement from the Governor that will be followed by a question and answer session. I ask members to keep their contributions as concise as possible as we must conclude by 4 p.m. because the Governor must catch a flight for the meeting of the ECB.

I draw attention to the fact that members of the committee have absolute privilege but the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. The committee cannot guarantee any level of privilege to witnesses appearing before it. Furthermore, under the salient rulings of the Chair, members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside of the House, or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I have been asked by the Minister for Finance to prepare one of the two reports proposed by the Government as the first stage of an investigation into the banking system. I have been informed that the context for these reports is that "the Government considers it essential to thoroughly examine the conduct of the banking sector in recent years in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the root causes of the systemic failures that led to the need for extraordinary support from the State to the domestic banking system." This seems to me to be a good basis for proceeding.

The two stage approach to the investigation speaks of "preliminary reports" which will provide a basis for the Government and the Oireachtas to prepare the terms of reference for the second stage, which will involve the establishment of a statutory commission of investigation.

The report I am preparing is on "the respective functions of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator", and it is to have regard in particular to their work "in assessing and responding to risks to the stability of individual institutions as well as to the banking system as a whole". The report is described as "preliminary", and is being prepared against a tight deadline, yet it will be possible for me to establish a fairly clear and comprehensive understanding of the matters in question. I hope satisfactory conclusions can be reached on many issues, leaving only a relatively limited number of open questions of significance requiring further investigation.

In parallel with my report, Mr. Klaus Regling and Mr. Max Watson, who appeared before this committee last week, are looking, among other things, at the performance of the banks and banking system generally. Evidently, the full picture requires that dimension also: after all, it is to the directors of banks that we look in the first instance for safe and sound operation of their firms; official prudential regulation can best be seen as a backstop designed to restrain the behaviour of imprudence or recklessness. Clearly in this case neither the first line of defence nor the backstop worked.

The issues that I have been asked to examine include the performance of the respective functions of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator over the period from the establishment of the Financial Regulator in 2003 to the end of September 2008. In addition, I have been asked to consider the inclusion of any matter that I felt should be brought to the Minister's attention which might help or inform the preparation of the terms of reference of the statutory inquiry. I intend to submit my report, as requested, no later than the end of May 2010.

I have assembled a small team of experts to help me prepare this report. If the members of the committee are interested, I can furnish them with particulars of the staff helping me in this work. Already in train is an examination of the most relevant files, beginning with the documents prepared both for the regulatory authority and for the board of the Central Bank, and drilling down from these to trace the pattern of work of the relevant units. Following this it is intended to interview a number of officials of the regulator and the Central Bank who were intimately involved over the period under examination. I also intend to discuss the key issues with members of both the regulatory authority and the board of the Central Bank.

I met Mr. Regling and Mr. Watson last week and we agreed to co-operate as our parallel work proceeds. This co-operation is to ensure that there is no overlap and duplication of work in our respective reports. My team will be meeting Mr. Regling and Mr. Watson later this week.

It might be considered surprising that it falls to me to inquire into my own organisation. Obviously any surprise will be tempered by the consideration that I am in place for less than six months. However, it is not the easiest of balancing acts to ensure that I find out what needs to be known, without damaging the functioning of the organisation. Nevertheless, I am confident that I can do the job effectively, and it is on that basis that I agreed to the Minister's request.

I have begun this task with a presumption that the situation which has emerged in our banking system reflects a failure of the regulatory system. However, I would stress that the organisation which I lead, the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, has over the years delivered a wide range of key services to the economy, including: consumer protection; consumer information; effective electronic payments systems; avoidance of excessive inflation as part of its euro system objectives; the supply of liquidity to the banking sector; and the production and issuance of bank notes and coins, to mention just a few, none of which is called into question by the terms of reference of this report. It is important to put that on the record.

When I appeared before another Oireachtas committee in December I said, "We understand some of what happened, but some of it is still hard to understand". We are already putting in place new procedures and arrangements that take account of what we have learned to date. I hope that my report can help develop that understanding further and enable us all to emerge from our current difficulties with a degree of restored confidence.

I thank the Governor and call Deputy Bruton.

I welcome the Governor. I believe this is his first appearance at this committee. He brings with him not only the good wishes of every citizen, but he also comes with a well-deserved reputation for being very objective, with a high level of expertise in this field. He has written what is probably the most lucid account of what went wrong in our bog-standard property bubble before he became Governor of the Central Bank and is very well equipped to deal with this.

I should like to ask a number of questions rather than go back over what has gone wrong. The Governor recognised that this has been a failure of the regulatory system. Against that background, what type of accountability should there be for that failure? Who should be held to account, and how? The public believe that the only accountability seen so far from the Central Bank and the office of the regulator are golden handshakes and not serious accountability for failure. That goes to the core of the issue.

As regards the scope of the Governor's inquiry, will he be looking at, for example, advice tendered by the Central Bank and not heeded in policy evolution? Will he be in a position to comment on that? Will he look at whether the treatment of Anglo Irish Bank as a going concern in the period to the end of September 2008 in the guarantee mechanism was a wise and sound decision? Will he be looking at the extent of the guarantee that was written at that time, which controversially included subordinated bonds of categories many felt to be risk capital, and perhaps should not have had a guarantee extended to them?

Does the Governor regard the Department of Finance as part of the regulatory structure he is looking at? In its annual output statement it sets out that one of its key objectives is to maintain an appropriate policy and legislative framework for securing financial stability and effective regulation of the financial sector, while safeguarding the interests of consumers and promoting the development of financial services. It goes on to give a largely self-congratulatory account of what it has been doing in this space, at a time when most of us would regard that this and a number of the Department's other objectives were not realised. Will the Governor be in a position to look at that area?

In terms of learning about what happened, will the Governor look at parliamentary accountability of the regulatory structure, because many members of this committee believe we were hoodwinked by those to whom we were looking to give us fair analysis of what was happening? For many people, to paraphrase Lord Denning, the "appalling vista" was not something they were willing to contemplate, so that effectively the committee saw a regulatory body that was part of the system, telling us how good and sound it was and how immune from problems we were, at the very time when we might expect the regulatory system to be in overdrive as regards trying to deal with the fire that was clearly burning right across the bridge of the vessel, as we know with hindsight.

It is perhaps still within the Governor's remit to suggest part of the problem was the fact that there was never a proper political understanding of the disciplines of the euro. Was that behind all this? The Governor put it very clearly, to the effect that the directors of the banks failed. A buccaneering model of banking emerged which was not held to account within the banking structure. Perhaps with competitive banking it was hard to contain it within the banking structure because anyone who did not do what others were doing effectively was told that he or she was a laggard. Is it fair to say that the regulatory failure is the core failure here?

I shall ask the question that the Governor begs, in a sense, in his submission. Is it appropriate that he, as Governor of the Central bank, should be presenting the assessment of the system he now leads? Is it fair to Dr. Honohan or is it appropriate at all that he has to manage the same resources and their failure, about which he is being asked to comment very critically? I am aware there will be a subsequent inquiry, but is that a sufficiently well-structured approach, even to the preliminary phase of this inquiry?

Professor Patrick Honohan

On the scope of the inquiry, it is clear that I am in a fairly satisfactory position for enlarging on or reaching out into areas that have not been specifically defined in my terms of reference. I am not like a consultant who produces a report, having wandered into some territory to whom the person commissioning it might say in effect, "Just go away and delete chapter 2". I want to remain focused. There are three months to undertake a particular task and I intend to remain focused but if my inquiries lead me to go outside precisely what is defined in the letter, I will not hesitate to do so.

Deputy Bruton asked if advice was tendered and not heeded. This is obviously a relevant question and I do not exclude it but I will not take the easy option where, instead of looking at the organisation I have been asked to look at, I will range far and wide over Government policy and decisions. That would be of no help to anyone. To go into particular questions about the treatment of Anglo Irish Bank and the question of how it might have been dealt with at the end of September 2008 is an important issue and there is no doubt that I will have something to say about that, and about the question of the advice that was constructed about the guarantee and the options that were considered around it.

By extending the remit to the end of September 2008, my terms of reference clearly require me to look at these issues. To be honest, I would have preferred to have left that for another study because there are several phases; there is a phase when the boom was growing, towards the middle or end of 2007, and then there is a phase of management and containment that followed that. To some extent, there will be two large sub-parts to this exploration looking at those two different aspects. The second part more or less terminates with the establishment of the guarantee.

It was then asked if I should go all the way into what the Department of Finance did. To get a full picture, we must look at the banks, the Department and the Government. That is not, however, what I have been asked to do here; the Regling and Watson report will look at the banks and the Department of Finance so, for the moment, we must compartmentalise to an extent. That is viable but I will not completely neglect the interaction with the Department of Finance.

On the question of parliamentary accountability, I can see this is a perspective of great importance to the committee. The word "hoodwinked", that the Deputy used——

I will withdraw the word and use a more parliamentary word.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I must look at the area of parliamentary accountability. I had not thought of it being within the scope of the study but it could be.

Who guards the guardians? I remember when the regulatory structure was going through and a professor in Trinity College asked at the time who in the parliamentary system would have the capacity to oversee the IFSRA structure that was being created. The answer was that no one would, but the question was never answered at that stage. There ought to be metrics of accountability against best practice of an Irish regulatory structure that Professor Honohan and his team should generate so we can have a meaningful debate about this.

Professor Patrick Honohan

There are layers of governance. The overall governance issue, including parliamentary accountability, is an area I must examine. I might not need to investigate it as much as to reflect on it in terms of recommendations I might make.

The question was posed about the regulator being part of the system, which is related to the idea that there was a lack of independence. The whole question of independence and pressure must be raised in this context. Definitely we must try to get to grips with this. The experience in other countries is that there are patterns of pressure, presupposition and a sense of the nature of the relationship between the regulated and regulators. This must be looked at if only to reject the more extreme views about the way the system worked, if appropriate. That is definitely high on my agenda.

I wrote an article about the euro, "The euro and banking stability, friends or foes?", in which I compare the Irish situation with some other countries to explore if our membership of the euro was a major contributing factor, and along what dimensions if it was a contributing factor. I stood back then to see if my conclusion stands up when looking at other countries. It is a nuanced conclusion. I have done it, in other words, and do not need to do it again.

Will Professor Honohan share his view with us?

Professor Patrick Honohan

If members wish.

Not today.

In a general sense, it would be useful.

It could be sent to us. Was it a factor, "Yes" or "No"?

Professor Patrick Honohan

Yes and no. That is me wearing my former academic hat.

It is quite elaborate.

What sort of accountability should there be or does the professor have a view on that? That is what exercises many people.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I will kick that question to touch because it depends. There is a potential paradox. It might be that all this happened despite people doing their jobs diligently, to the best of their ability, in accordance with standard policies and in good faith. That is a question that must be answered before we arrive at the question of accountability. Beyond bringing that perspective to the attention of the committee, it must be addressed by the inquiry before approaching the question of what accountability should be considered in the light of all this. It also relates to the question about parliamentary accountability, but that is different.

I thank the Chairman and welcome the Governor of the Central Bank. Does the Governor expect to come up with more questions and pointers for a further public inquiry or does he anticipate issuing findings that will analyse the crisis up to September 2008? In that context does he intend to go into the history of road marks or milestones en route to the crisis?

The Governor talked about the parallel and different natures of the inquiries that he, Mr. Regling and Mr. Watson will make. As the Labour Party spokesperson on finance, I generally sought to meet the Governor about twice a year, and also the regulator. In my meetings with the Governor from time to time I have raised issues which appeared in the public media as regards reinsurance and the Swiss Re scandal in the IFSC, some years before the crash, DEPFA and the whole business of Sachsen and what happened in relation to German banking — for which I do not believe the Germans have yet forgiven us. We may have a different view as to where responsibility lies in that regard, but in Germany it is believed that our light regulation was a major contributory factor.

In 2005The New York Times talked about the IFSC and Ireland being the “wild west” of finance. Given that we had form in relation to those three major events — I said this to Mr. Regling, as did other members of the committee — we had Professor Honohan’s esteemed predecessor before the committee and the regulator on regular occasions and each time we were told that everything was fine. It may be that as the Governor of an institution the incumbent is nervous in talking to a parliamentary committee on anything that seems to be negative about Ireland. To be honest, it reached ridiculous lengths where the Governor’s predecessor and the regulator marched in, patted us on the head, told us to go away and that everything would be fine — even when it was very clear that the ship was sinking and we were in iceberg territory.

What relationship should the regulator and the Governor of the Central Bank have to the Dáil? Is there a role in Ireland, as there is in many other jurisdictions, for bipartisanship as regards sharing information and asking questions, including accountability requests, by a parliamentary committee which has a different life to the Executive — even if the parties in government effectively control membership of the committees, through chairmanships and so on? If questions were honestly answered, while we would still probably have problems, they would be nothing to the scale of current problems. I would like to hear the Governor's observations in that regard.

Specifically on Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide, these were at the core of the loss of Ireland's reputation and the really bad stories prior to the crash which were circulating about the country. The bubble involving the Quinn contracts for difference issue burst on St. Patrick's Day, 2008, with the massacre in share prices. Will the Governor's inquiry team go into the history of events? When the Central Bank saw the share price of the third banking institution in Ireland had effectively collapsed in spring 2008, did that set alarm bells ringing in the Central Bank? Were there people in the Central Bank who said, "There's something very wrong here", even though the Governor and the regulator had come here, subsequent to that, for a long period of time and told the committee that everything was all right? That is a scandalous part of the relationship between the Dáil, this committee and the institution of the Central Bank and the regulator.

I would also like to know whether the Central Bank gave serious advice? I know there was a considerable amount of small print warnings in the quarterly articles and so on, about the level of credit, indebtedness and so on. The former Governor, Professor Honohan's predecessor, said he believed he was not being listened to. Although the Governor of the Central Bank is an important public office with a great deal of independence, he obviously believed he had to play on the Government's side, as it were, rather than on the Ireland side, which is broader than the parties which may be currently in Government. Will Professor Honohan's inquiry address those delicate relationships? Where there is grave danger for the whole economy, jobs and employment, surely the national interest must precede the interests of the Government of the day.

When property lending was growing so rapidly, were there actions which the Governor believes could have been taken by either the Financial Regulator or the Central Bank to slow down the growth in property lending? There was the general business area, but also the issue of the 100% and 110% mortgages at the individual borrower level. Are there sufficient measures available to a banking regulator to ensure sound lending policies by the banks? This goes to the heart of the relationship between the regulator and the Governor with Government. Which comes first, the national interest or the policies of the Government of the day? Is there a quality of independence attached to the Governor's office? I thought there was. However, I came to believe that there was not because everybody sang from the same hymn sheet and there were very small print regulations on different elements of policy.

On the Central Bank's relationship with the European Central Bank, does the Governor believe that once Ireland was in the eurozone the Central Bank effectively acted as the gatekeeper for the regulation of the disciplines necessitated by being in a monetary union at a time when the national economy and the European economy were expansive and there was plenty of spare cash available from German banks for Irish banks to borrow? Some of them ended up borrowing short to lend long because of the enormous well of German money that was available. In the context of how the European Central Bank is dealing with the series of crises and the issue of imposing discipline on countries, does the Governor have a view on whether there is a role for solidarity within the ECB and among the member states? Many people in Ireland look at what is happening in Greece and what may happen in Spain. There is an issue now whereby speculators are moving against countries that are perceived to be weaker. The Governor is Ireland's representative on the ECB. Does he, as a Governor in his independent status, have a position which he contributes, or is this confined to the Government line which he takes, as it were, to the ECB deliberations?

I shall finish on this. In the United States, California has a bigger deficit than Greece or any other country in Europe but, because there is a federal system there is a degree of cover. A variety of countries are in difficulty in the EU but there is no sense of the ECB evolving a policy to deal with the down side of being in the euro when economies are contracting. Perhaps Professor Honohan's article addresses that point.

Professor Patrick Honohan

The first segment of the Deputy's questions is very relevant to the report, though not so the later questions. Her first question was whether I expected to come up with more questions for another inquiry or if I would produce an analysis. The term "scoping report" was used to describe the first case and while it might give me an out, it is an out I do not propose to take. I propose to take the inquiry as far as I can within the scope which has been set out and to arrive at as many conclusions as I possibly can. I aim to gather the most convincing evidence possible to provide answers to the questions implicitly posed by the terms of reference.

The Deputy asked about a number of foreign institutions in the IFSC over the years, which came to public attention because of one problem or another. DEPFA Bank is an important case and one I have identified as needing to be looked at closely. However, I will not try to go into every single instance and will not go back as far as the other case mentioned by the Deputy.

Professor Patrick Honohan

The Deputy quoted from an article in The New York Times of 2005. This issue concerns the philosophy and enforcement of regulation as perceived from the outside. The question to ask is how it is understood on the inside. There have been public speeches about the philosophy of regulation, which has sometimes been wrongly described as “principles based”. I wish to ascertain how people understood the goals and philosophy of regulation and why the philosophy was acceptable. What were the ultimate goals?

The Deputy will know that, in the current legislation governing the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, the development of the financial services industry in Ireland is an objective. This has been argued to account for the rationalisation inherent in part of the approach which has been adopted, though it is only one argument.

Does the Governor suggest that there is a potential conflict between regulating and promoting the activities of the IFSC?

Professor Patrick Honohan

I do. There are many potential conflicts in a job as central as that of the Central Bank but that is a particularly acute one. In a previous existence I would have argued against allowing such a conflict to arise, because of the difficulty of taking off one hat and putting on another.

The Deputy asked some important questions about the attitude that everything was fine. Back in the days of fixed but adjustable exchange rate regimes, finance ministers around the world were famous for saying "there will not be a devaluation" but the louder they said it the more likely it seemed it would happen. The conclusion academics have drawn is that this was not a good regime. When people in other countries are caught in a situation in which they say black is white, it is the wrong kind of regime. They have to either change out of the regime or change their understanding of their position within it. A person runs the same type of risk if he or she decides to write a report on the financial stability of a country. The report could be interesting and valuable. It could alert people to risks and highlight mitigants that could be adopted to reduce them. Alternatively, it could be a terrible trap. If the inquiry is set up to ask "Are we all right, then?" the answer can never be "No. We are in trouble actually." However, one might end up not being satisfied with the statements one reads and it could be that the wrong question was asked, creating an impossible situation.

I conduct monetary policy at the ECB. In the old days people said monetary policy was effective because it was able to surprise the market and that one could achieve less inflation and greater output by surprising the market. Such thinking dates back to the 1960s and 1970s but it has been completely overturned and monetary policy is now designed to be entirely predictable. If the market thinks a body will do something which it does not intend, that body will have to ease the market back into a position where it understands its intentions. It is much easier to have communication which is coherent, straightforward and not coded.

I was also asked if the inquiry would cover issues relating to Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society. The answer is "Yes, absolutely." I do not say we will be able to produce a blow-by-blow account and certain issues will not be appropriate for the report as they will be covered in other fora.

Mr. Klaus Regling ruled out talking about individuals in his report but said he would comment only on institutions. Will Professor Honohan's report adopt a similar policy?

Professor Patrick Honohan

The art in writing a report like this is to start inside a bubble of confidentiality as many things will have to be confidential and secret, both in law and in practice. I will then have to reach outside the bubble to communicate an informative and sufficiently comprehensive report. I know the Deputy is interested in people involved in banks or other regulated institutions but the people from whom I will take evidence are inside people. In that way I will get close to the real people. I wish to leave open how the report will refer to individuals or groups of individuals. The important thing is to ensure we avoid interminable legal problems but I hope I can go a long way to providing the detail and comprehensiveness the Deputy wants.

When the Governor says "inside" people, does he mean——

Professor Patrick Honohan

I just meant inside my institution.

I welcome the Governor and thank him for his contribution.

There are salient questions about the role of the regulatory function at a time when the bubble was growing exponentially and whether the regulator saw the risks to the institutions themselves and the banking system generally by way of the lack of proper risk assessment within the institutions. If the regulator failed to see the risk the entire system was being exposed to, why was that the case? Were there human failings in the regulatory function? Was it a systemic issue? Was it the way the regulatory system was structured, with the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator being separate? Was it a question of resources within the regulatory office? These questions must be answered and I presume Professor Honohan will be interviewing former Governor of the Central Bank, Mr. John Hurley, and the former Financial Regulator, Mr. Patrick Neary.

Did the Central Bank's commentary on the risks to the Irish economy due to the over-reliance on the property sector serve as enough of a warning? Going back over the commentaries issued by the Central Bank during that time that gave an objective analysis of the data, was its commentary on the issue sufficiently robust?

I welcome the confirmation that Professor Honohan will be looking at the build up to the Government guarantee in September 2008 and will give a view on the advice that was given and the decision that was ultimately taken.

Anglo Irish Bank has been mentioned. I understand Professor Honohan's reluctance to look at the particular issues that are the subject of criminal investigation. However, Anglo Irish Bank was at the epicentre of the near collapse of the Irish banking system. Some of these issues have implications for the regulatory function. I am referring to the concealment of directors' loans, the fact the Financial Regulator's office was notified by way of regular returns of such loans but did not pick up on the issue, and the non-recourse loans and transactions with Irish Life & Permanent that appear to have been window dressing the position at a point in time in Anglo Irish Bank. From a regulatory point of view those issues must be looked at. Obviously Professor Honohan cannot comment on any implications from the point of view of potential prosecutions but they have implications for the function of the regulatory office.

Last week when Mr. Regling spoke to the committee, he mentioned international comparisons and pointed out that there are examples internationally where financial systems have come through the crisis almost unscathed. He highlighted Canada, Singapore and Asian economies in general. What lessons can be learned from how they conducted their business during that time compared with what we did? He gave some examples involving loan to value requirements that were insisted upon in those countries that clearly were not being insisted upon here.

Will the outcome of Professor Honohan's work, as well as feeding into the statutory commission of inquiry, feed into the reform of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator in Ireland? Legislation is pending on the issue but this is a golden opportunity for the outcome of Professor Honohan's work to feed into that process.

I welcome the Governor and thank him for appearing before the committee.

What does Professor Honohan see as the role of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator? There is a public perception that during the boom there was light touch regulation. Professor Honohan mentioned the first line of defence was the directors of the banks followed by a second line, namely, the regulator. Business operates according to the regulations in place. The reality was that we had gone towards light touch regulation and away from heavy, prudential regulation. People felt the light touch had extended to an overly casual and familiar relationship between the Financial Regulator and the individual banks. Could the Governor comment on the fact that in countries like Spain, central banks introduced regulations that were more severe than European regulations generally?

There was a property bubble in Ireland and from 2003 there was a massive rise in the property sector. The development loan book developed in some of the banks between 2003 and 2007. Should the regulator and the Central Bank have stepped in to put in place more severe forms of capital ratio requirements?

The inquiry only extends until the end of September 2008. In the past 17 months, Anglo Irish Bank has been nationalised, €11 billion of taxpayers' money has been put into the banks and NAMA has been established. Would it not be fairer if the inquiry extended until the present? It is also difficult for the Governor to investigate himself and his organisation.

Who are the experts who are involved with the inquiry? Where did everything go wrong? Can that be pinpointed in terms of regulation? The Department of Finance must be included in the inquiry because it was involved in the guarantee scheme on 29 September 2008.

Does Professor Honohan believe the statutory inquiry should be held in public? He referred in his commentary to the fact he has been asked to consider the inclusion of any matters he feels should be brought to the Minister's attention. Does he believe that for the public to have faith in the process, the inquiry should be held in public?

I want to see the time period for the investigation extended because the Governor is on record as saying the NAMA model is inefficient. Does he believe the situation will arise where NAMA will pay over the odds or does he think it will bring about a flow of credit? Will the banks, even after the NAMA process, continue to have significant non-performing loans and, after recapitalisation, the Government will have to keep going back to put in even more money?

I would like to develop the point made by Deputy O'Donnell on where Professor Honohan sees his report in the overall context of the investigation. He referred in his opening contribution to its being a preliminary report that will provide the basis for the Government and the Oireachtas to prepare terms of reference for the second stage. I am conscious of the answer Professor Honohan gave to Deputy Bruton in terms of the involvement of the Oireachtas and public accountability in the regulation of banking in the past. I am anxious to hear the Governor's opinion and his views beyond the report in terms of the Oireachtas helping to frame the terms of reference of the tribunals of inquiry, in particular, and the extent to which this committee should be part of that process.

I suggest the Senator confines his comments to precisely what the report is about.

I refer to a paragraph in Professor Honohan's statement. Part of the constraint on the debate in the second phase of the investigation is the lack of whistleblowing legislation so that people in financial institutions could find themselves compromised. Also, public servants working for the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator and civil servants working for the Department of Finance will be constrained by the Official Secrets Act. Those types of contributions would necessarily have to be heard in private. Other than those, there should be no constraint on large elements of the inquiry being held in public. I would like the Governor's views in that regard, also.

The second area relates to the fact that while this is still a very tight timeframe in which to finish his report and for the commission or tribunal to report within six months thereafter, things are moving very fast in this area and decisions may yet have to be made. We have now got clearance from the European Union on NAMA starting its work. The extent to which it proceeds with that might invite further policy decisions, which Professor Honohan, as Governor of the Central Bank might help the Government to form – in terms of any additional supports that are needed, to which institutions and in what form. I will be interested to hear his views as to the extent these are parallel processes or whether one must inform the other. In terms of its being an exercise of public confidence as well as a fact finding initiative, there has to be a degree to which the revelations in the Governor's report and what the tribunal will reveal will form the basis of the extent to which the public believes in this process and how the financial system can recover.

I will be interested in the Governor's responses to those two areas.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I thank members for their questions. Deputy McGrath, in a sense, laid out my first agenda for this. I fully accept his approach to asking the questions. Did the regulator see the risk, and if not, why not? Was the critical commentary on over-reliance on the property sector sufficiently robust? All the matters he laid out are akin to check boxes on my "to do" list.

On the sensitive issues he mentioned that were under investigation in another context, I make it clear that it is not the case that I will not look at those, but rather that I will not report on them, except perhaps, in the sketchiest manner. I do not envisage reporting on those, for obvious reasons, but this does not mean I will say, "I cannot possibly look at that file". That would be a mistake.

He also raised the question previously asked in a different way by Deputy Burton, on the tools and the powers. There is much to be said about that and about the tools that could have been used. There was an attempt to increase capital requirements against 100% loan to value mortgages. It was implemented, from memory, in May 2006. There were further increased capital requirements against speculative property of 150% — the other one was from 50% to 60%.

Basically, that on the one hand shows that tools were available, but evidently it was too little too late. I have said before in public that the tools were available and I still believe that. There are some other tools it would be good to have. I cannot remember who asked the question about the link with the current legislative programme. Certainly, the lessons we have learned so far are already planned to be brought into the legislation, which will probably be introduced quite soon. There will be more than one Bill proposed and we are in discussion with the Department of Finance on the design of that legislation. The process of dialogue involved is quite satisfactory towards getting good legislation in place and the reform of the structure will help us along here.

Deputy O'Donnell asked the big question about the role of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator. Unfortunately, I have an answer to this question.

It is the key question.

Professor Patrick Honohan

Yes, it is the key question. It is pretty clear that the first goal is price stability, but we can almost take that for granted – except that we may end up with inflation later this year, which is not satisfactory and is one of the reasons I have to alert people to the risks in terms of wages and so forth. That whole area of price stability is obviously the key one, and we are now sensitive to financial stability as a No. 2 role in a way that we probably were not, in the past.

Regulation feeds into financial stability but is also important on a stand-alone basis — the proper regulation of financial institutions, both on prudential grounds and for consumer protection. That is a clear function. There is also the economic advice provided to the Government and the nation. All of these are independent.

The question was raised by Deputy Burton as to whether the Governor of the Central Bank was independent. It is very much an independent office, explicitly so in the case of price stability but implicitly so in the case of all the other functions. Independence per se is pretty clear and I would not tolerate anything else. That does not mean I do not listen to people.

Did the Governor's predecessors kowtow?

That question is not allowed.

I am sorry, why not? It is part of the dialogue. We might not have had a crash if we had this dialogue earlier.

We shall not have that question.

Professor Patrick Honohan

There are other things, too, such as the payments system. Therefore the role is quite clear and it is an independent one. I was asked whether there was a too-familiar relationship between the regulator and the regulated, and I believe I have mentioned that before. That is an area I am looking at. One has to unpick that to an extent. There are various dimensions to the relationship between a regulator and those he or she regulates. Whether they play golf together is not quite salient. There are other forms of implicit or explicit pressure that can exist as we have seen from experience in other countries. I will explore that.

This is a reasonable question. Do you believe the Financial Regulator——

Hold on a minute, Deputy. The question must be put through the Chair.

Does the Governor believe the Financial Regulator had the requisite expertise to deal with the regulated institutions?

Professor Patrick Honohan

Expertise is one of my questions. It is there on the list and it will be answered. I will get to that question, but I will not prejudge it. I have three months.

Professor Honohan has had 17 months to look at it. No doubt, a man of his eminence and skill has an opinion, and perhaps he could give us an indication.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I want to turn to the question that may appear to be move beyond the scope of the inquiry, but since the Deputy has asked it, this is a good opportunity to make some comment on it. First, I am not at all constrained, annoyed or anything about stopping in September 2008. That is far enough for me. I am not worried about that, but I want to say something about the current process since this has been raised. A number of things have happened since, the emerging loan losses of the banks and the creation of NAMA, if I can just comment on that. A number of things have happened since then, including the emerging loan losses of the banks and the creation of NAMA. I believe the NAMA programme and the recapitalisation of the banks which will follow very soon, now that NAMA is up and running with the initial purchases, will deliver on the expected initial results, namely, to derisk the banks' balance sheets, to give them liquidity and to build their capital. I am referring to the recapitalisation, not NAMA in this regard. This will set the scene and create the foundations for the recovery of banking.

I have always maintained, and there is nothing new in this, that the flow of credit will depend on the recovery of confidence among bankers and borrowers, in addition to those factors, which are prerequisites. It will not be a question of unleashing the gates at the moment of the first NAMA purchase. I have stated as much consistently and I still believe it. This is not the only way to undertake a process of this type. Some other countries have chosen other routes but there are considerable advantages in going the NAMA route. I was concerned that NAMA would overpay. I discussed that in another committee and I have not changed my view on the exact design of that. However, as the numbers have evolved this has become a less relevant issue. We can discuss this off-line but it will turn out that it will not be a central issue. I am not really concerned about the NAMA pricing as a high priority issue anymore.

What is the central issue for the Governor?

Professor Patrick Honohan

When this is all over the central issue is that NAMA will exist, but it will be out of my sphere as Governor of the Central Bank. NAMA will exist as an entity with a very large portfolio of loans backed by property. The working out of those in the most effective way possible for the economy will be a continuing challenge, but one which can be achieved.

Surely there will be a great cost to the taxpayer?

The Deputy should note that other Deputies——

I wish to make one final point.

The Deputy must allow some of his colleagues to come in.

I will finish on this point because it is important. Does the Governor not agree that the price paid for the loans has a consequence for the taxpayer?

We will move on. I call Senator Quinn.

I refer to the value and discount and their effect on the taxpayer.

Deputies Morgan and Barrett are next.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I believe the Deputy will find it is not as important as it seemed to be some time ago. This will await the play-out of the whole recapitalisation process which will give a very effective and clear picture for the banking system and which protects the taxpayer.

Does the Governor believe there will be further recapitalisation needs for the banks post-NAMA?

We will move on.

It is a very important point.

Professor Patrick Honohan

Given that the matter has been left hanging, I must answer it. There will be recapitalisation but the recapitalisation to be undertaken will take account of the additional loan losses, which can be predicted in the banks' books and which are non-NAMA loan losses. There will be no question of dipping back in, year in, year out.

I wish to make one short interjection.

The Governor stated further recapitalisation was required post-NAMA.

I asked about the approach of the ECB and the possibility of solidarity.

The Deputy should allow other members of the committee to have their questions answered.

If the figure will be as large as the Governor has implied, will the ECB have to come in and express some solidarity?

This is not Deputy Burton's personal committee. Senator Boyle put questions. I call on the Governor to answer Senator Boyle's questions. I am sorry Senator Boyle.

There is no need to apologise.

I am looking to the future.

Professor Patrick Honohan

Senator Boyle asked the interesting question of whether conducting this investigation and contributing to the next stage of the banking resolution would proceed in parallel or in sequence. They must work in parallel. The next stage, namely, the recapitalisation of the banks, involves a manageable amount of money, it is being prepared in a very systematic way and will work very effectively. That is taking place over a short timescale and it cannot wait until the end of this inquiry. I do not believe this creates a problem.

The Senator also asked about the design of the next stage of the inquiry. I have not been involved in the two-stage design of the inquiry. If I held strong opinions on it I would not hesitate to share them with the committee, but I do not, nor do I have a very clear picture in my mind of what the next stage will do that the first stage could not do. That may become clearer later on.

I look to the US model to some extent. Its inquiry is under way and, from memory, I gather it started the process sometime during the summer of last year. There was radio silence for several months as preparation was undertaken. There is some analogy between that process and what I and Messrs Regling and Watson are doing. The US inquiry held several public hearings, including one involving professional experts in the field of banking and finance which was held over several days and during which the experts presented their opinions. I am unsure exactly how this will unfold in the period to come but there is a good mixture of quiet, behind closed doors assessments and public discussion in the US process. To some extent, what we are seeing here may reflect that balance adequately.

Will the inquiry include Mr. Neary and the Governor's predecessor in the Central Bank? Will they be a part of the process?

Professor Patrick Honohan

Yes. They are quite happy to participate.

We should call in a team of experts.

I enjoyed listening to the Governor. His use of words makes it very easy to listen, as does his use of such terms as "bubble of confidentiality". I do not intend to ask the Governor if he plays golf with certain people. In his opening speech, the Governor indicated he would consider the inclusion of any matter. He did not use the word "recommendations" in his written script or, at least, I could not find it there, but he used it in his spoken contribution. Is Professor Honohan likely to include any recommendation that Ireland should leave the euro and consider joining sterling? It has been mentioned but the matter has never received headlines. Is that the type of recommendation Professor Honohan would consider?

Professor Patrick Honohan

That is the sort of recommendation I would certainly not consider.

I welcome the Governor. I was much pleased by the reference to his strong views and that he would not hesitate to give them to us. Long may he hold on to these values in his relatively new job. Is it possible that the Governor may seek additional or, at least, different regulatory authority for his function as a result of what is under consideration in the preliminary report? In the consideration of the factors that caused the whole problem, will the Governor examine salaries and bonuses? There is a clear possibility they may have had a strong influence on the activities of the people involved.

Does the Governor believe he should have a greater role in allowing banks to set their rates of interest? AIB announced this morning it intends to increase its interest rates. This will have a very negative impact on those struggling at the moment, of whom there are many. I refer to the Governor's excellent comment — I intend to keep the sentence — on the need "to restrain the behaviour of imprudence and recklessness". Does the Governor believe he may have a role in NAMA in the future and that he could exercise that line in respect of NAMA?

I congratulate Professor Patrick Honohan on his appointment as Governor. It is refreshing that somebody totally independent is taking over the role. That has been our main problem, that there has been a succession of retired Secretaries General from the Department of Finance moving from Merrion Street to Dame Street. It was a continuation of Government policy from the Department to the Central Bank. The fact that Professor Honohan is coming to the task fresh and independent will answer many questions for the future from my point of view.

The Governor has been asked to take part in this examination. Has it delayed in any way the changes he considers necessary since he has taken over his appointment? It was improper that he was asked to participate in this exercise. It impinges on the independence of his office, which is the secret to the success here, and anything that links him in to making recommendations that do not directly assist him in carrying out his duties is wrong. He should not be asked to interview his predecessors. It is not fair to ask anybody to do that. His actions, the changes he will make, will indicate clearly whether his predecessors were right or wrong in how they carried out their duties. Would the Governor agree that he should protect his independence at all costs? That is fundamental.

The point was raised earlier that the Governor's predecessor, when he attended a meeting of this committee, stated he had stress tested the banks and everything was all right. That left us in a weak position. People on the street were telling us that this could not last and we were coming in here and asking the independent Governor what he thought, and he was misleading us. That, in turn, affected us and the job that we are supposed to do.

The independence of the Governor and our independence in asking the questions are vitally important in any democracy and I hope that this kind of exercise will not trap the Governor into interfering in any way with his independence. He should not be asked to comment on what his predecessors did. That is wrong, and I hope the Governor will not do it. If the Governor needs extra powers he should have the right and the openness to state it and we as elected Members should support him in getting them to maintain his independence. I would ask that the Governor's changes would not be delayed in any way by carrying out this exercise. This exercise is for somebody else, not the Governor.

When Professor Honohan took up this job, did anybody hand him a handbook on what to do and not to do, such as a Minister gets on taking office? People ask me what exactly does the Governor of the Central Bank do. Does Professor Honohan understand the point I am making? It is a serious matter. The Governor's role within the ECB, and his role here in Ireland in terms of his independence in overseeing regulation, behaviour, etc., must be clearly defined for us all so that we all know where we stand.

I do not mean to be political in what I have said. I believe that the main advantage of Professor Honohan's appointment is his complete independence. Anybody with a brain could see what was happening in the past. A Secretary General of the Department of Finance carries out the policy of the Government of the day, whether my party or another is in power. That is what they do. It is not living in the real world to ask that person to move over to Dame Street, put on a different hat and expect him or her to change and not follow through on that policy. Therefore, it is wrong.

I stated here previously that it was wrong that ex-Secretaries General of the Department of Finance should be appointed Governor. They should never have been so appointed. For me, Professor Honohan's appointment is a sign of new hope that there will be independence. I would urge the Governor not to do anything in this exercise that would interfere in any way with that independence.

Professor Patrick Honohan

Deputy Morgan asked will there be recommendations for the powers and the structures of the organisation. To some extent we are getting these recommendations implemented in proposed legislation. For matters on the ground that do not require legislation, however, it will help to some extent.

I may have stated to another Oireachtas committee in December that I did not consider I needed such an inquiry to do my job, and I made that comment to my new colleague, Mr. Matthew Elderfield, the head of regulation. I asked did he agree and he replied, "Well, maybe 80%". Perhaps there will be some benefit from this kind of investigation to really understand, in a way that one would not without it, how the organisation and the structure of regulation worked. That may be helpful.

I will return to the other questions, but that somewhat addresses what Deputy Barrett was saying about whether this would delay the changes and reforms. I do not think so. I have many colleagues, including especially the new head of regulation, who is motoring ahead on changes in the way things are done and in expanding the staffing to get it up to the necessary minimum international standards he deems necessary. There is much ongoing work on that dimension and we are working closely together with the other senior staff on it.

Some of the staff most expert in this area welcome there being an investigation because they have their own perception, which is helpful for them to get out there and form the overall understanding of what happened. One can imagine that many people in the organisation feel they are the object of criticism.

The question of salaries and bonuses is an interesting one. It is an area that has come under considerable scrutiny in the public arena, but also by experts in regulation. For years many of these regulators were saying if only we had got the incentive structures well designed within banks, then we would not have got the problems that arose. Sometimes these incentive structures are quite subtle. It is not just that we should have paid them less, but that we should have paid them in different ways, and maybe less too. It is the structure of the incentives that can have been distorting. That is something that is on the agenda.

May the Governor look at that in terms of regulation or control, notwithstanding the current cap that is in place?

Professor Patrick Honohan

My approach in terms of introducing new regulations is to ensure that we are fully up to steam. There is a wave of re-regulation happening around the world and my approach is to ensure we are in no way behind the curve on that, to ensure we are well adapted and getting best practice in terms of the new public interest regulation being adopted worldwide. It is also to ensure also that we will not be in any way a kind of loophole or soft option where we would get free-riding firms migrating. As an Irishman, I like firms migrating to Ireland but I do not want them migrating to Ireland because of some perception that they will get some kind of regulatory free ride here.

On interest rates, central banks hate to control spreads on interest rates. It is difficult for the Central Bank. It is difficult for anybody outside the banking system to determine the appropriate risk pricing. If we had been controlling interest rates over the years on lending, I would appear here and the committee would tell me to look at certain developers who got interest rates at only so many basis points above the European Central Bank rate and that it was ridiculous given the risk involved. I am still sufficiently a believer in market logic to say that interfering too aggressively in the area will be counter-productive.

If the committee wants to know if the Central Bank should have a role in NAMA, our hands are already full and NAMA is a non-banking area, it has its own governance structure and it is vital to get that right.

It has a banking structure too.

Professor Patrick Honohan

Not from a legal point of view. It looks a little like a bank but it is not a bank.

It looks like a bank, feels like a bank and smells like a bank — like a bad bank.

As this inquiry is going on, is there danger that if it makes recommendations for change which involve changes to legislation, that it will be put on the long finger until the statutory inquiry is finished? That is what bothers me and that is where I think the Governor's independence should not be interfered with. If he thinks there should be change in legislation, he should not have to wait for the statutory inquiry.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I do not think we need worry about that; it is not what is happening. It is not like putting back all the legislation. The legislation is being prepared, it is not being delayed by this. I can imagine it might have occurred if I had said it would be better to wait. I hesitated when it was mentioned that I would investigate my own organisation but I felt I could do it and be effective because I am inside the restrictions on information. I can do it quickly, effectively and with a degree of trust on the part of the people I will work with. I can write a report that communicates without feeling my independence is compromised. I considered all these factors and I am comfortable that this will not compromise my independence. To some extent, people could say I asked for this by raising the whole question of an inquiry in another Oireachtas committee.

I thank the Governor for coming before the committee.

Will he interview officials and key decision makers including retired officials, such as the retired Governor and the previous Financial Regulator as well as other senior officials? Will there be any difficulty in pointing the finger at whomever is ultimately responsible for the debacle that took place in this country? If something damaging to the Central Bank or the Financial Regulator emerges, while the Governor said he had to be delicate in the balancing act, what way can he deal with that if it arises in a way that affects his position?

How have the day to day workings of the Central Bank changed since Professor Honohan took over the main job? What confidence can he offer the public that it is not a case of business as usual and that policy and procedures have changed whereby people can have confidence in the organisation?

What input has Professor Honohan into the new Central Bank legislation? Does he feel it is important for the Government to put the Bills out for public consultation so that as many people as possible have an input directly into the legislation to ensure it is robust and works correctly so we do not have a repeat of what has happened?

Professor Patrick Honohan

I will talk to the retired officials and they are willing to co-operate. There is no problem there. The committee will see how I handle those delicate issues.

What input have we had in the legislation? There has been two way discussion with the sponsoring Department and the Department of Finance and I have been kept fully informed and made inputs at the appropriate point. To be perfectly honest, a great deal can be done within the present structure. There will be a better structure under the new legislation but we can still do a great deal in the current structure. We are already doing things differently. To an extent that started before my time. The regulatory authority and the board of the Central Bank have met. There are matters reserved in law for the regulatory authority to do and when we come to the end of a meeting, those from the authority and the board of the Central Bank leave, except for me, because I have been invited to stay on and participate in the discussions. It all works well when people have trust and confidence in each other. That is why there must be legislation, in case a situation emerges in the future where the people change.

What has changed on the day to day basis?

Professor Patrick Honohan

In terms of regulation, relative to the situation before the crisis, there has been a huge increase in the number of staff working on bank regulation for the covered institutions. There have been substantial changes in the personnel assigned to the banking system, with many new people hired. There is a whole of bank risk approach now that was not as comprehensive in the past, the institutions are now looked at as a whole. The new head of financial regulation is introducing a raft of different methods and procedures. He will appear before this and other committees at an appropriate time to provide further detail.

My first task was to finalise the appointment of the new head of financial regulation and we were lucky to get him, he has been in place since the start of January. I did not come with a prepared pack on what we have been doing because it was not the topic of today's conversation so I will give a flavour.

How many new employees are there and what specialist expertise now exists? This is linked to the other question Deputy O'Donnell asked.

Professor Patrick Honohan

The best thing is to deal with that at the appropriate time. We will make announcements on the plan for the years ahead. I do not have the material in front of me and would prefer to wait until we are in a position to make a comprehensive outline.

Who are the team of experts and what are their qualifications? Should the statutory inquiry be held in public? What level of funding will go into the banks above what would be expected based on the NAMA loans?

Professor Patrick Honohan

I have dealt with the question of the public or private nature of the inquiry as well as I can in my response to Senator Boyle.

I have the team with me here and will divide them, somewhat unfairly, into senior and junior members. There are two outsiders, in other words people who have not been working in the Central Bank. Mr. Paul Gorecki is a professor at the ESRI. Previously, he was a member of the Competition Authority and, therefore, he has a regulatory background but not specifically in the financial sector. I took the view that he would be the ideal person to lead the work on the regulatory structures from an external point of view. This would include work on the first part running up towards the end of 2007. The second person is Mr. Donal Donovan, a visiting lecturer of economics in Trinity College Dublin at the moment. He has retired from the IMF. He is an Irishman and I have known him off and on but not very well for many years. He is not a great pal but he is someone I know and trust.

Does he play golf with the Governor?

Professor Patrick Honohan

No, we do not play golf together. To give the measure of it, I do not even know if he plays golf. The expertise he will bring to the picture relates to the business of crisis management, the relationship between the Central Bank and Departments and his wide international experience. Mr. Rafique Mottiar has just retired from the Central Bank. I have know him for a long time as well. He worked in the Central Bank for approximately 30 years. He has not worked on either the financial stability side or the regulatory side of the Central Bank but he is well liked and trusted in the organisation and he is familiar with it. I took the view it would be essential to have such a person to anchor the process. I refer to a number of junior people who will be involved as well — they are not so very junior in fact. Mr. Seán Kinsella is on secondment at the Central Bank from the Department of Finance. Ms Suzanne Pepper manages the executive secretariat in the general secretariat department of the Central Bank. Ms Nodhlag Cadden is an audit manager in the internal audit department. Ms Irene McKenna and Ms Margaret Murray are very experienced support staff. By the way, we had this prepared weeks ago and no one asked for it.

What about the level of funding for NAMA?

Deputy Burton has further questions to put.

The Governor mentioned the issue of governance in one of his lists. Presumably, this was a reference to the governance of the board of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator. Does the Governor believe in the system of a Government appointing members of a board to represent the banking sector, the social partnership sector and so on? I refer to the role of non-executive directors in the regulator and the Central Bank where, it appears, there has been a dramatic failure on the boards of the banks. Does the Governor intend to examine governance and appointment issues? Does he intend to examine the fact that the Government appoints all these people to the boards? Did these boards have anything to say about the various crises? I refer to a previous question. The Governor referred to what he foresees as the outcome for NAMA. What is his view on how the ECB is treating Ireland or the approach it is developing towards Ireland?

The Deputy has widened the whole issue again.

It is a repeat of a previous question to which I did not receive an answer.

That is because it was not relevant to the reason for this meeting. There should be clarity in the question.

It is a remarkably relevant question for the 400,000 people who are currently unemployed. The question is whether the ECB will close down the country and, in my humble opinion, it is relevant.

We can hold a discussion on that matter at another meeting.

No. The Governor is making one of his rare appearances here and we deserve the benefit of his insights. The Chairman cannot protect the Government all the time.

May I speak, please?

The Chairman is acting to try to protect his Government. We are trying to take a bipartisan approach as part of which we can put questions.

I call on the Deputy to withdraw that remark.

My question is perfectly in order.

It is not relevant to the meeting.

It is deeply relevant to the meeting.

Does Deputy Barrett have a question?

I object to the Chairman's ridiculous attempts to constantly protect Fianna Fáil.

Do the Governor and the Chairman believe it would be a good idea if the heads of the Bill in respect of the new legislation under discussion were referred to this committee after approval by the Cabinet to establish the benefit to the legislation of further input from interested bodies before it is actually prepared? Would it be a good idea?

Professor Patrick Honohan

I could not possibly comment on parliamentary procedure.

It is not parliamentary procedure. This is about the practice of preparing good legislation.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I am sorry, I do not have anything further to say on that because I do not know nor do I understand enough about it.

This is the same as the mistake made last time, when the legislation was very ill-conceived. A big bulldog clip was put around the existing regulations and no attempt was made to say whether it amounted to best practice. It landed in and was passed and we have learned to regret at our leisure the lack of parliamentary scrutiny on that occasion.

Perhaps the Governor could consider the matter in his report as one of the requests made by the committee. It may be a good idea to refer the heads of the Bill concerned with further regulation in this area to the committee following their approval by Cabinet and prior to the final preparation of the legislation. I call on the Governor to consider the suggestion.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I will bear it in mind.

There was similar consultation on the broadcasting Bill. Perhaps we could proceed in such a way. We could make a recommendation to that effect.

That process should take place for most important legislation.

The NAMA legislation was published in draft format for consultation.

That should happen.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I wish to ensure the committee is not left with any concerns about the future in regard to the ECB and the recapitalisation of banks. I am unsure about the concerns the Deputies held but I assure the members of the committee that——

Through the chair——

Allow Professor Honohan to speak, please.

Will Professor Honohan elaborate on those points?

Professor Patrick Honohan

I wish to pick up on the sense of concern that may exist and I do not believe there are any grounds for such concerns. Standard procedures exist in the ECB system for the provision of liquidity and these systems remain in place. There have been changes in these procedures in light of evolving liquidity. However, I do not foresee that any of the changes that might occur during the foreseeable period would have an adverse affect on Irish banks' ability to secure liquidity.

What level of funding does the Governor expect to be put in to the banks? I refer to forward projections as well.

Professor Patrick Honohan

It will be a well-calculated, manageable sum. I will not give a number. We can get out of this——

How does the Governor define manageable?

I asked about the governance of the boards of the bank and the Regulator.

Professor Patrick Honohan

I made a note of that and I will respond.

I thank the Governor, Professor Honohan, and I wish him well with his report. I look forward to the publication of same in due course. I wish him a safe journey to the ECB.

The joint committee adjourned at 4 p.m. until 1 p.m. on Tuesday, 9 March 2010.
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