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Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform díospóireacht -
Thursday, 4 Apr 2013

Recovery and Resolution Framework for Financial lnstitutions: Discussion

No. 7 is scrutiny of COM (2012) 280 which relates to a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms in the European Union. I welcome Mr. Aidan Carrigan, Mr. Pat Casey, Mr. Kevin Nolan, Ms Mairéad McGuinness and Mr. Cathal Sheridan from the Department of Finance and Mr. Greg Dempsey and Mr. Greg Lavelle from the Central Bank of Ireland. Mr. Carrigan will make some opening remarks and we will follow that with a question and answer session.

I advise witnesses that by virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the Defamation Act 2009 they are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to the committee. If you are directed by the committee to cease giving evidence relating to a particular matter and you continue to so do, you are entitled thereafter only to a qualified privilege in respect of your evidence. You are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and you are asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, you should not criticise nor make charges against any person or persons or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable. Members are reminded of the long-standing ruling of the Chair to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

I welcome Mr. Carrigan and his colleagues and I call on him to make his opening statement.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I am accompanied by colleagues, whom the Chairman has introduced, from the Department of Finance and the Central Bank to provide support. I thank the committee for the invitation to brief it on the Commission's legislative proposal to create a harmonised recovery and resolution framework for financial institutions. I acknowledge that the committee has facilitated us in having this meeting around the Easter period when the European Parliament and the European Commission have taken a break. This has allowed me to pull together my full team, which has been rather stretched with servicing meetings throughout Europe during the past three months. It is much appreciated that we can fit the meeting into this timescale.

The proposal before the committee and under discussion today is a proposal establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending various Council directives and regulations. The Commission's proposal for the recovery and resolution of financial institutions in difficulty was published in June 2012. It seeks to establish a standard framework for dealing with the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms in Europe and will provide member states with a common set of tools and powers to resolve institutions in difficulty. The overriding objective is to ensure that a bank's critical functions can be maintained while the costs of restructuring and resolving banks fall on the banks' owners and creditors rather than on taxpayers.

The overriding objective is to ensure that a bank's critical functions can be maintained while the costs of restructuring and resolving banks fall on the bank's owners and creditors rather than on taxpayers.

The current proposal will ensure convergence in how national authorities implement resolution actions. This is particularly important in the context of resolving large cross-border banking groups where co-ordination of actions and co-operation between national authorities in different member states is essential if we are to avoid costly break-ups on national levels.

The financial crisis in Europe has highlighted that authorities were often ill-equipped to deal with the resolution of banks in difficulty. Furthermore, given the high degree of financial market integration in Europe, the risk that problems in one member state can rapidly spread to several others has been clearly demonstrated. This backdrop sets the scene for the considerable efforts undertaken over recent years, both on a global basis and in Europe, to equip authorities with common tools and powers to resolve systemically important institutions with minimal disruption to the wider economy.

In 2010 the European Commission commenced a consultation around its plans for a union framework for crisis management in the financial sector. It held a number of consultations with experts and stakeholders, including experts from member states, the banking industry, academics and legal firms. Parallel to the EU consultation process in November 2011, G20 leaders endorsed the Financial Stability Board's key attributes of effective resolution for financial institutions. This internationally agreed standard sets out responsibilities, instruments and powers that national resolution regimes should have to resolve a failing systemically important financial institution. The key attributes also specify requirements for resolvability assessments and recovery and resolution planning for global systemically important financial institutions, SIFIs, as well as the adoption of institution-specific co-operation agreements between home and host authorities. In the EU context, efforts culminated with the publication of the Commission's proposal on bank recovery and resolution in June 2012. The proposal is largely in line with the FSB key attributes and has been welcomed by member states and internationally as a positive step towards rebuilding confidence in the banking system and its ability to deal with future crises.

At the June 2012 summit euro area leaders considered a report from President Van Rompuy prepared in collaboration with the presidents of the Commission, the Eurogroup and the ECB on strengthening EMU. One of the main proposals in the four presidents' report related to an integrated financial framework or, as it is better known now, a banking union. An integrated financial framework should have two central elements: a single European banking supervision system and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework. The June summit also affirmed the imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.

The first step towards a banking union was the creation of a single supervisor for euro area banks. The Irish Presidency finalised agreement with the European Parliament on the single supervisory mechanism on 19 March. The agreement provides that the ECB will supervise the eurozone banking system and banks of non-eurozone states that wish to participate in the single supervisory mechanism. The ECB will have direct supervision of banks with assets over €30 billion or an assets-to-national-GDP ratio of 20%, while national supervisors will continue day-to-day supervision of smaller banks in accordance with ECB guidance. It is expected that the ECB will commence its supervisory functions in mid-2014.

The current proposals on bank resolution are only to harmonise national regimes, so for now these functions will remain national competencies. A complete banking union would effectively centralise all of these and other national competencies, providing that banking policy in the EU, including regulation, supervision, deposit insurance and resolution, would be centralised. To this end the Commission intends to publish a proposal for a single resolution mechanism this summer.

The harmonised bank resolution framework builds on efforts by several member states to improve national resolution systems. It strengthens them in key respects and ensures the viability of resolution tools in Europe's integrated financial market. The proposed tools are divided into powers of prevention, early intervention and resolution, with intervention by the authorities becoming more intrusive as the situation deteriorates. I will explain these tools and how they operate in more detail. The main elements of the preparation and prevention stage are as follows. First, the framework requires banks to draw up recovery plans setting out measures that would restore the bank's viability in the event of a deterioration of its financial situation. Second, resolution authorities tasked with the responsibility of resolving banks are required to prepare resolution plans with options for dealing with banks that are in critical condition or that may no longer be viable. These contain information on the application of resolution tools and ways to ensure the continuity of critical functions. Recovery and resolution plans are to be prepared both at group level and for the individual institutions within the group. Third, if authorities identify obstacles to resolvability in the course of this planning process, they can require a bank to change its legal or operational structures to ensure that it can be resolved with the available tools in a way that does not compromise critical functions, threaten financial stability or involve costs to the taxpayer. Finally, financial groups may enter into intra-group support agreements to limit the development of a crisis and quickly boost the financial stability of the group as a whole. Subject to approval by the supervisory authorities and the shareholders of each entity that is party to the agreement, institutions that operate in a group would thus be able to provide financial support, in the form of loans, guarantees or assets for use as collateral in transactions, to other entities within the group that experience financial difficulties.

The next stage is early intervention. Early intervention powers are triggered when an institution does not meet, or is likely to be in breach of, regulatory capital requirements. Authorities could require the institution to implement any measures set out in the recovery plan, draw up an action programme and a timetable for its implementation, require the convening of a meeting of shareholders to adopt urgent decisions, and require the institution to draw up a plan for restructuring of debt with its creditors. Early supervisory intervention will ensure that financial difficulties are addressed as soon as they arise. In addition, supervisors will have the power to appoint a special manager at a bank for a limited period when there is a significant deterioration in its financial situation and the tools described above are not sufficient to reverse the situation. The primary duty of a special manager is to restore the financial situation of the bank and the sound and prudent management of its business.

The final form of intervention provided for, which was seen as the ultimate intervention in a crisis, is the power of resolution and the use of resolution tools. Resolution takes place if the preventative and early intervention measures fail to prevent the situation from deteriorating to the point at which a bank is failing or likely to fail. If the authority determines that no alternative action would help prevent failure of the bank, and that the public interest is at stake, authorities should take control of the institution and initiate decisive resolution action. The public interest includes access to critical banking functions, avoiding adverse effects on financial stability and protection of public finances. In such circumstances, harmonised resolution tools and powers, together with the resolution plans prepared in advance for both national and cross-border banks, will ensure that national authorities in all member states have a common toolkit and roadmap to manage the failure of banks. The impact on the rights of shareholders and creditors which the tools entail is justified by the overriding need to protect financial stability, depositors and taxpayers, and is supported by safeguards to ensure that the resolution tools are not improperly used.

Where preparation and early interventions are insufficient, the main resolution tools are as follows. The first is the sale of business tool, whereby the authorities would sell all or part of the failing bank to another bank. Then there is the bridge institution tool, which consists of identifying the good assets or essential functions of the bank and separating them into a new bank, often referred to as a bridge bank, which would be sold to another entity, following which the old bank with the bad or non-essential functions would be liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings. This would be followed by the asset separation tool, whereby the bad assets of the bank are put into an asset management vehicle.

This tool cleans the balance sheet of a bank. In order to prevent the tool from being used solely as a state aid measure, the framework prescribes that it may be used only in conjunction with another tool such as bridge bank or sale of business. This ensures that while the bank receives support, it also undergoes restructuring. Finally, there is the bail-in tool, whereby the bank would be recapitalised with shareholders diluted or wiped out, and creditors would have their claims reduced or converted to shares. An institution for which a private acquirer could not be found could thus continue to provide essential services, and authorities would have time to reorganise it or wind down parts of its business in an orderly manner. To that end, banks would be required to have a minimum percentage of their total liabilities in the shape of instruments eligible for bail-in. If triggered, these instruments would be written down in a pre-defined order in terms of seniority of claims in order for the institution to regain viability. In short, shareholders would bear losses first. Once shareholders' claims have been exhausted subordinated creditors would then be written down. Only when these claims have been exhausted could senior creditors be written down.

It should be noted that our domestic bank resolution legislation - the Central Bank and Credit Institutions (Resolution) Act 2011 - provides the Central Bank with tools for the resolution of credit institutions. It is focused on ensuring the resolution of an institution does not impact on the stability of the financial system. It was designed to be aligned with international best practice in this area and is broadly in line with the Commission’s proposal in that it provides for recovery and resolution plans, resolution tools, including a bridge bank tool, and the appointment of a special manager. The Irish regime also established a resolution fund which is being financed by contributions from industry. However, the issue of bail-in mechanisms was not fully developed at the time the Act was being drafted in early 2011 and no clear consensus had emerged on it. The concern was therefore that any pre-emptive action on our part by including bail-in type tools in our “steady-state” resolution regime in advance of agreement at EU and international level could have had significant consequences for banks within the scope of the resolution Act. Of course when the Commission proposal is finalised in the form of an agreed directive we will need to review our domestic resolution legislation to see what needs to change in order to fully implement the directive’s provisions including in relation to bail-in mechanisms.

In order to deal with EU banks or banking groups that operate across borders, the resolution framework enhances co-operation between national authorities in all phases of preparation, intervention and resolution. Resolution colleges are to be established under the leadership of the group resolution authority and with the participation of the European Banking Authority, EBA. The EBA will facilitate joint actions and act as a binding mediator if necessary. It will also have a role in developing technical standards or guidelines on particular matters and thereby strengthen the single rule book and protect the development of the Single Market.

To be effective, the resolution tools will require a certain amount of funding. For example, if authorities create a bridge bank, it will need capital or short-term loans to operate. If market funding is not available this supplementary funding will need to be provided by resolution funds which will raise contributions from banks proportionate to their liabilities and risk profiles. In other words, the costs of resolution are primarily borne by the institutions themselves and their owners and investors. The funds will have to build up sufficient capacity and the proposal sets a target level for member states' resolution funds to reach 1% of covered deposits in ten years. The Commission proposes that resolution funds should be used exclusively for supporting orderly resolution. National resolution funds would interact, notably to provide funding for resolving cross-border banks. The proposal also gives national resolution funds a right to borrow from their counterparts in other member states in the event that there are insufficient funds in their own resolution fund. This right to borrow is complemented with an obligation to lend to other funds within the Union. Safeguards are in place to ensure that no national fund shall be obliged to lend in circumstances where it would not have sufficient funds to finance a resolution in its own territory in the foreseeable future or where the loan required would exceed more than half of the available funds in the lending member state's resolution fund.

Deposit guarantee schemes, DGS, may be called to contribute to resolution in two ways. First, deposit guarantee schemes must contribute for the purpose of ensuring continuous access to covered or guaranteed deposits. Deposit guarantee schemes are currently established in all member states in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC. They compensate retail depositors up to €100,000. By contrast, resolution avoids the unavailability of covered deposits, which is preferable from the depositor's point of view. In that context it is considered desirable that the DGS contributes an amount equivalent to the losses that it would have had to bear in normal insolvency proceedings.

Second, while member states must at least use DGSs for the purpose of providing cash to ensure continuous access to covered deposits, they retain discretion as to how to fund resolution. They may decide to create financing arrangements separate from the DGS, or use their DGS also as financing arrangements for resolution under Article 91. Indeed, there are synergies between deposit guarantee schemes and resolution. When a resolution framework that limits contagion is in place, it reduces the number of bank failures, and therefore the likeliness of DGS pay-outs. The proposal therefore allows member states to use deposit guarantee schemes for resolution funding in order to reap economies of scale. Where the two arrangements are separate, the DGS is liable for the protection of covered depositors to the extent and in the conditions laid down in Article 99.

Before concluding, it would be useful to outline the position of the bank resolution proposal in the overall context of the integrated financial framework, IFF, or banking union, which is one of the key building blocks of a strengthened EMU. The other elements of a banking union are: integrated European supervision of banks in the form of the single supervisory mechanism, SSM; adoption of the capital requirements directive, CRD IV, which will, inter alia, facilitate the SSM’s implementation of a single rule book based on the Basel III accord; development of an operational framework for the direct recapitalisation of banks by the ESM; and a recasting of the DGS directive to further harmonise national deposit guarantee schemes.

The single supervisory mechanism is the first element of the package of banking union measures, and it is necessary now to conclude discussions on the remaining elements of banking union. In this regard the December 2012 European Council conclusions call on the co-legislators to agree on proposals for a recovery and resolution directive and for a deposit guarantee scheme directive before June 2013.

The draft bank recovery and resolution, BRR, directive is an important first step towards an efficient and financially sound Europe-wide bank resolution regime. It aims to provide a harmonised toolbox at EU level. Nonetheless, to overcome the challenges surrounding the orderly resolution of cross-border institutions, an independent European resolution authority is required to align the incentives of the single supervisory mechanism and the resolution function. To this end, a common authority, free of the constraints of national mandates, is needed to exercise the bank resolution function in an independent manner across the euro area. When banks are regulated and supervised at the SSM-wide level, a common resolution authority is the inevitable complement.

An additional element in the banking union initiative is a single resolution mechanism, SRM, and single resolution authority, SRA, to centrally manage the resolution of banks within the banking union. The European Council of December 2012 noted the Commission’s intention to submit a proposal for a single resolution mechanism for member states participating in the single supervisory mechanism to be examined as a matter of urgency during the current parliamentary cycle of the European Parliament. We understand this proposal will be presented by the Commission in the summer and consultations at EU level are already commencing.

To return to the bank resolution proposal, the file is a high priority for the Irish Presidency and we have been working very actively to achieve agreement at European Council level. We have held nine meetings of the expert working party in the first three months of the Presidency and the file has moved now to attaché level where the focus will be on the remaining political issues.

The intention is to progress to COREPER before the end of April so the bank resolution proposal can be discussed and, I hope, agreed at the May ECOFIN meeting, which will keep us somewhat in line with the timetable set for us by the Council. Following agreement at the meeting, trilogue negotiations with the European Parliament and European Commission will take place. As indicated, the intention is to include this by June 2013.

Ireland, during its Presidency of the Council, is affording top priority to the banking union package. In recent weeks, we have achieved agreement between co-legislators on the capital requirements directive and the proposal to establish a single supervisory mechanism. This in itself represents a significant milestone on the path to banking union. During our Presidency, we have invested significant resources in the bank recovery and resolution proposal, and we will continue to prioritise this file over the coming weeks with the intention of achieving a considered proposal that will have the broad support of member states. This will provide us with a negotiating mandate to move into discussions with the European Parliament. Committee members will be aware that during our Presidency we are required to reflect the views of all member states at the Council. We will, of course, act as an honest broker in discussions with a view to arriving at a workable final legislative proposal at Council level.

We will be happy to clarify any points made. Our team is available to deal with any questions.

I thank Mr. Carrigan for his very comprehensive briefing. We will limit the first round of questions and answers to 12 minutes and bring people back in for a second round if necessary. Is that agreed? Agreed. I will ask some questions to get the ball rolling.

In addition to the implementation of the capital requirement regulation, the capital requirement directive and the bank recovery and resolution directive, it is strongly recommended that a set of additional issues, including support for more stringent supervision of loan-to-value ratios, be addressed with regard to the separation of banks' trading activities. There are high-street banks in which one lodges one's salary at the end of the month and from which one obtains a mortgage or business account and there are investment houses through which major construction and development projects would have been financed. The two have different risk profiles. With regard to the restructuring of the banks, which is what this process is very much about, how much has the Irish banking system been examined with this in mind? Have the risks of both types of banks been monitored in terms of moneys they may have in accounts and their management of loan-to-value ratios?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

The Chairman is correct to draw attention to that. It is a further element of the bank restructuring debate at European level. It is not as developed as the banking union proposals that I outlined in my presentation, but the debate is live. The Liikanen report has considered the structural issues associated with banks. In the United Kingdom, there is the Vickers report, and the United States has a similar one. Each of the reports has come up with slightly varying solutions. The United Kingdom is focusing more on structural separation. The Liikanen report examines the idea of making provision for different capital requirements depending on the risks of the various elements of the institution. All of these approaches are being considered by the European Commission. It is the intention of the European Commission, in the summer or shortly thereafter, to bring forward a specific proposal for legislation to deal with the structural issues associated with large financial institutions. It is not clear as yet whether the European Commission will opt for complete structural separation or different treatments within existing structures. There are consultation groups examining the matter. It is not clear yet what elements will need to be separated. In advance of determining this, we have been engaging in discussions on the matter, but we have not developed any clear policy ourselves because we anticipate that a clear policy will emerge from Europe in the coming weeks.

Let us say a bank has a significant high-street retail structure and also a very significant investment arm. I understand each of these arms will be siloed separately so contagion will not spread from one to the other, and so the investment side of the bank will not collapse and transfer the contagion to the depositor or retail side. The Department of Finance has made a recommendation in recent weeks and has given targets to the banks with regard to examination of their distressed mortgage loan books. They are to have so much dealt with by the end of quarter two. Is the Central Bank asking the banks that fall under its remit to determine how much asset and liability exposure they have in either area?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

The Deputy is correct that the outcome of the debate will involve dealing with the high-risk activities of large financial groups separately from the lower-risk deposit and normal lending activities, and to try to ring-fence one from the other, whether it requires structural separation or otherwise.

With regard to the specific Central Bank issue, I do not know whether we have the right official from the organisation present to comment. We did not anticipate the question but we can look into it.

I would appreciate it if we were forwarded a note on it.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Okay.

Mr. Carrigan mentioned the report produced in the United Kingdom. Reference was also made in the United Kingdom to how bankers' bonuses are to be dealt with. One of the key tenets of the capital requirements directive was the restriction on bank bonuses and the strict requirement for a linkage between fixed and variable remuneration in terms of what constitutes set increment payments and what people might receive by way of a bonus in once-off or other given circumstances.

In Britain, there has been much talk about Government intervention in this area. I would be very keen to hear from the Central Bank what is happening in Ireland with regard to guarding against the giving of excessive bonuses. I refer to additional payments awarded recently to senior officials in Bank of Ireland. If we are to put in place a monitoring arrangement as part of CRD IV, how could senior officials and directors in Bank of Ireland have been given a pay increase last week or the week before?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

The Government has imposed very strict limits on bankers' remuneration. Recently, in response to a parliamentary question, the Minister indicated that he has further directed the banks, in view of the continuing losses therein, to come up with plans outlining how they intend to address the issue of bankers' pay to help meet the State's objectives. The Minister has indicated that he expects the plans to result in a saving of 6% to 10% in the cost of remuneration, through payroll and pension benefit reductions, new working arrangements and putting in place structures that deliver efficiency gains.

I understand that in the middle and lower tiers of the banks, certain changes must be made. In recent weeks in Bank of Ireland, there was a salary increase recommended by the remuneration board to the chief executive officer or the bank's directors. In the context of CRD IV, how did this happen?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Our shareholder management unit is involved in the hands-on, day-to-day oversight in that regard so I cannot comment in detail on it; suffice it to say that the Chairman will be aware that-----

It is contrary to what the capital requirement directive seeks to achieve. Banks that are receiving State support are giving wage increases to senior managers and directors although those banks are not performing profitably in the private sector.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

At the time of the recapitalisation of the banks, caps were put on the salaries of chief executives at quite low levels compared to European levels generally. That issue is being sustained and overseen by the Irish shareholder management unit, so I cannot comment on the detail.

Members of the committee will recall that we briefed them on the capital requirements directive before Christmas 2012. Remuneration control was a late issue that was brought to the table by the European Parliament. It has now been concluded within that directive that bankers' bonuses be restricted to twice their actual pay, subject to shareholders' approval. I do not think there is any issue of bonuses such as that currently.

As I understand it, bonuses and additional payments can be described in two ways. They are either fixed or variable. With a fixed bonus, if I work in the private sector I get an additional top-up payment at the end of the year. Or, if I have served so many years, I get an increase in salary. That is measurable, although it is not understandable to many people. There are also variable increases which occur on a once-off basis or may happen because the bank has achieved excessive profits. I am asking Mr. Carrigan again what is the rationale for the increases in the Bank of Ireland figures in recent weeks.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I cannot comment specifically on that, Chairman.

Mr. Carrigan cannot argue with me, in any case.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

We can come back to the Chairman further on that if he is interested.

Yes. I think other committee members would like to hear that as well.

The bank recovery and resolution directive, or BRR directive, is still awaiting backing from the European Council and European Parliament. The Irish Government in particular has a role to play in moving it on. I would particularly like to hear from the Irish Central Bank in this regard. In his presentation, Mr. Carrigan referred to the implementation of the bail-in tool. Perhaps Mr. Carrigan could elaborate further, in layman's terms, on what the bail-in tool means. Does it mean that the banks themselves are covering losses in future? Is this a different way whereby, if banks misbehave or there is no proper governance or due care in terms of how they are managed, the banks themselves will pick up the tab in the first instance?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Maybe our Central Bank expert, Mr. Dempsey, could take us through the nature of bail-in tools and the sequence of bail-ins.

Mr. Greg Dempsey

The first point to make is that the bail-in tool is only one of the resolution tools available. The preventative measures - such as the resolution and recovery plans, and early intervention - must be shown not to have worked before any of the resolution tools can be used by the resolution authorities. At that stage, where the capital or financial position of the bank is such that it has failed or is likely to fail, and there is a public interest, the resolution authority can use one or other of these tools.

Conceptually, the bail-in tool itself is as follows. A valuation would be undertaken to determine the value of the assets and the gap between the assets and liabilities, including equity. That gap would first be applied to shareholders and then to the subordinated capital. Where that is insufficient to cover the losses, other creditors would be subject to a haircut so that the assets and liabilities match. In certain circumstances, there is a further process whereby certain creditors would be further written down but compensated with new equity issued to recapitalise the bank, so that it can operate on the basis of going forward.

The process is stating the losses that the bank has experienced and passing those losses to the bank's owners and creditors according to the insolvency hierarchy rather than allowing the losses to be picked up by taxpayers.

I would like to welcome Mr. Carrigan and his colleagues from the Department of Finance and the Central Bank. I welcome the fact that a common bank resolution regime will eventually be in place throughout Europe. It is long overdue. It is a great pity one was not put in place a number of years ago, which could potentially have been to our benefit in Ireland.

I will continue in the same vein as the Chairman's questioning. I fully understand Mr. Dempsey's statement that the resolution tools are a last resort. One would hope they will never have to be applied, but experience tells us otherwise. We certainly need to be prepared for that.

Can Mr. Dempsey elaborate further on how the bail-in tools work? He said that shareholders get hit first, and that is what happened in Ireland. About €60 billion of equity was lost in shareholder values. Subordinated creditors would be next in line, which also happened here. He also said that only after these had been exhausted could senior creditors be written down. The remaining senior creditors are the senior bondholders and depositors, presumably those with more than the €100,000 covered under the deposit guarantee scheme. How would the distribution of losses work when we get to that point? If senior bondholders and depositors are left, how do the losses get divided up at that point under these tools?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I will make a general comment first, if I may. The Deputy's question is a matter of live negotiation at the moment in Brussels as part of the legislative process. It is not yet in the form of a definitive proposal that says what the actual hierarchy will be among senior bondholders. There is still a lot of debate on how senior debt should be treated in a situation such as this. That is complicated by debate on things like depositor preferences and how deposit guarantee schemes should be bailed in. A number of issues are being debated on how to deal with senior debt in this situation. I do not know if Mr. Dempsey wants to comment further on that.

Mr. Greg Dempsey

As Mr. Carrigan said, the actual mechanics - including which creditors will be excluded and the proportion - are still being debated. If it is helpful to the committee, I can describe the original proposal and how it was envisaged to work.

I hear what Mr. Dempsey is saying, but I find it very unsatisfactory that that is the position. I know he is just explaining the current status of the ongoing negotiations, but that is the nub of the issue. The prevention and recovery plans, which are absolutely necessary, are prepared; this should have been done a long time ago. However, if it does come down to a situation in which there is a hole in the bank's capital base and one has to resort to a bail-in tool because none of the other resolution tools are appropriate, is Mr. Dempsey saying that that matter has not yet been decided upon? After shareholders and subordinated creditors have been hit, has the distribution of losses between senior bondholders - ECB money in some cases - and depositors yet to be determined? Is that the position?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

The allocation of any remaining losses at that point is one of the key points that is still being debated, along with which creditors might be excluded on a case-by-case basis in the interests of financial stability or to maintain critical functions.

Is it the intention that that omission, as I would regard it, will be filled during the negotiations? Will more flesh be put on the bones concerning what one does with the losses at that point in the bail-in, after shareholders and subordinated bondholders have been hit? Will that be fleshed out or could it be left the way it is, which is inconclusive?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

There are two ways this could work out. Essentially, we are talking about the scope of the bail-in - which creditors will be included and which excluded. A number of proposals are being debated. One is a series of defined exclusions, whereby creditors are excluded in advance for whatever reason. Another approach is that a very narrow list of discretionary exclusions would be allowed and thresholds for their use would have to be met.

Both approaches are linked to financial stability and the maintenance of critical functions. It is one of the key issues being debated.

What is the current legal position? I understand that, aside from ECB policy, one of the reasons senior bondholders were not burned was that they ranked pari passu with depositors. They were equal in law. Is that still the case under Irish law?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

Yes.

If the banks, God forbid, needed more money and the EU was not prepared to sanction the deployment of the ESM to recapitalise them directly, shareholders and subordinated bondholders would take the hit. If depositors and senior bondholders are equal in law, what would happen with regard to them?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

In the absence of the directive being finalised and any amendments being superimposed by the directive on insolvency, we would have recourse to the Central Bank and Credit Institutions (Resolution) Act, which provides for partial transfers. Matters would be dealt with situation by situation. The Act allows for partial transfers, which means some deposits might be moved and others left behind. Ultimately, the no-creditor-worse-off protection for all creditors remains.

I hear what you are saying. It is a reasonable question to ask. This is a work in progress and, hopefully, greater clarity will be brought to bear before matters are finalised. Given what happened in Cyprus, people are entitled to ask where they stand as a matter of law - and will stand when the directive is finalised - in respect of any deposits they hold in excess of €100,000.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Deputy McGrath mentioned the Cyprus situation. It behoves me to point out that the situation there is a long way from the situation here. We have been through our bank restructuring and have well capitalised banks. We have set up our bad bank and cleaned up the balance sheets. In the first instance, that situation will not arise here in the foreseeable future. In the second instance, the Minister has made it very clear that what happened in Cyprus was particular to the situation there. Deposits in Ireland are clearly guaranteed by the Government.

Up to €100,000.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Yes. The Government is also conscious that to draw depositors beyond that into a resolution situation would be very destabilising to the economy. It is not something the Government would be in favour of doing and we do not anticipate it happening.

If there are losses and a bank needs to be recapitalised, what will determine whether the ESM is used or the bail-in tools are deployed and losses are distributed?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

We are in the realms of speculation as we do not have an ESM for recapitalising banks at the moment. We do not have a resolution directive or regulation at the moment either. The very purpose of bringing these matters to a conclusion in the coming months, in terms of the way the ESM and resolution will operate, is to establish the certainty the Deputy seeks.

A resolution fund was established in Ireland under the 2011 Act. How much money is in the fund? I understand €250 million was put in last year and that an equivalent amount is to be invested this year. Has part of the fund been drawn down by credit unions in need of additional capital and have we started to levy the financial institutions to repay the Minister the money he put in on behalf of citizens?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

I do not have the exact figure, but slightly more than €250 million remains in the fund. In essence, that is made up of the €250 million contribution plus interest earned on the balance less costs, including legal costs, arising from resolution actions undertaken by the Central Bank. No funds have been used from the resolution fund to recapitalise credit unions. If that were necessary, the money would come directly from the Minister.

Eligible credit institutions under the Act have been levied. The levy period started last year but the levy notices were issued in February 2013. The levies have been received at this stage.

How much has been received?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

It is just under €10 million.

Is that the full amount for the current year? How much per year is being paid in?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

That is the full amount for eligible credit institutions for the current year.

I ask that the committee be sent a note by the officials setting out in tabular form the money that has been put into the fund, any outgoings to date, the interest earned and payments made by the eligible institutions.

I thank Mr. Carrigan and his colleagues for attending. Much of the subject matter is very technical in nature and I would like to distil for the ordinary taxpayer and citizen how the framework will work in practice. People will want to know if the European-wide supervisory, resolution, recovery and banking union system will prevent a situation similar to the one that arose in September 2008 when four men decided to put in place a blanket guarantee and bank bailout that has cost taxpayers €64 billion. Ultimately, this is about how much it is going to cost taxpayers and deposit holders. Will the proposed measures provide that assurance to the ordinary person looking on today who has been paying for the bank bailout for four years?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

All of the various elements of financial sector reform that have been put in place at national and European level are intended to ensure a situation does not arise wherein the Government finds itself facing a bank run if it does not take immediate action. The new framework requires all banks to put recovery and resolution plans in place and to create a resolution fund which is overseen by a resolution authority and a European supervisory authority.

How often will they have to update their recovery plans? Will it be on a yearly or a six-monthly basis?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Yearly updates will be required.

Will they be reported to both the Irish and the European authorities?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Under the single supervisory mechanism, Irish banks will either be supervised directly by the ECB or day-to-day supervision will be carried out by the national authority under the guidelines the ECB sets. The ECB will have overall responsibility for supervision. Within the current proposal on resolution, resolution and recovery plans will be overseen by the Irish national resolution authority. The Commission has indicated that it will bring forward a proposal for a single resolution authority.

Will each member state have its own resolution authority?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Yes. While the current Irish resolution authority under the 2011 Act is within the Central Bank, that will not necessarily have to be the case in future.

Some countries have opted for an independent resolution authority.

How much will the Irish taxpayer have to put into these resolution funds and the ESM?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

The proposal is that an ex ante resolution fund be put in place, which will be 1% of covered deposits. The financial institutions will put that money into the fund.

If the deposit scheme was up to €100,000, would it then be 1% of all funds below €100,000? How much will this scheme cost the Irish taxpayer?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

The new directive suggests the creation of an ex ante fund and a suggested target level, to be built up over ten years, of 1% of covered deposits. That is roughly equal to €900 million in the Irish context.

That is just short of €1 billion. What is it meant by covered deposits in the Irish context?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

They are the deposits of €100,000 and lower.

The eligible liabilities guarantee scheme finished on 31 March. Are there any five-year deposits over €100,000 that would be continued to be covered by the scheme?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

The scheme I am referring to is the deposit guarantee scheme.

I understand that, but I am looking for clarification on the other point.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

There is a risk here of confusion. There is a deposit guarantee scheme with a fund to back it. What is proposed here is a resolution scheme with a separate fund. There is still some debate as to whether the deposit guarantee scheme should be used as a backstop for the resolution fund.

In the case of Ireland, the deposit guarantee scheme will cover 1% of covered deposits, which is effectively about €900 million.

Mr. Greg Dempsey

It is the resolution fund that is proposed to be 1% of covered deposits.

Who would fund that?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

The banking industry.

Is there a fund for the current deposit guarantee scheme for deposits of up to €100,000?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

There is a fund for that at the moment, which is funded by the banks.

Is that the €250 million fund?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

No, that scheme comes to under €400 million. To avoid confusion-----

There is one fund for the deposit guarantee scheme, which is a current fund for €400 million. There is also a proposal for a resolution fund, to be 1% of covered deposits, which will come to €900 million in the Irish context.

Mr. Greg Dempsey

That is to cover credit institution resolution. As we already have resolution legislation in place in Ireland, we also have a resolution fund which has €250 million.

Who is funding that?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

The €250 million was contributed by the Minister for Finance but the expectation is that this money will be recouped from the sector over time.

Will this be separate to the resolution fund?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

We are looking into the future. We have a current resolution Act with a resolution fund to which the Minister has paid money up-front, which will be recouped from the industry. If that gets overtaken by a fund required under a European directive, it is quite likely that our fund will disappear. The ultimate objective is to have a deposit guarantee scheme and a resolution fund.

So the resolution fund is being calculated on deposits.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Yes.

The eligible liabilities guarantee scheme finished on 31 March. What did the scheme cover?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

As of the termination of the eligible liabilities guarantee scheme, demand deposits are no longer covered. However, if one has a fixed-term deposit in place that runs out to five years, it will be covered.

What is the proposal for the funding of the ESM? How much will Ireland be required to put up in respect of that scheme?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Work is continuing in the Eurogroup on the preparation of proposals for the ESM at technical and senior official level. It is too early to say yet how the ESM will operate. The Eurogroup has been tasked with finalising the proposals for the ESM by the end of June 2013.

The European resolution fund will be funded entirely by the banks.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

That is right.

However, there is a question when one gets down to the pari passu in terms of the structures and the bail-in procedures, which need to be clarified. With these proposals, in what circumstances could the taxpayer be caught to make a contribution? That is what the ordinary person wants answered. Is this scheme bulletproof?

That could be a big one.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

The driving objective behind every measure that is being taken is to minimise the potential exposure to taxpayers in the future. The whole deposit guarantee framework, the resolution framework, the recapitalisation of the banks, the new supervisory arrangements and the ability of the European Central Bank and the national supervisory authorities to require additional capital buffers, as well as the capital requirements directive, are all intended as a package to ensure the chances of the taxpayer being called on in the future are minimised. That is why we have looked on the banking union as a package of measures.

In the context of the single resolution authority, Ireland's approach is that in return for single supervision, there needs to be some mutualisation of support or funding across Europe. In the negotiations, we will be looking to achieve an element of mutualisation of resolution and deposit guarantee funding in the context of the single supervisory authority.

I welcome the delegation to today's meeting and thank them for outlining this programme, which will lead to banking union, a welcome but overdue development. Senior bondholders could not be burned in Ireland's case, so to speak, because we had established a scheme to protect depositors beyond €100,000 and there was a pari passu ranking for senior bondholders. The delegation also explained that the Cypriot situation was different.

Taxpayers' equity in Bank of Ireland has been reduced to 15%. The taxpayer and the Exchequer have received something back already, although the continuing losses are being written off. When is it envisaged that the remaining 15% will be disposed of and when will AIB make a start on recouping the moneys invested in it by the Exchequer?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

The development of banking union is a rolling process. It is not a big bang on a particular date to the effect that yesterday we had nothing and tomorrow we have a comprehensive banking union. The process in Europe is to build this banking union framework. I noted that we have put in place a single supervisory mechanism. This initiative was introduced at record speed by European standards in that Europe was only tasked to come up with a proposal last summer and we now have in place an agreed legislative framework for the single supervisory mechanism and a commencement date of early 2014 for the single supervisor. The capital requirements directive we have just agreed at European level will demand that we keep new and consistent capital requirements across Europe. That directive will come into effect in mid-2014, with rolling implementation beyond that date. We hope the resolution measures will also be introduced in or around that time. Over the coming two to three years, therefore, we will see substantial developments in the European framework to protect against situations like the banking crisis arising in the future.

As regards the Irish institutions, we are not able to comment on specific institutions. It is, however, in the public domain that Irish banks are showing signs of recovery. They are now raising funds independently and we expect the recovery process will continue so that they will be in a position at some stage to consider their position vis-à-vis their debts.

Given the insolvency situation, the amount of mortgage arrears and the continuing write-off of losses, does Mr. Carrigan envisage a return to profitability in 2014?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I cannot comment specifically on that.

It could be three years before we have an end product on banking union.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

It is a rolling process over the next two to three years but we will see progress as early as next year.

I thank the witnesses for their helpful presentations. I noted what they said in regard to the bail-in and the potential participation of depositors at whatever level. Mr. Carrigan indicated that it would be an unlikely development in light of all that has happened with recapitalisation and the strong tier 1 capital base in our institutions. However, we are none the less scrutinising a directive aimed at dealing with such eventualities if Armageddon comes or a catastrophic event occurs either here or in another jurisdiction. I ask him to bear with me on that and work it through.

He noted that the negotiations are ongoing and, as such, nobody is in a position to dictate how depositors might contribute. As my question is somewhat political I do not know how he will respond. In recent weeks Ministers have given categorical assurances that the way in which events were resolved in Cyprus will never be contemplated by this Government. They stated that it will not and cannot happen. Is Mr. Carrigan surprised that Ministers would take such a position given that the negotiations have not reached a conclusion? It is at least possible that the finalised directive or some future legislative proposal resulting from it could require a bail-in of depositors above or below a certain threshold as part of a harmonised set of tools. Would Mr. Carrigan say it is unwise for anyone to rule out something that has not been finalised or agreed?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

As I said earlier, the situation in Cyprus is very different to that of Ireland. The structures of the banking systems are dissimilar. Cyprus was a deposit-funded banking system. We have a different structure for funding our banking system. Furthermore, we have already experienced our banking crisis and our banks are fully recapitalised at this stage and the system of banking supervision has improved immensely. A considerable number of steps have been taken from the position in which we found ourselves several years ago. There is no comparison between Ireland and Cyprus and the Minister made that clear. Furthermore, he stated there is no question but that guaranteed deposits are guaranteed. The issue in Cyprus arose out of a decision by the Cypriot Government in its own right to impose a levy on deposits. Taxation is a matter for individual member states and Cyprus made that proposal. It was an unfortunate proposal and the Government indicated that it did not favour it as a solution for deposits under €100,000, which are guaranteed. There is no question regarding the guaranteed deposits.

As my colleague from the Central Bank has made clear, even under the existing legislation there is no absolute guarantee for deposits in an insolvent institution. As part of the resolution of an insolvent institution, issues arising from the current legislation, which has been in place for some time, have to be addressed. The measures now being putting in place will ensure such a situation does not arise. Recovery and resolution plans will be brought forward and there will be early intervention measures. Even in the event of resolution there will be a clear call on all other available resources so that the likelihood of a call being made on depositors will be much lower in the future than is the case today. We are doing all we can to protect depositors better through these measures.

I thank Mr. Carrigan for that but I prefaced my question by accepting that is the situation. However, if we are to be true to our mandate in terms of scrutinising legislation, we have to consider all eventualities. It is a given that regulation has improved and it is now clearer who will participate in the resolution process at a much earlier stage. However, it is possible in certain extreme circumstances, such as the catastrophic failure of a financial institution, that a provision will be made requiring the participation of depositors. It is coming from this framework and it will be done in a harmonised way. It seems to be an overstatement of the facts for any member state to say that can never happen given that the position has not yet been finalised.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I am not sure I can say anything further on this point. I have outlined the substantial and significant measures being taken nationally and at European level to avoid the situation to which the Deputy refers, to improve the protection of depositors and taxpayers and to make it extremely unlikely that a call will be made against them in the future. Beyond that it is probably a matter of Government policy and I could not comment further.

To develop Deputy Dooley's point, if, let us say, we faced a catastrophic situation - if we had a change of Government and were back to terrible management of the economy and governance we were used to, which got us into the earlier difficulties - would there be enough bells and whistles in this system to let us know we were approaching that difficulty before we get to what would be described as a meltdown?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

Absolutely. The intention is to have early interventions at a supervision level and a recovery plan.

I welcome our witnesses. Our problems were created by large capital flows, leading to the property bubble. How would the resolution mechanism highlight that if it were to happen again, as Deputy Dooley said?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I am not sure I understand the question. I understand the control of large capital flows would be a matter of supervision, which will be dealt with in the first place by the capital requirements directive that controls the capital retained by particular institutions and the necessary liquidity and capital buffers that must be in place. The supervisor would have to monitor the ongoing performance of institutions on a much closer basis under the CRD and with the new single supervisory mechanism in place.

Mr. Pat Casey

I might just add to that. The purpose here is the overall framework, which involves a prevention phase and a preparatory phase. The individual institutions and the resolution authorities will be required to draw up recovery and resolution plans. They will have to do that at the level of the institution. That will identify the various risks and how those risks are to be addressed. There are a number of early warning lights which should arise if the system is properly structured, supervised and enacted at the levels of the institution and of the supervisor and the resolution authority. There is also the ability to intervene. The resolution authority, in consultation with the supervisory authorities, can take a number of actions to intervene in a bank which looks as though it is beginning to enter into difficulties. They can be of a fairly active nature and can include the appointment of a special manager. It is only if the institution is failing, or is likely to fail, that one is into more stronger powers of interaction. What one should have with this framework in place is an architecture which allows interventions to take place.

As Mr. Carrigan and colleagues in the Central Bank of Ireland have said, it is not just on this pillar that the overall safeguards rest. Stronger capital requirements will be put in place between 2014 and 2020 when the full effect of the capital requirements directive is in place. Ongoing stress testing is taking place and is being overseen by the EBA. That will also be monitored. There are more robust powers in the Central Bank of Ireland, which have been put in place through legislative processes, and there is better and more recruitment and more active engagement with the individual institutions. Taken together, one has an overall framework which should allow more effective monitoring of risks. The issue is how those risks are addressed by the different actors at the level of the institution and that of the supervisory authorities in the bank and elsewhere.

The design fault in the original euro was that it did not protect small countries from massive capital flows from large countries, which did not mean much to the large countries because, by definition, they are large countries. Do the witnesses think we are protected against the Croke Park-style cheering of the two main Irish banks as they bought vast amounts of money in Germany, causing the property bubble in this country and seriously enhancing their bankers' fees and the value of their shares as long as the bubble lasted? The witnesses were left to sort out the mess. Do they think we are protected and that we could stop a property bubble if a lot of money arrived here from Germany and France again?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

One of the drivers of the single supervisory mechanism, and pulling together supervision to a European level, is that the markets had lost confidence, to a certain extent, in national supervisors in certain countries which did not react when these red flag alerts should have been set off. The intention now is that by pulling away from the national level to a European level there will be more consistent supervision, and trends such as potential bubbles will be identified. That is reinforced by the creation of a further part of the new architecture - that is, the European systemic risk board, whose specific task is to watch out for risks such as that around Europe. There is a considerable architecture in place to protect against that risk.

Is there a mechanism to require higher deposits on property lending?

Is the Senator referring to residential properties or investment properties - that is, factory developments and so on?

They are pretty well all in trouble.

Since 2009, the Central Bank of Ireland - Mr. Dempsey can correct me if I am wrong - has put in place new criteria, including the requirements for loan-to-value ratios to be brought into line, for mortgage calculations not to take into account overtime payments, rooms that could be rented and so on, for income ratios to reflect more normalised states in regard to mortgage lending and for 35-year mortgage schedules to be brought back to 25 years or 20 years. That is a discussion for another day with the Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland. Is that what Senator Barrett is talking about?

Denmark's success in not having a property bubble was due to a 20% deposit requirement. Does that mechanism exist here?

Mr. Greg Dempsey

The banks themselves have tailored their loan offers to require higher deposits to be available before credit is provided.

In July 2009 the Central Bank of Ireland issued very stringent guidelines to the banks in regard to mortgage lending. It referred to reductions in mortgage terms, more robust loan-to-value ratios and the tightening up of calculations in regard to mortgage lending. If there was an additional room in a house, one could not include renting it as earning capacity, nor could one include overtime. These are all the types of madness which got us into difficulties. That direction was given to the banks in 2009 and I would be very keen, as would this committee, to learn what sort of oversight the Central Bank of Ireland has in regard to that. Have the banks reduced their mortgage terms in recent years? Are they tightening up on the ratios and on earnings?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I thank the Chairman for his clarification. Unfortunately, I am not directly involved in that particular aspect. We can definitely seek to get an update in regard to developments in that area.

I am concerned that we still have a banking system that is obsessed with property. We are talking about the lack of money for small and medium-sized enterprises. The banks have not provided that for ten or 15 years. Playing golf with builders was the life of a banker. All measures the witnesses can take to end that connection could only help the Irish economy. How do we separate the utility banks from the casino banks? It is an artificial division for the purposes of illustration. Will there be protections? Members of the public would be quite happy to see some of the casino banks go broke. What they were trying to defend was their own deposits up to €100,000, as my colleagues said. Will there be a mechanism for that?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I mentioned earlier that the Liikanen report looked at the structure of the banking sector and how large banking entities - the investment element - have been taking large risks, using the benefit of the safer deposit side to fund those risks. There is a definite view at a European level that there needs to be a separation of those high-risk activities from the more secure deposit and lending activities.

The nature of that separation - whether it will be a physical separation or a separation within the entity in relation to capital requirements, buffers, risk controls and so on - has yet to be determined. The Commission will bring forward a proposal on that specific issue later this year.

I wish to raise two points. We have been very concerned about bankers' bonuses. Let me reiterate that all of the constituencies represented here would say more power to the elbows of people who are trying to control them, as they are seen as a scandal.

Speaking on behalf of the majority of the committee, we are disappointed with the public interest directors. What is the role of public interest directors and what do they do? Do the proposals envisage that the experiment should continue? Mr. Carrigan has not attended all of the meetings, but I think there would be a certain level of disillusionment that what seemed like a good idea at the time seems not to have worked. Did the public interest directors ever contact the Department? Did they take briefings on public policy or did they just join in with the rest of the directors?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

First, I will deal with the issue of bonuses. I mentioned earlier that it became a key element of the conclusion of the capital requirements directive. We are directly involved with the negotiation with the European Parliament, which pushed very hard for a cap on bonuses, and now there is a fixed cap which was agreed by Council. A large majority of member states supported this concept at the Council. There is a broad view across Europe on the need to control bonuses. There was an effort to try to focus on long-term incentive bonuses which could be clawed back depending on the performance of the organisation over the long term. It was seen as a positive development to move towards this type of performance bonus.

I am afraid the issue of public interest directors is outside the brief today but I understand they appeared before a committee. Was it this committee?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I do not think we would be able to add anything to the committee's understanding.

I would advise officials to read the transcripts.

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

We could not add anything.

I thank the delegates.

The bottom line is this: what would be different if we were to turn the clock back and transpose what we are trying to create now back to the years 2007-2008 when difficulties were beginning to permeate? What would be different from what actually happened?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

The purpose of the resolution proposal, which is only one part of the jigsaw of the integrated financial framework proposal, is to prevent a situation similar to what happened in 2007 from happening again, to improve the quality of supervision, to improve the quality of capital retention, to improve the tools and mechanisms available to supervisors and resolution authorities to intervene early and to take corrective action, to provide resolution funds and to provide for a bail-in process. All of these measures are to protect against a situation such as arose at the time of the financial crisis and to protect depositors and the taxpayers to the maximum extent possible.

Ireland is hosting the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Given that we are halfway through the term, what are we trying to do in terms of putting in a series of firewalls, if I may use that analogy, and trying to get them over the line or achieve agreement on legislation before the conclusion of the Presidency on 30 June?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

When we came before this committee to discuss the single supervisory mechanism before Christmas, we outlined that the issue of banking union was critical and that we believed an integrated financial framework with mutual funding and centralised control was something that would protect the Irish taxpayer in the future. We said that even though there was a range of other legislation flowing around Europe - at the time there were 21 different dossiers - we would focus on the banking union dossiers during our Presidency. We are happy to say we have managed to bring the single supervisory mechanism and the capital requirements directive over the line. In fact, the capital requirements directive was there for some 18 months and we brought it to a conclusion. We brought the single supervisory mechanism to a conclusion in record time. With our limited and scarce resources, our priority is to apply our resources to the extent we can to the resolution area to try to complete the banking union framework and build in those protections. Separately from that, there is a range of dossiers in the markets area on which we are making progress, and we are bringing forward legislation on the markets in financial instruments directive, MiFID, to improve the markets area. The deposit guarantee issue must be revisited. It is clear from our contributions earlier that the deposit guarantee scheme is in some way integrated with the funding arrangements for resolution. We hope to bring this resolution to Council agreement and to get it into Parliament negotiations before the end of our Presidency and to reactivate the deposit guarantee scheme at the same time.

There are other priorities. I mentioned market abuse. We have made progress in the area of protection for mortgage holders under the mortgage credit directive, which we hope to conclude. We are moving to improve provisions for central securities depositors on the market. There is UCITS directive, on which we will focus. We are also trying to introduce provisions on retail investments on behalf of consumers. There is a full range of financial legislative framework measures that we are dealing with, and we hope to be as successful as we can. We hope to conclude many more financial dossiers and as a result improve the financial framework within which we operate.

There were three items that were referred to over the course of the meeting. On the question of CRD IV, the credit requirements directive, we need an explanation as to how the senior executives and the senior staff in the Bank of Ireland were able to get bonuses through their remuneration structures. As I interpret it, that decision runs contrary to the directive. I request that the committee be informed as to whether that decision was in line with CRD IV. The input of the stakeholder management unit may be required to establish what informed that decision. We may call the Department's stakeholder management unit before the committee to explain that decision in greater detail.

Second, an issue I addressed in my opening remarks, and to which Senator Barrett and others referred, is the contamination of retail banking by merchant banking. Under the heading of preparation and prevention, in which Mr. Carrigan stated:

Third, if authorities identify obstacles to resolvability in the course of this planning process, they can require a bank to change its legal or operational structures to ensure that it can be resolved with the available tools in a way that does not compromise critical functions, threaten financial stability, or involve costs to the taxpayer.

What does this mean in layman's language, in terms of splitting retail banking from merchant banking? As I said to Mr. Dempsey, it is critical that the committee be briefed on whether the Central Bank is carrying out this type of audit. When AIB and Bank of Ireland representatives came before the committee in November of last year, they were asked whether they were gong through their distressed mortgage book, and their answer was "Not necessarily."

When the Governor of the Central Bank appeared before the committee earlier this year he did not really speak about targets. As a result we had to put targets in place. It is critical that the banks carry out this type of audit and I would hope the Central Bank is giving a direction in this regard at this time. This is an issue we will certainly follow up on because this type of separation needs to take place. It is not something that needs to be moved down the line but it is a matter on which the banks themselves should be proactive. If Mr. Carrigan or any other member of the team wish to make some final comments they are welcome to do so. In regard to the residential mortgage guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Ireland in July 2009, what level of monitoring has been put in place?

Mr. Aidan Carrigan

I thank the Chairman for facilitating the timing of our appearance before the committee. It is a small window in a very busy six-month Presidency.

Obviously we need exercise after the Easter eggs. With that I will bring matters to a conclusion. I thank all the officials for the briefing and lively discussion which has added to our understanding of the matter. I propose that the committee forward a copy of the transcript of today's meeting to the Minister for Finance noting the observations of members following the scrutiny of COM (2012) 280. Is that agreed? Agreed. Is it agreed that the clerk prepare a draft report for the committee's consideration? Agreed. As there is no further business I shall adjourn the meeting.

The joint committee adjourned at 4.40 p.m. until 2 p.m. on Wednesday, 10 April 2013.
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