The joint committee will receive a presentation from Amnesty International on the arms trade. When the discussion on the matter concludes, the committee will go into private session to consider a number of housekeeping matters. I welcome Mr. Jim Loughran, campaigns and communications manager, international arms trade working group. Before we commence, I advise witnesses that whereas Members of the House enjoy absolute privilege in respect of utterances made in committee, witnesses do not enjoy such privilege. Accordingly, caution should be exercised, particularly with regard to references of a personal nature. I ask Mr. Loughran to proceed with his presentation, after which we will have a discussion.
Amnesty International: Presentation.
Mr. Jim Loughran
I thank the joint committee for giving me this opportunity to present Amnesty International's concerns about the current debate on a proposed arms trade treaty. To set out Amnesty International's position on the issue, our job as a human rights organisation is to campaign on the gravest abuses of human rights. These occur most often in conflicts, including, for example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo where 3 million people have been killed in the past ten years. Even now when the conflict is no longer on the international agenda, killings continue at a rate of 1,000 per month.
The arms trade is not only about war and conflict but also causes poverty and is a major obstacle to development and the ending of poverty. This is the reason Amnesty International and a coalition of more than 70 non-governmental organisations have come together to campaign for an international arms trade treaty, the only long-term solution in dealing with the devastation caused by the arms trade.
Where does Ireland fit into this scenario? Ireland is an increasingly significant player in the export of military and dual use goods. The most recent figures supplied by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment indicate that every year this country exports military goods valued at €400 million and dual use goods, as they are commonly described, valued at €4 billion. In this context, Ireland is part of the problem and must, therefore, be part of the solution.
The Government has a creditable record on arms control issues, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons proliferation and on the international landmine convention. Therefore, Ireland is ideally placed to play a leading role in campaigning for effective control over the arms trade. This returns us to the current debate on the proposed arms trade treaty. The reason we are focusing on this proposal is that the United Nations will review the programme of action on small arms in June and July. The coalition of NGOs has been trying to secure political support from a number of countries to declare for an arms trade treaty. More than 50 countries, including the United Kingdom, have already declared full support. We are disappointed that the Government has held back from declaring its full support. While it has participated in the process and made constructive contributions to the debate, it has stopped short of declaring its full support for a treaty.
The debate on an arms trade treaty and related issues is entering a critical period. In January the preparatory conference in New York proved a major disappointment to all concerned. In recent weeks the chair of the review conference of the programme of action on small arms has circulated a draft outcome document. We are extremely disappointed with its content. Despite three years of preparations for the conference, there is now a serious risk that the review conference in June, which we had all hoped would be a major step forward, will deliver very little. For this reason, the role of the Government is critical. While we still hope Ireland will avail of the opportunity to declare its support for the treaty, even if it falls short of that level of commitment, it can carry out a number of concrete measures which will move the agenda forward. Much reference was made in the review conference to standards, criteria and recommendations but our key concern is that there is a complete lack of specifics in those recommendations. Therefore, one of the key goals we want to achieve with the UN conference in June and July is that the set of global principles which underpins the arms trade treaty is incorporated into the final outcome document. If we do not achieve that, then the chances are that in four years' time we will be coming back to have exactly the same conversation all over again. The UN conference is one of the key stepping stones and the final review document is essential to that. We would strongly recommend the Irish delegation and the Government to use their influence to strengthen the language in that document to make it as strong and specific as possible.
Apart from the UN review conference, there will be a special meeting of the General Assembly in September. The First Committee of the General Assembly will discuss a resolution in support of the arms trade treaty. Again, we urge the Government to back that resolution as another stepping stone in advancing the arms control agenda. Apart from that rather general resolution which is already under discussion in some fora, one of the other options will be the opportunity to establish an open-ended working group. One of the decisions the General Assembly will have to make is whether it sets up an open-ended working group or appoint a panel of experts.
Amnesty International feels very strongly that if we go down the road of appointing a panel of experts which will ultimately report in two years' time and set out objectives for the way forward, this would be a very long and delayed process. Our preferred option is that the resolution would go through with the maximum amount of support and, in addition, the open-ended working group would be established which would then begin drafting the formal text of the treaty.
I will recap briefly on where I have come from on that. The review conference is very important. We have been waiting five years for it to take place. We cannot wait another five years for another opportunity. In terms of outcomes from that process, the review document is central, followed up by the debate at the General Assembly. We hope the Government will play a central role in pushing that agenda forward.
While I appreciate that the domestic context falls within the remit of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, a key concern for us at present would be the disconnect between Ireland's commitments at the international level and the practice in Ireland. Eighteen months ago the Government promised us new domestic legislation to control exports of military and dual use goods from Ireland. To date, that has not even been published. It was supposed to go through the Dáil by the end of last year but the heads of the Bill have not even been published. Therefore, our best expectation is that it will take another 18 months before that legislation makes its way through the Dáil.
One of the key elements of that Bill is the proposed control on arms brokers. This is also on the table at both the review conference in June and the meeting of the General Assembly in September. There is a proposal for the establishment of an international working group on arms brokering. Again, we hope the Government will support this very strongly, but it is also an issue that needs to be addressed in Ireland.
Some committee members may have seen the Channel 4 "Dispatches" programme which highlighted how a group of 16 year old students from the Presentation secondary school in Portlaoise were able to set up a dummy company and broker an electric stun baton from Korea to the United States and leg irons into Ireland. What this emphasises is that there is zero control on arms brokers in Ireland and even if every Member of these Houses knew who was brokering weapons, they could not be touched because there is no legislation.
I have highlighted the situation in countries such as DRC, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The United Nations rapporteur appointed to analyse the conflict in Liberia linked its escalation from a local power struggle to an all-out civil war to two shipments of AK-47 rifles. Amnesty International tracked the deals back to an Irish-registered company. We now have the tragic situation where UN peacekeepers who have been asked to remain in Liberia because of their constructive role could come under fire from weapons brokered in Dublin.
The work carried out by the students may seem comical but it is a serious issue. In almost every report Amnesty International has published in the past two years on the issue of arms brokers, we have pointed out that they are able to act almost with impunity internationally and that there has been an Irish link. While we hope the Government and the Department of Foreign Affairs will play a strong role in promoting control of arms brokers at international level, the issue must also be dealt with in Ireland.
Another issue I would like to highlight is the publicity given at the weekend to the transport of Apache helicopters from Shannon Airport to Israel. Amnesty International has called for a cessation order on such exports because of their involvement in attacks on the civilian population and use in attempted assassinations. Apart from the details of the shipment from Shannon Airport to Israel, we would welcome clarification of the specific controls that apply in that context and would like to highlight the fact that the hub component of the Apache helicopter, which the company describes as the lifeline of the aircraft, is manufactured in Ireland. This underlines the need for stringent new domestic legislation to address the broad issue of the export of military and dual use goods and, in tandem with this, see Ireland work to establish strong international controls.
In its report, Ireland and the Arms Trade — Decoding the Deals, Amnesty International recommended that there should be an Oireachtas committee specifically to scrutinise export licences granted from Ireland. We suggested the British quadripartite committee as a model. The chairman of that committee has indicated on several occasions a willingness to host Oireachtas Members who might wish to attend a sitting of the committee to observe its work. While I appreciate that there is no appetite for another layer of bureaucracy, the Oireachtas must be in a position to exercise effective control and scrutinise licences granted from Ireland.
Amnesty International would like to see Ireland use its diplomatic influence and credibility to push the arms trade treaty forward and the discussions on the programme of action on small arms to make the existing system even stronger. If there is a failure to match Ireland's international commitments with its domestic policy, we are at risk of being accused of double-think.
We inquired about the position of the proposed legislation on arms brokering. It will include provision for the regulation of arms brokering activities in Ireland and by Irish citizens at home or abroad. This will enable Ireland to fulfil its obligations under the EU common position on arms brokering. Work on drafting the heads of the export control Bill has been completed. Consultations with other relevant Departments and agencies are under way. It is anticipated that this process will be completed within the next few weeks, at which point the heads of the Bill will be submitted to Government for approval. Allowing for the formalities of drafting the legal text, it is hoped to bring the legislation before the Houses of the Oireachtas in the autumn.
That provides committee members with a further opportunity to consider what other measures should be included or may be missing. If Amnesty International maintains contact with the committee members they will be in touch with the legislation when it is tabled in the Houses. That process will begin with the Second Stage debate which is a wide-ranging discussion. We will communicate with the Government on the urgency of that issue.
Mr. Loughran mentioned some other items, such as the shipment of helicopters through Shannon Airport. The planes coming through Shannon Airport are not allowed to carry any weapons and they are so advised in advance. This plane should have been going through Iceland rather than Ireland but was diverted on the day of its flight. It was said at the time that the diversion was due to a technical fault in the plane which was corrected at Shannon, where the facilities for doing this were available.
The Department of Transport should have been informed of this. Even if it was not possible for the Department to be informed in advance it could have been informed when the plane got there but was not. The Department is reviewing its procedures because the transport of arms from here is banned.
Apparently, the plane came through Shannon on its return with a helicopter on board. It was not armed but is not an ordinary helicopter. We saw them in use in Uganda routing the rebel leader, which was valuable at the time. The Department has taken up this issue seriously.
Mr. Loughran
This is an important point. This is an attack helicopter. It has no other function; it does not double up as a food-delivering machine, or deliver aid. It is an efficient killing machine and that is where our concern lies.
I thank Mr. Loughran for his submission and the information contained therein. We all support the thrust of his address. We are worried on several counts, apart from the magnitude of the overall problem.
There is the question of brokering from Dublin which can have implications for international and local security because if brokers are able to supply the international markets they can also supply the home market. Will Mr. Loughran give us some further information on that activity? For example, is brokering carried out through legitimate business interests or underworld interests, or a combination of both? We neither want to be nor can we afford to be involved in that kind of trade. That kind of behaviour puts the good name of any country at risk.
Mr. Loughran referred to the export of military goods with a value of €400 million. I have an idea of the nature of these goods but I would like him to define them. It remains to be seen how they can be restricted to legitimate areas. Legitimate armies require armaments of varying kinds. It is a difficult task to separate one purpose from the other in order to ensure that such goods are not used in an oppressive fashion.
Some €4 billion is the figure for dual use goods. I suspect, from previous discussions on this issue, that these goods include a wide list of items, including computer hardware and software technology. To cease exports in the area would lead to serious problems for Irish trade. I do not believe that these are exported for the purpose of oppression. They can, however, fall into the wrong hands, which is a different story. Modern aircraft, tanks and various weapons of war require technology that is manufactured in Ireland and other countries.
The Chairman referred to Apache helicopters being transported through Shannon Airport. When a protest is made to a friendly government, the assurances given should be taken in good faith. If the information is not true or if one government fails to alert another, there are undesirable consequences for both sides. We discussed this matter previously. It must be dealt with at the highest levels.
Apart from the arms issue and depriving the participants of a ready flow of arms, special focus needs to be placed on those countries with the greatest conflicts and erosion of human rights. When one reads of atrocities in the countries to which the delegation referred, the shades tend to come down. The public has become battle weary and is suffering from an overdose of information to such an extent that matters of this nature no longer register with it. The UN and the NGOs need to deal with this in a way that will focus on the fine details in each of those countries. Shocking as it may seem, they sadly do not register with the public anymore.
On the issue of Apache helicopters, the company stated that because they were not armed, they did not come under the 1973 order. It was given a clear message, however, that the helicopters are regarded as attack weapons and, therefore, must be reported.
Mr. Loughran
That is our point.
When the Department of Transport receives an application for an exemption under the 1973 order, it consults the Department of Foreign Affairs on foreign policy, the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform on security matters and the Irish Aviation Authority on aviation safety. The Department of Defence is also informed. The Department operates a tight system but the problem in this instance was that it was not informed and the company involved claimed that the helicopters did not come within the remit of the order. The position has been made clear to the company and the matter will be pursued.
Mr. Loughran
I was asked to clarify how brokering operates. Essentially, those involved are salesmen, or middle men, who sell washing machines one day and arms the next. The only criterion is making money. As the students from Portlaoise demonstrated, it is a simple process. The latter set up a shelf company and listed a set of directors. Within a short period, a new set of directors was listed, as happened in the case of the company named in the Amnesty report linked with the shipment to Liberia. In that instance, we followed the paper trail all the way back to Dublin. There is no legislation and, given the current arms control regime, the failure to control brokers and licensed production, which is a separate issue, render it largely cosmetic because unscrupulous dealers can circumvent it and cannot be held to account. They are the original invisible exports and there is no way of tracking them. Being an arms broker is not necessarily a problem. If such brokers were setting up deals to ship military equipment to the police in Denmark, we would say nothing about it. Amnesty's key focus is on the link between certain shipments and their impact on human rights, which is why we focus on control rather than on an outright ban.
From where were the arms sourced?
Mr. Loughran
In this instance, they went from Moldova to Liberia via Burkina Faso. The Dublin registered company not only managed the financial end of the process but it was also involved in leasing the aircraft that delivered the weapons. There is a clear link. The legislation due before the House this year will be important in restricting such deals.
With regard to the figures of €400 million, for exports of military goods, and €4 billion, for dual use goods, the military list is less problematic because there is broad consensus that it needs to be controlled. For example, a piece of equipment called Fire Control is on the list. Initially, I thought this referred to fire extinguishers but it is a reference to a computer designed in Ireland that controls the bomb-dropping equipment on military jets and also their firing mechanisms. It may not have a bullet coming out of the end of it but, in our book, it is a weapon and, therefore, needs to be controlled.
We are on a more sticky wicket when it comes to dual use goods. There is less agreement about these. For example, I mentioned the Apache helicopter and I flagged the component that carries a €5 billion a year licence for export. We accept that a large proportion of them are not problematic and because they are multi-purpose, it would be impossible to track them but we are concerned about certain categories of components. The classic example is that the electronics system that controls every function of the Apache helicopter is made in Ireland. We are concerned because this system is exported to the US and incorporated into helicopters that are sent to Israel, Turkey or Indonesia. The recommendation for the controls was that each government should develop criteria for the export of dual use goods. One of the key criteria should be the risk of it contributing to internal repression. Those criteria have never been developed and this represents one of the major gaps in the system.
A second example of the dual use component relates to landmines. Ireland played an important role in the development of the landmine convention but Irish legislation does not cover components that could be incorporated into landmines. It is not clear whether components designed for use in such mines are controlled under existing legislation. That is precisely the type of component that should be controlled because while Ireland may not be in breach of the letter of the landmine convention, it is at risk of breaching the spirit thereof.
The question is, do we care whether a military battlefield communications system, ends up in the hands of someone like Saddam Hussein or of repressive regimes around the world? If we care, we need an export control system with the capacity for scrutiny, backed up by the authority of the Dáil to ask searching questions. This brings us back to the proposed legislation. Amnesty is not calling for the cessation of exports or for the shutting down of the sector. What we want is rigorous control.
Deputy Durkan asked about what can be considered "diplomatic assurances". This question may take us into the broader issue of renditions generally and flights through Shannon Airport. Amnesty is concerned that diplomatic assurances have no legal status. Our view, backed up by research we carried out recently in which 76% of the public agree with us, is that flights passing through Shannon should be checked. We feel that under the torture convention Ireland has an obligation not just to condemn the use of torture but to actively seek to prevent any act which may contribute to it.
We need greater clarity in this area and need Ireland to comply fully with the investigation currently being carried out by the Council of Europe under the auspices of Dick Marty. The findings of that report should be published and Ireland should take a leadership role in fighting human rights abuses in the context of the war on terror. Also, at a minimum, flights suspected of involvement in rendition should be obliged to submit a full itinerary — starting point, ultimate end point and the names of any passengers on board. That would go a long way towards answering our concern about the lack of credibility of these diplomatic assurances.
Mr. Loughran raised a number of issues. He said he would like an Oireachtas committee to examine the issue. This committee could do that as it is unlikely we could establish any new committee at this stage. One of the issues arising, particularly with legislation coming forward soon, is the need for Amnesty and others to keep the committee informed on the issues. If we get information from Amnesty we will circulate it to the members of the committee so matters will be open and transparent. Then when the legislation goes through the House the Members will be better informed to deal with it.
We will do what we can in terms of using our influence to push through the arms trade treaty through. One of the reasons we invited Amnesty to the committee was because we wanted to highlight the issue and follow up on it. We are committed to this under the EU code of conduct on arms exports and under existing legislation, which has to be tightened up and expanded. I could mention legislation that deals with the issue, but I do not want to take from the fact that we must still pursue the matter.
The EU code of conduct on arms exports contains criteria for the granting of arms export licences. These include first, respect for the international commitment to the EU member states, in particular the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations. Second, respect of human rights in the country of final destination. Third, the internal situation in the country of final destination as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflict. Fourth, preservation of regional peace, security and stability. Fifth, the national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a member state as well as that of friendly and allied countries. Sixth, the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law. Seventh, the existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. Eighth, the compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion to armaments of human and economic resources. Ireland subscribes to and is committed to this but the relevant legislation must be tightened up.
With regard to the exports of dual use, the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment set out the position in a recent reply to a parliamentary question and referred to the licensing unit of that Department. The export of dual use goods, that is, goods that have both potential civil and military applications, from the European Union is controlled by a regulation of the European Council which is updated regularly to take account of the changes agreed in the international export control regimes in which the EU member states participate. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, as the national licensing authority for Ireland, only authorises the export of controlled dual use goods when satisfied that the transaction complies fully with the EU regulations and with Ireland's commitments as a member of the export control arrangements and non-proliferation regimes. This Department issues the licences.
When deciding whether to grant licence applications, a key consideration is the intended end use of the goods and the risk of diversion of the goods to a third country. Account is taken of the criteria contained in the EU code of conduct, to which I referred, which include respect for human rights and the rule of law in the country of final destination and the possible impact on regional peace and security. Ireland also abides by its obligations imposed by trade sanctions and arms embargoes which have been adopted by the EU, the OSCE and the United Nations Security Council.
A fairly strong regime exists in practice. It cannot cover every possible situation, as has been acknowledged by the delegation. The committee is particularly interested in the issue and will endeavour to send an expert delegate to any future international conferences. The issue will stay on the committee's work programme.
Mr. Loughran
I appreciate the Chairman's comments about the EU code of conduct. One piece of work for which the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment deserves congratulations was the research carried out by Forfás which was an analysis of the Irish export control system. It made a number of specific recommendations. While this does not address all the issues of concern to Amnesty International, if all the recommendations were implemented, it would go a very long way towards addressing them. One of the recommendations was that there should be a submission of an annual report and the outstanding question was to whom this report should be submitted. On the basis of the Chairman's earlier comment, that might come before this committee for scrutiny to see exactly where equipment from Ireland is going.
On the question of the EU code of conduct, Amnesty is of the view it is a little like the curate's egg, good in parts but generally considered to be weak. It is one of these EU documents that is pitched at the level of the lowest common denominator. A point I should have flagged earlier is that Ireland needs to address an outstanding commitment. The trade regulation on torture equipment which would ban the trade in torture equipment and control equipment that has a risk of being used for torture must be implemented by July. My understanding is this can be implemented by ministerial order and does not need to wait for the legislation.
While I appreciate the pressure that may be on the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment in covering all the angles, one area of particular concern is that with respect to the broader issue of transparency and accountability, the website of the Department, which is supposed to publish statistics on licences granted, has not been updated on the dual use side for four years and on the military side for more than three years. It is almost impossible to determine the ultimate destination of goods leaving Ireland.
What kind of torture equipment can be exported from here?
Mr. Loughran
An example would be cattle prods. We know already that the students from Portlaoise were able to broker an electric shock baton. That has been described in the past as the torturer's weapon of choice as it leaves no forensic trail. One of the gaps in the Irish system is that if such a device is labelled as a security device, it is covered by the present export control regime. However, if it is called a cattle prod, it is not covered and no licence is required to buy, own or pass it on. Two years ago a company in New York was reported as having been fined for illegal shipment of cattle prods in breach of the US control regime to a number of countries, including Ireland. We have never been able to identify the paper trail on the matter, as it would necessitate tracking it back through Customs and Excise, which would be a very complex operation. That is precisely the kind of equipment to which we refer.
The trade in goods used in capital punishment, torture, etc. regulation was adopted by the Council on 27 June 2005. Member states have until 30 July when the regulation enters into force to put national measures in place. In Ireland it will be implemented by way of secondary legislation and a statutory instrument is in preparation. However, many of the goods listed in the regulations such as leg irons, shackles and pepper spray are already controlled under the Control of Exports Order 2005, S.I. 884 of 22 December 2005, which is fairly recent. The main reason for an additional order is that the Council regulation also controls imports of the goods in question, which is a point Mr. Loughran made earlier. Possession of other items within the jurisdiction may be subject to control under the firearms and offensive weapons legislation. However, that would be a matter for the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.
I thank Mr. Loughran for attending. The discussion has been quite stimulating. We have noted what he said and will follow up those questions in the months ahead. Mr. Loughran knows what to do to keep members informed. He is obviously full of information and up to date with all these matters. The members represent all parties and none, including the Technical Group. We would welcome any further information Mr. Loughran believes to be relevant as we progress the legislation.
The joint committee went into private session at 3.27 p.m. and adjourned at 3.45 p.m. until 2.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 9 May 2006.