We have been in public session but the cameras were not on. I call Mr. Frank Durkan.
Public Hearings on the Barron Report.
Mr. Frank Durkan
On the question of privilege, I have a slight dispute with you, Chairman. I feel privileged to be here. I have heard of Leinster House since I was a child but I did not have the privilege until yesterday morning of being within these walls. I thank the committee for taking the time to hear me.
I am also privileged to represent somebody who is the only United States citizen to experience the trauma of the subject matter of this hearing, not only one bombing but two. She was a 17 year old girl on 1 December 1972. At that time she was Joan Ann Burke from Artane, one of the nine children of John and Terry Burke. I might add that I am a member of the Bar of the State of New York, of various federal courts throughout the United States and an admitted member before the United States Supreme Court.
Joan was working for USIT, a union of students concerned with travel. She was working at St. Stephen's Green on 1 December 1972, when she made arrangements to meet a friend and arrived by bus in the vicinity of Liberty Hall. As she got off the bus, which pulled away, there was a tremendous explosion which blew her against the wall and caused her severe physical and psychological injuries. She remembers two men taking her to a bar across the street - she thinks it was Daly's Bar - where the bartender took off his uniform or apron and wrapped it around her shoulder and arm, which were badly mangled.
She was taken to Jervis Street Hospital, which she described as being a scene of utter pandemonium, with people injured, dead and in all kinds of states of confusion. She was duly admitted. However, because she was 17 years of age her parents had to be summoned to give authorisation for surgery. One of the issues discussed with the doctors was whether they should amputate her right arm. Mrs. Burke refused such permission, and ultimately they did perform surgery to extract shrapnel and various pieces of metal and glass. She was treated in the hospital for three or four days and sent home.
It had a devastating effect on her life, both physically and mentally. I will not go into all the details but she continued to receive treatment from psychiatrists, psychologists, orthopaedics and her own private physician. The injury to the shoulder necessitated her subsequent admission to the Dr. Stevens Hospital, where plastic surgery was performed with, according to her, not too good a result. Ultimately, she was able to overcome her fear of the city and go back to work in early 1974 with USIT. She was barely back to work when, on 17 May 1974 as she was heading for a train to Raheny to baby-sit for her sister, when, amazingly, for a second time she was exposed to another tremendous explosion, which blew her off her feet and knocked her to the ground. Again, she does not have very much memory of it. She knows that she ran to the train and got on the train. She was not aware that she was injured until a woman seated next to her said, "Are you all right?" She said, "Yes, I am. I am Okay". The woman said, "Look at your legs - you are bleeding." By now she had become thoroughly traumatised. Again her parents were called. She absolutely refused to go to the hospital. She had such a nightmare experience on both prior occasions at Jervis Street - particularly Jervis Street - and ultimately settled for treatment by her family doctor, Dr Aidan O'Byrne, in Coolock. She continued getting various treatments as an outpatient. She got a new job. She absolutely refused to come back into the city; she was so traumatised and so scared. She got a job in Swords with an American company that provided her with substantial psychological and physical treatment.
Ultimately, she decided to emigrate. I asked her why. She said, "Nobody seemed to care. By now what happened on those days was forgotten." She came to the United States and became a United States citizen, got married and became naturalised. However, her torment continued. She continued receiving treatment, again, psychologically, for post-traumatic stress disorder and also for severe back injuries that were occasioned by the second blast.
Ultimately, in March 2000, she had severe surgery on her injured back, which was in the form of a discectomy and a fusion of the spinal bones. It gave her a minimal amount of relief, and as late as August of last year she was referred to an orthopaedic surgeon in Cornell University in New York on the question of whether or not further surgery might help. The doctor advised against it. He said, "It is too long, the injuries are too severe and it would be too late to consider further surgery. You have got to learn to live with your pain."
I spoke to Joan over the weekend. I put it to her directly. I said, "Joan, I am appearing before a committee that is considering whether there should be a further public hearing with respect to the accountability for what happened on the date that you were injured. Exactly what do you want me to say to this committee?" She said, "I will fax you what I would like." With your permission, I will read from the fax that she sent to me last Monday morning, before I left New York. It states:
I am at a point in my life where my quality of life is deteriorating. I cannot enjoy golf with my husband. I cannot bowl with my friends. I cannot even sit for long periods of time. My shoulder throbs with pain, especially in the winter, and I have arthritis in my fingers. I go to bed every night with back pain and I wake up every morning with the same pain, and sometimes I find it hard to accept. This, of course, compounds my depression. Pain wears me out mentally and physically. I am on a prescribed painkiller that also treats depression that I take at night to help me sleep as, unfortunately, I have recurring nightmares.
I do not feel sorry for myself and I do not need anyone else giving me sympathy, but I would like for someone to help me bring this to closure by uncovering the truth. Someone else committed these crimes and got away with it. I am serving their time with my pain and my suffering, and I will continue to do so for the rest of my life, along with the other survivors. All I am asking is what is due to me - the truth.
I must say that, regardless of the nature of my presentation, it is a shame and pity that she could not see fit to come here herself so that you could appreciate the passion and the feeling that this woman has for what happened to her and for what she would like this committee to do. She is an articulate, bright, intelligent person whose life has been shattered.
She would like some indication of accountability concerning what happened to her and also what happened to the others. I do not think she is asking for too much. I respectfully urge this committee to grant what she and the others want, which is a formal public hearing, so that she can find out - for whatever it means to her - have some accountability and some record in her heart and mind concerning this awful tragedy that befell her and the others, who suffered so much. I think that we, as a body - I say this respectfully because I am coming from outside - owe that to her and to the others, and that the State owes her this. She was a citizen of this State, injured in one of the most horrific crimes that ever happened in this country. Surely, she ought to know why and how. Thank you.
Thank you very much. It is unfortunate that Ms Joan Ann Burke was unable to come. You have told her story very well. It is another harrowing tale of suffering caused by that terrible tragedy and bombing.
Mr. Durkan
I do not want to elaborate but she finds that getting involved in something like this really sets her back. She is so traumatised that reading about a bomb explosion in Africa turns her off.
Thank you very much. What you have said is self-explanatory. It tells a story. Does any committee member wish to say anything?
I have a brief comment rather than a question. While the document speaks for itself, I wish to let Mr. Durkan know that he has very clearly conveyed to us her pain, feelings and anxiety about her position. These hearings are televised and recorded in print. It is open to him to have a video recording of these hearings so that Joan Ann will be able to see the manner in which he has conveyed her situation to our national Parliament. It is very important to make this point.
I welcome Frank to the Houses of the Oireachtas and commend him for his work. He is a classic example of the Irish emigrant who went to America and has a very strong record on international human rights issues. I am not surprised that he is here representing Joan in this process and I thank him for his work. I know that he is respected internationally. On behalf of many Members of the Dáil, we respect that work and commend him for it.
It was mentioned that Joan Ann had been awarded £3,000 from the criminal injuries compensation fund. From your knowledge, Frank, did she receive any other form of compensation or assistance in recent years?
Mr. Durkan
None, other than the £3,000 mentioned.
You say Joan places a strong emphasis on finding out the truth. Is she aware that this committee's work is part of a process towards getting at the truth?
Mr. Durkan
Yes, that is why she asked me to come.
I too welcome Frank and thank him very much for making his presentation so well on Joan Ann's behalf. I suppose it was a chance in a million that somebody should have been involved in both sets of bombings in 1972 and 1974. There has been a huge amount of suffering, emotionally and physically. The treatment received over the years must have cost her an absolute fortune. You have presented us the cost on an emotional, human and physical level. What has been the actual financial cost?
Mr. Durkan
I am sorry, I do not have those figures but I know that the cost was covered, as I understand it, through her husband's insurance. I can certainly provide you with those figures, but I do not have them to hand.
You say she wants to find the truth and she wants to ensure that the people responsible are held accountable if at all possible. Can you give us any information on whether there are mechanisms of inquiry in the United States that would be of value to us with regard to our terms of reference?
Mr. Durkan
The first thing that comes to mind is our own problems with similar situations. I am referring to 9/11. Everybody was asking, "How could this happen? Was somebody asleep at the switch to let this happen? With all our equipment and all our expertise to find out what is going on all over the world, how did we let them in through the back door or the front door?" Therefore, the President appointed a commission headed by former Governor Kane of New Jersey to look into that matter. He had, I believe, power of subpoena to bring in the people who may be able to provide answers to how it happened. That is a model that we could follow.
We also have a similar situation in New York at the moment, where the Staten Island ferry ran into the pier, killing 11 people. There is all kinds of míle murdar about who was responsible and why and how it happened. There is, of course, a criminal investigation, but there is also a civil investigation to find out what happened. I believe the commission was appointed by the state, although I am not absolutely sure about that. However, there is a commission trying to explain to the public how this happened, who would be responsible and what action should be taken. That is a parallel of the problems facing this committee. As you can imagine, it has engendered tremendous interest in New York and, indeed, throughout the country. Those are two things that immediately come to mind that might be followed as guidelines for the committee.
Are the commissions into 9/11 and the Staten Island ferry crash judicial commissions?
Mr. Durkan
I do not think they are judicial; I think they are committees of laypeople who will sit in the nature of a grand jury to hear evidence and to bring in people to tell them what they know.
I want to say one thing that I think is peculiar. Joan Ann Burke says, "You know, I am very lucky. I was injured in '72 and I survived, and I was injured in '74 and I survived. Maybe I won't be as lucky the next time." That is her thinking.
Thank you, Mr. Durkan, for being with us today to represent Joan Ann Burke. You are speaking of a lady in her late forties. Although she says here that her quality of life is deteriorating, does she envisage herself ever returning to the workforce?
Mr. Durkan
She is working at present; she is employed. She is gainfully employed in a job that keeps her out of the city. She is working in a small town in New Jersey. That keeps her away from big cities and does not expose her to the stress that causes her such pain.
She said that she had lost her job because she could not face going back to work full-time. I did not realise that she was still working; I am pleased to hear that she is still working in her limited capacity.
Mr. Durkan
She lost her job at USIT; she just could not come back into Dublin city.
I want to ask a follow-on from Deputy Costello's question. The inquiries in the States into the two issues that you mentioned are being carried out by laypeople. What legal representation do witnesses have who come before those commissions? Are considerable numbers of lawyers involved?
Do the witnesses coming before the inquiry come with their lawyers or without them?
Mr. Durkan
If they so desire. We are so traumatised ourselves in the States that we would not move from A to B without a lawyer.
I will ask one other question because I am conscious that Mr. Durkan will not be back with us on module 5. I know you and your client are anxious that closure will be brought to the issues for her. What do you see as the specific outstanding questions that would need to be addressed in the inquiry that you seek?
Mr. Durkan
The Barron report, of which I just got a copy before I came over and happened to read for the specifics of knowing what it said, seemed to have gone to a certain point and then wandered away without coming up with anything really specific. There are a lot of suggestions about what should have been done and what might have been done and what could have been done but was not done.
I sent my client a copy of it. She did not want to read it but her husband read it. He is now a retired policeman and he was appalled, particularly with the lack of a definitive probe into the whole business of the bombing. I do not know what relevance that has but certainly the Barron report raises more questions than it answers. That is not to be critical of it. I think the man ran up against a brick wall in many places. I understand he had a limited staff. I understand he had unco-operative witnesses or sometimes no witnesses that he could really put his fist on. He did the best he could under the circumstances but the circumstances did not give him the kind of instrumentality that he would need to really dig in and find out what did happen and who did it in the face of the limited information he had.
I, too, welcome Mr. Durkan. I understand that you are from the west of Ireland. It is nice to have you back here in a different capacity perhaps and it is sad that it is your first visit to our national Parliament. Not enough of our returned emigrants come and see what happens here and how we have moved on perhaps from the time you left Mayo, however many years ago that might be.
Mr. Durkan
Fifty-five.
I was just born at that time. I know your client, Joan Ann Burke, has said that it is not just sympathy she wants but, nonetheless, it is important that she would know that the committee has heard from victims and survivors of the various bombings. We heard their stories and they were very moving. You may also want to get the video of what happened on that day and take it back because it was a very moving experience for everybody. We are certainly beginning to understand the kind of trauma that many of those people, including your client, went through as a result of what happened.
A couple of questions arise, if you would, please, Mr. Durkan. First, my colleague asked you about the lawyers and appearing at those inquiries. Who is funding that? Is it funded by the State or by your federal Government, or who funds those inquiries?
Second, you asked that we have a full public inquiry. You will have noted from the Barron report that, in effect, there was not co-operation from the Northern Ireland Office and the British Government in relation to this inquiry. They estimated that there were 60,000 files and 1 million documents relating to the happenings of the time. Mr. Justice Barron did not have access to those and he got a 16 page summary of what they thought might be important to him. In the light of your experience and that finding in Mr. Justice Barron's report, how important would you think full co-operation from the Northern Ireland Office and the British Government might be if the public inquiry is to get to the truth that we all want and your client, in particular, wants? Will you comment on that please?
Mr. Durkan
To take the second question first. I think there must be some awful interesting information in the 68,000 files that Mr. Justice Barron would love to have been able to get. To distil them down into 16 pages, which I think is what the report says, would indicate to me that somebody did not want Mr. Justice Barron to know everything. I think a formal request by our Government to the British Government could not but bear fruit. Either they give it or they do not, and if they do not, that speaks volumes, that they are hiding something. I would think that such a move ought to provide fruit.
On the first question, as far as I know, the funding for these hearings would be paid by, in the case of Washington, the federal government, and in New York, the state government. If a witness wants to bring the lawyer, he pays the lawyer himself. You can go in with the lawyer - they are not going to provide one.
I hope I have answered the question.
That was rather interesting.
Thank you very much indeed, Mr Durkan. I hope that coming over here and coming before the hearing have been helpful, and helpful to your client.
Mr. Durkan
It was very enlightening. I appreciate the privilege that you have extended.
Sitting suspended at 11.25 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m.
I welcome Mr. Paddy Cooney, former Minister for Justice. I do not know whether you had other roles as well, Mr. Cooney.
Mr. Paddy Cooney
I was a bit of a Nanki-Poo.
You are very welcome here today. The sub-committee is discussing the matter of issues that were addressed by Mr. Justice Henry Barron and whether all of the issues have been addressed. You have sent a submission to the committee, and we have invited you in to make an oral presentation. We are delighted that you have accepted our invitation and that you are here today to make that oral presentation.
Yesterday the sub-committee discussed the report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry with the former Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald. All members of the sub-committee have read your statement, so it will not be necessary for you to read it in its entirety. If you would give a brief synopsis of your submission, as suits you, we would then have questions. I would like to advise you that, although the Members of the Oireachtas and the sub-committee have parliamentary privilege, your parliamentary privilege has run out and you do not have it.
Mr. Cooney
I would like to thank you and your members for inviting me here this morning and giving me an opportunity to speak to my submission. In what I say I will touch on, in greater detail, the various points that I make in the submission. I do not intend to be over-long - you will be glad to hear that.
First, I would like to reiterate the sympathy which the then Taoiseach, Mr Liam Cosgrave, offered on behalf of the Government and the people to the victims and bereaved of these awful atrocities and to re-echo the revulsion that he expressed. In doing so, he was echoing a widespread national feeling.
It is upsetting, at the least, to note from the submissions by and on behalf of the victims and the bereaved to you last week that, not withstanding the passage of so much time, their grief does not appear to have diminished substantially. Thinking about that, possibly one of the reasons why that unfortunate state of affairs exists is that they feel there are questions unanswered and that if they had the answers to those questions, they might assuage their continuing grief. Consequently there was considerable expectations on their part that the commission of inquiry would answer many of these questions.
Indeed, when we look at the terms of reference of the commission of inquiry, one can see why that expectation might be raised. The terms of reference posed a formidable task for the inquiry. If I could paraphrase, the inquiry was directed to investigate, in effect, the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, to examine the Garda investigation - in effect, to second-guess the Garda investigation - and to consider the Ulster Television programme of 1993. By any stretch of the imagination, that was a formidable task with which the commission was asked to deal and which Mr. Justice Barron, very patriotically, took on. In discharging that task, he, as the sole member of the commission, had to contend with a number of difficulties, which I feel are well-nigh insuperable. It made his task almost impossible to achieve.
The first difficulty he had to contend with was the lapse of time; it is a generation ago since this atrocity - 30 years - and the lapse of time - I speak from experience - plays tricks with memories. It dims memories but, more importantly, it distorts them. I was centrally involved in the affairs of the Government at the time of these atrocities and centrally involved in their investigation. However, even I cannot recall with clarity many of the incidents and contemporary events. When it is put to you, you begin to say, "Oh yes, I remember that." You then begin to say to yourself, "Am I remembering it because it is put to me now? Am I remembering it as it happened or am I remembering it in the way it is being put to me now?" These are practical difficulties people have in recalling after such a length of time, and I am sure those difficulties were constantly encountered by Mr. Justice Barron when he was interviewing the various witnesses from those days.
Another point worth making is that the ambience in which he conducted his inquiry and in which you are holding your proceedings is light years removed from the fraught and frenetic times of 1974. The burned out British Embassy was still standing as a stark reminder that democracy could very quickly become anarchy. Atrocities were being committed, mainly by the Provisionals, mainly in the North, on a distressingly regular basis. Some of those atrocities spilled over here. I think Dr. FitzGerald mentioned the murder of our colleague and your predecessor, Billy Fox.
Armed robberies on post offices, banks and mail vans were commonplace. Demonstrations and agitation were being fomented and agitators bused in. There were hunger strikes and unrest in the prisons. It was a very fraught time. The contemporary context has always to be kept in mind when considering the task that Judge Barron had to contend with.
Another great difficulty he had was the methodology he employed or the modus operandi handed to him by the Government. One can understand how the Government of the day would have had some puzzlement about how they should set up a commission of inquiry but at that stage I think Dublin Castle was in full flow and those procedures had attracted, and still attract, no little criticism. They are slow, prone to delay, very expensive and a bit one-sided, with the resources of the State on one side against the resources of an individual on the other.
The format allowed people, in effect, to be accused and condemned before they had time even to ask questions in their defence. Reporting was not subject to anything equivalent to the sub judice rule that restricts commentary on cases in the courts. These were disadvantages of what I call the Dublin Castle tribunal-type, and I could well see the Government being anxious to move away from and avoid some of those disadvantages. The advantages, however, are that it is in public and that parties can themselves or through counsel examine witnesses. They are substantial advantages and, of course, evidence is given in public and on oath and documentation is available for all the parties. They are serious advantages.
What was proposed for Mr. Justice Barron was that he would sit in private. As a result, his witnesses are largely anonymous, his documentation is unknown - a lot of it is unpublished - and we are ignorant consequently as to its provenance or complete contents. Of course, it is largely unattributed. They are serious impediments in making an assessment of the Barron inquiry. Of course, there was no cross-examination of witnesses.
He had a limited staff and there appears to have been a fairly high turnover of staff judging by the number of names mentioned in his report. He did not have technical assistance as far as I can see in one area which has emerged as an area of controversy and potential importance - the analysis, identification and all the technical stuff in connection with high explosives. I do not think he had any technical backup.
He himself, for three years, had the burden of interviewing all the witnesses - hundreds possibly - reading and assimilating a great mass of documentation, including intelligence memoranda from the police and the army, assessing interdepartmental Government memoranda and inter-Government documentation. He had to read and assess all of this and at the same time hear witnesses and try to keep a clear mind. It was a formidable task.
Another handicap - this was partly of his own making - was that the witnesses were not recorded verbatim. There was no verbatim record kept of what witnesses had said to Judge Barron. I appeared before him on two occasions. He was a most courteous man. We had a very interesting discussion. We then had, effectively, a question and answer session conducted by him at normal conversational pace - about the pace at which I am now speaking. The only records of those meetings were notes taken in long hand by a young assistant. Chairman, it is not possible to make an adequate note in long hand of a conversation conducted at normal pace; it is bound to be inaccurate.
I had reason, subsequently, arising out of another issue, which is not germane here, to request the record of my meetings. They were sent to me after each meeting. I was horrified when I read them because I regarded them as inadequate and they did not fully represent what I had said to Mr. Justice Barron. On each occasion I had to write long letters of exegesis on them without going through them in total detail because otherwise he was going to be left with a totally inaccurate record of what I had said. This was a huge impediment because that was the only record that he had available for cross-examining further witnesses.
I ask you to desist from being critical of individuals because of the situation.
Mr. Cooney
I take that point, Chairman, although I think the sole inquiry is not quite an individual in the sense you mean but I will be respectful.
You take the point. You understand, being a lawyer.
Mr. Cooney
That was an impediment that the inquiry had to deal with - inadequate and incomplete recording of the statements of witnesses. Over a period of three years, if that was not a good record or was a misleading record, when the inquiry came to talk to further witnesses, it would not have been fully informed. I understand there was evidence from a Lieutenant Colonel Wylde, a retired British Army explosives expert. Have I mentioned the name? He is a consultant to the victims and the bereaved.
He was here yesterday.
Mr. Cooney
I think he had serious complaints about how his evidence had been recorded, how it had appeared in the final report and how it had been interpreted. One reason could be bad recording of what he said and, of course, lack of resources, as I mentioned earlier.
Another difficulty which Mr. Justice Barron adverted to was that some documentation filed in the Department of Justice was missing. Of course, with missing files in the Department of Justice, every conspiracy theorist in the world kicks into action. I think when Minister McDowell issued a statement on this point after the report had been published, he said, "Do not make too much out of these missing files. There was nothing significant in them." They would have largely consisted - I can confirm this - of reports that would have come over from the Garda security section for the information of the Department and myself. Most of those documents would be secondary documents and the originals should still be available, or the genesis of them, in Garda Headquarters. All I can say is that they do not seem to have disappeared during my watch because Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, one of my successors, did have access to some files in 1987. As I say, I do not consider it to be a serious impediment to the work of the tribunal.
The greatest difficulty - in my opinion, an insuperable one - for Mr. Justice Barron in establishing facts - I emphasis the word "facts" - is the absence of key personnel. The key personnel from the Department of Justice and the Garda from those days are dead: from the Department of Justice, the Secretary, Mr. Andrew Ward; assistant secretary, Mr. Michael Donnelly, and Mr. Paddy Caldwell who was the principal officer in the security section and who would have been the day-to-day interface of the Department with the Garda. These men would have been in frequent contact with the Garda. Reports would have been received and analysed by them and they would have discussed them with me. They were performing a critical role during this period. There are so many question marks in the Barron report that if they were there, I am quite certain they would be able to explain them. These were professional civil servants of the highest integrity, dedicated and patriotic men with immense experience in this whole area. They are not available.
On the Garda side, Commissioner Malone is dead, the then Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Garvey, is dead and the two most senior detectives in the country, Chief Superintendent Joy, head of ordinary crime, and Chief Superintendent Tony McMahon, head of subversive crime - two of the most experienced police officers in the State and the two men who headed up the investigation - are also dead. The lack of their evidence is particularly unfortunate because there are so many things they could explain, in fairness to them and to their force.
For example, I am quite certain they have explained why it was decided not to travel to the North to interview witnesses. Mr. Justice Barron speculates that perhaps they should have gone to the North but that is all he can do because he has no evidence as to why they did not go North. I could speculate - I have possibly a more comprehensive background in this area than Mr. Justice Barron - as to why they did not travel to the North but I am not going to waste your time, Chairman. Speculation is of no use to you or to anybody.
Given the absence of first hand evidence - what is known in law as best evidence, which is generally the only evidence that would be accepted by the courts - to be given by those two detectives, the inquiry was forced to speculate and come to speculative conclusions. Indeed, in doing that, the inquiry transgressed one of the rules which it set down for itself in the earlier part of its report, as reported: that it would draw reasonable inferences from credible evidence. Frequently, it is drawing hypothesis not merely from credible or incredible evidence, but literally without evidence.
The relationship between the Government and the Garda was exercised through the Department of Justice. In my submission, I have included part of a letter that I wrote to Mr. Justice Barron. As it is set out in some detail for the committee, I do not propose to go into it in detail again except to say that it was a close and ongoing relationship, and a good relationship. I was satisfied at all times that I was kept fully informed. I never had any instances in four and a half years in the Department of Justice of finding out that I had not been informed of something appropriate or important. There was a good personal relationship between the officials and the gardaí on the other side - small numbers who knew each other well, men dedicated to the same task of confronting and overcoming crime.
The role of the Government in this general area regarding the Garda was to support the Garda. That support could be given in a number of ways; for example, it could be political in a very narrow and specific sense, which I am going to mention because the subject has raised itself in the report. There was no political assistance given by the Garda. The context in which that appears in the report is that we did not approach the Northern authorities for assistance. The Government would only act on a request from the Garda for such intergovernmental assistance. No such request came, because it was quite clear that no such request was needed. The Garda was having full co-operation as far as it was concerned from its colleagues north of the Border. The question of seeking political assistance, in that sense, did not arise. It was not made, was not requested and did not arise.
The Government would support the Garda in regard to the numbers on the force. At that time, I think the numbers were being increased every year - I think there were programmes to recruit several hundred extra gardaí. We would support the Garda in its request for enhanced training facilities; in the legal area, we would support it by ensuring that that the criminal law was adequate for the contingencies of the time. Indeed, the Government of the day suffered severe criticism as being anti-libertarian for proposing measures that were recommended to us by the Garda as being needed to deal with the crisis of security which it faced. We suffered a considerable amount of political obloquy as a result. It is interesting to note that in these comparatively peaceful times legislation, at least as harsh, is now popularly demanded and introduced as a matter of routine.
We would also support the Garda in the area of technology. This is an important point because much play is made of the inadequate forensic procedures following explosions. Undoubtedly, the procedures were inadequate, as is clear from the evidence of experts. One reason for that inadequacy was the absence of a dedicated State forensic laboratory. We set it up either late in 1974 or early in 1975. That was a radical improvement for the forensic-gathering capacity of the Garda.
To take a slight diversion into intergovernmental relations, there is the question of whether the Government should have done anything about collusion. There was no evidence at that stage; there were suspicions of collusion between maverick elements of the security forces in the North and the probable-putative bombers but there was no hard evidence of collusion on which the Government could have gone to the other Government to make a complaint. There would have been no question of the Government's being behind the door if anything like that arose. I remind you, Chairman, that at that very time the Government was pursuing through the human rights courts in Strasbourg a case against our neighbouring Government for irregular procedures in Castlereagh interrogation centre.
The role of the Government is to support the Garda in the way that I have indicated but no more. It was not then; it is not now, and never can be any part of the role of the Government to interfere in the operational activities of its police force. That is a fundamental principle of democracy. Not to accept it is to imply that political interference could possibly be permitted on occasion. There are no conditions about that principle: it is an absolutely fundamental principle of democracy. If it is not observed and there is political interference by the Government of the day with its police force, then you do not live in a democracy; you live in a totalitarian state. It is as serious as that. It is a principle of which we were cognisant and a principle which we observed.
I am disappointed that principle does not seem to have impinged in the way it should have on Mr. Justice Barron, or that he did not seem to be aware of it. He reached conclusions using language to suggest that the Government, because it did not interfere in some way with the police force, was in dereliction of its duty. That is certainly how his conclusions were interpreted by the press. Widely damaging and hurtful publicity along those lines appeared with lurid headlines - I cannot blame the press for that; that is their job - in the days immediately after the publication of the Barron report. I think Mr. Justice Barron thought that there should have been more direct involvement by the Government with the police of the State. I am sorry to have to say that but there is some internal evidence on which I rely to support that.
In conclusion 5 on page 275 he talks about the Attorney-General being consulted. He said: "Although the investigation team had in their opinion no evidence upon which to found a prosecution, there is no evidence that they sought the advice of the Attorney General". The implication is that they should have sought the advice of the Attorney General. The Attorney General is a political figure, he is the law officer of the Government. It is no part of his role to give the police any directions as to how they should conduct their investigations. I will talk about that conclusion later in a little more detail.
It is stated on page 127, the third paragraph from the top: "Nor is there any evidence of any political approach by the Government itself concerned at the lack of progress by An Garda Síochána". That word "concerned" is used in one of the conclusions. Here it is used directly in the context of suggesting that there should be a political approach by the Government.
Again, I refer you, Chairman, to page 273, which states: "Control of the gardaí lay with the Department of Justice." That is a total misrepresentation of the relationship between the Department and the Garda. I have already indicated what that relationship was and how it was exercised by the Government. That statement shows a fundamental misunderstanding by Mr. Justice Barron of the relationship between the Department and in that context "Department" and "Government" are synonymous. It shows a fundamental misunderstanding. He thinks that the Department of Justice and the Government controlled the Garda. They did not, they made the policy for the Garda and we were available to advise the Garda and assist in the other ways that I have already indicated, but control in that sense is, as I say, anathema to the principles of democracy.
By the way, I should say that after that statement, "Control of the gardaí lay with the Department of Justice", the report goes on to state: "The two Commissioners before the current Commissioner had been officials of the Department...." I presume that statement is meant to try to underpin the earlier statement, but it is wrong. My recollection is that the last set of such Commissioners was back in the 1930s. However, those statements and the implications of the conclusion to which I have referred - conclusion 7 - shows that Mr. Justice Barron's mind was running in the direction that the Department and Government should have been directing the police to pursue their inquiries more vigorously, to go down this road or to go down that road. As I say, and I cannot say it strongly enough, that was no part of Government activity. It is anti-democratic and could not happen, but because the judge obviously believed it and has reflected that belief in his report, we have been damaged. I resent that very much.
I will deal, as it has arisen, with conclusion 5, where Mr. Justice Barron is of the view that even though there was no evidence on which to found a prosecution, the Attorney General should have been approached. I think you may have heard from Mr. Justice Declan Costello, who was the then Attorney General. I heard from him and he confirmed to me that that misrepresents the role of the Attorney General. The Attorney General in those days was the prosecuting officer of the State. Another reform which that Government made was to hive off that function from the Office of the Attorney General and set up the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. That had not happened at that stage and the Attorney General was still the prosecuting authority. He has confirmed he had no role in investigating crime or in directing the Garda in the investigation of crime. He did not want to see a file and a file would not be sent to him until there was a file or prima facie evidence against named persons and then he would deal with it. That position is confirmed internally in the report where in 1994, the DPP - I think it was Mr. Barnes - following re-examination of the television witnesses and some other people gave his opinion on what he had to get, namely, a prima facie case. That conclusion is erroneous and shows a serious lack of knowledge of what was a basic principle of practice and procedure at the time in the area of criminal law.
It is interesting to contrast that statement with a statement on page 91. I should say, Chairman, that the statement I quoted was also enunciated by Mr. Justice Barron when he attended the committee - I think on 10 December - to make a presentation of his report. He made the same erroneous statement to the committee in that presentation. That is why, in the second paragraph on page 91, there is a statement which I do not want to quote in its entirety. I will paraphrase it. It says that if satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to charge a suspect, a file would be prepared and sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions. That is a correct statement of the law at the time. I must contrast that correct statement appearing on page 91 with an incorrect statement appearing in the introduction and repeated on page 275. It suggests that the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing.
Was there a DPP at that time Mr Cooney?
Mr. Cooney
No, there was no DPP at that time. I just draw the committee's attention to that anomaly.
I believe that it is impossible to have a balanced and fair judgment on the performance of the Garda in the absence of the men who led and directed the investigation. I am not here to defend them; I am not capable of doing so. It is a technical matter to defend them. However, as a matter of logic, if the men who led and directed the investigation are not here to explain the technicalities of the police investigation then I do not think that it is possible to condemn the people concerned.
So far as the Government is concerned, I want to reject the conclusions as vehemently as I can. They have been widely reported, and as I have said earlier, they have provoked much critical comment. The impression has been given that the Government was uncaring, that it did not mind what happened, that it was uncaring that a large number of its citizens were slaughtered and that it was indifferent to their murder. That is a travesty of the situation. The erroneous conclusion 7 is based on the assumption that the Government of the day should, and was entitled. to interfere actively in the operational duties of the Garda. That is a most serious misrepresentation of the legal and constitutional position. It ignores the system of checks and balances that ensures that we live in a democracy and not in a totalitarian state.
I have indicated to you why those conclusions are wrong and why they were not accidental. They were deliberately drawn by the commission of inquiry. They are wrong, totally wrong, and I reject them with all the vehemence I can. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you very much Mr Cooney. The conclusion that Mr. Justice Barron arrives at, which is the main point of contention today, is in relation to the chapter on the Garda investigation alone. The matter is that the Government of the day failed to show the concern expected of it, and that relates to the Garda investigation.
Does the terms of reference of Mr. Justice Barron's inquiry include matters that could lead to that conclusion?
Mr. Cooney
I do not quite follow.
The inquiry's terms of reference require the commission to undertake a thorough examination involving fact finding and assessment of all aspects of the Dublin-Monaghan bombings and their sequel including, among other things, the nature, adequacy and extent of the Garda investigation, including the co-operation with relevant authorities in Northern Ireland and the handling of evidence. Do you believe those terms of reference include matters which could or should lead to the conclusion Mr. Justice Barron has reached in regard to the Government of the day?
Mr. Cooney
No. They could lead, indeed command him to investigate the police inquiry and consider its adequacy. However, they do not compel him in any way to come to a conclusion which is based on a totally false premise, the false premise being that the Government of the day can interfere politically with the Garda or can direct it in its operational activities.
I accept fully what you said in regard to the control of the operations of the Garda. Recently, extra resources were given to the Garda because of particular circumstances without interfering with the operations of the Garda. Is there any way the Government of the day could show that it demonstrated concern at the Garda investigation into the Dublin-Monaghan bombings?
Mr. Cooney
I do not know what the Chairman means by "concern". We were highly interested in it. It was a time when the Garda was under huge pressure for manpower reasons along the Border. The two most senior detectives in the country were in charge of the investigation. They had a dedicated team of 40 detectives. The Government was increasing the level of the police force. We were aware of the difficulties of a lack of a forensic laboratory and were addressing that. As I said in my letter to Mr. Justice Barron, it was policy of the Government to see that crime was confronted and overcome in the most vigorous way possible within the law. The Garda knew it had our full support and that anything it wanted in terms of technical support would be made available to it. As far as the actual investigation of the crime was concerned, that had to be left to the Garda.
We were aware, as was the Department of Justice, of what was being proposed by the Garda and we had to accept its professional assessment of how it was going to deal with this serious crime. The two most senior detectives in the State headed up the investigation with a dedicated force of 40 officers. It was unprecedented. As Minister for Justice, I would have been happy with that and happy that that was an appropriate response from the Garda. There was no need for me to show any more concern, whatever "concern" means. I addressed that in my submission. Another complaint I have is that none of the allegations were put to me by Mr. Justice Barron to allow me to confront and answer them. The only time he mentioned "concern" was when he raised the point that Government flags were not at half mast on public buildings. That is hardly what he meant.
I think the conclusion here is in regard to the Garda investigation rather than to how the Government felt about the bombing itself.
Mr. Cooney
It states that the Government of day failed to show the concern expected of it. It could mean anything.
In regard to the Garda investigation.
Mr. Cooney
Perhaps I will have an opportunity to conclude at the end of questioning.
Absolutely. It is a very informal setting, Mr. Cooney. Please feel free to make a point at any time.
Mr. Cooney
There is a general point that I would like to make afterwards.
Okay.
I thank Mr. Cooney for coming today and assisting the committee with its work. It is much appreciated. I also thank him for submitting a written submission beforehand. Before I come to your written submission, will you explain what appears to be a radical difference between your submission today and that which we heard from yesterday from Dr. FitzGerald? I do not know if you have had an opportunity to read the transcript of yesterday's hearings. I would like to quote from Dr. FitzGerald's response to a question that I put to him at the end of his submission. I said, "Is Dr. Fitzgerald saying, therefore——
Let us give a copy of the transcript to Mr. Cooney in order that he can actually see what the Deputy is referring to.
It is taken from the first paragraph on page 36 of the transcript for the afternoon session.
Okay. Mr. Cooney has a copy.
It reads, "Arising out of my last question, is Dr. FitzGerald saying, therefore, that in the immediate aftermath of the atrocities, there was not a discussion in Government circles, or a suspicion at Government level, that there may have been involvement at a high or lower level by the security forces in Northern Ireland [in these outrages - that is my addition] in this atrocity?" Dr. FitzGerald's response very clearly was: "I can recall nothing of the kind, even at a lower level." To paraphrase, "If I had such a suspicion, I would have been minded to pursue it. I would probably have had to consult first before doing so but I would have wanted to pursue anything of that kind. I have no recollection of that happening. It is highly unlikely that it was ever raised with us [I presume the Cabinet] - or I would have been chasing after it."
That is what Dr. FitzGerald said to us yesterday. In your submission this morning you have said in the clearest of terms that yes, there was a suspicion but not enough to go knocking on the door of No. 10, or anything like it. What surprised people about Dr. FitzGerald's submission was that this was, to my knowledge, the first time this had come out. It is diametrically opposed to what you are telling us today. Can you possibly reconcile these diametrically opposed positions?
Mr. Cooney
They are not diametrically opposed positions. Your question to Dr. FitzGerald was, "Arising out of the last question, is Dr. FitzGerald saying, therefore, that in the immediate aftermath of the atrocities..." There was no evidence of collusion in the immediate aftermath of the atrocities. This talk of collusion only emerged subsequently, and it only emerged in a tendentious way by people interpreting - people had the explosives. Could they have done it? Had they the expertise to do it? Therefore, there must have been——
The discussion centred upon the months leading up to the completion of the Garda investigation. Therefore, we are talking about those months - the immediate aftermath. He actually said that right up until 1976 and 1977 there was no suspicion but you are saying there was.
Mr. Cooney
No, what he is saying is that there was nothing on which you could have gone to the other side. I totally agree with him.
With respect, Mr. Cooney——
If a question is asked and Mr. Cooney is speaking, please allow him to finish.
Mr. Cooney
According to this transcript, Dr. FitzGerald says he can recall nothing of the kind - that is what the transript says - and that if he had had any suspicion, he would have been minded to pursue it. He could not have pursued it if it was only a suspicion. There would have to be hard evidence before you could raise something with another Government. You cannot pursue a suspicion with another Government. That is what I meant when I was speaking earlier, that these suspicions of collusion were never more than suspicions. This is why, I think, the victims and the bereaved are paying so much attention and are so disturbed that the evidence of their explosives expert which, I think, they feel might lead to some hardening of evidence in that area of collusion has been misinterpreted by the judge but there was never anything other than suspicions and it was based, I think, on a false syllogism: the loyalist paramilitaries carried out this explosion, they did not have the sophistication to do it and, therefore, they were assisted. That is false logic. That is all that was available at that stage. On that basis one could not go protesting to a friendly government.
You have reiterated again that there was a suspicion but nothing about which you could have gone further to the British Government.
Mr. Cooney
No.
I am just saying there is a discrepancy between that and what was the clear evidence of Dr. FitzGerald yesterday.
Mr. Cooney
To clarify this point, I do not want to leave any——
We are not here listening to evidence. We are not adjudicating on any item.
We are here to clarify one or two different strands in the submissions.
Yes but please do not just the word "evidence". Dr. FitzGerald informed the committee yesterday. He spoke to the committee yesterday. He did not give evidence because evidence is given when there is a judgment to be made. We are not making any judgment. Therefore, I ask you to think in those terms, please.
I will certainly withdraw it and say Dr. FitzGerald, in his submission yesterday, said that there was ".... nothing of the kind, even at a lower level", and ".... I would have been minded to pursue it." That was his opinion.
The point I am getting at and what we are trying to explore here today is as follows. Did Judge Barron address this particular issue? The issue, especially among the families, is that the Government did not pursue it. What I am trying to elicit from Mr. Cooney is whether certain members of the Government unaware of this, specifically the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The question arising out of that is this. Dr. FitzGerald went on to inform us that he was not on the Cabinet sub-committee on security. In a statement made on 11 July 1993 by one of Mr. Cooney's Cabinet colleagues, Mr. Justin Keating, in the Irish Independent, he said——
Mr. Cooney would need to have a copy in front of him. It is unfair to quote from something which he cannot see in front of him.
I can explain the general tenor and will not quote from it. What he said at that time was that it was highly possible that the list of suspects would have gone to the Cabinet sub-committee on security and that there may have been a political decision at that level not to forward that on to the full Cabinet of which Dr. FitzGerald would have been a member.
This following question arises which I ask Mr. Cooney to address. Was the Cabinet at the time fully aware of the list of suspects and the fact that some of those suspects had close associations with the security forces in Northern Ireland? Was the entire Cabinet aware of this?
Mr. Cooney
I shall explain the procedure to the Deputy. Before I do, let me go back to this question of knowledge of possible collusion. To this day there has been no proof that there was collusion and I do not think Mr. Justice Barron comes to that conclusion.
The apparent difference is that the Deputy seems to imply what I said today and what Dr. FitzGerald said yesterday relates to when the knowledge or, if you like, the gossipy knowledge of possible collusion emerged. That did not emerge for some time and it had not emerged sufficiently, definitively to justify an intergovernmental approach.
On the question of the list of suspects, very quickly the Garda was in possession, from its northern counterparts, of a list of suspects. Those names were given to me and I probably informed the Cabinet security sub-committee of the existence of this list of names. I have no recollection that any of them were listed to me as having connections with the security forces. My recollection is that they were shown to me as being members of loyalist terrorist or quasi-terrorist organisations. However, the names as names meant nothing to me and as names would have meant even less to the members of the Cabinet security sub-committee. I would probably have told the Government in full session that we have names of suspects, but that is all.
That response gives rise to the next issue that Mr. Justice Barron was trying to address. If we had the documents that were prepared in Mr. Cooney's Department at the time, we would know who was on that list and whether he had provided that information to the Cabinet sub-committee. Mr. Cooney's submission states that he is not unduly concerned that the files have gone missing. As a committee, we are deeply concerned about that issue. Mr. Cooney drew a demarcation line between the Department and the gardaí, but we are very interested to find out what was the official assessment of the reports that came into the Department. For example, if a report came from the Phoenix Park and somebody read it and said, "This is baloney; we are deeply unhappy with this; we are not satisfied with the sort of information we are getting", what would have been the official assessment? I think I know what Mr. Cooney's response will be, but we place a great deal of importance on getting possession of that documentation to find out what was the level of concern at Department of Justice level. Can Mr. Cooney help us with that? He does not seem to share that concern.
Mr. Cooney
I do not, Deputy. I think you misunderstand the position. First of all, the list should be still available on Garda records. The list I got came from the Garda; it had been copied from its records. Ask it for this.
As for the assessment, the list would come in, possibly accompanied by a background document from the guards. That would be received, first of all, by Mr Caldwell, the principal officer in the security section, and if he thought it was a serious document, as he would in that case, he would discuss it with the secretary and the assistant secretary. They would probably then come and discuss it with me. They would make an assessment of it verbally among themselves, but they were not going to write a long minute on this. You can take it that there would be no documents of significance in that regard, as you seem to think, missing. In any event, if there were, I did not do anything with them.
In relation to the 68,000 documents that you are discussing, our terms of reference do not include concern over any item that is involved in a court. Our concern is the lessons that we can learn and the actions we want to take.
The 68,000 documents are those that are referred to in the Northern Ireland Office.
I realise that, but the same point applies in relation to investigation. What we are looking at here are the issues to be addressed, so if you would just keep that in focus.
The question is, did Mr. Justice Barron address all the issues? If all the documentation was not available, was he in a position to address those issues? I accept they were not lost or destroyed during Mr. Cooney's watch, but if they were available, could the issue be addressed properly?
Mr. Cooney
Deputy, before you leave that, what issue have you in mind that is not addressed that might have been addressed if the documentation were available?
Specifically, whether the Department of Justice was satisfied with the quality of the Garda investigation.
Let me put it another way. You make the point, quite rightly, that it was not for you to investigate the quality of the Garda investigation but Mr. Justice Barron was specifically asked by the Houses of the Oireachtas and the Government to investigate this. Having investigated it and looked at all of the Garda files, he came to the conclusion that the Garda investigation had been deeply flawed, unprofessional and did not display expertise whereas in your letter to Mr. Justice Barron on 24 April 2003 you said you were happy to rely on the professional expertise of the people concerned. In hindsight - I know it is at a remove of 30 years - would you now say your happiness to rely on their professional expertise was misplaced?
Mr. Cooney
It was not misplaced because I had evidence over four and half years of the successful exercise of that expertise in times often of great danger and stress for the themselves. I never had any reason to doubt the efficacy of the operations of the Garda. To condemn them on the basis of Mr. Justice Barron's assessment is to do so when he did not have any evidence from the two most senior detectives in the State, who are dead and were not there to defend themselves. They could have explained what exactly they had done and removed whatever doubts Mr. Justice Barron had.
Page 94, the chapter on the Garda investigation under the heading "eye witness information", reads:
The search for witnesses who may have seen the bombers and their vehicles was extremely thorough. A very large number of statements was taken. In some instances, confidential information was received and this was followed up. In most instances leads were followed until their natural conclusion.
That statement indicates a high level of efficient Garda activity and I find it difficult to reconcile it with what the Deputy has just said.
I am not saying that. I was just quoting from the person who was charged with——
Mr. Cooney
Let us deal with what Mr. Justice Barron says.
In your submission, you say the judge made much play of the fact that "the minutes of this sub-committee do not contain discussion of the Garda investigations or consideration of what action should be taken to assist them". Did you make photocopies of the minutes of the Cabinet sub-committee on security available to Judge Barron or were you asked for them by him?
Mr. Cooney
I did not have them. If they exist I——
Mr. Cooney is retired.
Mr. Cooney
I do not think there were any minutes kept. I do not know. I was not au fait with the——
You do not have possession of them?
Mr. Cooney
I do not. I never did. On that question, again, I think Mr. Justice Barron was inclined to read too much into the role of that sub-committee. I made it clear in the letter that it did not have any investigative or supervisory role. It was merely there to receive information and give political advice to me if I needed it in regard to any particular security crisis, rather than involve all the Cabinet, maybe at short notice. It was easier to convene a sub-committee.
We are not going to reinvestigate that sub-committee now.
I welcome Mr. Cooney and commend him on his willingness to come before us. The gist of his very first letter to us was that he was quite willing to come before us, which certainly is much appreciated by the committee.
I notice in your summing up that you stated very trenchantly that you felt the findings of Mr. Justice Barron had been erroneous. I think the words you used were that the judge was "totally wrong". You have a very strong position on this. Do you not feel that the judge made any attempt to get a balance regarding his comments on matters of your concern?
Mr. Cooney
My assessment of Mr. Justice Barron's error relates to the conclusions, which imply that the Government was negligent in its approach to the atrocity because it did not interfere or get involved with the operational activities of the Garda. Mr. Justice Barron made a conclusion based on that false and dangerous premise. That is why I say that it was totally wrong.
Rather than drawing conclusions could we address the issues in their generality.
This concerns all the issues addressed by Mr. Justice Barron and how he addressed them. Mr. Cooney, you have taken a diametrically opposed position to the manner in which he came to his conclusions, so this line of inquiry is relevant to how Mr. Justice Barron addressed these.
How many times did you meet Mr. Justice Barron and for how long? Were other people present and were the proceedings recorded?
Mr. Cooney
I met Mr. Justice Barron twice for approximately one hour or more on each occasion. The first meeting was in March 2001. According to the minute I have it commenced at 11.00 a.m. and it terminated at 12.20 p.m. On that occasion the only other person present was Mr. Justice Barron's then assistant, Mr Michael Buckley. I met the judge again on 30 January at 10.00 a.m. The meeting concluded at 11.50 a.m. The judge was accompanied by Ms Linda Cronin, a secretarial assistant. Our discussions were not recorded. As I said earlier, long hand notes were taken, in one case by Mr Buckley, and in the other by Ms Cronin. I subsequently discovered on reading the long-hand notes that they were a totally inadequate representation or record of my meetings.
In future, if we could avoid naming names.
Mr. Cooney
The question asked of me was who was present. I wonder was anybody present.
If we could all take on board that matter - try to avoid mentioning names.
I did not necessarily want the names of people who were present, just whether or not somebody else was present. However, a verbatim account was taken by a third party.
Mr. Cooney
No. Notes were taken in long hand, but they were not verbatim.
Were they verbatim?
Mr. Cooney
No. Not that I did not want the meeting verbatim, but I understand verbatim to mean a word-for-word transcript.
Mr. Justice Barron indicated to us that there were no verbatim notes but that general notes were taken.
And you dispute the detail of those.
Mr. Cooney
And did so in correspondence with Mr. Justice Barron. I corrected matters that I thought needed correcting.
They were contemporaneous but not verbatim.
It is important to note that Mr. Cooney is not disputing the notes that were taken, but that they could be construed as an accurate account of all that occurred at the meetings. He is not disputing the notes that were taken or what was in them, but you are disputing that they formed a totally accurate account of everything that transpired at the meeting.
Mr. Cooney
I will put it another way: I would say it was an inaccurate account.
At what stage did you see those notes?
Mr. Cooney
Shortly afterwards because I had asked to be furnished with a transcript. I was apprehensive about the quality of the recording.
At that point, when you read them, did you point out the inaccuracy to Mr Justice Barron?
Mr. Cooney
I subsequently wrote to him.
You wrote to him.
They were not a full account.
Mr. Cooney
They did not adequately represent what I thought I said.
Mr. Cooney, could you give us a picture of your overall practice and policy at the time? We are getting snippets of it here and there. You were the new Minister for Justice in the new Government in 1973. Is it correct that the Cabinet security sub-committee was established at an early stage? At the same time, there were high level meetings with the British authorities. Were you present at those meetings? We heard yesterday from Dr. Garret Fitzgerald that you were instrumental in establishing a summit on security with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Merlyn Rees. Could you give us a picture of the sort of activities which were going on, and the dealings you had with the Garda? At what level did they occur and were they hands on?
Mr. Cooney
When you ask what sort of activities were going on, do you mean-——
From a policy and practice point of view. You had your policy and practice.
Mr. Cooney
The policy of the Government was to confront crime vigorously - at that stage, the major crime was subversive crime - to overcome it; to support the Garda in any way it asked which was within the resources of the Government to provide; to provide legal support in terms of strengthening the law, if necessary; and to provide the Garda with new technology. We were always looking at radio systems. It was a bone of contention in the Border divisions that communications were not as good as we would have liked them to be and we were constantly improving them. The numbers of the force were also being enhanced.
All of that was going on. At the same time, there was a cross-Border dimension to it because the atrocities were mainly taking place across the Border but spilling back to our side. There was also a mistaken belief on the other side that these were being planned down in the South and that, if we had a will, we could have stopped it and arrested all the miscreants. Of course, that was mistaken; that was not happening. The majority of terrorist incidents originated in the North because they were much safer in the North. The British and the RUC hardly ran along the Border at all. The British army was given police powers so they could patrol and act as policemen in areas where the RUC could not go. It was a much safer area for terrorists to plan and operate from, and that is where they were operating from, but it was politically appropriate to appease some elements of Unionism by suggesting that we were somehow at fault or could not be trusted in this area. There were complaints from time to time from the British authorities of bad co-operation and bad procedures for Garda-RUC co-operation.
I should say Garda-RUC co-operation has been at a close level since 1922. Individual policemen on both sides of the Border knew each other well and tic-tacked over the years, and had a good working relationship. That continues right up to this day, and was in place all during the Troubles. In fact, Mr. Justice Barron in his report quotes a detective from Monaghan praising the amount of co-operation and information he got from his opposite numbers of intermediate rank on the other side.
Nevertheless, that practical co-operation was ignored politically. We felt it necessary to put in place formal structures to demonstrate that there was a will to co-operate in this common fight against terrorism. That led to my meeting with Mr. Merlyn Rees at Baldonnel where we discussed possible structures to put in place. That may have followed Sunningdale, though I am not too sure of the timetable. Following that meeting, structures were put in place and, as the years went on, they were refined and provided for consultation at all the levels right up to commissioner and the head of the RUC - the inspector general, or whatever his title was. There was quite a lot going on in that regard.
Sunningdale was to address the vexed question of extradition. As the Chairman and members will recall, we were not extraditing people arrested down here and wanted in the North because they pleaded that their activities were in connection with a political offence, and that defence was accepted by our courts. The irony was that this political exemption or political defence originated in Great Britain in the earlier part of the preceding centuries to stop the British sending Russian revolutionaries back to Moscow.
It was ironic that in the 1970s it became the legal reason that we were not returning wanted people to the North. It was a sore point. It did not give us any pleasure to see these people walking free from our courts; we wanted to see them tried in the North. That problem was addressed at Sunningdale, and a high-level commission was set up consisting of judges on both sides. One of the Northern commissioners, incidentally, was Mr. Hutton QC, who probably figured in another area today.
The commission came up with the idea of extra-territorial jurisdiction. We brought in an Act to provide that offences committed in the North could be tried down here and vice versa. That could be implemented only on the basis of full co-operation between the police forces and all the Government agencies.
That was the general level of activity. It was a fraught and frenetic time because a lot was happening in the whole security area, and we were constantly in touch with the Garda about how to contend with it and how to confront it.
Mr. Justice Barron found, despite all the activity on your part and on the Government's part, that little concern or interest was demonstrated in what was the biggest crime ever committed in the history of the State. You certainly demonstrated concern in the immediate aftermath; you went to the hospitals, expressed sympathy and so on. At the high-level intergovernmental meetings, we saw it was the British side that brought up the bombings. Did the Irish side ever raise the issue of the bombs at those meetings?
It appears from Mr. Justice Barron's report that the Garda did not avail of the opportunities to pursue the investigation. Did that relate in any way to your function in a proactive fashion as Minister for Justice? How would you deal with the fact that, so far, no record has been presented to us of any raising of the issue at any high-level intergovernmental meeting? The Garda investigation does not seem to have been pursued with the enthusiasm that Mr. Justice Barron would have expected of it. What is your view on that? Was the issue addressed adequately?
Mr. Cooney, we are not here to investigate; we are here to see whether the issues were addressed. Perhaps you could answer that question on a general policy basis. I ask members of the committee to take into account that we are not here to rehearse the Barron report or to reinvestigate the issues. We are here to see whether they have been addressed on a general basis.
Mr. Cooney
As a matter of policy, if there was a need to raise anything with the British Government to support the Garda investigation it would have been raised. It would not have been for the Government to decide whether that need arose; it would have been an operational matter for the Garda to bring to our attention. No request was made at any stage by the Garda for political intervention with the other side that might have assisted in their investigations. It is possible that the bombings were raised when I was discussing general security with Merlyn Rees at Baldonnel; I do not have a record. We had a long day's discussion, and I have no doubt that we touched on a lot of security issues of mutual interest. It is quite possible that I raised it there. That is the only meeting that I recall having had with an opposite number.
Let me emphasise this: there was no request by the police for political intervention or political assistance vis-à-vis the other jurisdiction. Had there been such a request it would have been followed up. However, the Garda did not feel any need for such a request because it was getting full co-operation. It was happy with the level and depth of co-operation it was getting from all ranks.
Mr. Justice Barron makes the charge that the Government showed little interest or concern. I sought to demonstrate in my opening submission that these charges are based on a misunderstanding by Mr. Justice Barron of the role of the Government and Departments vis-à-vis the operational activities of the Garda. It is quite clear from a number of instances that I gave out, and I will not repeat them, that this is what the judge thought - that the Department should have been in sitting on the Garda’s shoulders, second guessing its investigations and telling it what to do, the Department being the Government, and that the Government and the Department should have been doing this. I cannot emphasise strongly enough that would have been highly improper, anti-democratic and contrary to the good principles of democratic government.
That did not happen but let me assure the Deputy that the Garda was aware from its contacts with my office, the Department of Justice, that we wanted the highest level of activity and we were very keen to ensure the highest level of success in the investigation of crime. That was the message that was constantly coming as a result of Government policy, a vigorous Government policy to confront crime at all levels. There was no question of looking the other way, no question of dodging any issues. I know, and I have said this in my submission, that that policy enunciated by us when we came into office was appreciated by the Garda because up to then it was not quite sure if it had a total, unequivocal mandate in relation to terrorist activities and it appreciated getting an unequivocal mandate to confront crime in a total fashion.
I call Deputy Hoctor.
I have one last question.
It must be brief and specific.
It will be specific. The conclusion of Mr. Justice Barron to which we have not referred so far, conclusion 6, states: "The Inquiry has examined allegations that the Garda investigation was wound down as a result of political interference." He comes to the firm conclusion that, "No evidence was found to support that proposition." That would support what you have said. We had other information presented to us yesterday. In the documentation, it was presented that the fact that the Irish Army was aware——
Mr. Cooney
The Army.
The Army was aware on 26 May, from intelligence it had received from its British counterparts, that people had been detained and, presumably, interned. Following on that, the intergovernmental meetings of June and September confirmed this. Prime Minister Wilson stated that those responsible for the Dublin bombings had been detained. That was confirmed. It was presented to us that it was a normal state of affairs and not necessary for the Taoiseach, the Minister for Foreign Affairs or anybody else to pass on that information that was given——
Please ask a question. We are getting on.
This question is important. It was not necessary to pass it on to the Department of Justice because the normal procedure was that the Army would do it and that the Garda would deal with the matter.
Who presented this evidence or information to us?
Dr. FitzGerald said, and it is in his presentation, that it was not necessary for the information that was received at governmental level to be communicated to the Garda because this information would have come through the normal sources and the Army would have given it to the Garda in the first instance. There seems to be no doubt about it but that at every level——
Deputy, could we have a question, please?
There seems to be no doubt that at every level there was information on the perpetrators, yet I put it to you that in your reply to Dáil questions in May 1975 you did not seem to be aware of this information. I do not know if you have seen those Dáil questions but I can read the context to you if you wish.
We are not going into an investigation of the matter. We will move on to the next questioner on this issue.
Was there a presumption that the information on the matter was supplied to everybody if it was not supplied to the Minister for Justice?
Mr. Cooney
I was aware, practically from day one, who the suspects were - whether the suspects are imputed as suspects is irrelevant. We knew who the likely people were from information given by the RUC but there was no evidence on which to charge them and that remained, and remains to this day, unfortunately, the position. I was aware of who those people were.
Mr. Cooney, thank you for being with us today. My first question relates to the people you mentioned, the senior officials in your department, Mr. Ward and Mr. Caldwell, who worked closely with you.
We are trying not to bring any names into the proceedings. We should stick to general issues rather than specific matters on evidence or investigation.
My first question will require either a yes or no answer from Mr. Cooney. I am sure that there were minutes and records taken of all the meetings between you and the seniors in the Garda force at the time with the officials I mentioned. Would that be true?
Mr. Cooney
I would have rarely met Garda officers. Those meeting would take place between the officials and the Garda. I would have met the officials.
Would it have been normal practice within the Department to have records taken of those discussions?
Mr. Cooney
I would not think so. There would be ongoing discussions on a very regular basis. They would be quite informal. There might be a minute made afterwards by the official of the Department of Justice and, possibly, a minute made on the Garda side but I doubt if there was any detailed record of those meeting. There were too many and too routine to have a formal recording arrangement. I would say a minute would have been kept of anything that needed to be minuted but I could not say at this stage.
You state in your submission that the Garda would have confirmed with you that full co-operation had been forthcoming. As time passed you say not enough evidence was forthcoming and eventually the investigation came to an end but that this was a decision taken obviously by the Garda rather than the Department of Justice. Could more not have been done by the Department of Justice in view of the consciousness that families were grieving and people were injured psychologically and physically.
Mr. Cooney
I do not know what the Deputy means by "more done" by the Department of Justice. Of course, we shared the great sense of disappointment that it had not been possible to procure evidence on which to move to a conviction. Evidence can only come in a number of ways. The defendant can be caught inflagrante; they can be witnessed by credible witnesses; there can be compelling forensic evidence; there can be compelling circumstantial evidence; and there can be admissions. No evidence under any of those heading was available to the Garda, or with the best will in the world could have been made available to the Garda, and they were not able to get it. Unfortunately, it is as simple as that. The files are there still and no crime file is ever closed - the Statute of Limitations does not run against a crime. The crime files are there, and if something arose even at this stage that would enable the Garda to procure evidence that would stand up in court, then the file would be reactivated immediately.
Many crime files run into a dead end. The cupboards of police forces all over the world are filled with records of unsolved crimes, and crimes as atrocious and as high profile as this one. It can happen. The circumstances in this case were that there was no evidence available to the Garda on which to bring a prosecution in spite of their best efforts. As Mr. Justice Barron's report mentions, in the early days hundreds of people were most vigorously interviewed and they had a quick and early picture of who was responsible but it is one thing having a belief about who was responsible, it is a totally different thing having evidence on which to convict them. That is not an uncommon predicament for a police force of any state. It is a matter of great regret to the Government, to me personally, and to all of us, that that was the position in regard to this crime but there was nothing the Government could have done to have supplied any of those wants of evidence in any of those areas.
To confirm my question, is there anything that you could have done as Minister for Justice when the Garda could no longer be seen as fulfilling their role given the limited evidence available to them?
Mr. Cooney
I do not know. That is the same question, Deputy. Once the Garda investigation, if you like, came to an end for want of evidence——
We must remain within our terms of reference. It is not something at which we have been asked by the Dáil to look.
My third question relates to our discussion with Dr. Garret FitzGerald yesterday when he made specific reference to Mr. Seán Donlon who was appointed at the time to be in charge of Anglo-Irish relations. Dr. FitzGerald, as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the day, sought the assistance of Mr. Cooney's Department to have Mr. Donlon briefed. Can Mr. Cooney explain why that co-operation was not forthcoming?
Deputy, could you refer to a "senior official"? Please do not use specific names.
All right. Correspondence went from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the day to Mr. Cooney's Department seeking assistance for a senior official who was working in the Anglo-Irish relations area. Dr. FitzGerald said the proposal was successfully opposed by the Department of Justice. Can Mr. Cooney explain why what I take to be a reasonable proposal was apparently rejected by his Department?
Mr. Cooney
This is a question of how the Department of Justice would handle information given to it and obtained in confidence by the Garda. Some of this information would be extremely sensitive and the very fact of having it could, if it was unwittingly revealed to some other party who would have knowledge of the thing, indicate to that third party the source of that information. Intelligence sources had to be protected. This is a prime and fundamental responsibility of the Garda and that had to be honoured by the Department of Justice. It had to be extremely strict in honouring it because if there was any deviation by the Department in honouring it, then one could not be sure the Garda would be totally confidential with one if it thought information or sources would be compromised. One can hardly blame the Garda for that.
The other side of that is that the Department had to be totally circumspect, most careful and conservative in how it shared that information. It was not possible to share that information in its fullest and at all times with the Department of Foreign Affairs. I readily agree this may have left the Department of Foreign Affairs possibly wrong-footed by not having that information in discussions with its counterparts in the Northern Ireland Office, and that is something we regretted. Unfortunately, it was a price that had to be paid to preserve the confidentiality of the information and to protect Garda sources. If, for example, that information was in the hands of an officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs who could not be apprised of its provenance and he revealed it in the course of discussions and there might have been members of the other police force on the other side present, it might give them a clue as to what was the source. I will not speculate what sources the Garda had as those sources are, and will always remain, private but they had to be protected. It was on that basis that the Department of Justice would not be fully forthcoming in the way the Department of Foreign Affairs would have liked from time to time - no more than that. That was a stance which I think was approved by the Government.
I call Deputy Finian McGrath.
I thank Mr. Cooney for attending but I am very disappointed by his harsh tone and dismissive attitude to the Barron report because——
Hold on——
With respect, Chairman, I had to sit here and listen to Mr. Cooney rubbish the Barron report.
I have to protect all the people, in particular, the witnesses those who are invited here. I would not expect any member of the sub-committee to in any way say anything so derogatory to an invitee. I ask you to desist.
We had to sit here and listen to remarks made about the Barron report.
I ask you to withdraw those remarks. We have been instructed by the Dáil to do certain things——
I accept that.
——and that does not include disparaging witnesses or to in any way——
There is no question of disparaging witnesses.
You can take on board what Mr. Cooney said in the deliberations within the sub-committee——
Which I am doing.
——in private but not in public.
Which I am doing.
I ask you to withdraw those remarks.
To withdraw which remarks?
Any that may have been disparaging towards Mr. Cooney.
If it is accepted that I was disparaging towards Mr. Cooney, then I will withdraw the remarks.
Thank you.
However, I will also make the point that the integrity of Mr Justice Barron has to be defended as well, and that is what I am trying to do in my argument.
The integrity of Mr Justice Barron is not being questioned under any circumstances. If it had, I would have drawn the sub-committee's attention to it and would have asked for that to be withdrawn also.
Okay. I accept your ruling, Chairman. Mr. Cooney has set out his stall.
Mr. Cooney is here at the invitation of the committee to discuss module 2, to address the issues that are raised in the report; to see whether it addresses all of the issues, and that only.
Absolutely. I accept that position. That is the direction that I was taking. However, I felt that I had to put those comments on record.
On the question of Government policies in 1974 - it is in order to raise this - the sub-committee earlier heard a submission from a victim whose husband is a retired American policeman. He seemed to be appalled at the lack of professionalism in dealing with the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in 1974. As an ex-Minister for Justice, what does Mr. Cooney have to say to that criticism from the husband of a victim of the Dublin bombings?
Mr. Cooney was not present, and did not hear what Mr Durkan said. Mr. Cooney, there was a submission this morning from the lawyer of a victim whose husband is a retired policeman and who criticised the Garda investigation. I do not see how that is an issue that should be addressed by Mr. Cooney.
I would like to hear his response to such criticism of the then Government's policies. It is a general, broad question.
With regard to the Barron report, could you rephrase the question in such a way that it is not personalised and addresses an issue within the report?
How does Mr. Cooney respond to criticisms of the then Government with regard to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings from victims and the public?
Which criticism?
The criticism that the Government of the day failed to show the concern that was expected of it.
Is that in respect of the Garda investigation, or the documentation?
It is in respect of Mr. Cooney's position as Minister for Justice?
To what issue in the Barron report do you refer?
In Mr. Cooney's submission, he says that inferences and conclusions drawn from unidentified witnesses and from hearsay are not worth the paper they are written on. They are his words. I would like him to respond to that in more detail, if that is within his remit.
To expand on that?
Yes, to expand on it and respond to it.
Mr. Cooney
In regard to that particular quotation, my recollection is that it had to deal with the question of Government interference to bring the Garda investigation to an end. It was in that context that I wrote that. Which letter was that?
It is section 1 of the submission: "Statement of Patrick Cooney, former Minister for Justice". Where in the page is it, Deputy McGrath?
It is at the very bottom of the last page; the last paragraph.
Which line?
The fifth line from the bottom, containing the words "Inferences and conclusions".
Mr. Cooney
I think that is a proper statement of procedures that we would have been expected to have met.
On the missing files, you mentioned in your oral submission that these kinds of situations happen and that it was not a serious impediment. You then mentioned the whole question of conspiracy theories. If I was to tell you that, say, in 1974 the British security forces and loyalist death squads were colluding in killing innocent people, killing lawyers, would you have believed that conspiracy theory?
From where do you get that? What does that have to do with the issues in the Barron report? It is totally irrelevant.
Mr. Cooney said the fact that files were missing in the Garda office was not an issue and should not be an impediment.
I did not hear that. Mr. Cooney, did you say that the fact that Garda files were missing was not an issue?
Mr. Cooney
No.
No, I did not hear that.
Sorry, the Justice files.
Mr. Cooney stated the Justice files did not go missing on his watch and that they were available later.
I know but I am asking about a broader policy view. Would he have believed conspiracy theories in 1974? I think it is relevant to the debate because he was very dismissive of other issues.
Okay. What is your opinion on conspiracy theories, Mr. Cooney?
Mr. Cooney
I would be highly suspicious of conspiracy theories.
I take it, therefore, that you do not respect and take on board the evidence of collusion over the past 20 years which now seems to be coming out.
That question which addresses the issues is a personal one which I cannot allow. Does the Deputy have another question?
Mr. Cooney seems to be getting a free run at the committee whereas those of us who ask questions are regularly stopped. I find this unacceptable behaviour.
No, Mr. Cooney is here as an invitee and he is addressing module 2 where we have to see whether the report of Mr. Justice Barron addresses all of the issues covered in the terms of reference of the inquiry. He is doing that. I think that——
I am asking him questions about his submission.
——the Deputy will agree that Mr. Cooney is co-operating in every possible way, apart from personal questions.
I have never disputed that. I am just asking questions. Can I ask questions about a comment he made a few minutes ago about evidence? He talked about evidence. Can I ask that question?
Is it an issue to be addressed?
Deputy Hoctor raised an issue. Can I respond to what Mr. Cooney stated and ask him a question about his oral submission? Otherwise, what is going on here?
Yes but do it in a way that is not going to get me into difficulty.
I am not trying to get you into difficulty, Chairman. I am trying to get a straight answer from Mr. Cooney. That is what I am trying to do.
Go ahead.
Mr. Cooney spoke earlier, in his oral submission, about the question that if there was evidence——
Mr. Cooney
Chairman, I resent the implication that I am not giving straight answers. The Deputy says he wants a straight answer. I am not here to give anything but straight answers.
My apologies for not picking that one up. I will have to ask the Deputy to withdraw the imputation against the integrity of Mr. Cooney that he would not give a straight answer. Please withdraw the comment that he is not giving a straight answer.
It seems that every time I ask a question I am interrupted and I am just waiting to ask the question.
Please withdraw the imputation against his character or integrity in saying that he is not giving a straight answer.
I withdraw it in the interests of the proceedings today.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Cooney
That is gracious of him.
I would be obliged if the Deputy tried to stick to the issues.
I am trying to stay within the oral submissions that he made this morning and his written submission.
No, within the matter of whether the report addresses the issues in the terms of reference of the inquiry.
On the broader or policy issue, Mr. Cooney seemed to say that if he was Minister and there was evidence, there would be an immediate response to it. We have received a submission from a person who was standing in Parnell Street on Friday, 17 May 1974. Let me give a short quote:
I remember the gardaí clearly saying, "That's first class," and then they left. I was never questioned by the gardaí again since that date and also I was never asked to co-operate with a photofit of the suspect. I believe I am probably the only person to see the bomber and more particularly speak with them, albeit he did not reply to me audibly.
Surely that is serious evidence that any Government or any person concerned should have taken on board at the time.
I am very sorry, Deputy, but the operation of the Garda is outside the remit of Mr. Cooney and not within the terms of reference, or within the——
I have a question on the policy view for Mr. Cooney.
On the policy view of what issue?
Of the Government of the time. He was talking earlier on ——
He was referring to the policy view that the Government does not interfere in the operations of the Garda, and to do so would be wrong - "undemocratic" was one of the words used. I do not know what other word could be used.
Could Mr. Cooney respond, because earlier he referred to evidence in his oral submission? That is why I asked the question.
Mr. Cooney
It is a matter for the Garda to assess the value of witnesses and what they saw or did not see. It is an operational matter for the police as to whether an unnamed witness saw was going to be of evidential value in procuring a conviction subsequently. That is an operational matter; I cannot comment on it.
Do you think a senior politician such as Prime Minister Blair or President Bush would say it was an "operational matter" if bombs went off in London or New York tomorrow morning?
We are not here to question Mr. Cooney about how he feels about President Bush or Prime Minister Blair.
It is a fair question to ask a former Minister for Justice. I do not think it is irrelevant.
It is outside the terms of reference of the committee.
Mr. Cooney
I am not privy to their minds, Deputy. Chairman, may I make a point here. I was a Member of the Oireachtas for almost 20 years and in that time I developed a political ear. When I hear a political resonance, it resonates with me. I am grateful and happy that you will ensure that the proceedings will be impartial.
Deputy McGrath is a member of the sub-committee and he is very dedicated. If he has any further questions——
I am trying to get at the truth.
Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh. Can I join in the welcome to Mr. Cooney and thank him for his written submission and also for his detailed oral submission here.
Chairman, I think you have dissected, from your perspective of the Barron report, the areas that are connected to the Government. If we accept that, it raises questions about this module when we come to drawing conclusions. I want to test that, and in testing it, I will not express any opinions but simply ask questions.
Mr. Cooney stated that the role of the Cabinet security sub-committee was to record information and give him political advice. Who were the office-holders of the committee?
Mr. Cooney
From recollection: I was a member, as was Dr Cruise O'Brien, Minister for Posts and Telegraphs; Mr Paddy Donegan, Minister for Defence.
If you could stick to titles, Mr. Cooney.
Mr. Cooney
I beg your pardon. Despite the unlikely title, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs was responsible for the communications of the Government, so he wanted to be au fait with that sort of thing. The Minister for Defence was a member as was the Minister for Local Government, Deputy Tully. I am not sure if the Tánaiste, Deputy Corish, was a member - probably not, no.
Dr. FitzGerald told us yesterday that he would have attended one or two meetings, even though he was not a member. This was a very difficult period, given the Dublin bombings in 1972 and 1974 and the ongoing paramilitary threat on both sides of the Border. Given the name of the sub-committee, did it have a remit with regard to the security of the State to ensure that all the security organs were co-ordinated and that they were effective in dealing with the risks to society?
Mr. Cooney
It had a general remit in the security area. It would be quite proper for any member of it to raise any concerns in regard to general security policy or in regard to any particular security issue from time to time. As I mentioned in my opening, there are difficulties in recalling after so long a lapse of time, but as I recall, the main function was to receive information from me and to advise me if I needed any advice in regard to the matters confronting me. That could have possibly involved the suggestion of an expansion of activity in this or that area. It would also be a useful lobby for me when going to the Minister for Finance to look for the funds for an extra 500 gardaí. The support of the Cabinet sub-committee on security would be useful for me. It also then obviated the need to call the entire Government into session to receive information. It was an informal gathering. I do not know what records were kept as I was not involved in that. I doubt if many, if any, records of its proceedings were kept because it was informal and did not make decisions.
Would it be provide evidence of Government concern generally about ensuring that the State was equipped and resourced to deal with any security challenges that arose? Would that be fair to say?
Mr. Cooney
Yes, it was an extra resource to assist me in that regard and in that way.
Questions were asked earlier with regard to suspicions about collusion. It would be fair to say that the 1972 bombings took place at a very critical stage politically, as Mr. Cooney probably recollects. There was a lot of speculation at that time, and subsequently, in the media and among the public generally, that the loyalists were very unlikely to have had the resources to carry out those bombings effectively, and the whole collusion issue was strongly in the public domain at that stage. Would Mr. Cooney accept that?
At what stage?
From 1972 onwards.
Mr. Cooney
Yes, it was in the public domain because there was, and still is, speculation about who carried out those bombings. I do not think that speculation will ever be removed. Speculation ranged from official British forces to loyalist and British forces acting in collusion to loyalists operating by themselves and to the IRA. It went over the whole gamut of likely suspects.
I think Mr. Cooney will agree that it is very difficult to get evidence on the collusion issue because of the subversive nature of it, but it must have figured, I would assume, in the concerns of the Cabinet sub-committee and of Government generally at the time as being a risk to the safety of this society. Would that be fair to say?
Mr. Cooney
It would have been a matter of concern because the possibility of it would probably have surfaced in Garda reports from time to time, when the Garda might have been indicating the value of information is was getting. It might lead it to having to make an assessment as to whether the information was being fed in by some collusive source. It would have been in the background as something to be aware of but I cannot remember it surfacing as something we needed to be afraid of because there were enough terrorists capable of doing enough harm without needing much collusion.
So there would not have been a risk assessment or anything done specifically on that issue?
Mr. Cooney
By its very nature, one could not make a realistic risk assessment of it.
In his report, Mr. Justice Barron has been critical of the Garda investigation. He proffers some reasons as to why the investigation did not advance. I shall put some of the reasons to Mr. Cooney, who is probably aware of them. First, there was the question of reciprocity, which would arisen if members of the Garda Síochána travelled to the North to interview suspects. That would have meant giving the RUC the same latitude in the South. The view was that this was against policy.
Second, in one of the conclusions, on page 275, Mr. Justice Barron states that the fact that the suspects were outside the jurisdiction would have brought the Garda to a view that it was very unlikely to bring the investigation to a successful conclusion. That may consequently have inhibited the whole investigative process.
Third, in one of the submissions which Mr. Cooney may or may not have read, there was a reference to fear within the Garda - I do not know how extensive - that too much involvement by it in the process, particularly in travelling to the North, would put gardaí at very substantial risk. Were you aware at the time of that attitude and those difficulties within the Garda? Would this have come through in any of the reports that you received?
Mr. Cooney
I have no recollection of a formal request being made to go North to sit in on questioning. I have no recollection of such a request. I feel, even with the lapse of 30 years, that would have been a fairly significant feature on the political landscape of the time. I feel I would have remembered it. How we would have dealt with it would have been determined by how serious the Garda considered the request and how fruitful they thought it might be.
I suspect that the Garda did not think the invitation to go North was that serious and they did not think that it was going to be that fruitful. The people they would have been going up to interview were hardened loyalist terrorists and the only point of the interview would have been to get an admission. I think their professional assessment - this is my judgement and speculation; having spent some time in that scene I would venture it as reasonable speculation - of hard-nosed detectives like John Joy or Tony McMahon would have been, "Look, we are wasting our time going up to talk to a fellow who is going to look at the wall, say nothing and fold his arms." Counter-interrogation was practised by loyalist terrorists as well as by republican terrorists. I imagine that their assessment would have been that there was little to be gained by going up to talk to those people. They would probably have heard informally from their colleagues on the other side. They would have been chit-chatting across the Border on the phone: "What is he like? Is he like a fellow who would crack?" or "Look, you are wasting your time with this fellow, he is hard-nosed." That sort of information would have been exchanged and would have informed their decision whether to go up or not.
I do not ever remember a formal request to go up. Now, if it had come, we would have considered it with circumspection because we did have to consider the country point of view that it could put pressure on us to afford similar reciprocation to officers coming South. That was a vexed question, as I explained. There would have been logistical reasons in terms of protecting them down here; policy reasons and legal reasons in terms of what effect it would have on the person whom they were questioning and his rights down here. At the time, I remember, it would have been a fraught issue because we were debating the extra-territorial jurisdiction Act. It was being heavily opposed by the Opposition at the time. One of the stories was, "This is going to lead to RUC men patrolling the streets of Tralee." I remember the phrase.
RUC men coming down could have been very politically sensitive; refusing to allow them to come down could have been equally politically sensitive vis-à-vis relations with the North. One would probably have indicated that one would have preferred it not to happen, unless there was a compelling reason. Again, I have no recollection of compelling reasons given to me to allow or disallow people to go North or people to come South. It is my personal belief that the Garda decided that it would have been a fruitless journey.
Of course, there is a further practical point - an ironic one, in a way. Suppose by some miracle, following a visit North by a senior detective from here, he got an admission of guilt from one of those hard-nosed loyalist terrorists, we would then have had to try to extradite him. At that stage we were refusing extradition on the grounds that similar offences were politically based down here and people could not be extradited. We could find ourselves at the opposite end of that coin in the unlikely event of an admission being made. It did not arise.
There would have been no physical fear on the part of the police. That would not have inhibited them from going North. I think there is no doubt about that.
Can I have this matter clarified because I have noted that you said you had received no such request.
Mr. Cooney
Not that I can recollect.
My question concerned whether you aware at the time of issues within the Garda which might inhibit the progress of the investigation.
Mr. Cooney
I was not aware of any of those, as presented to me, being likely to inhibit the investigation - absolutely not. I am quite certain they were not presented to me in those terms. That is something one would not forget.
With regard to gardaí not travelling to the North, and I heard what you said in that regard, did the Government accept that position? There would appear to have been a duty of care on the Government to exhaust the investigations. Was it satisfactory to assume that the suspects the Garda was to investigate were not going to give any information - I think you mention that was the advice of the RUC?
Mr. Cooney
Mr. Justice Barron did not. He was speculating that it was unsatisfactory in the absence of any evidence from the gardaí concerned, from the two officers who decided it. I do not know whether it was satisfactory or not. It would be a matter of professional judgement by the gardaí and I would have to rely on that professional judgement. The two gardaí concerned were experienced, dedicated officers, Chief Superintendent Joy and Chief Superintendent McMahon, head of ordinary crime and head of subversive crime respectively. They would have been in the best position to make an assessment whether it was worthwhile for them to travel to the North or not. If they knew they were to embark on a fruitless journey, I think they would have been wrong to have wasted valuable officers' time in sending them to that environment on a wild goose chase. Nobody can know in the absence of evidence from these two men.
I want to pursue this because it is fundamental to some who look to what the Barron report has to say as opposed to what you are saying, Mr. Cooney. I think you have accepted some of the earlier proposition that, at the time, there would have been speculation but no evidence with regard to collusion. It is something which would, obviously, have been in the back of your mind if not foremost. In that regard, you were asking agencies in the North, of which there were suspicions of collusion - I will not put it any stronger than "suspicions" - to carry out the investigation as the agent of the Garda on the issue, without the Garda being in attendance. Would you accept that this does not appear to be the best approach?
Mr. Cooney
Underlying the Senator's question and his reference to collusion is the implication that the collusion was widespread.
We do not know that.
Mr. Cooney
No, we do not know and we do not know the opposite either, but the impression I got from the Garda from time to time was that there were mavericks; there would be the odd maverick officer in the RUC or the UDR but, by and large, they were loyal, dedicated officers. Their contacts were sufficiently close and of sufficiently long standing for them to know the men on the other side. They also had sufficiently close contacts on the other side so that those contacts would give them the tip: "Be careful of X, Y or Z." It would not have been a factor to endanger or discourage the investigation.
To clarify a point which I may have misinterpreted, is it correct that you said that if there were evidence, we were unlikely to extradite people from the North?
Mr. Cooney
No, we would have sought the extradition but we would have been unlikely to have succeeded because of what was happening down here, where we were refusing to extradite on similar grounds.
On the issue of evidence, one point from the report comes to mind. While I appreciate that there was no concrete evidence to pursue some of the suspects, in regard to the owner of one of the cars - who was allegedly detained in his house by subversives for a period of the day about which an insurance person gave quite contrary evidence - the evidence, as I think Mr. Justice Barron concludes, was sufficient to warrant an interrogation of that person, which never happened.
Mr. Cooney
I cannot comment on that.
That deals very much with the investigation and Mr. Justice Barron's inquiry, with which we are precluded from dealing. Again, we cannot judge what Mr. Justice Barron did.
Mr. Cooney's proposition, as I interpret it, is that the Government of the day was satisfied with the quality of the Garda investigation. Am I fair in saying that? That is how I interpret it. Anyway, I am happy to let that issue rest.
Mr. Cooney, the top of page 2 of your written submission perhaps has relevance perhaps to the comments of the British Prime Minister. You state: "It is equally certain that this information was conveyed to the Department of Justice; the Department were notified." It is the third sentence, fourth line down, in the second paragraph on page 2 of your submission. On page 3, first paragraph, third last line, you state: "I was fully satisfied that I and the Department were kept fully informed at all times by the gardaí of all relevant facts and information." Towards the bottom of that page, last paragraph, third line down, in reference to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, you state: "Consultation would be frequent - daily or more often as the Department would be anxious to be kept updated as soon as possible." Why did the Department want to be kept updated?
Mr. Cooney
To keep me informed.
For information purposes only?
Mr. Cooney
Yes, it was very important that the Minister of the day be au fait as quickly as possible with everything that was happening in the investigation.
For what purpose?
Mr. Cooney
It is an end in itself that the Minister for Justice on behalf of the Government would be kept up to date as quickly as possible on the progress of the investigation into the worst atrocity committed in the State. It is a desirable end in itself.
The responsibility of the Minister for Justice of the day or of the Government of the day would also have been to ensure that progress was being made on the investigation. Mr. Justice Barron in his report states that it was more or less wound down in the latter part of 1974. Was there any assessment by the Government at that stage of the reasons for the stall and whether it could do anything to assist a more proactive approach to try to bring the perpetrators to justice?
Mr. Cooney
If I may answer the first question. As I recollect, it was not our position to interfere; but it was our right to be informed. That information did not necessarily mean that we then had to become proactive and interfere. If the information showed that there was an area in which the Government could help in its role as Government, action would have been taken. However, if that information merely showed that no progress was being made in the investigation of a crime, we were not competent or entitled to say to the Garda, "Try this course or try that course." That was not our role; operational investigation of crime was for the police.
What if there is a deficiency in how the gardaí are functioning? In a major investigation of this nature - as we said yesterday, it paralleled the Twin Towers atrocity in the United States as a percentage of our population compared with the percentage of the US population - would there not have been some reason to look at it a little differently than you might other issues?
Yesterday, in reply to a similar question, Dr. FitzGerald said that perhaps the Government should have taken a different view - I am summarising what he said. The whole tenor of your submission is that Government cannot have any part in interfering with the operation of the Garda in a democracy. Do you see that as absolute or do you think the Government could take an initiative, rather than waiting on a request, particularly in a situation where you were so well briefed by the Garda as to know that no progress was being made and it was being stalled?
Mr. Cooney
That is an absolute position. It is a fundamental tenet of democracy but that is not to say a Government stands idly by if the country is falling into rack and ruin through ordinary crime or subversion. If it is patently clear that the response is inadequate, the Government has to address that vis-à-vis the Commissioner, who has to report on how he is going to rectify that situation. We had not reached that situation in regard to this particular crime. All the indications were that it had been investigated thoroughly and professionally. As I said earlier, the two senior detectives in the State were in charge of it. A cohort of 40 officers, scarce personnel at the time, were dedicated to investigating this crime and it just ran into the sand because there was no evidence.
It was not a question of the Government seeing the Garda and the Garda not functioning. The Garda was functioning but there was nothing the Government could do by way of support that was not already being done or——
Did you express concern to the Commissioner at any stage in any meetings you might have had with him, say, towards the end of 1974 or some time in 1975? Did you say, "Look I am concerned that this is not progressing into anything——
The Senator's question is out of order. It is too individualistic.
I, too, welcome Mr. Cooney in joining us today. I thank him for coming and his presentation. To pursue the matter of the Garda crossing the Border to sit in on interrogations of people who were being questioned by the RUC in the North, you mentioned that you were not aware of any policy being made by the Government on whether the Garda should or should not do so and the matter was not put to you. In your further time in the Dáil - you were a member of a subsequent Government - was there any further discussion on that policy that the Garda should or should not do so because it appears that around 1979 the Garda got an opportunity to sit in on interrogations and it did not do so. Even as late as the late 1980s and early 1990s, it got the same opportunities and did not do so. Were you aware of any further discussion on that at any subsequent time in your tenure in the Dáil or as a member of a subsequent Cabinet?
From where does this information come?
We got it from Mr. Ó Dúlacháin yesterday.
Fine.
Mr. Cooney
I cannot say I was aware of this issue being a serious policy issue coming into isolation for Government memoranda and counter memoranda and a formal decision being taken. It would have been an operational matter with policy implications and there would have been a general approach to it, a general attitude that it was something one would be circumspect about but it was neither ruled in as a matter of course, nor ruled out as a matter of course. That would have been the general approach to it.
Moving on to your support for the Garda, you talked a lot about your confidence in the Garda in conducting its work and doing its business and said you responded to requests from it. Did you provide extra gardaí at that time, at any stage? Did you beef up the force in terms of resources to deal with the very difficult situation that pertained at the time?
Mr. Cooney
Certainly, there was pressure from the Garda all the time for enhanced radio equipment. I know that was being modernised and extended all the time. There was also the pressure of numbers. There were huge demands on the Garda numerically because of the involvement in patrolling along the Border. Our Army patrols could not go out without a garda accompanying them because the Army did not have police powers. They could only come out in public in aid of the civil power - that was a technical term - and that required a Garda presence. Across the Border the British Army - because admittedly the RUC did not run in many areas - the British Army had police powers and that is why it patrolled without any members of the RUC. There had to be Garda presence on our side of the Border. There were so many patrols going on at that time, from Buncrana to Warrenpoint, which made huge demands on Garda manpower, that I was under constant pressure to increase Garda numbers. In about 1974 there was the first major increase in the force, by about 500, which was probably unprecedented.
The lawyer for Joan Ann Hourigan, who was involved in two bombings, said that she received compensation of £3,000 at that time, which was grossly inadequate to meet even her medical expenses. Another witness told us that they received £50. Are you aware, or can you remember, if there was a fund established to help victims at that time, or were you involved in any way in providing finance to them?
Mr. Cooney
There was a scheme of compensation established for criminal injuries to the person. I had always thought it anomalous that the law provided for compensation for criminal injury to one's property but none for criminal injury to one's person. I sought to cure that anomaly as Minister for Justice and I got the Government's agreement to bring in a scheme for compensation for injuries criminally inflicted. It was an informal scheme. Its two main features were that it had power to award damages to those people at the same level as damages were being awarded in the civil courts. The civil courts in those days had been awarded in the High Court by juries and in the other courts by judges. That was the level of damages awarded by that scheme.
It was an informal scheme administered by panels of practising lawyers, barristers and solicitors who were practising in that area of law and who would have been thoroughly au fait with the general run or measure of damages awarded in the courts. They had freedom to award the same level of damages to the people coming in - victims of bombings of any terrorists or any criminal assault for that matter - as they would have got if their injury had been justiciable in the civil courts. I cannot comment on the level of damages paid in any particular case. That would have been decided independently by those experienced and independent assessors.
Mr. Cooney, at the start of your presentation today you said that Mr. Justice Barron was faced with an impossible situation in his inquiry. Then you went on to talk about the difficulties you had with it and so on. Would I be right in saying that arising from that you might say that there should be a further inquiry, because obviously you are unhappy with what has happened and you felt that the task was too difficult for Mr. Justice Barron. Do you think there should there be a public inquiry?
We are here to discuss the module.
Perhaps Mr. Cooney would like to respond.
If Mr. Cooney wishes to come back at module 5, and if he wishes to make a submission on that, he is more than welcome. However, we are not discussing that now.
Mr. Cooney
I did say that I had to conclude my submission and you said at the end that I could do.
Perhaps Mr. Cooney you would like to sum up now. You said earlier that you would like to make it.
I wanted a clarification on a very small point which I did not understand. In response to a question from Senator Walsh , and I think I am quoting your words accurately, you said that even if we sent up one of our hard-nosed garda from Dublin and we cracked one of those hard-nosed loyalists, we would have had issues in regard to extradition because of the situation down here. If, for example, the RUC had presented new forensic evidence at the time which linked a particular person, or persons, to the atrocity, would there have been issues in relation to applying for the extradition of that person at that stage?
Mr. Cooney
If this was evidence of weight and the Attorney General decided it constituted prima facie evidence, certainly in that case, there is no doubt about it that extradition would have been sought. I raised the necessity to seek extradition as a problem we would have to face if and when we reached the stage where evidence was forthcoming that would lead to an arrest in the other jurisdiction.
There was nothing in our jurisdiction, or in our legal framework at the time, in relation to extradition which would have caused issues in that regard. You would have just made the decision or the Attorney General, in your opinion, would have made the decision to apply for extradition.
Mr. Cooney
Yes, it would have been applied for in the normal way. Whether the application would have succeeded is another day's work. The point I was making was that there could have been a question mark about its possible success because of the practice down here.
There is a question mark as to the success of that application because of what was happening here.
Mr. Cooney
There would have had to be a question mark as to the likely success of our application to extradite from the North when we down here were——
Would it have been a factor with the extraditing authority, that is, the Northern Ireland authority? Why would that have been a factor?
Mr. Cooney
It would not have been a factor with them; it would have been a factor with the court before which the extradition case would have been taken because, inevitably, the person sought to be extradited would have raised the same defence up there that terrorists were raising down here, that is was political and extradition did not lie. We never got as far as testing whether that would have happened or not because we never had enough evidence to seek extradition. Of course, the vexed question was cured by providing for extra-territorial jurisdiction. We cured that subsequently.
On the number of exchanges between members and Mr. Cooney, the sub-committee is constrained in all its activities by its terms of reference. Accordingly, all of its work must be directed and controlled by the parameters of those terms of reference. It can never be the function of the sub-committee to reinvestigate the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974 or, for that matter, to arrive at a different conclusion from that arrived at by Mr. Justice Barron.
I wish to restate the terms of reference of the motion of referral by Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann. On 10 December 2003 both Houses of the Oireachtas requested the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights or a sub-committee thereof to consider, in public session, the report of the inquiry and to report back to both Houses within three months concerning three items only, the first of which is whether the report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings of 1974 addresses all of the issues covered in the terms of reference of the inquiry - one of the issues at which we were looking today. The other two items are the lessons to be drawn and any actions to be taken in the light of the report, its findings and conclusions and whether, having regard to the report's findings and following consultations with the inquiry, if a further public inquiry into any aspect of the report would be required or fruitful.
As a result of what the Supreme Court said in the Abbeylara case, the sub-committee is legally restrained from entering into any adjudication on the issue of individual or personal culpability. I hope that all interested parties and bodies will understand and respect its position in that regard.
I have to say those words in order that Mr. Cooney fully understands from where are coming and what our job is. Mr. Cooney, I will give you the last word on this one.
Mr. Cooney
Thank you, Chairman. I do not want to go over what I have already said. It has been recorded, and I am sure that it has been taken into account by you and members. One outstanding factor that emerges, which I think I sought to make clear, is that there are insuperable difficulties in the way of the commission of inquiry that are impossible to overcome. These difficulties were compounded by the modus operandi employed by the inquiry. It led to it stating, for example in conclusion 6: “The Inquiry has examined allegations that the Garda investigation was wound down as a result of political interference.” Those allegations were never put to me, and the source of them was never put to me. I cannot conceive of a more serious charge. The paragraph ends: “No evidence was found to support the proposition.” That is not good enough. It is a negative absolution.
I want to say here - unequivocally, without any doubt - that there was no interference - good, bad or different - expressed or implied by the Government of the day to bring this to a conclusion; to bring this investigation to an end. I want to make that very, very clear. It is a great disappointment to me that the methodology used by the Barron report failed to confront me with that, and failed to give me an opportunity to respond as I have responded to the sub-committee.
There are other issues in the Barron report which, because of the nature of the way it conducted its business, I would have liked to have questioned many of the witnesses who appeared before it. I would like to have seen the documentation that appeared before it. It could be very relevant to my position and that of my colleagues in Government, because we the are ones who are impugned by the Barron report - unjustly, as I think I have demonstrated. The only way in which that could be done would be through a public inquiry, which would give me the opportunity to participate in public, and - more importantly - would reveal to me all the documentation, and would give me the opportunity to ask questions either personally or through counsel. However, on the other hand, I do have to say - and this is addressed in part of the terms of reference of the sub-committee - that a public inquiry would still meet the insuperable obstacle in the way of establishing finality in this matter, and that insuperable obstacle is the absence of definitive Garda evidence because the two officers who were in charge of the investigation are dead.
Chairman, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your courteous reception. I appreciate all the questions. I do not resent any of them. I am former politician, and I think I still have the remains of that neck.
Thank you very much, Mr Cooney, for coming along to the sub-committee today. It was - the new phrase - a "robust session". I appreciate all of the information you have given us. We will take it on board when deliberating on the terms of reference given to us by the Dáil. We will now adjourn until 2.30 p.m., at which time we will resume. It is a short lunch break.
It will be impossible to return in time by 2.30 p.m., Chairman.
We will then adjourn until 2.45 p.m. There are other witnesses here.
The sub-committee is suspended till 2.45 p.m.
Sitting suspended at 2.05 p.m. and resumed at 2.50 p.m.
I welcome Mr. Seán Donlon, Chancellor of the University of Limerick and former diplomat and ambassador. He is very welcome. I thank him for accepting our invitation to attend the meeting to discuss whether the report of Mr. Justice Henry Barron addresses the issues under his terms of reference. That, effectively, is what we are talking about.
Before you begin your contribution, I point out, as I have done to others, that the members of the committee have parliamentary privilege but that same privilege does not apply to you. Before making your oral presentation, perhaps you will give some background information on your qualifications, expertise and experience.
Mr. Seán Donlon
Thank you, Chairman and members of the sub-committee. I was an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs from 1963 until I resigned in 1987, when I was Secretary of the Department. For the relevant period, particularly from 1971 to 1978, I was assigned to the Northern Ireland desk. From 1974 I was the assistant secretary in charge of that desk.
In the early 1970s, in particular, my main task was the collection of information in Northern Ireland related to the behaviour of the security forces. This information formed the basis of the Strasbourg case, when Ireland sued Britain for breaches of the European Convention of Human Rights. Ireland successfully did so but with great difficulty because to get to the bottom of what the security forces had done and were doing was not easy. I give that just as background, given the nature of some of the evidence that you have heard.
There are four points that I would make, and make them as briefly as possible. I have made them in writing and I believe all of you have a copy. I apologise that it is in handwriting, but when one is retired one does not have secretarial support.
I thought that the emphasis in Mr. Justice Barron's report, particularly his references to alleged perpetrators of the bombings made at high-level meetings in September and November 1974, was misplaced. The same information had been conveyed, certainly within a matter of days. To clarify a point that has arisen this morning and, I believe, yesterday: I had a very good informal relationship with the principal officer in charge of the security section in the Department of Justice. We saw one another and spoke to one another almost every day. Our offices were on the same side of St. Stephen's Green. I believe it was mutually beneficial that that relationship worked because I would frequently need to get from him information, and similarly he would need to get information from me. But the way we did it was, for example in this case, he would have said to me, "Three or four people" - and I do not remember the number - "have been picked up in Northern Ireland on suspicion of involvement in this bombing. One or two of them are being interned." But he would not give me the names nor would I press him for those names. Nor was any of this done in writing. But he kept me fully briefed so that when I met, for example, with British officials, I had enough information to keep the ball in the air.
Similarly - I came across a note, and just to give you an example, when going through papers to prepare for this meeting - a British official had said to me, "There is a gelignite trail from Monaghan to Omagh", I would immediately go to the relevant principal officer and say to him, "The British have made this allegation." He would check it out through the Garda and I remember he came back to me on this one within a few hours and said, "No such allegation has ever been made by the RUC to the Garda." We would immediately then know that that was simply a political point the British were trying to score in the negotiation. I give that example just to give an indication of the give and take between the two departments. It was not, as Garret FitzGerald said, formalised. Nevertheless I think it was effective. That was how I was certainly not surprised when in September and November 1974 references were made by Harold Wilson to the fact that suspects were interned; that was not new information. I was confident that the Garda and the RUC were processing that shortly after the bombings.
I do not want to go into detail because I think others have done it. The political/diplomatic channels were never used in my experience to discuss individual outrages. These are investigated as crimes and as such are exclusively operational matters for police authorities. And again to check my own memory on this, I went through the records of all the high-level Anglo-Irish meetings which took place in three years - 1973, 1974 and 1975 - and can confirm that no outrage, however serious, was ever discussed in that channel. Bear in mind that in those years, 833 people were killed and there were major outrages in Northern Ireland and in Britain as well as in this jurisdiction. I think it would have been unreasonable to expect, however bad the outrage was in Dublin and Monaghan, that it would have been discussed in the diplomatic or political channel.
The third point I would make is that there were major efforts made after the Dublin and Monaghan bombings to step up security and investigative co-operation. These efforts culminated in a security meeting which Mr. Cooney referred to this morning, which took place in Baldonnel in September 1974. I attended that meeting, and while it is not appropriate to go into all the detail, it set up a number of working parties and co-ordination groups to enhance various aspects of both investigation and prevention.
Lastly, I have sympathy with Mr. Justice Barron in his efforts to deal with allegations of collusion. From August 1971 onwards I had, on the instructions of various Governments, sought to stand up those sorts of allegations. At one stage we contemplated the possibility of adding that as one of the accusations in our Strasbourg case. In the course of my work in Northern Ireland, I mainly talked to people like solicitors, barristers, politicians, community leaders, clergymen or anyone with a standing in a community who might be able to help. I would see them on a very regular basis, get information or allegations and bring it all back to the Office of the Attorney General, where it would then be assessed by a team which included two or three senior barristers and two or three juniors. They would then instruct me to go look for more or see if I could make this or that stand up. However, in 1971 to 1973 we could never get anything that would enable either the Government to raise it with the British Government or to enable us to raise it in the Strasbourg context.
I fully understand why Mr. Justice Barron has not been able to stand up the allegations of collusion. Nevertheless, at this stage I can say that I believe there was collusion. I believe this on the basis of what we now know about collusion between rogue elements in the RUC and the British Army, on the one hand, and loyalist paramilitaries, on the other.
We know it from a litany of court cases in Northern Ireland involving collusion at local level, particularly in certain areas. Mr. Justice Barron comes to the conclusion that Dublin and Monaghan in part happened because of the politics of the day. This was part of an effort to bring down a political settlement. He does not use the words "politically motivated" but it is reasonable to use those words, in the same way that it is now reasonable to say that the Dublin bombings of 1972 were politically motivated. I cannot give the committee specific evidence to support that but I have had a good deal of experience through my 28 years in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Twenty of those years were involved in the conduct of Anglo-Irish relations. On the basis of my experience, I can reasonably add to the speculation that there was collusion, and specifically that there was collusion in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.
They are the points I make in my submission. I made one last point, but I am not sure it is appropriate to this sector, that if there is to be a future inquiry it should be on the basis of a significant international element. I do not believe the British Government will co-operate willingly or that the Irish Government has the capacity to investigate this thoroughly. However, I hope we have now reached a stage in Anglo-Irish relations where both Governments might agree on an international form of inquiry and that both Governments would commit to co-operating with it so that, at minimum, we can say we have done everything possible. This is not simply for the families, whom we would all have as our first point of sympathy, but because there is an issue of sovereignty here. I think that it is very important that a country is confident that its neighbouring country has not, in any sense, attempted to breach its sovereignty. I believe that involvement, even by rogue members of security forces - I think Governments should be able to control rogue members of security forces. It is for those two reasons - for the sake of the families, the relatives and the victims, and also for the sake of our national interest - that this should be investigated. Those are my remarks, Mr Chairman, and obviously I am willing to answer any questions that members might wish to ask.
Thank you, Mr Donlon, for an interesting submission.
I thank Seán Donlon for attending the committee. He is a very distinguished diplomat who represented this country, and I appreciate that fact that he has attended the committee. He made two major points, one of which relates to the discussions you had with the Department of Justice. Yesterday, Dr. Garret FitzGerald indicated that the formal lines were closed down and that there were no formal contacts between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Justice in the context of individual outrages or happenings. I am interested in what you said, and perhaps you could elaborate on it. Did it cause a problem within your Department with the Minister, or did he know that you were getting those briefings or that you had that relationship with the Department of Justice?
Second, I appreciate your judgement on collusion and the fact that you are prepared to say that you firmly believe that there was collusion in relation to those happenings. Can you give us anything more on that? There was a clear pointer in that direction by Mr Wylde. I do not know whether you have seen his presentation to the committee. He was an army explosives expert, and he said that the way in which the bombing was carried out and the type of explosives used and so on pointed in one direction only - towards collusion.
At what level do you think the collusion occurred? You mentioned rogue elements within the RUC. Would you put it entirely down to small groupings or individual areas operating on their own, or did you see a certain amount of collusion or back-up or turning a blind eye a bit higher up the channels that you might have been dealing with?
Could you answer that question in relation to our terms of reference - should there be a further public inquiry and, if so, how could the issue of collusion be addressed?
Mr Donlon
The first question was about the nature of the relationship between the Department of Justice and the Department of Foreign Affairs. During the break I read Garret FitzGerald's contribution from yesterday, and I understand exactly what he was saying. He wanted to see, I think, a more formalised system of communication between the two Departments than the one that existed, which was very informal. However, as Mr. Cooney explained before the lunchbreak, there were valid reasons why the Department of Justice would not share all the information with us. Therefore, I had to rely on the judgement of the relevant principal officer, and, if necessary, the assistant secretary and Secretary. I would rely on their judgement to tell me what they felt they could tell me. Again, looking back on it, all I can say is that I believe that their judgement was normally correct. Of course, Dr. FitzGerald wanted to see this formalised and a lot of meetings and minutes and so on, but that was not the way the world worked, certainly in those days - I do not know how it works these days. That is the difference - the difference between informality and formality. I felt that informality was fine; it did the job.
Turning to your second question on collusion, I have not read the evidence to which you have referred, the evidence of the explosives expert. I come to it from a somewhat different angle. As far as I could see, there was a pattern of collusion within Northern Ireland. For example, I think there were areas where the RUC was driven to pick up certain people and to intern or arrest them not because of anything the RUC knew, but because of information given to them by people who were loyalist paramilitaries. I think there was a very close collaboration in some areas between elements in the RUC and members of loyalist paramilitary organisations. That was information I picked up from people I would very highly respect, particularly solicitors, priests, politicians and people on whose judgement I would rely and who could give me very practical instances and point to court cases in Northern Ireland which clearly indicated collusion to me.
That was my starting point. In particular, there seemed to be a pattern of collusion in parts of Armagh, east Tyrone and also in parts of Belfast. When I saw where the cars used in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings had originated, something clicked and that is when I began to get suspicious. In subsequent years, after the bombings, references were frequently made to this possibility by people in Northern Ireland who I would see but, much though I would press them at the time - it was something that was pressed very heavily - they could never come up with evidence that was remotely useable either in intergovernmental relations or in a court of law. Obviously, we would not have needed the high test - the court of law test - to raise something with the British either at official or political level. If we had enough information, we would have raised it. We hunted but we could never get the information.
Is this more of an opinion you have reached with hindsight? Looking back over the years and knowing now what has happened and what has come to light in terms of various court cases and so on, is it with hindsight that you have formed this very firm conclusion rather than at the time when you were at the coal face?
Mr. Donlon
I began to form it at the time because the court cases to which I referred were cases that were taking place in those years. The committee should bear in mind that for the Strasbourg case we needed a lot of information which was legally sustainable, so I was dealing a lot with solicitors in Nationalist areas of Northern Ireland-——
In what year was the Strasbourg case?
Mr. Donlon
Strasbourg was initiated in 1971 and was pursued for almost six years. It resulted in a finding that the British Government had used inhuman and degrading methods and, at one level, that they had tortured people. It was, from the point of view of the Irish Government, a very successful case but one pursued with enormous obstacles in the way including, eventually, evidence being taken from British soldiers and RUC people at a NATO base in the north of Norway because the British did not want to expose their people to the possibility that they might be identified. Even when we went to the north of Norway, those witnesses gave evidence behind screens.
Was there any hint of collusion that you could detect in activities running through that series of cases, including the Strasbourg case?
Mr. Donlon
Again, there was, to use your word, a hint, but we could never stand it up.
I thank Mr. Donlon for a concise and unambiguous submission to the committee. While I appreciate you may have been one step removed in the Department of Foreign Affairs, do you recall at any stage any discussions about what, if anything, the Government might do on the investigations into the Monaghan bombings coming to, more or less, an early conclusion? Do you recall at any stage discussions about what, if anything, the Government might do on the investigations into the Monaghan bombings coming to, more or less, an early conclusion?
Mr. Donlon
No. As a young diplomat, I was very severely warned never to get into operational police matters. This goes back well before the troubles. For my first four or five years I was based in Germany, and even if there was a road accident we were told, "Never get into the police investigation. There might be a trial; there might be extradition. God knows what there will be." From the very beginning our training was, "Don't get into matters which relate appropriately to police investigations." The answer to your question is no, absolutely no discussion that I can recall.
Mr. Donlon is very definite in his statements. He says specifically that there was collusion in the Dublin/Monaghan bombings. Why did you come to that conclusion? Was it to do with information coming to you from departmental or intelligence sources at the time? Or was it to do with your experience of being in Northern Ireland and observing what was happening there?
Mr. Donlon
It was very much the latter. No information came to me specifically relating to whether it was Army intelligence or Garda intelligence. The relevant principal officer in the Department of Justice would have said to me, probably within four or five days of the bombings, that information had come to the guards from the RUC that suspects had been picked up and interned. However, no names were given to me and no other information was given to me. What I am saying is based entirely on my own activities in Northern Ireland, on information that I picked up from other people on whom I believed I could rely.
With regard to the collusion that you observed in your work in Northern Ireland, did you see it on an ad hoc basis or did you get the impression that it was co-ordinated or masterminded in some way? At what level can you pitch it? Mr. Justice Barron mentions in his report that a Mr. Jackson, who was a suspect in this case, arrived at a checkpoint with two RUC officers and was waved on by the inspector. I think he was drawing certain conclusions from that. What would you say to the claim that collaboration was going on without the acquiescence of more senior officers?
Mr. Donlon
An example is the easiest way to illustrate it. I went to see a solicitor in Dungannon, who is, sadly, now dead. He would take me for a meal or a drink and he would point to a corner of the restaurant or pub where there were two RUC men and two other men. He would say, "I think those two other men are not here for the beer." He would adduce that as evidence of collusion because these would be people who he knew to be active loyalist paramilitaries, as he would have seen them in action, particularly during the UWC strike in May 1974.
At what level, you and Deputy McGrath have asked me, and how far up did this go? The answer is I do not know. However, I do think there were people at least as bright if not brighter than I am in the British system who knew this was going on and who did nothing to stop it.
At senior level?
Mr. Donlon
Yes.
With regard to our terms of reference, what sort of inquiry would be appropriate to find out whether there was collusion and how much of it was carried on? You mentioned earlier an international inquiry. Could you expand on what type of inquiry you think would be appropriate?
Mr. Donlon
To start with, both Governments would have to agree on the form of such an inquiry and possibly even legislate specifically for it. Having done that, they would bring in someone who is neither British or Irish to head it up.
Like the Cory inquiry?
Mr. Donlon
Yes. Internal inquiries, whether Barron here or Stalker and Stevens in Northern Ireland, have tended not to produce anything. However, the element of embarrassment created by the involvement of an international figure is very helpful and it has been very helpful politically. Examples not on the security side include George Mitchell and John de Chastelain. Politically a lot of progress has been facilitated by that international involvement. Equally, there might be the possibility of such involvement here. I am not saying that it would have results, but it is probably as far as we can go to try to get the results that we all want.
Should such an inquiry have powers of compellability for witnesses, documents and the power to enter premises? Could you also comment on the investigative element to be undertaken and the public process being transparent, as that is also a factor. What are your views on that?
Mr Donlon
I would have thought that legislation would have to give powers of discovery and compellability. I do not easily see any British Government opening its files willingly, even going back 30 years. I am pretty confident that papers would exist on the British side because that was the way they operate. By having an older bureaucracy than we have and having dealt with far more crises than we have ever had to deal with, they have developed systems for dealing with such matters and they have probably written protocols. I think there are papers somewhere: I do not know where they are and I do not think that they are going to be discovered willingly, but if the two Governments were able to reach agreement and have similar powers in both jurisdictions and then get an outsider to exercise those powers, something might happen.
I do not know about investigation, and I have no experience in investigation. I follow what is going on in just the same way as the committee. I am impressed with Nuala O'Loan's investigative team, which is entirely separate from the PSNI. I gather that it is a pretty hefty team: she has 100 or 120 people involved. All of that would need to be taken into account.
Is Mr. Donlon familiar with the investigation by the Comptroller and Auditor General prior to the DIRT Inquiry?.
Mr. Donlon
Happily no.
You are aware of it.
Mr Donlon
I am yes.
As a member of the Public Accounts Committee's DIRT Inquiry, we found it very useful to have that body, that investigation, in a book in front of us. Happily you were not involved in it but I am sure that you were aware of the type of book involved. Would it be something along those lines?
Mr. Donlon
Yes, absolutely. I am not sure how you could get that unless you had extraordinary powers that would not normally be available to investigators. In particular, somehow or other you would have to overcome the normal answer that is given, "I am sorry, in the interests of national security we are not prepared to reveal this.".
Do we need legislation to do that?
Mr. Donlon
Yes, but it could be done. There is no reason why some trusted figure could not be given very detailed access and that he would have discretion in what he would make public. If people trusted him he would be able to say that he had information, he was unable to give the source, but believed that there was a good security reason why the source should not be given and to accept his word on the accuracy of the information. That sort of approach might be helpful. A lot of investigation and assimilation of information is needed before there could be a productive public inquiry.
At point 4 of your letter, you state that the paucity of information from the British authorities would obviously have affected Mr. Justice Barron in drawing certain conclusions. Given the number of references there are in the report to the issue of collusion which he detected, does Mr. Donlon think he gave sufficient weight to that in his conclusions when he said that collusion might have occurred at a low level, but that there was no evidence that it happened further than that? From his experience, does Mr. Donlon feel that conclusion is too minimalist?
Mr. Donlon
I was disappointed when I read it. I can understand, particularly given his judicial experience, why he would present it in that way, but I felt that the emphasis on collusion in his report was not sufficient, given what is generally known. I understand that his requirement for proof may be at the judicial level, but certainly I was disappointed. I expected that most of that report would deal with the issue of collusion, and that the sections dealing with the Garda investigations and the actions or inactions of other partieswould be a relatively minor part of the report. Given - it has to be said - the lack of co-operation from the British authorities, I can understand why he did not come up with stronger conclusions.
Interestingly, Mr. Donlon gave another reason as to why the collusion issue is so important - the area of sovereignty. Given where we stand with the report, with regard to how the issue of collusion is addressed and the magnitude of the crime committed, is it his view that it warrants further inquiry and that there is a certain incumbency on the State to proceed with it?
Mr. Donlon
Yes, there are two reasons for proceeding. First, to satisfy as far as is humanly posssible the needs of the victims and their families, but overriding that there is an issue of national interest that we must not feel that our neighbour can ever again be tempted to become involved in collusion. It is tantamount to declaring war. It is entirely inappropriate.
Thank you, Mr. Donlon, for your clear and valuable contribution to our deliberations.
I welcome Mr. Donlon and thank him for appearing before the sub-committee. On a lighter note, I am glad that he still relies on the judgments of lawyers and priests, and he also mentioned politicians. It is great that some people can still rely on the judgment of politicians. Many people nowadays would not necessarily agree with that statement.
In section 2 of his letter, Mr. Donlon says that neither political or diplomatic channels are normally used to discuss individual outrages, and that he can confirm that no outrage, however serious, was discussed in that channel. As a politician, I find that a very strange policy. How does Mr. Donlon respond to that?
Mr. Donlon
All I can say is that it is a fact. It is well established in the conduct of international relation that you do not discuss those sorts of things. Anything that is a matter for police authorities - an operational police matter - is left to police, because discussion, no matter how careful, at political or diplomatic level is capable of confusing an investigation, or at minimum is capable of being used in a subsequent court case to show bias. As far as I am aware, certainly in my experience of 28 years as a player in international relations, I am not aware that any two democratic countries would discuss details of police operations in diplomatic or political channels.
My second question relates to the collusion issue. Mr. Donlon said he believed there was collusion but that he cannot give direct evidence. Does he agree that when it comes to the murky world of state security services, or of special duties teams, to which Nigel Wylde referred yesterday, that it is very difficult to prove and it is very seldom that those involved get caught?
Mr. Donlon
I agree that it is difficult to prove it and I do not know how many people have got caught, but I do think that after a lapse of 30 years there is possibly a better chance of getting something useful than there would have been at the time. As time goes by people who may have been involved may begin to examine their consciences or they may have other reasons, including ones, for doing so, but I do not think it is impossible. In particular, if one could somehow or other access the documentation, it is possible.
Does that mean you would not give up on getting to the truth and the possibility that, eventually, all the information will be revealed?
Mr. Donlon
I would not give up, although I do not want to raise expectations——
I understand that.
Mr. Donlon
——but I would not give up hope at this stage. In the same way as the Garda file remains open, I think the intergovernmental file should also remain open and should be activated.
Mr. Donlon mentioned that between 1971 and 1978 he was involved in the collection of information and gathering material for the Government. With what types of information was he dealing?
That is outside the terms of reference.
I apologise. Mr. Donlon mentioned the Ulster workers' strike at the time. It is mentioned that part of the political agenda of the Dublin bombings was to bring down the Sunningdale Executive and to hit the South and intimidate the people in the South. If one looks at the effects of what happened in Dublin in 1974, not only of the atrocity but politically, it is obvious that one particular interest and foreign policy view came out on top, that is, the British one. Surely the reality is we are going in that direction all the time. Would Mr. Donlon agree with that?
Mr. Donlon
I am not sure I understand the question.
What I am saying is the people who won as a result of the Dublin bombings were those who had pushed a particular political agenda in Ireland. Would Mr. Donlon agree with that?
Would the Deputy rephrase the question so that you can get the answer?
I take your point, Chairman.
Mr. Donlon
I think I understand the question.
What I am saying is that as a result of the atrocity in 1974, a political viewpoint came out on top and that is evident if one studies Irish history after 1974.
Mr. Donlon
Only in part. One of the consequences of the Dublin-Monaghan bombings was the enhanced security arrangements in this jurisdiction to ensure that it did not happen again, and I believe that was a significant outcome. Measures were put in place which manifestly have worked.
Did that not lead to an emphasis on security policy rather than trying to resolve the political issue? That is my concern. I think the peace process was delayed.
Mr. Donlon
That is debatable. I would go a bit of the way with the Deputy anyway, but I am not sure I would go the whole way.
I welcome Mr. Donlon, a neighbour from home, to Leinster House and thank him for his very valuable contribution. My question is a general one. In view of the fact that it was 30 years ago and some of us were mere children at the time, can Mr. Donlon recreate in a few sentences the environment and climate in Northern Ireland? He was the person working on the ground. He clearly stated that it is his opinion——
We will suspend the sub-committee for a few minutes.
Sitting suspended at 3.35 p.m. and resumed at 3.47 p.m.
Mr. Donlon expressed the opinion that the Dublin and Monaghan atrocities were designed to bring down a political settlement. As a person working on the ground in Northern Ireland and given the nature of his work, I am sure the tensions were palpable. I would like him to describe for us what the climate was like up there. Can the resistance to the prospect of the Republic of Ireland becoming more involved and having a greater role in the administration of Northern Ireland be quantified?
Mr. Donlon
Yes, there was huge uncertainty, politically. Stormont had been prorogued in 1972 and the Unionists, who had been accustomed to having their own parliament for 50 years, found the loss of power difficult to accept. They found it even more difficult 18 months later to accept the prospect of the Irish Government's involvement through the Council of Ireland and the whole Sunningdale arrangements.
There was also a good deal of uncertainty created by the fact that in February 1974 there had been a change of Government in Britain. Harold Wilson became Prime Minister, and the level at which he was trusted in relation to Ireland was very low among both Unionists and Nationalists. He had previously had talks with the IRA, which did not endear him to anybody except the Republican movement. It left us in a situation where I do not think anybody knew exactly what was happening, and in that situation paramilitary groups on both sides tended to flex their muscles. We are talking of an era when violence was very bad. From memory, some 440 people were killed in the Troubles in Northern Ireland in 1973 alone. The number was down somewhat in 1974 but the whole situation was very difficult. There was movement of people, with Catholics and Protestants leaving mixed areas.
In general, there was enormous uncertainty, a very difficult security situation and very little trust between communities. When the Sunningdale Agreement was announced and, in particular, when Brian Faulkner, leader of the Official Unionist Party, lost his majority in the party, it was clear that politically there were going to be difficulties. The Ulster Workers Council was formed, basically an amalgam of political and paramilitary people. It was formed for the specific purpose of bringing down the Sunningdale Agreement. Strikes were called and power was cut off. We were within hours of sewage flowing down the Falls Road, as Paddy Devlin once described it. It was a very unsettled and uncertain situation.
I welcome Mr. Donlon. I thank him for coming here and speaking to us so candidly. It is particularly valuable because he had so much hands-on involvement at that time. He mentioned the identification of collusion as a major factor that the whole terms of reference must address. That is extremely important; it is a key issue.
In the second last paragraph of your submission you say that unless the issue of collusion is addressed, the facts, circumstances, causes and perpetrators of the bombings will never be established. Are you saying that Mr. Justice Barron has not, and could not have, addressed the issues that he was asked to address?
Mr. Donlon
Yes. I am saying that because of the failure of the British Government to co-operate fully, Mr. Justice Barron was not able to investigate the allegations of collusion and therefore his inquiry, inevitably, is incomplete.
That is the 68,000 documents, and perhaps others, that he mentioned in the report that he did not have access to in their original format.
Mr. Donlon
Yes
He did not have access to some documents in this jurisdiction because they were missing, destroyed or misplaced. Can you be of any assistance to us with regard to that issue? What sort of archival structure or control existed in the Department of Foreign Affairs in relation to documents and filing? Do you have any idea what the situation might be in the Department of Justice? You mentioned that you regularly met a senior official in the Department of Justice, and no doubt all the material that he communicated to you was on file. Is there any possibility of identifying material that at present is either misplaced or possibly destroyed? Can you give us some colour of how material was kept in your Department and how it might be kept in another Department?
Mr. Donlon
I can speak with first-hand knowledge of the Department of Foreign Affairs only. In those days paperwork related to Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations was not put into what is called the general registry. Most Departments - I think all Departments - probably have a general registry, which is the central filing system for the Department. However, for reasons of confidentiality in the Department of Foreign Affairs, we did not put Anglo-Irish and Northern Ireland documents into the central registry. We maintained our own registry in our own section. Basically, it was nothing more than a series of safes. We tended in the Department of Foreign Affairs to commit a lot to paper because, again, part of the training of a diplomat is to write it down and report it because other people will not know unless they read it.
The files in the Department of Foreign Affairs and the filing system generally were good. I understand that the files are intact. Certainly, the files that have been released under the 30-year rule seem to me to be intact. I can comment very little on how the Department of Justice organised their files. I would expect that none of my own contact with the relevant principal officer, in particular the almost daily contact, is on file because neither he nor I would have thought it necessary or appropriate. Beyond that, I am afraid I cannot help you, I just do not know. For example, I just do not know if he received the information from the Garda authorities orally or in writing.
Was there a structure in the Department of Foreign Affairs in order that an individual person would be responsible for the general registry or various files? Would different people be responsible?
Mr. Donlon
In the Northern Ireland section in those days, you basically looked after your own files. It was a very new section. In fact, it was only created in 1973. Up to then there was no Northern Ireland or Anglo-Irish section; there were individuals who were given specific tasks, as I had been in 1971. I was given that task on secondment from my regular job which was as consul general in Boston. I came back from Boston to do that job because they felt Boston did not need two people. I was pulled back to do that job but, in fact, I never went back to my original job. That will indicate to you how ad hoc the approach was in those days because, again, it was a new issue for the Department of Foreign Affairs. It had never previously dealt in that way with Northern Ireland.
I mentioned earlier to Mr. Cooney that there were questions asked in the Dáil in May and November about the bombings in Dublin. The replies from the Department and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform seemed to indicate very tenuous information about what was going on. Would that information from the Minister reflect what was in the files?
Mr. Donlon
As I do not know what was in the files, I cannot answer that question but my general experience is that replies to parliamentary questions are not known for the fulsomeness of the information given.
On the question that you have been pursuing - the inquiry issue - you indicated the various points which you thought would be important in an inquiry. If it was an international inquiry, do you consider it should be a public inquiry or are you talking about an international figure who would have various powers of compellability and discovery, with an investigating team, as you suggested, like Ms Nuala O'Loan in the North? Would all of this take place in public or is this something that would be done in private by an investigator.
Mr. Donlon
Ideally, it would be a mixture of both. I think there are some things that could best produce results if they were done in private but, ultimately, most of the information would have to be laid before the public because it is an issue of concern, not just, as I have said, to the victims' immediate families but also an area of legitimate national concern. As much as possible should be done in public but I accept that there might be certain elements that could only reasonably and productively be done in private.
Thank you very much. With regard to the aftermath and the effect of the bombing, are you aware of any positive action taken as a result of or because of the bombings, either in North-South relations in which you were involved, or any other field or matter?
Mr. Donlon
There was very little that was positive. Clearly, at about the same time, the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed and that began a period of very frosty Anglo-Irish relations with difficulties even in securing meetings at political level. Equally, we in this jurisdiction had difficulty in establishing contact with people in the Unionist community. There were whole months when there was very little contact. If there was anything positive - it is very peripheral - the level of enhanced co-operation on security and investigative matters between the two jurisdictions was a major factor in ensuring that there was no repetition. Beyond that, I cannot think of anything positive.
You did say that the security arrangements were better down here than in the North. What did you mean by that?
Mr. Donlon
Security down here was always better because the gardaí were acceptable in the whole community. In Northern Ireland there were whole areas where the RUC could not and did not patrol and did not and could not investigate. It was a very uneven situation. Frequently, for example, when the British blamed us for things that were happening in the North, they were covering up for the fact that they did not control parts of south Armagh; they did not control parts of west Belfast. If there had been an IRA bombing or a loyalist bombing, people would escape back into communities where they felt that they had a level of immunity simply because the writ did not run.
I thank Mr. Donlon for echoing what everybody has said. Your contribution has been very helpful. Although we have dealt with many of the issues in the report, collusion, by its very nature, is one that we found very hard to tie down. That you were actively engaged in investigating underground collusion at the time of these atrocities is extremely helpful.
That leads me to my first question. There was a long exchange today between members of the committee on collusion. Did you have the same sort of exchange with Mr. Justice Barron? Did he address this issue in the same way that we have?
Mr. Donlon
I did not meet Mr. Justice Barron. I was not asked to meet him.
Was there any particular reason for that?
Mr. Donlon
I do not know.
I must confess that I thought that you had met him. That is interesting.
You obviously received an invitation from our committee.
Mr. Donlon
I saw the advertisement in the newspapers and I responded by asking for a copy of the report, which I received. Having read the report, I felt that I should offer some comments.
That is interesting. I thank Mr. Donlon very much for doing that.
Mr. Donlon
No problem.
It is amazing that we are having a discussion about collusion, yet this is the first time that one of the country's foremost experts on collusion has discussed the matter in any sort of forum. That is very interesting.
Mr. Justice Barron in his report is very careful in his choice of words to describe the level of proof of collusion. His words are that an inference can be drawn and in some instances that inference is irresistible, but it is not a probability and it has not been proven. From your experience in dealing with these issues and from having spoken to various people, would you go further than merely drawing an inference? Would you say it was a probability?
Mr. Donlon
I am not a judge. I am not even a lawyer. I would, therefore, use language perhaps in a less carefully defined way. However, I would certainly, with the passage of time, use the word "probability" rather than "possibility" when it came to collusion. I must emphasise I say that with the passage of time and with the bits and pieces of evidence that have emerged over the years, whether in the television programme, or in the four of five books written on the Monaghan/Dublin bombings, or simply by talking to people. I would certainly now use the word "probability".
Did I hear you say that you have read the books, such as Mr. Mullan's book?
Mr. Donlon
Yes.
Could I clarify one matter, Mr Donlon, and I think that you were present when I asked Mr. Cooney this question this morning. You were a senior official in the Department for Foreign Affairs when Dr. FitzGerald was Minister, and I know you subsequently had a very close working relationship with him for many years. You say now that you are clearly of the opinion that there was collusion. In addition, you were, if I may use the word, investigating——
That word cannot be used.
I am describing what Mr. Donlon was doing during his tenure. I am not saying the committee is involved in investigating. Am I correct in understanding that Mr. Donlon was looking into the whole issue of collusion.
Mr. Donlon
Not primarily.
Sorry, I am incorrect on that point. However, Mr. Donlon is familiar with the issues we are discussing now. However, the Minister in his Department said yesterday that this was all new to him, that it had never occurred to him that there could be collusion and that it certainly was not brought to his attention. He also said that if it had been brought to his attention, it would have merited further investigation. I do not recall his exact words to the committee.
I am not trying to drive in a wedge - far from it - but in trying to see if Mr. Justice Barron addressed this issue, we are trying to ascertain how Dr FitzGerald could be of that view and you have a different view?
Mr. Donlon
I would make two points in response. The information that I was gathering in Northern Ireland was for the purposes of the Strasbourg case. The political lead in the Strasbourg case was taken by Attorneys General from 1971 onwards. For that purpose I reported to the Attorney General and his staff when it came to information from Northern Ireland. I certainly had discussions in the 1970s with Dr. FitzGerald about the possibility of collusion. His attitude would have been——
When was that?
Mr. Donlon
When he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, which was between 1973 and 1977. I cannot be specific as to when exactly I would have had discussions with him. His point always was, as it was in relation to anything that was happening in Northern Ireland, "Get me the facts. I am not going to raise this at Cabinet or I am not going to raise it in Government unless I have the facts on which I can do it.".
I glanced at his evidence during the lunch break and I do not know precisely what he said, but I am pretty certain that he was aware of what I would call the speculation or gossip about collusion. However, being the sort of person he was, his first request always was, "Give me the facts". The facts were not there. We did not have facts, no matter how hard we sought to find them. Gossip was not sufficient. I do not think that there is a huge difference, but that is for you to judge.
As Mr. Donlon was involved in Anglo-Irish relations for many years, he would have more insight than most into the psyche of, say, the British Establishment and Government. What are the chances now, in your opinion, of the British Government co-operating with any intra-jurisdictional inquiry?
Mr. Donlon
They are not bad, given the nature of the relationship between the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister, given the success that he has had in persuading the British Prime Minister to bring in a Canadian judge to look at specific incidents, and given what was once called the totality of the relationship between the two jurisdictions. I think it is a tough battle, but most of these issues are tough. The nature of Anglo-Irish relations today is, I believe, sufficiently robust to be able to take a tough and rough discussion on this. I am not sufficiently plugged into the details to give you a reading on it, but I would have thought, looking at it from the outside, that there has to be a prospect. Unless it is tried we will not know.
Mr. Justice Barron addresses the issue of collusion on pages 132 onwards, when he examines the allegations that were raised in the "Hidden Hand" programme. Therefore, he obviously addressed that part of it. Did Mr. Donlon ever see that programme?
Mr. Donlon
No, I never saw the programme. I was abroad.
That is right. In Mr. Donlon's capacity in Northern Ireland, did the activities of Captain Robert Nairac, which were part of the "Hidden Hand" programme, ever come to his attention?
Mr. Donlon
You will have to give me a year on Captain Nairac. The only thing that I can immediatley recall is shortly after Captain Nairac was abducted. I think I was Secretary of the Department at the time, so it must have been between 1982 and 1987. I do remember the British ambassador coming to my home, telling me that this man had been abducted and asking would we please use every effort to see if we could find him. That is my only immediate recollection of that episode.
At the same time, when you formed the opinion that there were elements or instances of collusion, either at a lower or higher level, did the activities surrounding the Fourth Field survey group ever come to your attention?
Mr. Donlon
No, I cannot say that they did. From reading, I am generally aware of the references, but I do not recall that they ever surfaced in my official activities.
Was there any appearance, or do you believe, that there may have been collusion with the army as well as with RUC and UDR?
Mr. Donlon
Yes. I believe that it would not have been confined to the UDR, because I believe that the British Army has always had either units or elements within it that engage in dirty operations. We discovered much of that information for the Strasbourg case, which definitely involved British Army units.
Are there any parallels between the type of collusion that you picked up in the Strasbourg case and what could be present in this particular case?
Mr. Donlon
I could not say that there is anything directly comparable. No, I do not think so. Most of what we picked up with regard to British Army activities would relate to the sort of "intelligence" that it picked up from the loyalist paramilitaries than from joint operations. I cannot say that there is any obvious parallel.
I have two questions.
Mr. Donlon
There is a very full account of this in a book called Low Intensity Operations by a retired British Army officer, which is very relevant to the behaviour of the British Army in Northern Ireland because he had just finished his tour of duty in Northern Ireland when he wrote it. This is back in 1972, or possibly early 1973.
Would Mr. Donlon say that it was a possiblity, or could certainly be inferred, that elements of the British Army could have assisted in some way with the Dublin and Monaghan bombings?
Mr. Donlon
All I am saying is that it is a possibility. I cannot go beyond that.
Is that based on the information which you gleaned when he was in the North?
Mr. Donlon
It is based on my general knowledge about the behaviour of the British Army in various theatres of activity over the past 50 years.
When Mr. Donlon was answering Deputy McGrath's questions, he said there was a need for an inquiry, first, to satisfy the victims if that were possible and, second, in the national interest. Both of these are predicated on the belief or hope that the truth would emerge in such an inquiry. Does he genuinely believe that the precise facts of what happened, including the culpability of the perpetrators, could come out in such an inquiry at 30 years' remove?
Mr. Donlon
It will be difficult but my main point throughout has been that it has to be tried. I base whatever optimism I have on the success of the Irish Governments in the 1970s in securing a conviction against the British Government. It had never been tried and had never been done before, but we established, both at the Commission on Human Rights in Strasbourg and at the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, that the British were guilty of breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights. If we could do it then in circumstances where the political backdrop was not favourable, I believe it is certainly worth trying to do something broadly similar on this occasion, but nobody can guarantee success.
Are you aware of any other person, who we may not have invited here, who could possibly assist the sub-committee in a similar way as you have so done?
Mr. Donlon
Not off the top of my head but if I may, I could give Mr. Mohan a call, early tomorrow morning or later this evening. Most of the people with whom I worked tended to be older than I was, and they tend to be either dead or retired.
If you could have that conversation with Mr. Mohan, I would appreciate it. I thank you very much, Mr. Donlon. Certainly it was a very informative contribution and it raised many questions. We appreciate it and are grateful to you for coming here today.
Mr. Donlon
Chairman, I wish you and your colleagues well in your activities.
I welcome Deputy Paudge Connolly, the Independent Deputy from Cavan-Monaghan. Deputy Connolly, would you like to make an oral submission?
My submission will be rather brief. I am here in answer to the advertisement in the newspapers. I submitted a written submission and thought part of doing so involved making a brief oral submission.
I do not have any new evidence to produce, but I am a public representative from Monaghan who knew quite well a number of the Monaghan victims from my own area of Tyholland and Silverstream. Coincidentally, I was in Dublin on the day in question and heard the bombs go off.
We would not be here were it not for the heroic efforts of the relatives' group, Justice for the Forgotten. I have a number of concerns with the report. While there is no definitive conclusion to the Barron inquiry, it signposted many issues which can only be dealt with by a cross-jurisdictional judicial public inquiry and I am here to support the relatives in pursuit of that objective.
Without going through all the issues raised, there are a number of questions regarding collusion. It is deeply disturbing that elements of the report refer to collusion. That must be teased out.
On the reluctance to compromise on relationships, we are talking about 33 lives and looking to compromise on relationships but this is almost an insult to the people concerned and the relatives left behind. We are not going to compromise a relationship to get at the nub of the truth.
There were a number of shortcomings as well, and I do not think it is good enough that there was a lack of co-operation from the British and Northern Ireland authorities. There is also the fact that 60,000 documents were suppressed in Northern Ireland and, I think, over 1 million in England. To present an inquiry such as the Barron inquiry with ten pages of documents is not nearly sufficient. There would be a lack of confidence if we did not go ahead. More importantly, the environment has now changed - the relationship has changed between Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland. We are in the midst of a peace process, which should be exploited fully. We should go for a full public inquiry. The environment is right. We should progress ahead on those lines.
That is why I am here today. There are a number of issues and recommendations, of which the public inquiry would be one, similar to the Lord Saville inquiry which is going ahead. The relatives have a right to know to bring closure to this whole matter, and the sooner the better. I hope that if there was a public inquiry, it would be dealt with rather quickly. That is what I have to say about the report.
Thank you very much.
I welcome Deputy Connolly and thank him for his submission, particulary as he was elected by the people of Monaghan. He spoke about the feeling on the ground and said that was his view. Is that the general view of people in the Monaghan area, that they want this type of inquiry?
That is the type of feedback I am getting. In the environment that has existed for 30 years there are all sorts of theories about who was responsible and how the bombings came about. There are so many theories, it is unreal. The only way to deal with this is to have a public sworn inquiry. We hope that would extract the truth. The environment has changed. A lot of people acknowledge that the relationship between England, Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland has developed and changed. We now have the peace process which it would also help.
Does the Deputy have a strong personal view on the collusion issue which has come up a few times in our submissions so far? Is he aware that it is stated in one of the submissions that, following the bombings, there was a cluster of suspects only ten miles away from Monaghan?
If you look at what has come up in the TV documentary, the name of which slips my mind, it has come up with some very disturbing evidence. There were also a lot of theories that those names had been handed over to the authorities at the time, that the authorities knew who had actually carried out the bombing but that there was no co-operation and it was better to save face rather than solve a crime in terms of bringing to justice those who had committed the crimes.
The Deputy mentioned that he knew some of the victims. From your contact with the victims, and from a local TD's point of view, what impact did it have on them?
A lot of people have never fully come to terms with the issue. They did not come to terms with it. Maybe for years afterwards they felt they were hung out to dry. Some suffered from different forms of depression as a result; some maybe had trouble with alcohol afterwards. Some of the people I knew had a lot of personal difficulties. It was quite difficult. When there was no closure, or the crime had not been solved, it was going to be very difficult for people to accept the actual happening or event.
I very much thank the Deputy for coming. It is good to see a TD from Monaghan here. I refer to the first page of his submission where he states at the beginning of the second paragraph:
In the immediate aftermath of the bombings it was widely known that loyalist paramilitaries carried out both bombings and the prevailing wisdom at the time was that co-operation was forthcoming on both sides of the Border in the matter of safe houses, collusion from the authorities etc.
Does Deputy Connolly have any hard information or can he give us anything further on that? Is there anything he can add to that in terms of information that would assist us in addressing the issues? Is he aware of any hard information out there in the public arena in the Monaghan area?
No, I stated that I have no evidence and I am not aware of any hard evidence. It is very difficult. There was a great suspicion in the immediate aftermath, and that is far as I can go on this. I have no hard evidence to state that the bombs were brought to a particular area, stored in a particular area and then used. I do not have that evidence, but this is why a public sworn inquiry would be very useful. It could perhaps get to the bottom of that type of thing. These are the types of theories that are knocking around and this is what an inquiry could come to terms with.
The Deputy has stated his preference for a cross-jurisdictional public inquiry and that, in the absence of that, he would seek a truth and reconciliation commission. Would he like to tell us something about that?
I would hope that the environment has changed an awful lot and that we will not have to come to a truth and reconciliation inquiry. We did have that in South Africa, but if given the preference I would certainly opt for a public inquiry. Since making this submission I have concluded that a truth and reconciliation commission would achieve less. It would not have the same teeth as a public sworn inquiry.
I thank Deputy Connolly very much for participating. We appreciate his interest in our hearings and will take on board what he has said in our deliberations.
Thank you, Chairman, and I wish you the best of luck with the remainder of the inquiry.
The sub-committee went into private session at 4.28 p.m. and adjourned until 11 a.m. on Tuesday 3 February 2004.