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JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, EQUALITY, DEFENCE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 16 Nov 2005

Scrutiny of EU Proposals.

I welcome the officials from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ms Mary Burke, principal officer, and Mr. Tony Flynn, assistant principal officer. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss a proposal for a Council decision on the European enforcement order and the transfer of sentenced persons between member states of the European Union. The proposal was referred to the joint committee for consideration by the Sub-Committee on European Scrutiny. Members have been circulated with an updated briefing note from the Department.

I ask the officials to make a presentation.

Ms Mary Burke

I thank the joint committee for its invitation to discuss the proposal for a framework decision of the Council of the European Union. The proposal is a joint initiative of Austria, Finland and Sweden and is proposed with a view to adopting a Council framework decision on a European enforcement order dealing with the transfer of sentenced persons between member states of the European Union.

Committee members will understand I am precluded from expressing an opinion on the merits of the policy of the Minister, the Government or the Attorney General. However, my colleagues and I will attempt to deal as comprehensively as possible with any issues the committee may wish to raise. The stated aim of the proposal is to establish the rules under which a member state shall recognise and enforce on its territory a custodial sentence imposed by a court of another member state for a criminal offence regardless of whether the enforcement of the sentence has already begun. The legal basis for the proposal is stated to be Articles 31 and 34 of the Treaty on European Union.

The initiating states propose that there should be a basic duty on each member state to take charge of its nationals and those persons legally resident in its territory. They note that all member states have ratified the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. As committee members will be aware, under that convention, sentenced persons may be transferred to serve the remainder of their sentence in their state of nationality, but only with their consent and that of the states involved. The additional protocol to the convention of December 1997 allows transfer without the person's consent, subject to certain conditions and has not been ratified by all member states. The committee will be aware that Ireland intends to ratify Article 2 of the additional protocol following the enactment of the Transfer of Execution of Sentences Bill.

In bringing forward the proposal, Austria, Finland and Sweden have stressed that relations between member states are characterised by special mutual confidence in other member states' legal systems and that, therefore, the arrangements for transfers of sentenced persons should go further than the existing Council of Europe instruments. They argue that it should be established that there is a basic duty on a state to take charge of those of its nationals and those persons described as permanently legally resident in its territory, who have been given a final custodial sentence or a detention order in another member state, irrespective of their consent, unless there are specific reasons for refusal. The initiating states have also stated that their proposal is based on the principle of rehabilitation of the offender.

In terms of progress to date, the proposal was discussed at meetings of a working party of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee on co-operation in criminal matters on 13 May, 27 June and 10 and 11 October this year. The next meeting of the working party is due to take place on 12 December to complete the Second Reading of the instrument. Ireland has taken part in the negotiations on the proposals to date and we have entered a number of reservations, including legal competence and parliamentary scrutiny reservations.

In the discussions to date, the Department has indicated that Ireland has concerns regarding the proposal on a number of grounds. In the first instance, there is concern about the legal basis cited for the draft framework decision. Further legal advice is awaited on this matter. Second, we do not believe that the rehabilitation process can be assisted where repatriation is enforced. Third, there is concern that such a proposal could be seen to undermine the rights of a citizen of Europe to legally challenge a deportation or expulsion order.

I will briefly explain the provisions as contained in the framework decision, designated COPEN 54. As I go through them, I will synopsise my speaking notes for ease of reference and time. Article 1 provides for the definition of the key terms used in the framework decision. Article 2 deals with the provisions for making contact with the relevant authority. Article 3 makes it clear that the framework decision deals with the enforcement, in the executing state, of sanctions imposed on natural persons by a court in the issuing state, regardless of whether enforcement has already started or whether the person concerned is still in the issuing state or already in the executing state.

Article 4 contains criteria for the forwarding of a European enforcement order to an executing state. The natural person on whom the sanction has been imposed must be a national of the member state concerned, or must have his or her permanent legal residence there, or must have other close links with that state. In the case of other close links with the executing state, the forwarding of a European enforcement order by way of derogation from the general rule, Article 5, is envisaged only with the consent of the sentenced person.

In accordance with Article 5, the consent of the sentenced person is not required for a European enforcement order to be forwarded, except for cases where the order is based on the sentenced person's other close links with the executing state. However, the person should be notified of the consequences of transfer to the executing state and, if he or she is still in the issuing state, he or she should, if possible, be given an opportunity to state an opinion. That opinion is to be taken into consideration when making a decision.

Article 6 makes it clear that a European enforcement order must contain certain information which must be translated into the official language, or one of the official languages, of the executing state. Article 7 refers to those offences which, if they are punishable in the issuing state by a maximum period of at least three years, lead to recognition and enforcement of a European enforcement order, without verification of the existence of double criminality.

Under Article 8, the competent authority in the executing state is obliged to recognise the European enforcement order without further formality being required and to enforce it, subject to the grounds for refusal in Article 9. This means that, in principle, it is not possible to carry out an adaptation procedure in the executing state. Such a procedure would not be in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition. The competent authority in the executing state can consider adapting the sanction only in the following cases. First, if the duration of the sanction is not compatible with fundamental principles of the law of the executing state. This may be the case if, for example, a life sentence was imposed in the issuing state, when such a sentence is incompatible with fundamental principles of the law of the executing state. In this event, the competent authority in the executing state may adapt the sanction to the maximum level provided for a criminal act under the national law of that state. Second, if the nature of the sanction is not compatible with the law of the executing state.

Article 9 states the grounds enabling the executing state to decide not to recognise and enforce the decision. Articles 10 and 11 specify time limits for a decision on a transfer and for its completion. Article 12 deals with the transit of a sentenced person through the territory of a member state. Article 13 states that enforcement is governed by the law of the executing state. Article 14 contains a specialty provision. Article 15 clarifies that an amnesty or pardon may be granted by both the issuing state and the executing state. However, only the issuing state may decide on applications for review of the decision imposing the sanction to which the European enforcement order relates.

According to Article 16, the executing state must terminate enforcement of the sanction if it is informed by the issuing state that it is no longer enforceable because of, for example, an amnesty or pardon. Article 17 refers to the fact that the competent authority of the executing state must communicate to the competent authority of the issuing state. Article 19 deals with costs, while Articles 21 and 22 contain standard provisions concerning the implementation and entry into force of the framework decision.

To return to the question of the legal basis, I have already mentioned that Ireland has serious concerns in this respect which other member states share. As members will be aware, EU competence to deal with criminal matters is governed by the provisions of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, particularly Articles 29 to 42. That title deals with police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. These provisions create an objective of providing citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice. The objective is to be achieved by preventing and combating crime, particularly serious crimes such as terrorism, trafficking in people, offences against children, illicit drugtrafficking, corruption and fraud.

If the framework decision was adopted, which would require unanimity, Ireland would never be able to reverse it, unless there was unanimous agreement to such a change. Article 31(1)(a) of the Treaty on European Union is cited as the legal basis for the current proposal. This article provides for competence to provide for the facilitation and acceleration of co-operation between competent ministries and judicial or equivalent authorities of the member states in respect of proceedings and the enforcement of decisions. Ireland has concerns as to whether this sub-article provides adequate vires for transferring a person following the conclusion of criminal proceedings. The framework decision proposals go much further than facilitating and accelerating co-operation and clearly seek to introduce obligations which would apply internally in each member state. The discussions of the working party so far indicate reluctance on the part of a large number of countries to accept the proposals. A number of countries, including Ireland, have expressed reservations about parliamentary scrutiny.

In summary, Ireland is of the opinion that there is already a common standard for transfers of this kind — the very adequate Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons — and the objective of the instrument can be achieved through compliance by all member states with it. This proposal is still under negotiation and, as such, I do not wish to forecast the outcome of the negotiations. I hope I have conveyed Ireland's position on very important issues, including the fundamental question of whether this framework decision is contemplated by the EU treaties. My colleague, Tony Flynn, and I will be pleased to answer questions and provide clarification.

I thank Ms Burke and Mr. Flynn for appearing before the committee. We touched on this matter in a previous meeting at which there was some support for the position outlined by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. I agree with the Minister's position. The existing situation operating through the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons is the proper one. Repatriation of sentenced persons should be carried out on a voluntary basis and should never be enforced.

Have any numbers been produced with regard to how it might affect member states? Some member states have a greater number of foreign nationals serving sentences in their prisons. I imagine it is the case with this country and the UK. What are the implications for different countries? As I understand the matter will be discussed on 12 December 2005, we do not need to dwell on it. The underlying principle of the existing convention that a sentenced person can request repatriation to his or her country of birth because his or her family resides there, appears to be preferable to enforcing repatriation. The country can then provide the mechanism for repatriation. There are no particular advantages in forcing an individual who has committed an offence in another country to serve his or her sentence in his or her country of origin.

I concur with the sentiments expressed by Deputy Costello and the Minister's approach to repatriation. Forcing a prisoner to serve his or her sentence in his or her country of origin is contrary to the human rights we espouse in this country.

Ms Burke

Mr. Flynn will give the committee the statistics on other countries which are readily available.

Mr. Tony Flynn

We do not have up-to-date figures from other countries. We requested figures regarding Irish prisoners in other member states through the working party group but, to date, have only received figures from the UK, which regularly produces such figures. The UK has indicated that 682 people detained in its prisons have identified themselves as Irish nationals. There may be additional Irish nationals in UK prisons who do not wish to declare themselves as such. Such prisoners may hold dual nationality. As a total of 564 out of these 682 prisoners were serving custodial sentences, the sentences were final at that stage.

A total of 116 people from the 24 EU member states are in Irish prisons. Of these, 96 are serving sentences. A total of 64 out of these 96 prisoners are from the UK and Northern Ireland. The UK is the country with which we would have the most business regarding the transfer of prisoners to and from Ireland.

There would still be a greater proportion of UK citizens in our prisons than there would be of Irish citizens in UK prisons. The UK population, at between 60 million and 65 million people, is more than twice the size of Ireland's.

Do we know how many Irish prisoners are serving sentences in UK prisons?

Mr. Flynn

A total of 682 Irish prisoners are serving sentences in UK prisons.

As it is more than ten times the figure here, one would be talking about 100.

Proportionately, the UK would have more prisoners.

It is a ratio of 100:1

The ratio is not quite 100:1. The proportion of UK nationals serving sentences in Irish prisons is greater than that of Irish prisoners serving sentences in UK prisons.

It is the other way around.

No, we have ten times more prisoners in UK prisons but its population is more than ten times the size of our population.

There are roughly 600 Irish prisoners in UK prisons and there are 60 UK prisoners in Irish prisons.

That is correct.

If our population was the same as that of the UK, we would expect to have 6,000 prisoners in UK prisons, as opposed to the 60 UK prisoners, which is a ratio of 100:1.

Perhaps the Chairman is correct.

This is significant.

It is very significant.

Could someone clarify whether there is an obligation on the home country to make a prisoner serve the full sentence imposed in the country where the offence took place? Article 14 of the convention appears to imply that when a person is returned to his or her home country, he or she cannot be charged with a prior offence, which appears illogical. If someone has committed a crime for which he or she has not been charged, it should be open to the authorities in the home country to pursue him or her for that offence.

What about the question of good behaviour? Does it apply to people serving sentences?

Mr. Flynn

A home country is not allowed to bring charges against a transferred prisoner for offences committed prior to his or her imprisonment in the other country once the transfer takes place. However, this is not the case in the convention. We check with the Garda Síochána as to whether transferred prisoners have previous offences and will tell prisoners before they return that they may face charges upon their return. They have full and informed knowledge of what could happen.

They may change their minds.

Mr. Flynn

In most cases, they come back and face the charges. They can give an informed consent to the transfer. The proposal before us would change this practice and not allow the home country to prosecute. The prisoner would have a two-week break once he or she is released from prison, by which time he or she could leave the home country, as happens in extradition cases. Charges could be brought against him or her after this two-week period.

Under this new proposal, it appears that Ireland could be forced to take back a person originally wanted for murder who was imprisoned abroad. A consequence of taking such a person back to serve possibly the balance of two or three years of a sentence would be that he or she could not be charged with murder. It is ludicrous if this is the case.

Mr. Flynn

I cannot comment on whether it is murder. A list of exceptions has been drawn up but they deal mainly with security and terrorism types of offences.

If that is the case, it turns human rights on its head. The human rights of the victim seem to be secondary to the human rights of the offender, which is a discussion the committee had previously. This is part of the problem we face. My other question relates to the compellability of serving the full sentence imposed in the country where the offence occurred. The Chairman added the question concerning the home country allowing the offender time off for good behaviour.

Mr. Flynn

One of the purposes of this proposal is to ensure that the sentence imposed in the sentencing country will be served in full in the country to which the offender is transferred. At present under the Council of Europe convention, it is open to each country to declare at the time of ratifying the agreement whether it will deal with sentences by continuing enforcement or convert them by some internal process. Prior to the person being transferred, a country must indicate to the sentencing country how it intends to enforce the sentence or convert it. Under this proposal, the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish delegations have indicated they perceive it as a failure of the convention and that the sentence should be enforced as a matter of justice.

On remission, national laws would apply, as they currently do under the convention. For example, if a person serving a sentence of longer than four years was transferred from England, he or she would be entitled to remission of 33%. When persons return to Ireland, they receive 25%. They are informed of this change and the expected date of release should they get full remission. Remission rules will continue to apply in national cases under this proposal but we foresee a number of problems as the proposal also indicates that the sentencing state would have something to say on when releases would apply. Currently, the Minster has full authority to release persons for humanitarian reasons at an early stage of the sentence but, under this proposal, he would need to consult the sentencing state to ensure it had no objection to granting a release.

I thank our guests. This concludes our discussion today on this proposal. Is it agreed to report back to the Sub-Committee on European Scrutiny that this committee has considered the proposal and does not require further scrutiny at this stage?

I would be very concerned about a situation wherein someone could commit a serious offence here but be sent back for a minor offence and avoid being charged for the one committed here. It would make a mockery of the law.

The proceedings of this committee will be taken into account and reported to the Minister. Is that agreed? Agreed. I thank Mr. Burke and Mr. Flynn.

We will move on to the proposal for a Council framework decision on the application of the principle of ne bis in idem. I welcome Mr. Barry O’Connor from the Department. The purpose of this proposal is to provide the member states of the EU with common legal rules to ensure uniformity in both interpretation and practical implementation of the principle of ne bis in idem or “double jeopardy”.

Mr. Barry O’Connor

I thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss this proposal. I will give a brief summary of the background and details of the proposal, as we are pressed for time, and will then answer questions as comprehensively as I can. The aim of the draft framework decision is to provide the member states of the EU with common legal rules to ensure uniformity in both interpretation and practical implementation of the principle of ne bis in idem or so-called double jeopardy, namely, the principle that a person cannot be tried in two countries for the same act. This principle is already enshrined in the 1987 Convention on Double Jeopardy, which Ireland ratified in April 1999 and which provides that, subject to exceptions, a person whose trial has finally been disposed of in a member state of the EU may not be prosecuted for the same act in another member state. In addition, this wording was later inserted in the Schengen Agreement of 1991 as Articles 54 to 58 and Ireland has decided to opt into these provisions.

This was the context in which the Greek Presidency proposed the draft framework decision in March 2003. It did so on foot of a decision of the European Court of Justice, C-187/01 in the case of Gözütok and Brügge. This was a joint case in which the German authorities had charged persons in respect of acts committed in the Netherlands and Belgium respectively. In each case, a settlement had been concluded with the accused, which involved the payment of a fine and a bar on further prosecution. There was a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice regarding the correct interpretation and application of Article 54 of the Schengen Agreement in each case. In the ECJ judgment, it was held that Article 54 did apply in these cases. The article states:

A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under laws of the sentencing Contracting Party.

The judgment effectively established that any procedure that barred further prosecution when taken by an authority empowered to play a part in the administration of justice would be regarded as "finally disposed of" under Article 54 of the Schengen Agreement.

The draft framework decision purports to build on the Schengen provisions. Also prompting this proposal was point 49(e) of the Vienna action plan, which provided that measures would be established within five years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, namely, by 21 September 2002, for the co-ordination of criminal investigations and prosecutions taking into account better use of the ne bis in idem principle. Measure No. 1 of the programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters, established by the Council and the Commission, calls for a reconsideration of the relevant Schengen articles with a view to full implementation of the ne bis in idem principle.

Negotiations began in March 2003 in the substantive criminal law working group and continued through the Greek and Italian Presidencies of that year. The last round of substantive negotiations took place on 5 December 2003 where the document DROIPEN 85 COMIX 729, which contained the latest proposals for the framework decision, was examined. A further document, DROIPEN 89, emerged from that meeting's discussions and is being circulated. The main barriers to agreement were in respect of Article 4 on the issue of lis pendens or the determination of which member state had competence where more than one had jurisdiction over a case and Article 5 on exceptions to the application of the principle of ne bis in idem.

The issue regarding Article 4 boiled down to whether the process of deciding which member state should have competence should be based on a list of binding criteria or on a non-binding consultation process. The Article 5 issue came down to whether the exceptions to the principle should mirror those contained in the Schengen Agreement or be more restrictive. The latest draft of the article proposed allowing member states to make a declaration at the time of adoption of the framework decision that they would not be bound by the principle of ne bis in idem where the acts involved constituted offences against national security or other essential elements of the member state, were committed by an official of the member state in violation of the duties of his office or took place in whole or in part in its own territory. The Commission believed that these exceptions should be limited as far as possible and should be subject to a five year “guillotine” on their application.

In essence, the differences came down to whether the proposal added any value to the Schengen Agreement. The Commission, supported by Italy, felt that the draft Article 4, as it stood then with a list of non-binding criteria to determine competence, added value but that the inclusion of the list of exceptions in Article 5 undermined the whole proposal. The Netherlands felt that there was no added value in the draft at all.

Some other issues that arose in the course of negotiations included the definition of "final decision" in a case, whether statute barred decisions come within the scope of the definition of "final decision", whether the framework decision should apply to both criminal and administrative offences and whether a definition of "same facts" should be included. By the Irish Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2004, discussions had reached deadlock. During our Presidency we did not formally table discussions for this instrument to allow for a period of reflection on to how best take the proposal forward. The negotiations had reached a stalemate and a Commission consultation paper on conflicts of jurisdiction was expected in autumn 2004.

Ireland reviewed the state of play, consulting a number of delegations, notably Greece and Italy, and the Commission. The Irish Presidency concluded that it would be best to refer the matter to the Article 36 committee for consideration. The Article 36 committee submitted the matter to Council and it was decided by Council in June 2004 to continue negotiations on the draft framework decision in the broader context of the Commission consultation paper on conflicts of jurisdiction, which the Commission originally planned to publish in September 2004.

It was hoped two cases that involved issues underlying the framework decision, and were pending before the EU would be resolved by the time the Commission issued its document and that the judgments would inform further negotiations. As it turned out, one of the cases, the Hiebler case, was withdrawn in March 2004. However, a preliminary ruling in the second case, the Miraglia case, was given in March of this year and this dealt with the issue of what constitutes final disposition of a case.

The current position is that the Commission now states that a Green Paper will be published in 2005 followed by a legislative proposal in 2006. The proposal remains subject to parliamentary scrutiny reservations by France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, and to a general scrutiny reservation by Belgium, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, and Germany. It is also the subject of linguistic reservations.

It seems to be making great progress.

Why are we dealing with it today if we are in deadlock, a Green Paper will be published by 31 December and there will be a further proposal next year?

The Committee on European Scrutiny asked us to examine this and we are trying to deal with all items we have been asked to examine. Mr. O'Connor has facilitated us in this respect.

The statement on Article 54, the European Court of Justice judgment, states that the "person whose trial has been fully disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under laws of the sentencing Contracting Party". A member state gets one bite at the cherry and there is no sense in other member states queueing up for another bite of the cherry. No wonder there is difficulty coming to any conclusions. It is difficult to see where there is added value other than fees paid to lawyers. If there is a Green Paper published before the end of the year we can discuss this further.

We will look forward to viewing the Green Paper.

Mr. O’Connor

I have checked on the status of the Green Paper and it is not on the Commission diary for this year. It will possibly be early next year before committee members see the Green Paper. This has come to light in recent days.

Does the Minister believe this will provide added value?

Mr. O’Connor

Our view was that there was no point in the proposal if it did not provide added value, particularly in respect of exceptions to the rule contained in Article 54 of the Schengen Agreement. We concentrated on Article 5 of the framework decision and if there was to be any added value it would be in this area, where exemptions could be limited as much as possible.

It is interesting that the people co-ordinating this project are the exception. Officials in the member states are trying to provide for their prosecution in two or three different member states. That concludes our discussion on that proposal. Is it agreed to report to the Sub-Committee on European Scrutiny that this committee has considered the proposal and it does not require further scrutiny at this stage? Agreed. I thank Mr. O'Connor for attending.

The joint committee went into private session at 10.15 a.m. and adjourned at 10.35 a.m. sine die.

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