I move:—
"That it is expedient that a Joint Committee consisting of five members of the Dáil and five members of the Seanad be set up to consider and report on the changes, if any, necessary in the constitution and powers of, and methods of election to, Seanad Eireann."
It is not because I feel that there is anything fundamentally wrong or objectionable in the present constitution of, or method of election to, the Seanad that I have tabled the motion standing in my name. I believe that, under existing arrangements, it is possible for the Seanad, in course of time, to become a thoroughly competent, representative and effective assembly, efficiently discharging all the functions rightly attaching to a Second Chamber. I believe also that it is unwise to embark on further alterations of the Saorstát Constitution in this respect until a reasonable experimental period has elapsed, under what might be termed normal Parliamentary conditions, which would certainly be different from the conditions that have prevailed during the greater portion of the time since the Seanad came into existence. There are people, however, some of them in high places, and others personally interested in the triennial elections due to take place this year, who profess to find something terribly wrong with the present method of election. We are told that a different method is imperative if we are to have what are considered the right sort of people returned. Then we are told that the number of Senators will have to be reduced by one-third. I have never heard any reasonable arguments advanced in support of either of these proposals, but, at all events, they represent the views of certain people in both Houses, and possibly also in the country, to the extent that the matter has ever been considered at all, except for loose propaganda purposes. They are proposals of an important character, involving a recasting of the Constitution, and should not be embarked upon lightly or without due consideration. Neither should they be lightly turned down, but explored to the uttermost in a calm judicial manner to ascertain whether they are calculated to evolve a more useful and efficient form of Second Chamber than the Seanad is likely to become under the existing Constitution.
It is to enable the whole question to receive the kind of consideration that it deserves that I move this motion. If there is to be any legislation involving a change in the power, constitution or method of election of this House, I think it is desirable, necessary and proper that the House itself should be taken into consultation before such legislation takes definite shape. The wisdom, apart from the constitutional propriety of such a course, should be obvious to any statesman. I am not going to waste time by making a complaint. The Seanad itself has important duties and responsibilities in this respect. It is one of the two Houses of the Oireachtas, created by the Saorstát Constitution, and it is its obvious duty to be exceedingly vigilant in regard to any attempt contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution to weaken the position of the Chamber actually or relatively, or to take away from it rights, powers and responsibilities conferred by that Constitution. We are the custodians of all that the Constitution has conferred on the Seanad, whether by way of power or responsibility, and we shall be rightly held accountable by the nation for the manner in which we discharge and preserve these Constitutional powers and responsibilities. In every human institution there will be found odd individuals who are prepared, perhaps, to impair or surrender its birthright if thereby they can ensure for themselves permanent membership of that institution. It is against any move of that kind that those who wish to preserve this as a dignified, useful national body will have to guard. Whatever our individual views may be as to the necessity for a Second Chamber I think we would all agree that if there is to be a Second Chamber at all it should not be a mere make-believe; that it should not be what the Canadian Senate was once said to be, a place for certain privileged people peacefully
To husband out life's taper at the close, And keep the flame from wasting by repose.
By no means the least important factor in the utility of a Second Chamber is the extent to which it commands the confidence and respect of the people. It is here that the method of election is of great importance, because no matter what the wisdom and abilities of its personnel, an assembly that is not built upon some popular foundation cannot possibly hope for long—if indeed at all—to command the confidence and support of the people, even when it takes a line that is in accord with the views of the great majority.
Writing of the Canadian Senate, Prof. Robert A. Mackay, Assistant Professor of Government in Cornell University, says:
Undoubtedly, the greatest defect of the Senate is that in a democratic community, governed by representative institutions and wedded to theories of popular sovereignty the Senate rests upon no popular foundation.... The Senate, if it is to be anything but a body of drafting experts, must on occasion take a hand in directing public policy, but whenever it does so it is very likely to meet with a storm of disapproval because its members have, after all, no political authority to voice anything but their own opinions. It matters little that these same opinions may be held by a substantial body of the electorate; the fact remains that Senators have no mandate to speak for others than themselves. However useful the advice offered, however successful the Senate may have been in interpreting public policy, or the real opinions of the electorate when it has opposed the Commons, the system by which it is constituted is the antithesis of representative Government. A political institution constituted thus cannot be strong, influential or trusted by the community at large.
It is true that the Canadian Senate is an entirely nominated body, but the general mass of the people are not likely to draw any very marked distinction between a Chamber nominated by one man on the advice of a Party caucus and an assembly elected by, say, 100 or 150 people. It would still be a very close borough with no direct contact with or responsibility to the general body of electors, and consequently no sympathy or support from them in its efforts to influence legislation, even in a beneficial way, should that influence not be in direct accord with the views of the Party in power at that particular time. The popular sympathy will always be with the Party in conflict with the Seanad. If this is likely to be the position, because of the source from which the Senate gets its authority, its powers for good will be very limited, and the other House is not likely to take much notice of its representations, or Senators themselves to take much interest in their work. Nobody wants to see the Seanad packed with that type of Senator, who thinks that his principal function is to turn up in a tall hat to receptions, garden parties and public funerals, or to act in the capacity of a flunkey or court jester to whatever Government is in power for the time being. By restricting the electorate in the manner suggested by certain proposals which have got a good deal of publicity I can see a grave danger of the Seanad becoming a sort of convalescent home for retired business men and people able to subscribe liberally to Party funds, just as the sale of titles in Great Britain has admittedly been the chief means of supplying the huge election funds of both Conservatives and Liberals.
I think it is time that some halt was called to the capital that is being made out of the alleged failure of the 1925 election. The whole of the contributing circumstances is always carefully ignored. In the first place, the second biggest Party in the country advised its followers to boycott the election. That in itself accounted for some hundreds of thousands of votes that would otherwise be cast. Secondly, the polling hours were only from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m., as if the day was a general holiday. An amendment to the Electoral Bill abolished the general holiday but omitted to insert a necessary consequential amendment in regard to the hours of polling. Thus many went to the booths shortly after 7 p.m. to find them closed. Thirdly, the day was one of the wettest and most inclement possible, and last, but by no means least, the daily newspapers took a commercial view of the election and refused to publish anything in connection with it except at the rate of a guinea an inch, single column.
Even in a Dáil election such a combination of circumstances would have a very vital effect on the result. The real wonder was that over 300,000 people went to the polls, for the purpose of electing 19 Senators. It is ostensibly on the experience of this unique election that the whole system of election is condemned. It is true that some good candidates were defeated, but surely this will always happen, to a certain extent, in every election, even if you had only three electors instead of 300,000. Who put the bad candidates on the panel? In my opinion the method of election has a direct relationship with the powers of the Seanad. The moment you restrict the electorate you raise the question of the powers to be remitted the body elected, and, moreover, give reasonable grounds for a demand for a restriction of the powers of the elected body. If the matter is not discussed when the method of election is changed, it will, I believe, be raised at a later stage when the whole position will have been prejudiced by an important alteration having been made without due regard being had to its effect on other vital aspects of the problem. Hence, before a final decision and an election method is decided on, functions and powers should be discussed.
If it is thought desirable that a reduction in the membership of the Seanad should be effected, this also should be a matter of consideration for the Joint Committee. It is not by any means the most important aspect of the question. At the same time it is interesting to note that in a very large number of States with Second Chambers the latter have generally from one-third to one-half of the membership of the popular House. In Belgium the membership of the First House is double that of the Second Chamber. Denmark has 152 in the Lower House and 78 in the Second Chamber. The Canadian Constitution made provision for 181 M.Ps. and 76 Senators, with power to increase the number to 78. The Act of 1915 increases the Senators to 96, with power to raise the number to 104, whilst the number of members of the Commons was, I believe, raised in proportion. The South African Constitution provided for 121 M.Ps. and 40 Senators. In Czecho-Slovakia there are 300 members in the Lower House and 150 in the Upper. There is a risk in reducing the number of any such assembly to a figure calculated to give a very low average attendance. At best only a proportion attend regularly, whilst the brunt of the work falls on the shoulders of a still smaller proportion. If the gross numbers are drastically reduced it will mean a smaller attendance still, and a smaller number of people to perform the real work. An assembly that musters about the same numerical strength as a Board of Guardians is uninspiring from a national view point, both as regards the country generally and those taking part in its deliberations. It is strange that some of those now demanding a reduction in the membership were the people responsible for having the present figure fixed when the Constitution was first drafted.
At all events, as the membership of both Houses was fixed at the same time it would seem to be only fitting that possible reductions in both might also be considered together, judging by the proportionate numerical strength of the First and Second Chambers in other countries. It might very well be argued that if forty Senators are quite as useful as sixty, with equal reason, particularly if we are out for economy, 100 Deputies might easily be a more effective body than 153. It is true that whilst the membership of this House is sixty the average attendance has been very much below that number, and it is also a matter for comment that the principal offenders in the matter of attendance are from amongst the nominated element. Some of the most useful members came from that section. This might reasonably be taken as an indication that a Senator who feels no personal responsibility to an electorate is not so likely to be regular in his attendance, or not so inclined to discharge his duties in a conscientious manner, as he would if the position were otherwise. Another reason, of course, why the attendance has been bad from some sections is the fact that people have been selected for nomination, and were elected, who have numerous commercial interests to attend to, and who cannot possibly give that regular attendance in the Seanad which membership should demand. In addition to other qualifications, one essential that I think should be necessary for election to a Parliamentary assembly is that the person elected should be in a position to give a reasonable amount of time to Parliamentary work. Otherwise he is simply exploiting and humbugging the State.
Our experience during the last five years goes to prove the necessity for some punitive measures to be taken with regard to bad attendance or nonattendance, which, in some cases, has amounted to a scandal. In the Canadian Senate a member absenting himself without leave for two consecutive sessions loses his seat. In Australia absence without the leave of the Senate for two consecutive months of any session involves the loss of the seat. In South Africa a senator absent for one whole session forfeits his seat, and in addition there is deducted £3 0s. 0d. from his allowance in respect of each day absent without leave. In other Second Chambers such as in Czecho-Slovakia no vote can be taken unless two-thirds of the total membership are present. I only wish that we had a standing order of that kind here. It would then be seen that on the great majority of the days we meet we would have to go home without doing any business because of the fact that two-thirds were not present.
Some measures such as these are necessary to protect the State from people who merely look upon a senatorship as an honour involving no duties or responsibilities, and who contribute more than any other factor in making this House unpopular and misunderstood in the minds of the general public. It is not necessary, in my opinion, that a member should consider he has discharged his duty simply because he dashes in here when he has nothing else to do and dashes out again unless the business to be done is of interest. I should say, speaking generally, that those who have been attending the Seanad at all have attended well and have influenced legislation to an extent that is not, I believe, at all appreciated by the public. A few figures as to the extent to which important Bills have been amended by the Seanad may be of interest. The Seanad amended some of the most important Bills as follows:—
Amendments. |
|
Electoral Bill, 1923 |
15 |
Damage to Property (Compensation) Bill |
16 |
Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Bill, 1923 |
13 |
Land Bill, 1923 |
27 |
Civil Service Regulation (No. 2) Bill |
7 |
Courts of Justice Bill |
44 |
Ministers and Secretaries Bill |
10 |
Dublin Port and Docks Bill |
11 |
Local Government Bill, 1925 |
109 |
Treasonable Offences Bill |
11 |
Local Authorities (Combined Purchasing) Bill |
7 |
Fisheries Bill |
15 |
Shannon Electricity Bill, 1925 |
9 |
Statistics Bill |
11 |
Court Officers Bill |
24 |
Juries Bill |
13 |
Intoxicating Liquor Bill, 1927 |
28 |
Industrial and Commercial Property Protection Bill |
70 |
Land Bill, 1927 |
13 |
Agricultural Credit Bill |
32 |
Barrow Drainage Bill |
10 |
Electricity Supply Bill |
54 |
Currency Bill |
33 |
These are only examples of numerous other Bills of importance which have been materially amended by this House. Altogether the Seanad has inserted 964 amendments of which 945 were ultimately agreed to by the Dáil. If Senators were better political propagandists than they are, they could have talked four times as much, inserted only one-fourth of the amendments, and have obtained greater credit from the public. Because they have done their work with the minimum of talk, there is a popular impression that they only meet formally for a few days in each session and pass at express speed, without discussion or amendment, the legislation so much discussed in the other House. Even during the period February to August, 1927, the Seanad inserted 268 amendments to Bills, all of which, with one exception, were accepted by the Dáil. It must, of course, also be remembered that scores of measures which have been enacted were merely consequential legislation arising out of the Treaty, and in the main non-controversial and not calling for any particular attention or amendment at the hands of this House.
I think it will be agreed generally that the great majority of the amendments inserted tended to make the amended measures more democratic than they were when they left the Dáil. During the Railways Bill discussions in 1924 I was personally able to get carried in this House numerous valuable amendments for the protection of railway employees rendered redundant owing to amalgamation which had been turned down in both stages in the other House. It is true, unfortunately, that these provisions were drastically removed by the amending Act of 1926, but the offensive did not originate in the Seanad. As regards the Local Government Bill of 1925 and the Electricity Bill of last year, it was in this House mainly that the case of employees likely to be affected with unemployment by Local Government and electrical development was most generously and effectively dealt with by the insertion of important amendments safeguarding their employment. The Seanad also rejected the Civil Service Regulations Bill of 1925 because of its unfair discrimination against women, and the principal fight for the rights of women in regard to serving on juries was also made in this House. There were, of course, times when splendid opportunities were afforded Senators to act as calm, unimpassioned but powerful guardians of individual citizen rights, whilst at the same time not imperilling the safety of the State or undermining its Constitution in any way. They had opportunities of showing that they could rise above mere Party passions and in a calm judicial way practise a moderating influence on hasty legislation, conceived in panic or in a spirit of vengeance. It was on such occasions that a majority of the House allowed itself to be stampeded in a very regrettable way, and it is through this lack of courage or lack of public interest on occasions such as these that it owes a tremendous amount of its unpopularity and the lack of confidence that at present prevails.
At the same time I do not think that the best interests of the country would be served by abolishing the Second Chamber, as some people would suggest. Quite obviously a Second Chamber is as necessary here as in any other country in the world. Moreover, the general trend of democracy has been to establish and maintain Second Chambers. The whole of the 48 American States have Second Chambers—all of them elected—whilst the whole of the new European States brought into existence as a result of the Great War have, with three minor exceptions, established Second Chambers. How necessary they are is quite obvious to every statesman of experience. The late Lord Bryce, one of the most enthusiastic supporters of popular government, declared that:
"Legislatures are liable to fall under the control of one political party disposed to press through, in a hasty or tyrannical spirit, measures conceived in the interests of that party, or of a particular class in the community, often without allowing sufficient time for full debate, sometimes even by means of an organisation of the ruling majority which binds all its members to support whatever measures have been adopted by the larger part of that majority. Where this happens it is not the legislature as a whole that governs but a majority of a majority which may frequently be a minority of the whole body."
But Bryce was emphatically of the opinion that an upper Chamber as well as the popular Chamber must enjoy the respect and confidence of the public if it was to be of any value, and he argued, therefore, that the question of function could not be separated from the method of creating the upper Chamber. If I might again quote Professor Mackay in regard to the Canadian Senate. He said:
Some of the reports of its Special Committees would do credit to any legislature, whilst its debates on important public questions are frequently full of valuable information, and show a breadth of view not found in similar debates in the Commons. Yet it must be admitted that much of this work is of little practical value because of the low estimate placed upon the Senate by the general public.
The low estimate he attributes to the method by which the Chamber is recruited, and it is for this reason that the greatest possible care should be exercised in any alterations that may be embarked upon regarding the method of election to the Saorstát Second Chamber. When you proceed to alter the method of election, to alter the Constitution by reducing the membership, you immediately bring into question the constitution, powers and functions delegated to that Assembly. Whilst every possible effort should be made to try to procure the most efficient Chamber possible, we should be careful to ensure that the Seanad does not develop into a miniature House of Lords without the ancient traditions of that assembly, to which may be relegated by Ministers and Party leaders in the other House people whose only qualification is their ability to subscribe handsomely to Party funds and who can be relied upon to confine themselves to innocuous pastimes, such as paying fulsome compliments to Ministers and turning out in suitable attire on all State occasions. The assembly to be useful must command respect and a certain amount of popularity, and to achieve this it must rest on some popular foundation. It must not be composed of people who hold their seats at the whim of one or two men but of men who must be prepared not only to work but at times who will have the courage to take a firm stand on matters of great moment either to the people as a whole or to a minority.
The composition and powers of the Second Chamber are matters of equal importance to all Parties in the State, because the Government of to-day may be in opposition to-morrow, and may require to be protected at times from the excesses of an unscrupulous political majority, acquired perhaps quite accidentally. It is therefore in the interests of all that any alteration in the present constitution and method of election should only be decided upon after very careful consideration, in an atmosphere removed from the heat and passion of Party debate. Let us hope, having once decided upon a further alteration of the Constitution, should such a decision be arrived at, that we shall then leave off tinkering with the Constitution which is supposed to be the fundamental law of the land, not to be changed daily like a draper's shop window. Not a Session passes but some alteration is made in the Constitution. At times it is set aside almost completely for a period of years, as in the case of the last Public Safety Act. It is fast becoming like a patchwork quilt with its patches threatening to obscure the original material. If we cannot have some stability about the Constitution, we had better abolish it and not run the risk of getting tied up in a complication of amendments, and amendments to amendments which will become an altogether insoluble puzzle, making people wonder what has become of the original Constitution. If alterations are desirable they should be considered, and I think that the best way of considering them is through the medium of such a Committee as I suggest, away from the limelight, away from the necessity of having to face the gallery, and away from all influences which party politicians and party passion introduce into public debates. It may be possible to arrive at some agreement or, at least, some substantial measure of agreement, which will, at all events, secure that, if any alterations are introduced, they will be introduced in the interests of an efficient and representative Second Chamber and in the interests of the State as a whole. I, therefore, move my motion.