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Seanad Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 15 Feb 1928

Vol. 10 No. 7

PUBLIC BUSINESS. - THE SEANAD ELECTIONS. MOTION BY SENATOR O'FARRELL.

I move:—

"That it is expedient that a Joint Committee consisting of five members of the Dáil and five members of the Seanad be set up to consider and report on the changes, if any, necessary in the constitution and powers of, and methods of election to, Seanad Eireann."

It is not because I feel that there is anything fundamentally wrong or objectionable in the present constitution of, or method of election to, the Seanad that I have tabled the motion standing in my name. I believe that, under existing arrangements, it is possible for the Seanad, in course of time, to become a thoroughly competent, representative and effective assembly, efficiently discharging all the functions rightly attaching to a Second Chamber. I believe also that it is unwise to embark on further alterations of the Saorstát Constitution in this respect until a reasonable experimental period has elapsed, under what might be termed normal Parliamentary conditions, which would certainly be different from the conditions that have prevailed during the greater portion of the time since the Seanad came into existence. There are people, however, some of them in high places, and others personally interested in the triennial elections due to take place this year, who profess to find something terribly wrong with the present method of election. We are told that a different method is imperative if we are to have what are considered the right sort of people returned. Then we are told that the number of Senators will have to be reduced by one-third. I have never heard any reasonable arguments advanced in support of either of these proposals, but, at all events, they represent the views of certain people in both Houses, and possibly also in the country, to the extent that the matter has ever been considered at all, except for loose propaganda purposes. They are proposals of an important character, involving a recasting of the Constitution, and should not be embarked upon lightly or without due consideration. Neither should they be lightly turned down, but explored to the uttermost in a calm judicial manner to ascertain whether they are calculated to evolve a more useful and efficient form of Second Chamber than the Seanad is likely to become under the existing Constitution.

It is to enable the whole question to receive the kind of consideration that it deserves that I move this motion. If there is to be any legislation involving a change in the power, constitution or method of election of this House, I think it is desirable, necessary and proper that the House itself should be taken into consultation before such legislation takes definite shape. The wisdom, apart from the constitutional propriety of such a course, should be obvious to any statesman. I am not going to waste time by making a complaint. The Seanad itself has important duties and responsibilities in this respect. It is one of the two Houses of the Oireachtas, created by the Saorstát Constitution, and it is its obvious duty to be exceedingly vigilant in regard to any attempt contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution to weaken the position of the Chamber actually or relatively, or to take away from it rights, powers and responsibilities conferred by that Constitution. We are the custodians of all that the Constitution has conferred on the Seanad, whether by way of power or responsibility, and we shall be rightly held accountable by the nation for the manner in which we discharge and preserve these Constitutional powers and responsibilities. In every human institution there will be found odd individuals who are prepared, perhaps, to impair or surrender its birthright if thereby they can ensure for themselves permanent membership of that institution. It is against any move of that kind that those who wish to preserve this as a dignified, useful national body will have to guard. Whatever our individual views may be as to the necessity for a Second Chamber I think we would all agree that if there is to be a Second Chamber at all it should not be a mere make-believe; that it should not be what the Canadian Senate was once said to be, a place for certain privileged people peacefully

To husband out life's taper at the close, And keep the flame from wasting by repose.

By no means the least important factor in the utility of a Second Chamber is the extent to which it commands the confidence and respect of the people. It is here that the method of election is of great importance, because no matter what the wisdom and abilities of its personnel, an assembly that is not built upon some popular foundation cannot possibly hope for long—if indeed at all—to command the confidence and support of the people, even when it takes a line that is in accord with the views of the great majority.

Writing of the Canadian Senate, Prof. Robert A. Mackay, Assistant Professor of Government in Cornell University, says:

Undoubtedly, the greatest defect of the Senate is that in a democratic community, governed by representative institutions and wedded to theories of popular sovereignty the Senate rests upon no popular foundation.... The Senate, if it is to be anything but a body of drafting experts, must on occasion take a hand in directing public policy, but whenever it does so it is very likely to meet with a storm of disapproval because its members have, after all, no political authority to voice anything but their own opinions. It matters little that these same opinions may be held by a substantial body of the electorate; the fact remains that Senators have no mandate to speak for others than themselves. However useful the advice offered, however successful the Senate may have been in interpreting public policy, or the real opinions of the electorate when it has opposed the Commons, the system by which it is constituted is the antithesis of representative Government. A political institution constituted thus cannot be strong, influential or trusted by the community at large.

It is true that the Canadian Senate is an entirely nominated body, but the general mass of the people are not likely to draw any very marked distinction between a Chamber nominated by one man on the advice of a Party caucus and an assembly elected by, say, 100 or 150 people. It would still be a very close borough with no direct contact with or responsibility to the general body of electors, and consequently no sympathy or support from them in its efforts to influence legislation, even in a beneficial way, should that influence not be in direct accord with the views of the Party in power at that particular time. The popular sympathy will always be with the Party in conflict with the Seanad. If this is likely to be the position, because of the source from which the Senate gets its authority, its powers for good will be very limited, and the other House is not likely to take much notice of its representations, or Senators themselves to take much interest in their work. Nobody wants to see the Seanad packed with that type of Senator, who thinks that his principal function is to turn up in a tall hat to receptions, garden parties and public funerals, or to act in the capacity of a flunkey or court jester to whatever Government is in power for the time being. By restricting the electorate in the manner suggested by certain proposals which have got a good deal of publicity I can see a grave danger of the Seanad becoming a sort of convalescent home for retired business men and people able to subscribe liberally to Party funds, just as the sale of titles in Great Britain has admittedly been the chief means of supplying the huge election funds of both Conservatives and Liberals.

I think it is time that some halt was called to the capital that is being made out of the alleged failure of the 1925 election. The whole of the contributing circumstances is always carefully ignored. In the first place, the second biggest Party in the country advised its followers to boycott the election. That in itself accounted for some hundreds of thousands of votes that would otherwise be cast. Secondly, the polling hours were only from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m., as if the day was a general holiday. An amendment to the Electoral Bill abolished the general holiday but omitted to insert a necessary consequential amendment in regard to the hours of polling. Thus many went to the booths shortly after 7 p.m. to find them closed. Thirdly, the day was one of the wettest and most inclement possible, and last, but by no means least, the daily newspapers took a commercial view of the election and refused to publish anything in connection with it except at the rate of a guinea an inch, single column.

Even in a Dáil election such a combination of circumstances would have a very vital effect on the result. The real wonder was that over 300,000 people went to the polls, for the purpose of electing 19 Senators. It is ostensibly on the experience of this unique election that the whole system of election is condemned. It is true that some good candidates were defeated, but surely this will always happen, to a certain extent, in every election, even if you had only three electors instead of 300,000. Who put the bad candidates on the panel? In my opinion the method of election has a direct relationship with the powers of the Seanad. The moment you restrict the electorate you raise the question of the powers to be remitted the body elected, and, moreover, give reasonable grounds for a demand for a restriction of the powers of the elected body. If the matter is not discussed when the method of election is changed, it will, I believe, be raised at a later stage when the whole position will have been prejudiced by an important alteration having been made without due regard being had to its effect on other vital aspects of the problem. Hence, before a final decision and an election method is decided on, functions and powers should be discussed.

If it is thought desirable that a reduction in the membership of the Seanad should be effected, this also should be a matter of consideration for the Joint Committee. It is not by any means the most important aspect of the question. At the same time it is interesting to note that in a very large number of States with Second Chambers the latter have generally from one-third to one-half of the membership of the popular House. In Belgium the membership of the First House is double that of the Second Chamber. Denmark has 152 in the Lower House and 78 in the Second Chamber. The Canadian Constitution made provision for 181 M.Ps. and 76 Senators, with power to increase the number to 78. The Act of 1915 increases the Senators to 96, with power to raise the number to 104, whilst the number of members of the Commons was, I believe, raised in proportion. The South African Constitution provided for 121 M.Ps. and 40 Senators. In Czecho-Slovakia there are 300 members in the Lower House and 150 in the Upper. There is a risk in reducing the number of any such assembly to a figure calculated to give a very low average attendance. At best only a proportion attend regularly, whilst the brunt of the work falls on the shoulders of a still smaller proportion. If the gross numbers are drastically reduced it will mean a smaller attendance still, and a smaller number of people to perform the real work. An assembly that musters about the same numerical strength as a Board of Guardians is uninspiring from a national view point, both as regards the country generally and those taking part in its deliberations. It is strange that some of those now demanding a reduction in the membership were the people responsible for having the present figure fixed when the Constitution was first drafted.

At all events, as the membership of both Houses was fixed at the same time it would seem to be only fitting that possible reductions in both might also be considered together, judging by the proportionate numerical strength of the First and Second Chambers in other countries. It might very well be argued that if forty Senators are quite as useful as sixty, with equal reason, particularly if we are out for economy, 100 Deputies might easily be a more effective body than 153. It is true that whilst the membership of this House is sixty the average attendance has been very much below that number, and it is also a matter for comment that the principal offenders in the matter of attendance are from amongst the nominated element. Some of the most useful members came from that section. This might reasonably be taken as an indication that a Senator who feels no personal responsibility to an electorate is not so likely to be regular in his attendance, or not so inclined to discharge his duties in a conscientious manner, as he would if the position were otherwise. Another reason, of course, why the attendance has been bad from some sections is the fact that people have been selected for nomination, and were elected, who have numerous commercial interests to attend to, and who cannot possibly give that regular attendance in the Seanad which membership should demand. In addition to other qualifications, one essential that I think should be necessary for election to a Parliamentary assembly is that the person elected should be in a position to give a reasonable amount of time to Parliamentary work. Otherwise he is simply exploiting and humbugging the State.

Our experience during the last five years goes to prove the necessity for some punitive measures to be taken with regard to bad attendance or nonattendance, which, in some cases, has amounted to a scandal. In the Canadian Senate a member absenting himself without leave for two consecutive sessions loses his seat. In Australia absence without the leave of the Senate for two consecutive months of any session involves the loss of the seat. In South Africa a senator absent for one whole session forfeits his seat, and in addition there is deducted £3 0s. 0d. from his allowance in respect of each day absent without leave. In other Second Chambers such as in Czecho-Slovakia no vote can be taken unless two-thirds of the total membership are present. I only wish that we had a standing order of that kind here. It would then be seen that on the great majority of the days we meet we would have to go home without doing any business because of the fact that two-thirds were not present.

Some measures such as these are necessary to protect the State from people who merely look upon a senatorship as an honour involving no duties or responsibilities, and who contribute more than any other factor in making this House unpopular and misunderstood in the minds of the general public. It is not necessary, in my opinion, that a member should consider he has discharged his duty simply because he dashes in here when he has nothing else to do and dashes out again unless the business to be done is of interest. I should say, speaking generally, that those who have been attending the Seanad at all have attended well and have influenced legislation to an extent that is not, I believe, at all appreciated by the public. A few figures as to the extent to which important Bills have been amended by the Seanad may be of interest. The Seanad amended some of the most important Bills as follows:—

Amendments.

Electoral Bill, 1923

15

Damage to Property (Compensation) Bill

16

Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Bill, 1923

13

Land Bill, 1923

27

Civil Service Regulation (No. 2) Bill

7

Courts of Justice Bill

44

Ministers and Secretaries Bill

10

Dublin Port and Docks Bill

11

Local Government Bill, 1925

109

Treasonable Offences Bill

11

Local Authorities (Combined Purchasing) Bill

7

Fisheries Bill

15

Shannon Electricity Bill, 1925

9

Statistics Bill

11

Court Officers Bill

24

Juries Bill

13

Intoxicating Liquor Bill, 1927

28

Industrial and Commercial Property Protection Bill

70

Land Bill, 1927

13

Agricultural Credit Bill

32

Barrow Drainage Bill

10

Electricity Supply Bill

54

Currency Bill

33

These are only examples of numerous other Bills of importance which have been materially amended by this House. Altogether the Seanad has inserted 964 amendments of which 945 were ultimately agreed to by the Dáil. If Senators were better political propagandists than they are, they could have talked four times as much, inserted only one-fourth of the amendments, and have obtained greater credit from the public. Because they have done their work with the minimum of talk, there is a popular impression that they only meet formally for a few days in each session and pass at express speed, without discussion or amendment, the legislation so much discussed in the other House. Even during the period February to August, 1927, the Seanad inserted 268 amendments to Bills, all of which, with one exception, were accepted by the Dáil. It must, of course, also be remembered that scores of measures which have been enacted were merely consequential legislation arising out of the Treaty, and in the main non-controversial and not calling for any particular attention or amendment at the hands of this House.

I think it will be agreed generally that the great majority of the amendments inserted tended to make the amended measures more democratic than they were when they left the Dáil. During the Railways Bill discussions in 1924 I was personally able to get carried in this House numerous valuable amendments for the protection of railway employees rendered redundant owing to amalgamation which had been turned down in both stages in the other House. It is true, unfortunately, that these provisions were drastically removed by the amending Act of 1926, but the offensive did not originate in the Seanad. As regards the Local Government Bill of 1925 and the Electricity Bill of last year, it was in this House mainly that the case of employees likely to be affected with unemployment by Local Government and electrical development was most generously and effectively dealt with by the insertion of important amendments safeguarding their employment. The Seanad also rejected the Civil Service Regulations Bill of 1925 because of its unfair discrimination against women, and the principal fight for the rights of women in regard to serving on juries was also made in this House. There were, of course, times when splendid opportunities were afforded Senators to act as calm, unimpassioned but powerful guardians of individual citizen rights, whilst at the same time not imperilling the safety of the State or undermining its Constitution in any way. They had opportunities of showing that they could rise above mere Party passions and in a calm judicial way practise a moderating influence on hasty legislation, conceived in panic or in a spirit of vengeance. It was on such occasions that a majority of the House allowed itself to be stampeded in a very regrettable way, and it is through this lack of courage or lack of public interest on occasions such as these that it owes a tremendous amount of its unpopularity and the lack of confidence that at present prevails.

At the same time I do not think that the best interests of the country would be served by abolishing the Second Chamber, as some people would suggest. Quite obviously a Second Chamber is as necessary here as in any other country in the world. Moreover, the general trend of democracy has been to establish and maintain Second Chambers. The whole of the 48 American States have Second Chambers—all of them elected—whilst the whole of the new European States brought into existence as a result of the Great War have, with three minor exceptions, established Second Chambers. How necessary they are is quite obvious to every statesman of experience. The late Lord Bryce, one of the most enthusiastic supporters of popular government, declared that:

"Legislatures are liable to fall under the control of one political party disposed to press through, in a hasty or tyrannical spirit, measures conceived in the interests of that party, or of a particular class in the community, often without allowing sufficient time for full debate, sometimes even by means of an organisation of the ruling majority which binds all its members to support whatever measures have been adopted by the larger part of that majority. Where this happens it is not the legislature as a whole that governs but a majority of a majority which may frequently be a minority of the whole body."

But Bryce was emphatically of the opinion that an upper Chamber as well as the popular Chamber must enjoy the respect and confidence of the public if it was to be of any value, and he argued, therefore, that the question of function could not be separated from the method of creating the upper Chamber. If I might again quote Professor Mackay in regard to the Canadian Senate. He said:

Some of the reports of its Special Committees would do credit to any legislature, whilst its debates on important public questions are frequently full of valuable information, and show a breadth of view not found in similar debates in the Commons. Yet it must be admitted that much of this work is of little practical value because of the low estimate placed upon the Senate by the general public.

The low estimate he attributes to the method by which the Chamber is recruited, and it is for this reason that the greatest possible care should be exercised in any alterations that may be embarked upon regarding the method of election to the Saorstát Second Chamber. When you proceed to alter the method of election, to alter the Constitution by reducing the membership, you immediately bring into question the constitution, powers and functions delegated to that Assembly. Whilst every possible effort should be made to try to procure the most efficient Chamber possible, we should be careful to ensure that the Seanad does not develop into a miniature House of Lords without the ancient traditions of that assembly, to which may be relegated by Ministers and Party leaders in the other House people whose only qualification is their ability to subscribe handsomely to Party funds and who can be relied upon to confine themselves to innocuous pastimes, such as paying fulsome compliments to Ministers and turning out in suitable attire on all State occasions. The assembly to be useful must command respect and a certain amount of popularity, and to achieve this it must rest on some popular foundation. It must not be composed of people who hold their seats at the whim of one or two men but of men who must be prepared not only to work but at times who will have the courage to take a firm stand on matters of great moment either to the people as a whole or to a minority.

The composition and powers of the Second Chamber are matters of equal importance to all Parties in the State, because the Government of to-day may be in opposition to-morrow, and may require to be protected at times from the excesses of an unscrupulous political majority, acquired perhaps quite accidentally. It is therefore in the interests of all that any alteration in the present constitution and method of election should only be decided upon after very careful consideration, in an atmosphere removed from the heat and passion of Party debate. Let us hope, having once decided upon a further alteration of the Constitution, should such a decision be arrived at, that we shall then leave off tinkering with the Constitution which is supposed to be the fundamental law of the land, not to be changed daily like a draper's shop window. Not a Session passes but some alteration is made in the Constitution. At times it is set aside almost completely for a period of years, as in the case of the last Public Safety Act. It is fast becoming like a patchwork quilt with its patches threatening to obscure the original material. If we cannot have some stability about the Constitution, we had better abolish it and not run the risk of getting tied up in a complication of amendments, and amendments to amendments which will become an altogether insoluble puzzle, making people wonder what has become of the original Constitution. If alterations are desirable they should be considered, and I think that the best way of considering them is through the medium of such a Committee as I suggest, away from the limelight, away from the necessity of having to face the gallery, and away from all influences which party politicians and party passion introduce into public debates. It may be possible to arrive at some agreement or, at least, some substantial measure of agreement, which will, at all events, secure that, if any alterations are introduced, they will be introduced in the interests of an efficient and representative Second Chamber and in the interests of the State as a whole. I, therefore, move my motion.

I second the motion.

As a member who has been successful under both forms of election which have been in operation for some years for the selection of members of the Seanad, I feel that I can speak with some experience on the subject of the motion. I am quite convinced that the mode of election which has been in operation for the election of Senators is altogether wrong. It is entirely too expensive, both for the candidate and the State. It does not produce the type of Senator who would do honour to the nation and whom the framers of the Constitution had in view. It also lends itself to many forms of trickery and malpractices, of which advantage would quickly be taken by many candidates at future elections. Many suggestions have been made with regard to the best form of electing members to this House, but to my mind the best method of election would be an election by members of the Dáil and Seanad combined, exclusive of the retiring Senators. Such election should be held on the principle of proportional representation. I am strongly of opinion that before such election should take place, there should be a selection board, or committee, set up to examine the credentials of the prospective candidates in order to see that they comply with the intentions of the Constitution. If that were done and if the panel were formed on the certificates of recommendation of such a board or committee, which would have nothing to do with party politics, Senators could be elected by both Houses without the necessity of having to be nominated by members of either House, thus saving candidates much worry and annoyance. Like Senator O'Farrell, I can appreciate the loose talk that has been going on with reference to the abolition of the Senate and the scrapping of the Constitution. Such pronouncements have been made by people who regard themselves as responsible politicians, but I would say to them—and I am sure I am expressing the opinion of every member of this House by doing so—that this House will sternly resist any encroachment on its powers and privileges as laid down in the Constitution, or any form of alteration which has not the direct approval of this Chamber.

I think it would probably make it much easier to debate this whole question if I were to be allowed to move the amendment which stands in my name and briefly to explain the reason why I suggest a somewhat different form of committee to that proposed by Senator O'Farrell. I therefore move:—

To delete all after the words "consisting of" in line 1 and to substitute therefor the words:—"six members of the Dáil and six members of the Seanad, with the Chairman of each House ex officio, be appointed to consider and report what changes, if any, are desirable in the Constitution, powers and method of election of members of Seanad Eireann and to recommend any consequential changes in the Constitution of Saorstát Eireann which they consider necessary; the Committee to make an interim report with regard to the method of election as soon as possible, and not later than March 31st next; and that a Message be sent to the Dáil requesting their concurrence in this resolution.”

I would like to say, first of all, that before I decided to propose the appointment of such a Committee as I suggest, I had my name down to a motion similar to that in the name of Senator O'Farrell, but it was not handed in quite so soon as his. It is, however, plain that we both believe that there ought to be a Committee to consider the matter. I believe that it will be in the interests both of this House and of the Dáil if these matters, before any more public discussion and rumour take place, were candidly and thoroughly discussed before a Joint Committee. I do not advocate the appointment of a Committee for the reasons suggested by Senator O'Farrell, because, so far as I can follow him, he believes that the present system is the best which he has yet heard of, and that his only object in bringing forward his motion is that certain people wish to change that system. I am in favour of a Committee, because I believe there is a general consensus of opinion that the method adopted at the last Seanad election was not the best, and that a bona fide effort should be made to get a better method. Senator O'Farrell spent a good deal of time in arguing against a nominated Senate. I do not propose to follow him in that, as I was not aware that anyone was proposing a nominated Senate. If such proposal were made I would oppose it. I did not know that it was being discussed or suggested in any serious way.

My reason for proposing a Committee slightly different in form to that proposed by Senator O'Farrell is, first of all, that having regard to the position of parties in the Dáil, six members from each House would, I think, be better than five. Secondly, I think that this matter ought, as far as possible, be kept out of party politics, and for that reason it would be quite proper to have two chairmen discussing the question. I propose that the chairman should be ex officio, with six members from each House, and that the Committee should be free to discuss all matters affecting the Seanad. They would not be bound to make proposals, but they should be free to do so. The vital difference between the resolution and my amendment is in the second portion of the amendment. I propose that the Committee should be asked to report on any proposal, if any proposal is made—they may fail to agree, or they may say that there should be no change—not later than the 31st March, affecting the question of the mode of election of the Seanad. My reason for such proposal is this, namely, the Government have not announced publicly what method they propose to adopt, but they have made it clear that it is their intention, if possible, to bring in some proposals dealing with the method of election which might come into operation before the next election in this House.

I want, if possible, this Committee to report before the Government bring in their proposals. That being the case, I propose that the Committee should report on that particular question not later than the 31st March. They may not have any proposals to make. They may agree that things are better left as they are. They may issue two reports, but I think that the two Houses and the Government should be in possession of any proposal that may be made in or about the date I suggest. As regards personnel, that is largely a matter of opinion. I do not imagine that Senator O'Farrell and I would seriously differ on that, but I would be opposed to appointing any Committee without such instruction as I suggest, because I think that to appoint a Committee to go on indefinitely and sit as long as they like, without giving any hint or suggestion regarding their proposals, would be to postpone any suggested change until after the next election. I think—and in my opinion it is largely the view held outside the House—that a bona fide and, if possible, non-party effort should be made to get a more satisfactory method of election.

I am not going into certain matters raised by Senator O'Farrell and Senator Counihan. I have my opinion about them, but I have an open mind, and if anyone suggests anything better I would be glad to support such suggestion. It is an important matter and one does not want to be too certain or dogmatic about it. Senator O'Farrell deprecated frequent changes of the Constitution. To a large extent, I agree with him, but I would point out that under the Constitution, as originally proposed in the Dáil, it would not be amended in this way by both Houses, and if I recollect aright, it was the Chairman of the Labour Party who proposed that during the first eight years, in order to get the Constitution as right as possible in the light of experience, it should be amended by ordinary legislation. It is because of that proposal, which was accepted by the Dáil, that amendments which would make for the improvement of the Constitution have to be made within the first eight years. After that period, it will be extremely difficult to amend the Constitution except it has been altered in that regard. That is one of the reasons why these matters have been dealt with fairly promptly. I am glad to hear that Senator O'Farrell—I take it that he speaks largely for the Labour Party—is not in sympathy with those who advocate the abolition of the Second Chamber. I tried to find out what sovereign States have only one Chamber, and I discovered that only Turkey, CzechoSlovakia, Latvia, Albania, Lithuania and Bulgaria have only one House. Every other country with sovereign powers has either kept to the bicameral form of legislature or gone back to the two-House system. I think that this is a matter of much interest, and I hope that the House will be prepared to accept my amendment, as I think it provides the better form of Committee and that it would be more expedient, having regard to the facts as we know them.

I beg to second the amendment.

Has Senator O'Farrell any objection to the Committee being limited in point of time as to its report? If there is going to be a change, retiring Senators should know where they stand.

I propose to limit the Committee only as regards one matter, namely, the date of their report regarding the method of election. They can go on discussing other matters afterwards as they desire.

I am glad to have heard Senator Douglas's speech, as I could not understand what difference there was between the resolution and the amendment. He has given his reason for suggesting an increase in the number of members on the Joint Committee. In his opinion six members from the Dáil would better represent the various parties in that House. I do not take any exception to that point. I think it would be useful if we had the Speaker of the Dáil and you, Sir, as ex officio members of that Committee, if you could afford the time to attend its meetings. The Committee would have the benefit of your experience. Throughout this discussion it has been borne on our minds that we are living under a written Constitution. I am not arguing the question of a written or unwritten Constitution, as that is beside the question, but in connection with a written Constitution one has to proceed very carefully before attempting to amend it. There is a certain period of time set apart for amending our Constitution in the light of experience and that, in my opinion, is a very good provision, but, at the same time, we should not amend it too often. We should go very carefully in that direction. As regards this question of election to the Seanad, it seems to me that we have a rather cumbersome and indeterminate system of procedure. The whole country is the constituency. The various candidates are probably unknown to the great majority of electors, and we have been told to-day how very expensive this method of election turns out to be. If possible, I think we should amend, or re-arrange, that part of the Constitution and, to my mind, we have a very good precedent in the American Constitution under which two Senators are elected to the Seanad by each State.

We might manage to restrict our constituencies if the Constitution would allow it, and let each county elect two Senators. That, of course, is a suggestion that would have to be very carefully considered by any committee that may be appointed to investigate the matter. There is one point on which I hold very strong opinions and that is that the members of this Seanad should be elected. I think it is only proper in a free country that the members of the Upper House should be directly responsible to the people, and I certainly would not like to see any change made in connection with the election to this Chamber which did away in any respect with the elective principle. If you had the various Seanad electors in the various counties electing two Senators in each county, I think it would be the best way of dealing with the problem. I would strongly oppose any departure from the principle of an elected Seanad. The general proposal suggested, both in the motion and amendment, is a good one. The proper and constitutional method of approaching all these questions is by a Joint Committee of both Houses which would inquire into the subject put before them and produce a carefully considered report. So far as the general principles underlying both the motion and the amendment are concerned, I am in favour of them provided we retain the elective principle in appointing members to this House. In that respect there are various reasons that will appeal to every student of history, and it certainly makes more for the dignity of the House if it is directly representative of the people and not merely a nominated assembly.

I do not think that it is necessary for me to go into the question of the method of election, as suggested in both the motion and the amendment. I am concerned with the relative merits of the resolution put before us. Senator O'Farrell gave a very lucid explanation of the whole position of the Seanad and as to its actions in the past, and I feel that the exposition which he has given us must convince us that we, at any rate, have done something during the last four or five years. We are asked to accept either of two alternatives, to change the Constitution as regards the method of electing members to this House. That seems to be what principally concerns Senator Douglas. He says that we should have the report of the Committee regarding any changed method of election within a certain period, and suggests that we should appoint fourteen members representative of both Houses for the purpose of considering that matter.

You may read into his remarks that he fears that these fourteen members meeting together, ostensibly to consider the method of election and various other matters, might burk the issue and not report before a specified date. I have not such an opinion of any members who might be selected to discuss and report on these matters. If it is incumbent on them to produce a report they will. I feel, report without any coercion. For that reason I prefer the motion of Senator O'Farrell to the amendment of Senator Douglas. Here you have an admittedly complex question. You appoint a Joint Committee. It will take some time to appoint that committee and to arrange for their meeting. You give them a very short time to discuss the whole matter and to compel them, so to speak, to go hastily in a matter which is of the most urgent importance to the State. I think that Senator O'Farrell's proposal is an eminently reasonable and desirable one. I will have an opportunity later on of giving my views as to the method of election when the report of the Committee comes before us, and I shall reserve any remarks I have to make as to the method of the last election and the results which it has brought forth until the proper time arrives. I would ask the House to consider whether in matters of this sort, in which we ask members of both Houses to consider a very complex question, it is reasonable, desirable, or proper to compel them, so to speak, to issue their report by a certain date, because the innuendo is that amongst the fourteen persons, as suggested by Senator Douglas, you will get a majority in favour of delay and of not assisting the State in a matter which is of the utmost importance. Therefore I intend to vote for Senator O'Farrell's motion.

Like Senator Bennett, I do not intend to make any observations on the method of election, as I think that that matter can best be discussed when we have the report of the Joint Committee before us. As between the motion of Senator O'Farrell and Senator Douglas's amendment, I am inclined to support the latter as I think that seven members from each House would provide a more representative committee. What I regard as the most important part of the whole matter is that those who realise the necessity and usefulness of the Seanad should have some agreed plan regarding the method of election, because, if they do not agree on a plan and if any acute differences crop up, we will be playing into the hands of those who are out, not to revise the method of election, not to reduce the membership of the Seanad, but to abolish this House altogether.

There is no secret about it. The second largest political party in the State have declared that their policy is to wipe out the Seanad altogether. Having, I suppose, failed to wipe us out by kidnapping Senators and burning their houses, they now see a gentler mode of dispatch and, apparently, they have satisfied themselves that there is a constitutional way of settling their differences. In my opinion, not even the presence of one just man in the Seanad, in the person of Senator Colonel Moore, will save us from destruction at the hands of those new apostles of economy who, had they been attending to the business of the State for the last five years instead of gallivanting about the country, as a Labour Deputy in the Dáil very mildly put it——

Has this anything to do with the resolution before us?

CATHAOIRLEACH

I cannot see that it is out of order.

I hardly think it is in order.

I am sorry that my friend Senator Foran does not agree with me, because I thought he was in favour of a Second Chamber. I think if these people to whom I have referred had the interests of the nation at heart they could not fail to recognise the usefulness of the work done here, and I think Senator O'Farrell has done a public service in bringing out that fact. Not only have Bills been amended here, but any flaws in measures passed by the Dáil have been detected and corrected in this House. If any House of the Oireachtas has justified its existence, the Seanad certainly has, and the work that has been done here will compare favourably with the work done in any Second Chamber throughout the world.

Senator Douglas has given a list of places where there is only one House, but we do not want to be on a par with such places. In any country where there is a Second Chamber I think it would be hard to find a political party that does not realise the necessity for and the utility of what is called a revising or cooling chamber. Unfortunately in this country, as I have said, we have a political party not only without experience in moulding or passing legislation but even without the rudiments of ordinary political commonsense. If they attempt to put into legislative form the crude and unpractical theories with which they have been regaling the country for the past five years I think that in the future we will require not only a cooling chamber but an intercepting tank as well, and the apostles of economy will land the country in additional expense and interminable turmoil instead of improving the position.

There is one point I might mention in connection with the proceedings of this Committee and which has an important bearing on the question as to the time in which the report will be presented. I think it would be well if there was an assurance that the Committee in considering this matter would have at its disposal any information the Government possesses on this subject, and also the expert advice of officials. Otherwise, if the Committee is to set about collecting information for itself, devising schemes, and going into a great deal of detail, it would be very hard to expect it to report at so early a date as that suggested by Senator Douglas, whereas if the facilities I have mentioned were given it might be comparatively easy to do so. I think as a general practice this should be done, and it would be well if we got an assurance on that point.

CATHAOIRLEACH

I understand your point is that it would expedite and convenience this Committee very much if they were put in possession of the Government plans?

Not necessarily their plans or proposals, but there should be a good deal of information in the Government offices on the matter it would be useful to have.

CATHAOIRLEACH

That would be at the disposal of the Committee. There would be no question about that. Personally, I think it would also be an advantage to the Committee if they were in possession of an outline of the Government's plans in the matter. Speaking for myself, I do not know what they are. I have not been consulted about them, and I know nothing whatever about them.

I do not think there is much difference between the resolution and the amendment. I feel, in a matter so closely affecting its privileges, that the House should have before it the report of the Committee and debate it before legislation is introduced. I hope the Government will consider the views of this House before legislation is introduced. I would like to have added to the resolution or amendment, whichever is adopted, words to the effect that the Government be asked to introduce no legislation amending the present method of election until the report of the Committee has been adopted or otherwise by either House.

CATHAOIRLEACH

The difficulty about that, as I understand it, is that if either House does not accept the report there could be no legislation.

"Or otherwise." I had in mind either the rejection or amendment of the report. I am in your hands as to the procedure.

CATHAOIRLEACH

Would not that involve that unless both Houses unreservedly accept the report there can be no legislation?

That is not my intention. It is that both Houses should express an opinion on this report before any legislation is introduced, such opinion not necessarily to be binding on the Government. At least, we should have a safeguard that the report will have to be considered by both Houses and decided upon before any legislation is introduced, so that the Government may know not the wishes of the Committee, because it is quite possible the opinion of the Committee may be totally different from the opinion of the whole House. There may be many matters that will escape the notice of the Committee, or that the Committee may not have embodied in their report and that this House would wish to have embodied.

Is it not inherent in the Committee that this report will come before the House?

Does Senator Sir John Keane mean that, assuming my amendment was adopted, the Government should not bring in any legislation until all the other matters have been disposed of?

No. As to the method of election, it is important that there should be an expression of opinion by both Houses before legislation is introduced.

I would be quite willing, as far as I am concerned, provided the date is fixed, to ask the Government not to bring in any legislation in the interval.

I think we should know whether the findings or report of the Committee will be before the House before the Government act in this matter.

According to the ordinary practice or procedure the Committee must of necessity report to their respective Houses as to the result of their deliberations. I do not think a direction as to that is required in the resolution. I think there should be some expression from this House that under no circumstances should the democratic elective basis on which the membership of both Houses is built be departed from, and that should be an instruction to any members that we may appoint to act on this Committee. I think there would be very grave danger if the elective principle is set aside. It would discount this House in public opinion as to the position which it is supposed to hold in deliberations that result in legislation, and we would lose caste very considerably by being placed in a false position.

I should like to know whether the procedure suggested by Senator Sir John Keane is feasible —that the report of the Joint Committee should be discussed by the House prior to legislation.

CATHAOIRLEACH

I do not quite know what Senator Sir John Keane means. Does he mean that no legislation is to be introduced, or that no legislation is to be passed?

Introduced. Once a Bill is introduced the Government have taken up a certain line. We want the Government to give full consideration to the views of both Houses before it frames its Bill.

CATHAOIRLEACH

We cannot possibly restrict Government action in that way, but we might make it a recommendation.

That is all—a request that the Minister would give us a pledge or some assurance on the matter.

It seems to me that Senator Sir John Keane is asking for an assurance for which there is no need. If we appoint this Committee they must report to both Houses. When they report the Seanad can discuss their report and deal with it as they please, and they will have the opportunity of expressing their opinion on it unless the Government goes out of its way to bring in legislation before that happens.

That is what I am afraid of.

I would like to say in reply to Senator O'Farrell that I hope in the interests of mature consideration that courtesy and statesmanship are not necessarily left unconsidered in the introduction of legislation to both Houses, and very often that is perhaps the most systematic, orderly and efficient way of getting mature consideration. So far as the proposal before the Seanad goes, the Government would welcome consideration of the matter by a Joint Committee of both Houses, and I might also say would welcome a discussion by both Houses of any such report before going ahead with legislative proposals, but we will have to realise that time is involved and no matter what process you may adopt for a Seanad election this year that very long-drawn-out arrangements may have to be made before the holding of such election. Senator Bennett struck me as rather resenting the introduction of any date as tending to restrict the work of this Committee. I do not think the introduction of a date as regards the election should be viewed in that particular light. Even if the Committee by the 31st March are not able to come to a definite conclusion as to how the election should be held, I think in order to help everybody they ought to report their position by that particular date. If we are to have a discussion by both Houses on this report it would be desirable that it should be available not later than 31st March. That is practically the week before the Easter Recess, and if legislation is to be properly thought out and passed in time it would be useful, and due to members of both Houses, that the proposals of the Committee should reach them in such time that they would be able to discuss them on re-assembling after the Recess. If the Committee do not report by 31st March they will not be in such a position. I think nothing is sacrificed from Senator Bennett's point of view by accepting Senator Douglas's amendment as against the motion, and perhaps Senator O'Farrell might see the matter in that way. In so far as exception has been taken to the Seanad not having been consulted before, as the Minister responsible in the matter I would like to say that I think the most efficient and satisfactory way of getting down to hard facts is to see them in legislative form. I have done that. I think the Government will be prepared to give all possible assistance to the Committee in the discussion of these matters, and, perhaps, by working along these particular lines we might make the best possible contribution to the question.

My name was brought into this discussion, and I was referred to as being the only just man. Although I am thankful for his selection of me as such, I do not think the Senator should have placed himself in the blasphemous position of selecting the just man, for the Bible warns us against it. Across the water for a number of years promises and pledges have been given as to reform of the House of Lords, but no Government there has been able to find any means of reforming the House of Lords.

They are beyond reform.

At any rate, Governments have given pledges as to reform that they have not been able to fulfil. The same thing may happen as regards this House. It may be many years before anything is done. I do not know why the Government want to reform this House. They have not stated why they object to the present House. If it is because of the personnel of the House that seems to be rather a reflection on themselves. Half of this House was selected by President Cosgrave. If he now makes out, or imagines, he made an entirely wrong selection and that a change is necessary, I think it is not creditable to him. Another portion of the members of the House was selected by the Dáil, and practically by a particular party in the Dáil. If those who made that selection object to the constitution of this House they also are simply condemning themselves. I do not know what is complained of. If we compare the Dáil with the Seanad, I think from any national point of view the Seanad must be said to stand pre-eminently in the front. For instance, in amendments to Bills from the Dáil the Irish language was made essential. I might select a number of other matters in which the members of the Dáil have not shown themselves very national. They did not trouble themselves in these matters but the Seanad intervened and brought about changes from the national point of view. I might mention that when the Seanad first sat a motion came up from the Dáil to give an amnesty to the British soldiers over here, without any reciprocal arrangement for the other side. The Seanad held it up from a national point of view, and said it was improper that an amnesty should be granted to one side without also being granted to the other. Then Ministers came tremblingly from the Dáil to this House and begged of us in the name of God not to annoy the people on the other side of the water by insisting on our attitude, as it would be a dreadful thing to quarrel with them, and that we must grant them their amnesty without granting any amnesty to our own people. They told us it would strengthen their hands enormously if we passed their motion as it stood, and although we gave in they never got a reciprocal arrangement. I do not see on what it is they base the failure of the Seanad. If it is not a personal matter, what is the fault? Surely, before you begin to reform a thing you must first show that there is something wrong about it.

I thought it was the Senator's Party who objected to the Seanad as it stands.

I do not know what you are talking about. I am talking for myself at present and not for any Party. I do not know whether the Senator has any Party, or whether he does not belong to every Party as it suits him. It seems to me the Government should first point out why they want to make a change in the Seanad. If it is the electorate they want changed there may possibly be a reason for that.

CATHAOIRLEACH

I think there is some confusion on the subject. The motion to appoint a Committee to investigate these matters is not made by the Government, but by Senator O'Farrell. The Government is not asking the Committee to do anything. That is Senator O'Farrell's proposal.

That proposal arose out of a statement by the Minister that the Government wanted to bring about a change in the Seanad.

CATHAOIRLEACH

I do not think that is the object of Senator O'Farrell's motion.

I do not know what the object of the motion was if it was not to intercept the action of the Government in the matter, and the procedure which it was anticipated would follow, and on which the Minister has already stated the Government would likely act. Senator O'Farrell's object was a very proper one, that is, to get a little discussion before the new scheme was presented to us. We have had many new schemes about the Constitution. Ministers have regarded anyone who has done anything against the Constitution as being guilty of a heinous crime, but the Government themselves have been amending the Constitution as it suited them, and now when it suits them they wish to change it again. I do not think anybody would agree that the powers of the Seanad should be diminished, and I suppose, also, there are many people who would object to their being increased. Between the two points of view it will probably happen that the House will remain as it is. I much prefer Senator O'Farrell's views on this matter to those put forward in the amendment. I do not see the object of limiting the Committee as to what they ought to do by putting a pistol to their heads and saying they must have a report ready by a certain date. That is a matter that could be left to the common sense of the Committee. I will support Senator O'Farrell's motion.

CATHAOIRLEACH

There are three points of distinction in the amendment as contrasted with the resolution. The first is as to the number of this Committee. Are you accepting or opposing that, Senator O'Farrell?

I think I had better leave that to the House.

CATHAOIRLEACH

The next is as to the interim report. That you are opposing?

CATHAOIRLEACH

I take it you will agree with the third matter, that a message be sent to the Dáil asking for their concurrence.

That is hardly necessary. There have been similar resolutions without having such a recommendation tacked on.

CATHAOIRLEACH

It is generally tacked on.

The Standing Orders provide that it should be.

I was hopeful that the discussion that would ensue might give some light and leading to those who would go on the Committee. I am sorry to say, as far as I can see, that it has given little or no indication to the Committee as to how it should act. I agree that there is apparently little difference between the motion and the amendment. The amendment is really a paraphrase of the motion with certain embellishments added. I do not know a case has been made for these embellishments. It looks bad that a question of importance and that might involve an alteration in the Constitution of one of the Houses of the Oireachtas, or an aspect of it that affects its whole powers and functions, is so urgent that the Committee have to report within four or five weeks. Two and a half years have elapsed since the last Seanad elections. I take it it is not now that people are forming their opinions as to whether or not that election was a success. It is only at this stage, as usual, we are being stampeded into issuing a report on the matter without the opportunity of giving it the consideration it deserves. The Committee, comprising five or seven members of the Dáil, will have a tremendous amount of work to do between now and the 31st March. In any case they will have their morning's work to do before the Dáil assembles, so they will have very little time left to devote to the work which this Committee will call on them to perform. We are, so to speak, threatened that unless they report at least on one aspect of the question which leads to a matter of great importance the Government will go ahead with the legislation on which they have already decided without consulting this House. They have, of course, power to do so, and it is not for us to complain, but whatever about our rights we have certain duties to perform, and it is our duty to resent any hasty action in matters affecting the membership of one House of the Oireachtas created by the Saorstát itself. For that reason I do not want to be a party to coercing the Committee on the plea of urgency to issue a report which could only be an ill-considered one, and to the consideration of which the Committee could not give the necessary time. It is suggested to raise the number of members on the Committee from ten to fourteen—and I suppose the mover of the amendment would be in favour of reducing the membership of this House from sixty to forty——

When did I say at any time that that is my view?

I took it from the general attitude of the Senator that he was in favour of a smaller Senate. In view of the fact that there is a difference of opinion in some respects between my motion and the amendment, I think it would be better to leave it to the House to decide which it will adopt. After that, we could suggest the names of the Committee and not leave that matter to the Committee of Selection.

CATHAOIRLEACH

You cannot do that, because under one of our Standing Orders, where we are asked to agree in setting up a Joint Committee, you cannot propose the names of such Committee until you receive the assent of the Dáil.

The points of difference between the motion and the amendment are in regard to the number and to reporting by the 31st March. If your statement, sir, is correct, we certainly cannot form a Committee for another fortnight, because we have already decided that we cannot meet for another three weeks.

Is it your ruling that we have to wait three weeks?

CATHAOIRLEACH

No. All I said was that I would not convene the Seanad unless there was business to be done.

With regard to the number on the Committee, I think I have served, in my time, on as many Committees as any other member of this House—I would be prepared to make a small wager that I have served on more Committees than any other member of this House—and my experience is this, that a Committee of fourteen will not handle a big job as well as a Committee of ten. I would prefer to see a small Committee, say of six, because I think on an important matter to have fourteen people wrangling is undesirable, and for that reason I think we ought to stick to the motion and have ten. Everybody who has experience of Committee work will realise, I think, that a Committee of ten will do more work, and do it more successfully, than a Committee of fourteen. For that reason Senator O'Farrell's motion ought to be accepted.

I think it is reasonable to ask the Committee to report within a certain time, but under all the circumstances, asking them to report by the 31st March, even making allowance for the difficulties that the Minister has explained, with regard to both Houses having to consider the report, and after that, with the Government having to sit down and prepare the legislation, the time allowed would be short. September being fixed for the election, the Government must have time to lay their plans accordingly. The Committee ought to be asked to report within a reasonable time, but I think that under all the circumstances the 31st March gives them an unreasonable amount of time in which to report.

CATHAOIRLEACH

With regard to Senator O'Farrell's point, the Standing Order is No. 85. It says: "When a resolution asking for a Joint Committee is moved, the number of Senators the Seanad will appoint shall be stated, but the names of Senators to serve on it shall not be proposed until a Message is received from the Dáil agreeing to the Joint Committee."

Amendment put and declared lost.

Would Senator O'Farrell be prepared to accept the words "of which the Chairmen of both Houses shall ex-officio be members”? I think it would be most desirable that the Chairman of the Seanad and the Speaker of the Dáil should be members of any committee. Although I am not very much enamoured of any special number, I think it is an absolute essential that the two Chairmen should be ex-officio members. I propose an amendment to that effect.

Is that in addition to the numbers in the motion?

"Of which the Chairmen of both Houses shall ex-officio be members.”

I think it would be invidious for any Senator who is retiring to be on this Committee.

CATHAOIRLEACH

It will not be easy work for any Senator.

It would be better for them not to be on it.

CATHAOIRLEACH

I do not know what Senator O'Farrell says about this. Senator Barrington is asking you if you would accept the suggestion that, in addition to the five members nominated by you——

No, not in addition, but of the five members.

CATHAOIRLEACH

Of which the two Chairmen shall be ex-officio members.

They are not debarred at all. I should be surprised if the Chairmen of both Houses were not appointed, not as ex-officio members at all, but as ordinary members of the Committee.

It seems to me that if there are a certain number of people who will agree with me that this Committee will do efficient work, the Chairmen of the two Houses ought, ex-officio, to be included in the five.

I think, in considering the numbers that would go on such a Committee. you would have to take into consideration the political structure of the other House. If the Committee is going to discuss this matter thoroughly so that the other House generally will feel that it has a sufficient voice in the discussion, you can hardly confine it to four members of the Dáil and the Ceann Comhairle. Speaking for myself—and I am sure I am speaking for the other House as a whole—I think that in the examination of any question closely concerning the Constitution they would desire the Ceann Comhairle to be on the Committee; and that being so, four other members would hardly leave a sufficient margin for the representation of the different political views that would require to be expressed on this matter in the other House.

In view of what the Minister has said I would suggest five and the Chairman of each House.

I would agree to accept that suggestion. Of course I contemplated that the Chairman of each House would be a member of the Committee in any case. Is it suggested that they should be ex-officio members, as in the motion?

CATHAOIRLEACH

If the motion requires them to be members they become almost ex-officio members. I mean that it would be a curious thing to say that they shall be members of the Committee unless they go on ex-officio. If they go on at all, I think it would be better that they should go on ex-officio.

Motion, as amended, put and agreed to.
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