TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR.

LEAS-CHATHAOIRLEACH (Mr. Kenny)

I move:—

That Seanad Eireann approves of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on the 27th day of August, 1928, a copy of which was laid upon the Table of the Seanad on the 20th day of February, 1929, and recommends the Executive Council to take the necessary steps for its ratification.

I have been asked by the Department of External Affairs to submit the Kellogg Pact to the House. Senators will have seen references to this Kellogg Pact in the Press. I do not know if any of us have clear information as to the origin of the Pact or of the matters leading up to the eventual drawing up of it. For my own information, and for the better information of Senators, when this motion was put into my hands, I asked the Department to draw up a short history of the Pact, so that we might approach consideration of it with as full information as the Department had at its disposal. A memorandum, which I propose to read, with the permission of the House, was furnished to me.

In June, 1927, the French Foreign Minister, Monsieur Briand, transmitted to the Secretary of State through the American Ambassador in Paris a draft of a Pact of perpetual friendship between France and the United States. The draft treaty proposed that the two powers should solemnly declare in the name of their respective peoples that they condemned recourse to war, renounced it as an instrument of their national policy towards each other, and that they should agree that a settlement of disputes arising between them, of whatever nature they might be, should never be sought by either party except through specific means.

The Secretary of State, in his reply (December, 1927), proposed that the two Governments, instead of contenting themselves with a bilateral declaration of the nature suggested by Monsieur Briand, might make a more signal contribution to world peace by joining in an effort to obtain the adherence of all the principal powers of the world to a declaration renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. After an exchange of letters with the French Government extending over a period of two months, the Government of the United States sent a preliminary draft of a treaty to the four remaining Great Powers, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan (April 13th, 1928). On the 22nd May the States Members of the Commonwealth of Nations other than Great Britain were invited to become original parties to the treaty. CzechoSlovakia and Poland were later invited to become original signatories. The Pact, without modification (of the American draft) was signed at Paris on 27th August, 1928. The text is now before the Seanad, and approval is sought for its ratification.

The Pact comes into operation only when it has been ratified by all the original signatories. The present American Administration goes out of office on the 4th March, and it is the natural wish of the Administration to have the Pact completed and in force by that date. All the Governments concerned are taking the necessary steps to meet the desire of the American Government. The ratification of the Irish Free State has been prepared and the completed instrument has been forwarded to our Charge d'Affaires, Washington. The instrument will become effective only when the approval of the Oireachtas has been obtained and notified by cable to our representative, who will then present the instrument to the Secretary of State.

There is a Preamble to the Treaty which is as follows:—

Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind;

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its natural interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;

Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this human endeavour and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy;

Have decided to conclude a Treaty and for that purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the German Reich, the President of the United States of America, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India: For the Dominion of Canada, for the Commonwealth of Australia, for the Dominion of New Zealand, for the Union of South Africa, for the Irish Free State, for India; His Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the President of the Republic of Poland, The President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic: Who, having communicated to one another their full powers found in good and due form have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I.

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE II.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise, among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.

ARTICLE III.

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington.

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties hereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to furnish each Government named in the Preamble, and every Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty, with a certified copy of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification of adherence.

In Faith. Whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty in the French and English languages, both texts having equal force, and hereunto fix their seals.

Done at Paris, the twenty-seventh day of August, in the year one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight.

Mr. DOWDALL

I beg to second the proposition. I must confess this Kellogg Pact leaves me very cold. I only second the proposition because it may be possible by some instrument, in the event of war between those who are called the high contracting parties, to give us an opportunity of preserving neutrality and of not being dragged into it. When I read of the Kellogg Pact, and at the same time saw that two of the so-called contracting parties were caught red-handed under a table with a secret naval agreement, I immediately knew the moral value of the Kellogg Pact—which was nothing. Merely because it may be an instrument by which we might preserve our neutrality and not be dragged into trouble, I second the proposition. I have no confidence whatever in the high contracting parties.

Mr. JOHNSON

I move the following amendment:—

To delete all after the word "That" in line 1 and to substitute therefor the words:—

"before approving of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on the 27th day of August, 1928, the Seanad requests the Executive Council to lay on the Table of the House copies of the correspondence which passed between the Executive Council and the Government of the United States of America relating to the said Treaty."

I am relieved to learn from the statement made by the mover of the motion that the instrument and ratification has been already sent to the United States at Washington, and that the final act can be completed by a cable. That gives time, which I did not imagine was available, for the correspondence which I am moving for to be laid on the Table, so that the House may have an opportunity of considering the Treaty itself in the light of the correspondence. Perhaps one might at this stage put in a complaint that we are asked to consider so important a document without having had it placed in our hands. It has been laid on the Table, but there are 60 members of the Seanad and 153 members of the Dáil, all of whom are eager to read the terms of this Pact. There are only two copies on the Table of the House, so that it is quite difficult in the rush to obtain access to it. One would naturally have thought that at any rate this very important instrument would have been circulated to the members, especially in view of the fact that it has been printed, and that the cry of economy could not have very much effect. But I want to make this case, that the Pact alone cannot be understood except in the light of the understandings that have been arrived at by the parties which have already signed. We do not know whether there has been any understandings between the Irish Free State Government and the United States of America, or between the Irish Free State Government and the Government of Great Britain, or any other Power involved in this instrument. We do know, though, that there has been correspondence. I have a faint recollection of something appearing in the Dublin Press purporting to be correspondence which took place between the Executive Council here and the Minister for the United States. That may have been imaginary; it may have been true. But surely it ought to be in our hands. It ought to be on record, so that the House would know what was meant between the two parties. Have there been any reservations; have there been any special interpretations? What does the Pact mean? These queries are not frivolous. I say we cannot understand the Pact unless we know what interpretation the various Powers are placing upon its language. It is not satisfactory to read that correspondence dealing with such matters is usually private and ought not to be divulged, because it so happens that the British Government has published a considerable amount of correspondence which must be read with the Pact, if one is to understand the meaning of the Pact. I think in the correspondence which is alleged to have taken place between our Government and the United States Minister there have been only two letters. There may have been more. I presume there were more than mere formal communications from the Minister for the United States and our Minister. There may not have been. At least we ought to know. Information of that kind, if it may be communicated to the Press, should also be communicated to the members of the Oireachtas. We are, unfortunately, too well aware that we cannot rely upon the versions that appear in the newspapers. Owing to stress and the condensation that is necessary, naturally we very often miss quite important details with respect to such State documents when they are published in the newspapers. Therefore I am asking that the correspondence which preceded the signature to this Treaty on behalf of the Irish Free State should be presented to the House.

I have said that the meaning of this document cannot be understood without reference to the preliminary public discussions between the parties who were primarily engaged in the negotiations. I have here, for instance, two documents containing copies of correspondence between the United States Minister and the British Ambassador respecting the proposal for the renunciation of war, and one learns from this correspondence that certain agreements were arrived at, and certain interpretations understood before the invitation was issued to the Irish Free State; that as a matter of fact that invitation was issued by the United States Minister to the Irish Free State at the suggestion of the British Minister, following an agreement upon the meaning of the Pact. Now, we know from previous statements in the Dáil, and from the report of the Imperial Conference, that nothing is done in respect of International Agreements by Great Britain on the one hand, or by the Dominions on the other hand, without the information being generally, shall I say, pooled—communicated to the various States concerned, so that we have to assume that our Ministers were fully aware of the line taken by the British Minister and the United States Minister in respect to the meaning of this Treaty. In the absence of any objection it seems to me at least a fair supposition that our Government endorses the interpretation of the British Government, and I am anxious to know whether that is true or not, whether the United States Government, whether the German, Italian or French Governments are to understand that the agreement as to the interpretation which was arrived at between the British Government, the United States Government and the French Government was approved of and endorsed by the Irish Free State Government before they come to the point of signing the Treaty. It is important to have an answer to that because of the contents of these letters. Those who have been following these matters will remember that before signing this agreement the British Minister let it be known that there were certain regions of the earth "whose welfare and integrity constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety." That is to say, the peace and safety of either Great Britain or the British Empire, according as one reads these implications: "There are certain regions of the earth, whose welfare and integrity constitute a special and vital interest for the peace and safety of the British Empire." I need not read what Sir Austen Chamberlain said, that his Majesty's Government in Great Britain has agreed to accept the new Treaty upon the understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. Now in a previous communication it is laid down and made quite clear that the right of self-defence is implicit, is well understood, and acknowledged by all.

Sir Austen Chamberlain continues in his letter: "I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of 28th April that the proposed Treaty does not restrict or impair in any way the right of self-defence, as also with his opinion that each State alone is competent to decide when circumstances necessitate recourse to war for that purpose." Now imagine what that means. Each State is entitled to take action in self-defence. Each State is entitled to decide when it is necessary to have recourse to war for the purpose of self-defence, but the British Empire has certain regions of the earth in its mind as to which it says that the integrity of the same is necessary for self-defence, for the defence of the British Empire. So that so far as Great Britain is concerned, this Pact is utterly useless as a means of preventing war with that interpretation. What I am anxious to know is whether that interpretation is also the interpretation that has been acceded to and endorsed by our Executive Council?

But there is something more, and perhaps even of closer relation to our particular circumstances. It is admitted in this correspondence that each State in this Treaty, and notwithstanding the Treaty, has the right of self-defence by recourse to arms. Perhaps it would be well to repeat some of the words in the preamble which were read by Senator Kenny. The high contracting parties declare their intention "that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its natural interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty.""All changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process." The value of that to this State depends upon the interpretation of this Treaty. Some Senators will be familiar with the report of the 1926 Imperial Conference, one particular paragraph of which has, to my mind, an unpleasant significance. This Treaty is drawn up as a Treaty between the heads of States. The high contracting parties are the Presidents and Kings of the various States referred to in the preamble, and in respect to the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, he signs for the various Dominions and Great Britain respectively. That is in accord with the form of Treaty drawn up in that Imperial Conference Report. In that Report there is a provision, or at least an explanation, in these terms: "The making of the Treaty in the name of the King as a symbol of the special relationship between the different parts of the Empire will render superfluous the inclusion of any provision that its terms must not be regarded as regulating inter se the rights and obligations of the various territories on behalf of which it has been signed in the name of the King."

My desire is to know what is the view of the Minister in regard to this matter. Does this Treaty impose obligations upon the various Dominions of the British Empire as between each other inter se? Do we agree for instance, that changes in the relationship between Great Britain and the Irish Free State shall "only be sought by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process?" If that is included, it is, of course, definitely and, I think rightly, a renunciation of an intention to go to war whenever opportunity serves with Great Britain to alter relations, but it also has this obligation, which is to my mind immensely more important, that Great Britain shall only seek pacific means to solve any dispute or any conflict, from whatever cause arising, as between Great Britain and the Irish Free State. The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. I would like to have a little more enlightenment on the reference in Article 2 to the high contracting parties. Does that mean that it is only territories under the reign of King George and the other Powers outside the British Empire that are bound, or does it also bind in regard to peaceful means those States within the British Empire which are supposed to be separate and distinct signatories to the Treaty?

I am anxious to know what the view of our Executive Council may be in that respect, because if they interpret the Treaty as being binding inter se I would urge upon them to make that declaration very clear and to let it be known formally to the Powers outside the British Empire, let it be known to Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, Geneva and The Hague, so that we shall have established as something once and for all that there will no longer be a threat of war held over the head of any Irish Minister in case of any conflict between Great Britain and Ireland. If it does that, and if that is the view of the Minister and if he will make that position clear, I think a tremendous gain has been achieved by the ratification of this Treaty. But if that is excluded, it seems to me that the Treaty is of no value whatever to this State, because we are entirely bound by whatever the British Government may do, in whatever wars and troubles the British Empire may be led into.

In the course of the correspondence which has been printed as a White Paper by the British Government, as far back as May, 1928, Sir Austen Chamberlain said: "It will, however, be appreciated that the proposed Treaty, from its very nature, is not one which concerns his Majesty's Government in Great Britain alone, but is one in which they could not undertake to participate otherwise than jointly and simultaneously with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and the Government of India. They have, therefore, been in communication with those Governments, and I am happy to be able to inform your Excellency that as a result of the communications which have passed it has been ascertained that they are all in cordial agreement with the general principle of the proposed Treaty. I feel confident, therefore, that on receipt of an invitation to participate in the conclusion of such a Treaty, they, no less than His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, will be prepared to accept the invitation."

I draw attention to the phrase that the Treaty is one in which His Majesty's Government of Great Britain could not undertake "to participate otherwise than jointly and simultaneously with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions." Only last week we had Sir Austen Chamberlain answering a question in the House of Commons. A fortnight ago he was asked if it was intended that the terms of the Kellogg Peace Pact were to be submitted to Parliament. He said that the Houses of Parliament had already expressed their views and, continuing, said: "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose, therefore, to deposit their ratification as soon as His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions are in a position to act." I think we have got to take all these things together. The invitation was received, in the first instance, by the British Government. Terms were discussed. The alternative suggestions of the French Government were discussed. A final understanding was arrived at between the various Governments as to what was meant, as to what was excluded, and as to what was allowed. Then the Free State Government and the other Dominions are invited to participate, but they are only invited to participate provided there was going to be joint and simultaneous agreement. That has been secured, and the final act, according to Sir Austen Chamberlain, is that there must be simultaneous ratification.

Now, I am at a loss to understand where the independent right and power of Treaty-making comes in if this course of action is considered to be necessary and essential. I can understand its being urged that we are on the road to independence and to treaty-making rights. I can understand it being said that while certain of the forms—this was alleged before and I think quite validly and rightly said—of subordination remain, the fact of equality will eventually be arrived at and that we are in process of "implementing equality," to use the phrase of the late Minister for External Affairs. On this point I am reminded of the simile which a very accomplished and learned publicist of Canada has used when he said "that Canada has ceased to be a Colony, but that she is not yet a sovereign State.""Transition states," he says, "very frequently must be described rather than named. Look at the polywog. He is an aquatic blob with an active, wriggling tail. But, shortly, he sloughs off the tail and protrudes four lusty legs. He closes his gills, useful in the water, and develops lungs, necessary for life on land. Eventually, as a full-grown frog he contributes to the enjoyment of Canadian summer evenings by giving us his version of ‘O Canada,'" (or, as we might say, "The Soldiers' Song.") He was a polywog or a tadpole. I take it that we are in the stage of development from the tadpole to the frog, but that we are neither tadpole nor frog, but may be nearer the frog than the tadpole. What I am anxious to learn from the Minister is how far we have got in the stage of development from tadpole to frog.

I want to put to the Minister two or three direct questions. Are there any special and peculiar interpretations understood as between the Ministry here and the United States? Are there any reservations? Are we to take the Treaty at its face value? Is the Irish Free State Government committed to the British interpretations or reservations? Do we agree that there should be certain regions of the earth as to which the British Empire has a special concern, and as to the defence of which it is her particular prerogative, and that if attacked then the Empire is attacked and the Peace Pact? Did the Minister make any inquiries, or does he know what are those regions of the earth which are reserved by the British Minister's letter to the United States Government? Do we know what portions of the earth are intended, and will that be made known to the Oireachtas assembled? Does the Minister interpret this Treaty as being applicable inter se within the States of the British Empire? I think the answers to these questions will enable us to understand whether we should approve ratification of this Treaty or disapprove. I think, on the whole, it is probably desirable that it should be approved, but I do not think that we could approve it until we have all the information necessary to enable us to understand what it means. If there had been no reservations by the other parties, and if there had been no peculiar interpretations then perhaps it would not be necessary to make those inquiries as to our position, but I, like Senator Dowdall, am somewhat sceptical as to the value of the Treaty in its present form with all that has happened since it was first promulgated by the American and French Governments. The very symbols that we used on the occasion of Mr. Kellogg's visit to this country did not inspire one's faith in the validity or the face value of this Pact. When on a peace mission the Minister is hailed with the only signs of war we have, the booming of guns and soldiers with fixed bayonets, that does not suggest the God of Peace. If the Minister can give an assurance on the points that I have raised, particularly that point in regard to the bond that each signatory takes, promising never to use anything but peaceful means to solve disputes, for instance, between Great Britain and the Irish Free State, then I think considerable advance will have been made towards the perpetuation of peace and friendly relations. I move the amendment standing in my name.

Mr. CONNOLLY

I rise to second the amendment proposed by Senator Johnson. In seconding it, I perhaps have reasons very different from those stated by him. I feel that we ought to know anything and everything that has transpired with regard to the attitude of the Executive Council in its negotiations re the Kellogg Pact with the United States. It is quite possible, however, that in the main the important correspondence has taken place not between the Executive of the Irish Free State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Washington, but that it has actually taken place between the British Foreign Office and the Washington Department. Whether that is so or not I do not know. There is, however, a grave danger, if it is so, because our position is, after all, the only one in which we are interested, and we may be pardoned for a certain amount of cynicism when we find the big Powers all coming together to make a pact of peace when all the world is more or less distributed amongst them. In other words, a close corporation that the "haves" have made for their own protection, having decided that the "have-nots" are to remain as they are, and because of their tremendous powers and their tremendous possessions it is not desirable to have another outbreak such as took place in 1914, whereby some of their power and possessions might be scattered to the winds.

Now the only position that Ireland occupies, or did occupy in international affairs, was a moral position. I submit that we had a rather unique moral position until such time as we became tangled up in the thing called the British Empire, the reputation of which is known far and wide over the civilised and so-called uncivilised world, and that we did stand clean and above such things as the imperial idea. The imperial idea has been essentially developed by England and copied by Germany and is now being pursued ruthlessly by America. It is rather extraordinary for us to sit here as a sober, intelligent people to discuss the possibility of signing a Peace Pact even with America, when we consider that at the present moment America is pursuing an absolutely cold-blooded, ruthless policy of exploitation and occupation of territory to which she is not entitled.

Sir JOHN KEANE

Is it in order for a Senator to refer in these terms to a nation with which we happen to be on friendly terms?

CATHAOIRLEACH

I think the Senator is just developing his argument, and he is quite in order.

Mr. CONNOLLY

I think I am entitled to show the different elements that we are getting connected with in trying to make a peace pact. We want above all things to preserve our honesty, if there is any honesty left in the country. I say, and I say deliberately, that it is a hypocritical gesture on America's part to preach peace while she is occupying Nicaragua. At present the people in that country are fighting for the liberty of their country. I say that our actions will have reactions on our moral status throughout the world if we do not stand out fearlessly and say what we believe to be the honest policy for a real peace pact. Let us remember that it is not so very long ago since we tried to get the ear of the world. We are a small people, as the people of Nicaragua are. American Imperialism is pursuing the same policy to-day as British Imperialism. It is enough to make one cynical when one reflects that only last week President Coolidge, before he vacated the Chair at Washington, signed a Cruiser Bill. It is also well to remind us, as Senator Dowdall did, that under the table an Anglo-French pact was surreptitiously communicated as a secret treaty between France and England, until America, through Mr. William Randolph Hearst, discovered what had been done and exposed it, and as a result created practically an international crisis. I submit whatever we may do should not become the rubber stamp of the British Empire, America or any other country.

If we believe in peace, as I think we do, we should make our position felt in so far as it is possible to make it felt. If we have no real power and influence then let us be content with that, but do not let us, in God's name, stand for all the hypocrisy that is being practised. I submit, through you, Cathaoirleach, to Senator Sir John Keane that that is quite relevant to any discussion upon the Peace Pact. There is a prior position to which we are committed, and it might be well to consider it when discussing the Kellogg Pact. We are, I understand, committed as one of the signatory nations to the League of Nations. I want to know, and I think the country ought to know, in how far our signature to the Kellogg Pact cross-cuts against our position in the League of Nations. Let us remember that America, who instigated the Kellogg Pact, is not a member of the League of Nations, and let us also remember that one of the commitments of the League of Nations, as I understand it, is that we undertake to allow a passage to the League troops over our territory, and to take punitive measures against any offending State. Now England, in the event of war with America, will undoubtedly use the territory known as the Free State, and England can already do that by virtue of her Treaty, but it can be argued, I think, with logic and reason, that the Treaty was an imposition under duress, under the threat of immediate and terrible war. The League of Nations' commitments of the Twenty-six Counties Government were a voluntary act.

There is all the difference in the world between a Treaty imposed under the threat of immediate and terrible war as distinct from a voluntary act of the Executive of the people representing the Twenty-six Counties. We want, in my opinion, before we sign the Kellogg, or any other pact of peace, to define what we mean by peace. We want to know are we satisfied with our position? Are we content to leave the world as it is? Have the boundaries already been set to the onward march of this nation and other nations struggling to be free? I, for one, will never subscribe to the occupation of foreign territory, whether by America, Germany or Great Britain. I think the only thing we can do at present is to put our point of view definitely before the world. It may not amount to a great extent, but if that is so, then our signature to the Kellogg Pact equally does not count. I feel that our only safety lies in a guaranteed neutrality, and if that is something that is not possible then we can only assert our rights and our moral position in the world, but I do protest that we have no right to give approval in view of all the circumstances of the signing of the Cruiser Bill and the whole attitude of mind in America to-day, and that is pretty well disclosed by the repudiation of Sir Esme Howard by Sir Austen Chamberlain on last Monday. It is quite obvious to anyone who knows the position in Washington that Sir Esme Howard was trying to make the best of a bad job in American politics.

CATHAOIRLEACH

I think that is extraneous to the matter.

Mr. CONNOLLY

I submit it is not, but I bow to your judgment. I think the whole position involved shows how unreal the Kellogg Pact is, and how unreal our position would be if we signed it. I think if we sign it we should make our declaration of peace to the world. I think we ought to declare to the world that we are a peaceful people and want peace. We should emphasise the fact that we are not going to act hypocritically and strengthen those great nations in carrying out their campaigns while they are at the same time carrying out their window-dressing with the Peace Pact, for there is no peace among the big Powers at present. It is pure hypocrisy, and I suggest that we should not be a party to it.

Mr. MILROY

Like Senator Connolly, I am always against the evils of hypocrisy. I do not like to accuse him of that practice himself, but I cannot get out of my mind the impression that he rose simply for the one purpose of devoting his observations to demonstrating that Ireland, known as Saorstát Eireann, is in a less enviable position than the Ireland prior to the creation of Saorstát Eireann, that the position held by this country prior to 1921 was a position greater and more desirable than the present position, the implication being that we ought to try to get back to that. As I said, I do not want to accuse the Senator of hypocrisy, but to my mind he is getting very near to that when he tries to demonstrate anything of the kind at the present time. I remember the time when this country was moved to great efforts and when the energies of this nation were directed towards a great objective to secure representation at the Peace Treaty at Versailles, and when that objective was the issue of several contested elections. When the election that gave the leader of Senator Connolly's Party to Irish public life was fought, that was the issue, and Ireland was led to believe, and in my opinion rightly so, that the achievement of such representation would be a big thing and a big stride forward. We were denied that right. To-day we are asked to sign a document of much greater moral significance, and I think of much more definite international significance than the Treaty at the signing of which we sought representation. I think that is a great national advance, and I think the Senator is on very untenable ground when he attempts to prove that by securing that position Ireland has weakened, instead of strengthened, its position and prestige.

No one will argue, I think, that this document, this Pact, is going to end war. No one is going to argue that it is going to change human nature. The utmost that can be claimed for it is that it is a gesture, and that the nations of the world are seeing that a settlement of international disputes by peaceful means is a much more desirable method of settlement than a settlement by force. It does not follow that after the signing of that document all parties are going to cast aside their arms, but it is an indication that such an objective is glimmering in the distance. All that Ireland at this stage can do in this matter is to bid God speed to such a spirit of pacific settlement of disputes. I think that the voice of this State should be very definite in approving of that instead of the occasion being utilised not only to express dissent from it, but also to try and belittle this State, which has been the outcome of so much sacrifice and struggle by the people of this country.

Mr. DOUGLAS

The immediate question before this House is as to whether we should ratify an act of the Executive in signing what is known as the Kellogg Pact. I personally may be satisfied, taking everything into consideration, that the right thing was done in signing that Pact and stating that this State did so unconditionally, which I understand was the position. Senator Connolly said one thing with which I am in entire agreement, and that is that in international affairs the right thing for this country to do is to express its own point of view though it may know it has not the power to enforce that point of view. I believe if we had to do that we must, as far as it is possible, having regard to our present position, take our place among the nations of the world and seize every opportunity for expressing that view. We cannot express it by methods of force, for which I should say thank God, but we can express it when the opportunity arises. I personally believe that we as an independent member of the League of Nations have got one place where that view can be expressed and where we can do so without fear. Senator Connolly suggested that it was of importance to consider the possible bearing of this Pact on our position in the League. If I thought for one moment that the signing of this Pact would in any way weaken our independent position in the League of Nations I would be opposed to its ratification.

Senator Dowdall is cold. He cannot get enthusiastic as to the details of this Pact. Who can? Like every other invention of the devil, war is not going to be easily killed, and it is not going to be killed by any number of persons or nations getting together and writing anything, however beautifully worded. It is going to be ended by peoples forcing their Government not to go to war. I am concerned not so much with what is written in the Pact but with the reason for it. I have a good deal of sympathy with what Senator Connolly said as regards the large nations. I do not believe that any of the large Government who instituted this Pact had no mental reservations; I believe they had. I cannot attach the same importance as Senator Johnson to written reservations. I do not care much about them. If Great Britain had mental reservations I believe other Powers had mental ones. I believe that we in this country can say without any reservations that we do not want war. We have everything to lose from it apart from its wrong, and apart from its effect as between this country and Great Britain. I would not be any more optimistic if the Minister told us as the result of this Pact there would be no more wars between this country and Great Britain. While we are prepared to stand for our rights, we want to avoid war at every cost. I think the reason for the Pact was that there is amongst the peoples of the world a growing sense of the damage war does to them. There is just the danger that the Pact may, as it were, take in a certain number of foolish people who may think war has been ended because there has been some signature to a Pact of this kind. Though this Pact is significant, it is significant to this extent, that the big Governments thought it wise to tell the peoples they had renounced wars. For years all the large nations have stated they did not want war except in self-defence. They are in the same position still. But there is a public opinion which, I think, influences the Governments in this matter. The United States of America was forced to take some action, for there is growing in the United States a strong feeling against that country staying outside the League of Nations, and in favour of its taking part in a general co-operation. I think one of the things that shows the significance of this Pact is the announcement that though not a member of the League of Nations the United States proposes to join a world court, subject to certain details. I think it is part of the movement of the United States towards co-operation in the affairs of the world. While we may be rightly sceptical as to the motives behind the politicians who put this forward, and may know that the idea of domination will not for a considerable time be killed, nevertheless this, apart from policy, is a step forward on the part of the United States. Where do we stand? The world does not care very much where we stand, and it is relatively of no importance. Its importance to us lies in that we can in a self-righteous way say this is an empty formula and refuse to sign it, and we can equally say we believe in it as it stands, and though we have our mental reservations yet we will sign. That is the position this country has taken, and it is one I believe this House should ratify.

Colonel MOORE

If I saw in this resolution even the slightest prospect or even hope of progress towards peace among nations I would be one of the first to welcome its advent. Peace is necessary for our people. But when I see among those foreign Governments willing to sign this Pact nothing but double dealing and equivocation and continued preparations for the wars which they promise to abjure I cannot be simple enough to be deluded by such hypocrisy. When it was proposed that this State should enter the League of Nations I opposed that, and I think I was one of the few who did oppose it, because I saw the League of Nations was governed by certain imperial powers who desired it for their own power and interests. In connection with this subject I wish to read the following extract from an article by an American gentleman in the "Sunday Times":—

"The weakness of the League of nations lies in the fact that it is dominated by the nations which have acquired all that they want and have no other desire than to keep what they have. They are seeking to make of the League an instrument to defend the status quo in the name of peace. But for at least a hundred millions of Europeans the League will prove a futile thing if it cannot furnish some means for ending conditions which are intolerable.

"During all the enormous activity at Geneva in the past five years, that is, since the League really became a going concern in the larger sense, not one single thing has been done to modify or ameliorate a single danger like the Polish Corridor, Vilna, Upper Silesia, the Hungarian Marches, or Macedonia. The causes of war remain, and even continue to develop dangerously. Therefore, while both the victors and the vanquished of the last struggle who are the satisfied and dissatisfied of the present hour, are utterly sincere in seeking peace, the former are preparing to defend what they have and the latter see peace contingent upon some change."

I think that is practically what I said four or five years ago. A little while ago there was a meeting of Ambassadors in Washington and much self-congratulations on the proposed reduction of naval armaments. On the strength of that agreement America sunk £100,000,000 worth of the finest ships aflóat. No sooner was this done than it was perceived that other nations were building in such a way as to evade the spirit while keeping to the letter of the Treaty. Later there was a meeting in Geneva to secure a better settlement, but that broke down because each nation was striving for superiority in some special line suitable to its warlike interests. In time it became apparent that some wanted cruisers, some submarines, some cruisers under ten thousand tons, others ten thousand tons, and so on, but it was impossible to arrange anything in connection with the matter. No sooner was the present Pact disclosed than the great powers began to make reservations. Britain reserved the right to make war at her pleasure over areas covering millions of square miles, including Independent countries. She was not content to specify these areas. Egypt, which Britain is pledged to evacuate by twenty Pacts, has not been evacuated. Also the Arabs of Arabia, Iraq and Syria.

CATHAOIRLEACH

Are you not going very far outside the subject of the motion? You are making a small League of Nations for us. I suggest that you narrow your arguments down to the Pact.

Colonel MOORE

I am trying to show there is no use in this Pact. Any State who signs it and wants to go outside it can go outside it.

CATHAOIRLEACH

The Pact can be discussed, but you are discussing the League of Nations.

Colonel MOORE

I want to show what is included in this Pact and what is not. These countries that I have mentioned—the Arabs of Arabia, Syria and Iraq, are all excluded. Persia, Afghanistan, and countries approaching India are all excluded. Wherever Britain has any fort, island or province to which anybody might approach, that territory is excluded, and in what part of the world has Britain not got forts? I am not saying whether it should have them or not, but it covers the whole world, and, therefore, the whole world is excluded under this Pact. Other nations, France, for instance, say that they must defend themselves from other countries. If that meant the homeland, it seems very nice and proper that people should have the right of self-defence. On the face of it that seems very proper. If that defence is defence of the homeland, I should think that nothing could be better. A Pact of that nature would be splendid. But it does not mean anything of the sort. These nations mean that they intend to defend all the countries upon which they have imposed their power. They have imposed Imperialism on these countries, and they are exploiting them as best they can, in the interests of their own country, and for the various commercial interests they have—rubber, oil, and all the other things. The Pact excludes all these places. What is left? Where is the Pact to operate? Not a square mile of the whole world is covered in the Pact. I think we should refer this Pact to Mars, but Mars, I remember, is a war-like place. I thought of Venus, but I find that many wars have been occasioned by Venus. All the nations, as far as I can see, as soon as they become strong and rich enough, become Imperialistic. They seek to impose their wills and to go in for exploitation, without any regard to the rights of weaker nations. Any nation which cannot fight to defend itself is at once pounced upon. Imperialism means domination. One country seizes the territory of another and uses it for the purpose of increasing its own wealth.

What was the Locarno Pact about which we heard so much? It was a Pact made by a certain number of nations to do away with war. Every nation in the Great War declared that self-defence was its object in going in. These particular reasons for defence are used for hypocritical purposes generally, in order to draw sympathy to their actions in the war, or sometimes to excite battle fury amongst their own people. They try to prove that they are going to war for glorious reasons—a war to end war—merely to excite the people. The people are driven into it by such statements. There was one country, China, which professed to do away with war and not to use it as a policy. China did away with her armies, and threw certain ridicule and contempt on her soldiers instead of calling them heroes. The hawks and eagles of the West immediately perceived this, and proceeded to seize upon ports and upon revenues in China, and to divide the country up between them. Nothing prevented them doing so but their own jealousies and blunderings. I will conclude by quoting what Senator Reed, of America, said in reference to this Pact:

You are writing a Treaty of words. You are putting that out now as a solemn remedy for war. You are not doing a single practical thing to remove the causes of war.

I think that sums up very admirably what this particular Pact means. Unfortunately, much as we desire peace, any nation which does away with its army does away with its methods of defence and is at once pounced upon by plunderers and destroyed. Our own country was without an army for 700 years, and suffered destruction and war, and if we put ourselves in the same position again, as we might, if we believe too much in this Pact, we will suffer the same fate. It was not by Treaties and anti-Pacts that we gained our liberty either in 1782 or 1921. It was by force of arms, and if we had not used arms we would never have seen it. I am sorry that I cannot support the Pact. I wish I could see some prospect of peace. I cannot see one glimmer of it, because I see all the nations combining and thinking of war and the plunder. Those nations have seized what does not belong to them, and they have no intention of giving it up. And as Imperialism always produces war, I see no value in this.

Dr. GOGARTY

It is astonishing that, with all the evidence as to the futility of peace treaties, which the members who are opposed to this motion have been quoting, that it has not dawned on them to realise that they are confronted not by something which may be improved by complaining, but by something which is unchangeable because it is a fact. It is small tribute to their intelligence, even if it is not surprising, that they should not recognise a fact when they are confronted with it. They prefer to lament and to talk about this country's moral position. Why this country's moral position should take the form of a whinge or a whine, and a turning of the other cheek may seem clear to them, but to me it seems disgusting and unworthy of a country which prided itself of old on being a nation, not of neutralists and avoiders, but of warriors. But it is what we should expect of persons who cannot recognise facts, or when they do, complain about them. They are usually under five feet high, and they suffer from flat and cold feet.

The fact is that every great war epoch has been followed by protestations of peace and good-will on the part of the victors. And these protestations of peace and good-will have invariably been the prelude to another war to end peace treaties. Imperialism is a recurring phenomena in the world's history, and it is unavoidable. It has certain advantages which, for our purposes, could be well illustrated, and most sensibly and instructively stated, by two curves on a chart which, for the edification of the other side of the House, might be drawn as a frieze in the alcove, sir, over your head. It would then be seen that as imperialism extended, as England looped in extra territory, that it was immediately followed by a rise in the price of Irish beef. The curves would vary in direct ratio to imperial prosperity. As I have said, this is not by any means the first time in the history of the world that peace treaties have been proposed. In the country of which Senator Moore has been talking, in China, Hiang Sui, as early as the year 535, tried to found a Peace League. After Hannibal was overthrown Rome forewent the chance of incorporating the East. But she had to adopt imperialism for self-defence. There was no other course open, no way of avoiding it. Tacitus tells how Musonius Rufus was nearly lynched for haranguing the legions who stood before the gates of Rome in the year 70 on the blessings of peace, and the general, Avidius Cassius, called the Emperor Marcus Aurelius "a philosophical old woman," a title that not even the English Press thought of applying to His Imperial Majesty of Germany. After every catastrophe of blood and terror there is a cry for peace. These facts are rigid and admit of no escape. There was a Hague Conference in 1907 and a World War in 1914, a Washington Conference in 1921 and another in Paris in 1928. What will there be when Headquarters and the manufacturers of public opinion, the Press, think that we are forgetful and ripe enough for a certain liveliness about 1978?

Life is a hard thing, and those who would succeed in it must accept hard facts. The issue or the choice is not between peace and war; but between victory or ruin. When we are confronted by the fact that our existence is threatened, all constitutional ornaments and all democratical pretences go by the board: a dictator takes over, we are mobilised and conscripted to fight for our very existence on the face of the earth. Compared to the grim reality of facts, compared to war, all this stuff about peace treaties is merely literature. It does not matter whether it is their common Anglo-Saxon heritage that inspires England and America to make what must seem to the ignorant to be extremely hypocritical protestations of good-will to each other, and to the little of the world that is left between them. The fact is that it has always been done after a great war and as a prelude to the next. If it were hypocritical it will be a comforting consideration to some of us to realise that England had a characteristic win: she got in first with the League of Nations; America had to have a Geneva of her own in Washington: the Kellogg Pact is the pious result. But no one here is deceived. It will not stop war; but it is the thing to do between the acts. We might possibly draw attention to ourselves if we refused to sign it. But we have a strong position, in that we have made no reservations when we agreed to it: we have no Singapores, Treaty Ports, or "zones of influence"... We have a great chance now if we sign it, because of this fact: that we alone sign it without reserve. It is, of course, a part of a game, but the game is the game of life, and why should we be left out? The little fellow who is concerned with the improvement of our moral position, which is supposed to follow our refusal, may be comforted by the thought that he will make only second or third-rate cannon fodder if we shirk and refuse to face facts. One thing that stands out clearly from the alignment of the nations in the League or out of it is that there will be no room for neutrals in the next war. And we will be in the highway of it: the Belgium of the next!

We have no power under our own Treaty to erect a wireless so that we may tell the world our own tale. Our moralists saw to it that the Marconi station at Clifden was destroyed. All the news of Ireland is censored in England by Reuter, silenced or distorted when the occasion arises. If we refuse to ratify the Kellogg Pact we will find ourselves calumniated in America and misrepresented to the world. We will even be libelled in the ether.

There is not the least doubt in my mind that this country will be overrun in the next war. Let us be in the running. War will not remain away for the sake of reason. It will return because of life. Life makes war. And wailing in the day of reckoning will not save our skins. Let us take warning, or rather notice, from the prevalence of Leagues of Nations and peace pacts and prepare to defend ourselves possibly from one or other of the high contracting parties who are so soon to turn into high contending parties, if there is any deduction to be made, or lesson to be learnt from the 2,500 years of history which I have reviewed.

Mr. COMYN

I am sorry there was not a greater attendance of Senators to hear the historical references made by Senator Gogarty, the classical allusions and the scintillating wit upon a subject which, in my judgement, is the most grave that could occupy the thoughts of the people of this country. In the course of an interjection during the speech of Senator Connolly, Senator John Keane used an expression about a country with which we happen to be at peace, referring to the United States of America. I think that is the happiest use of a word which I have ever heard. I differ entirely from Senator Gogarty when he said that this country should follow the band and be near the loud speaker. We have no navy. We have not got even a mercantile marine. We have, however, a strong moral position in the world by reason of the strategic position of this country in the Atlantic, by reason of the fact that the Irish race is scattered all over the world, and by reason of the fact that we are a vocal people. For all these reasons we have a strong moral position, and we are the nation apparently designed to lead the sentiment of the small nations against Imperialism. I am very happy to support the amendment moved by Senator Johnson. I think we ought not to be in too great a hurry about joining the chorus. I think we ought not to show the alacrity of slaves. This Seanad ought to consider the matter as an assembly of men representing a nation which occupies a central position in the affairs of the world and a strong position in the moral leadership of the world. An adjournment for some days, or for the purpose of getting this correspondence, will give us time to think, and perhaps it may eventuate in a resolution which will be spoken of, not merely in London but also in Washington.

I will tell you my reasons for wanting to have this matter more fully considered and after some time perhaps proposing a resolution in this House. These are my reasons: This Kellogg Pact to outlaw war originated in one of the Imperialist countries. I believe there is now some rivalry as to the authorship of the original idea. The English claim it is their idea. At all events the Americans have put it into shape. It is a Pact to outlaw war. It is brought forward by America. Now let us see what answer the Great British Empire gives to that Pact. We have the Pact, but here is the interpretation I place upon that Pact:

As regards the passage in my note of the 19th May relating to certain regions of which the welfare and integrity constitute a special and vital interest to our peace and safety, I need not repeat that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new Treaty upon the understanding that it does not prejudice her freedom of action in that respect.

The plain meaning of that is that there are certain regions of the world, land and sea—and the seas include the waters around this country—the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest to the peace and safety of Britain. The meaning of that is this: Let there be peace all over the world; let there be war the moment any attempt is made to interfere with the British Raj, whether it be in Ireland, in Egypt, in India or in China. America responds with her Monroe Doctrine, and France comes forward and says: "Yes, I accept the pact, but it does not exclude the right of self-defence." In these circumstances what is the meaning of the Pact? My submission to this Assembly is that the League of Nations partitioned the world and copper-fastened the land surface of the earth, and that this Kellogg Pact with the interpretations which have been put on it was designed to partition the ocean. America with her Monroe Doctrine was to have the ocean surrounding not merely the United States but South America. Britain, with this explanation given here, and forming part, as I contend, of this peace treaty, was to have the waters surrounding the British Isles, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean, and I suppose Indian waters. Senator Gogarty asks: Why not sign? There is a lot to be said for that, but I say, why sign in a hurry? I agree with Senator Johnson when he said: "Let us see what our own men have done." You see how cleverly the British have worked, how well the Americans understand the interests of their country, and you see the conciseness and the precision with which France has acted. What have our Ministers done to protect the interests of this country?

The nations of the world have said, let there be peace, but they are preparing for peace or war by the construction of huge armaments. What preparation have we made for peace or for war? I saw a light in the Minister's face when in the course of his speech Senator Connolly inquired whether our obligations under this Peace Pact cut across our obligations under the League of Nations. I wish they had, and I wish our Minister had the foresight to act in the same way as the Ministers in Egypt and in Russia have acted. I wish he had accepted this Peace Pact unreservedly. What has he done? This is what the Minister has done. I hope I am not misrepresenting the Minister, because I have no wish to do so.

MINISTER for EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (Mr. McGilligan)

You will not be let.

Mr. COMYN

I will not be let. I have no intention of doing so, but I think a fair representation of the Minister's action in this matter will give him a nut that a cleverer man than he will scarcely crack. Take the letter of acceptance of this Kellogg Pact. Instead of being a simple direct acceptance of Mr. Kellogg's invitation it stated that in view of the fact that there was nothing in the proposed Pact that was inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the invitation to sign the Pact was accepted. I hope I do not misrepresent the Minister in that, or rather I hope that I do misrepresent the Minister. What does it mean? The Peace Pact is absolutely unconditional in its terms. It outlaws war. Our Minister says: "I will accept that on condition that it does not cut across my obligations under the League of Nations." What obligations has he under the League of Nations? I might ask, what rights has he under the League of Nations? This is one of his obligations—to uphold the integrity of all the grabbing nations of the world. Under the Treaty which has been forced upon us we are bound to give Britain certain harbour facilities in time of peace, and in time of war whatever other facilities she requires. It may be said that these were things which were got from us under compulsion, but, under the League of Nations, which the Minister is so careful to safeguard, we are willing parties to that.

They speak of peace, while the covert enmity under the smile of safety wounds the world. The moment the Pact is signed in Washington a resolution is passed for the building of 15 cruisers, costing five million apiece, the most perfect engines of war, I suppose, that the world has ever seen. Britain, on her part, is doing a little, and France. I think, is building some submarines. I admire the splendour of Britain's statesman. What is her answer to the 15 cruisers? Her Foreign Minister says: "We are examining very carefully the relations between Great Britain and America, and particularly in relation to the naval position." When they had an examination and a report on that important subject the next thing the British propose to do is to send to the Minister for External Affairs of the Free State and to the Foreign Ministers of all the others. daughters, I suppose, of the Empire, a complete report, and then she will march on and face America with her five daughters hanging on her arm all united.

These are serious matters for consideration by the Seanad. We are not in a position to make war. Our supreme interest is peace, and particularly peace on the Atlantic. There are two main reasons why we should desire peace on the Atlantic. The first is this, that we are in the line of fire between two mighty Empires. The second reason is that we have no mercantile marine, absolutely none. The moment war is declared between the United States and England every ship trading with Irish ports becomes a belligerent ship, because they are all owned in England. To the Minister I would recommend serious thought upon that question. Another reason is this, that although we are an agricultural country we have not sufficient supplies of food. We have not food for more than three months. To put it shortly, the reason why I would urge upon this House a postponement of this question is this: I want to see how far we can get guarantees, either from England or America, that foodstuffs coming into this country shall be exempt from search or seizure. If we cannot get those guarantees I would wish that Senators and members of the Dáil, and those who lead public opinion in this country, should make arrangements that, if the worst should come, this country would be able to feed itself. In one word, you must either have guarantees of freedom of trade or you must till your land. That has to do with the Kellogg Pact, because it has to do with the preparation for either peace or war, call it what you like. Now, we could become great protagonists of realness, but we could only do that by falling back on the principles which were advocated by the leaders of this country within the last ten years.

Perhaps my friend the Minister will let me quote from observations made by a man whom he and I knew well. I apologise for saying my friend the Minister. Michael Collins, referring to the League of Nations, said this: "It is going to be a great diplomatic tug of war between Lloyd George and the French Tiger on the one hand, and President Wilson and the democratic forces of the world on the other hand. If President Wilson gets the support he deserves the hypocrites will be dished." Well, they are all gone, but there is a new supply of hypocrites. There is only one way of preserving peace on the ocean and it is this: have freedom of the seas. The Dáil, on the 4th April, 1919, passed this resolution: "We recognise that in the independence of Ireland more than in any other single fact the freedom of the seas depends. It will never be with the consent of the Irish nation that their land, its coast and harbours, shall be made use of by any power to dominate the ocean which should be a free highway for all people. We desire that our ports and harbours shall be equally accessible to all external nations, and that the present naval and mercantile monopoly exercised by England to our great detriment and the detriment of our nation, shall be abolished." A true principle is enunciated there. We cannot go so far now, perhaps, but we can do this: we can use the adjournment that is asked for by Senator Johnson for the purpose of making representations to these two mighty Empires that at least in the event of war we shall have free passage for our goods. If we cannot get this guarantee then it is the duty of every man in Ireland to see that the soil of Ireland is tilled.

MINISTER for EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (Mr. McGilligan)

This is in reality a serious motion. The motion to which the amendment now being discussed has been tabled is a serious motion that has been dealt with seriously by the proposer, by Senator Johnson, and by Senator Douglas; dealt with in a rather light-hearted way by Senator Gogarty, dealt with ludicrously and futilely by Senator Connolly and Senator Moore, and approached by Senator Comyn in a manner and with all the mannerisms that I had hoped we had forever and happily lost when we had temporarily and unhappily lost the old Four Courts.

With regard to the serious part of the discussion, Senator Johnson has put a series of questions, founded on suspicions. If the suspicions are not deeply rooted in his mind I welcome their exposition as suspicions, because they give me an opportunity of clearing up quite an amount of the distrust that there is, in regard not only to this Pact but in regard to any international treaty which the Government of the Free State enters into, a distrust which, I believe and hope, in the case of Senator Johnson, and I believe in the case of a great many others, is founded on a complete misapprehension of the details and a complete and entire ignorance of the whole position. Senator Johnson asks that the motion should not be passed by the Seanad until such time as certain correspondence is printed. There have been four letters between myself and the American Minister here—two from him to me and two from me to him. One of my letters to him has already been read and published. The other, without having been read to either House of the Oireachtas, has definitely been published fully and quite accurately in the daily Press. As far as the correspondence proceeding from my side is concerned, that correspondence has been accurately and fully before the whole country for a great many months. The letters are there. I propose, if anybody thinks it worth while having them, to read the two of them this evening, and I propose, for the sake of refuting Senator Comyn on one matter, to read one of them.

Senator Johnson, however, asked a series of questions, and before I go on to the correspondence itself I think it well to deal at some length with some of the points he has raised. He spoke of undertakings prior to the Pact, undertakings between either the Free State Government and the Government of the United States of America, or between the Free State Government and the Government of Great Britain. My letter to the American Minister stated that we accepted the Pact unreservedly. That word was deliberately chosen, and we attended to its insertion. There are no commitments that we have made, and there are no interpretations that we have agreed to, other than what are in those two letters we sent to the United States Government. We declared there definitely that we agreed to nothing in the Pact that was inconsistent with our agreement with the League of Nations Covenant, and that we accepted it on that basis unreservedly. We said in the second letter that as we had agreed previously to accept unreservedly the draft Treaty, we gave similar acceptance to the second draft. In other words, we are proceeding, and we ask the House to agree to our proceeding, to sign the Kellogg Pact read out by Senator Kenny, with no reservations in our minds, but simply the Kellogg Pact; and if there is any interpretation supposed to come from our side as to what that means, the two letters to the American Minister here indicate what our attitude was—that we believed that there is nothing in the Pact inconsistent with our commitments under the League of Nations Covenant. In that belief we accepted it unreservedly—the word was deliberately chosen—and we attended to its insertion in the draft. There are, therefore, no special interpretations, and there are no reservations.

Senator Johnson spoke of correspondence re the Pact which preceded its taking the shape in which it came to us first and, of course, prior to the shape in which it came to us second. The difference was only in the Preamble. Senator Johnson enunciated a theory that I would be horrified with if it was put forward for acceptance by any member of the Foreign Office in Great Britain—that when we got certain information in regard to the British interpretation of it with regard to a reservation, in fact unless we made explicit and direct objection we are to be presumed to have endorsed and accepted it. That is not our policy, and not the line we take. The line we take is that until we agree explicitly with any sort of collateral document there may be, the thing that we signed stands as the only thing to which we are committed, and that that is the case with regard to the Kellogg Pact. I would not like to have it, and I am sure Senator Johnson does not wish to press it as a line of policy to be adopted, that when the Foreign Office in Great Britain does send us information, as it is bound to do under the Agreement we have with it and with all the members of the Commonwealth, the mere receipt of it makes us a party to reservations that any of these States members like to put to any Article. What we sign we sign clearly and distinctly. We sign documents giving our own interpretation. We may sign at times documents which say that we accept interpretations put upon them by somebody else, but in the absence of such a direct and explicit statement, what we sign is what is on the face of the document we sign, and if that document contains any reference to any collateral document that is included, but not otherwise.

I said that the remarks made by Senator Johnson were founded on suspicion. I do not mind suspicion, because it gives me an opportunity to clear up matters. But I do not think it is sound for Senator Johnson, or any other Senator, to assume that we have made any commitments, that we have accepted any reservation, or that we have agreed to any interpretation, other than what is on the face of the document. I presume that Senator Johnson put forward the contrary view only in order to have a clear expression of policy on a point of view which, unfortunately, a great many people in the country hold, and to have it refuted.

Mr. JOHNSON

I would like, if it were possible, to have that view that is now enunciated made known universally.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

I make it universally known with whatever degree of universality a statement in this House tends to give it. Senator Johnson went into two points of detail on this Pact. He drew attention to a paragraph in the Imperial Conference Report of 1926, and pointed out that this was a type of treaty that was being negotiated between heads of States. He read a paragraph from the report which indicated that where a signature was affixed in a particular way the obligation inter se was to a certain extent excluded. He then asked for an explanation from me as to whether we agreed on our part that in signing this we renounced, so far as the document gives the right, going to war with other States members of the Commonwealth, with Great Britain in particular, and that we agreed that disputes arising between us would have to be settled in no other way than by pacific means. We certainly agreed to that, despite what Senator Connolly apparently wants—that we should hold our God-given right to beat England until Senator Connolly is satisfied not only with the position of this country but with that of every oppressed nationality in the globe. We renounced that right, and people ought to be clear about it.

As regards the other side, this Pact cannot be viewed alone; it must be viewed in the light of its signature and in the words of the Imperial Conference Report of 1926—in view of the special relationship which holds as between the States members of the Commonwealth of Nations. We have entered into that Commonwealth. We believe we get certain advantages from that Commonwealth. We are in peaceful association with the peoples of that Commonwealth. We believed when the Treaty was signed that there was renounced recourse to war as between the different nations of the Commonwealth, and it is in view of that peculiar relationship that we advanced to the signature of the Kellogg Pact. I do not see how anybody, regarding the Treaty as an instrument accepted by this country, and going to be kept by this country until it is cancelled and negatived in the most formal and constitutional way, could believe that the Kellogg Pact would be excluded in so far as that relationship went.

There are special things that stand around the Kellogg Pact which, I think, strengthen that point of view. The invitation to renounce war as an instrument of national policy between nations was addressed in the first instance by France to the United States. The United States said in return that it thought a better contribution towards world peace could be made if all the principal Powers could be got to renounce war. All the other Powers were approached, and then an invitation was extended to us. We did not get the invitation in the first case because we were not one of the principal Powers of the world. We got the invitation later because, in the course of correspondence, we expressed the point of view—which was shared by other members of the Commonwealth— that we did not want to become original signatories to this Pact, and that was accepted. That invitation was addressed specifically to all the members of the Commonwealth. That, again, takes it out of the category of a Pact lightly entered into, signed by the King on behalf of all the States members and not specifically addressed to them, and separate negotiations evolved after the first invitation. In that way again I think this Pact is marked out specially.

Whatever may be said in the Report of the 1926 Imperial Conference, although I believe that that was in line with the original signature of the Treaty and that we were going to enter into this Pact freely, in fact there is special relationship between the States members, and if the Kellogg Pact has no obligation, then neither has our Treaty position. It is wrong to take the Imperial Conference proceedings of 1926, segregate one paragraph and look on that as summarising the whole thing. Remember that there is stated in the Preamble all the details agreed upon, the details of certain adjustments of old-time machinery to meet new conditions. It is stated: "Their position and mutual relation may be readily defined. They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Later it says that conditions made equality of status impossible of attainment by way of federation. "The only alternative was by the way of autonomy; and along this road it has been steadily sought. Every self-governing member of the Empire is now master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever." It goes on to say: "The British Empire is not founded upon negations. It depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its lifeblood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and progress are among its objects." It is in the light of the Treaty, backed by the Imperial Conference documents of 1926, that we are asking this House to approach the Kellogg Pact. I say positively that on our side we are agreed to the renunciation of war as a type of procedure in our relations with Great Britain and the other members of the Commonwealth, and we believe that from the Treaty, the Imperial Conference documents, and the Kellogg Pact the same thing holds.

Deputy Johnson used a phrase with regard to signing jointly and simultaneously. We participate jointly and simultaneously with His Majesty's Government and the Governments of the Dominions. That is the statement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain. I think that there was no special emphasis laid on the second point that Senator Johnson referred to. In so far as jointly and simultaneously is concerned, the matter comes to this: We signed through the instrumentality of President Cosgrave. President Cosgrave had full power granted him by the King, at the request of the Executive Council of this State. That full power was limited so that he could speak and sign only for the area of jurisdiction under the Parliament of this country, and similarly was limited the full power granted to every other member signing, including Great Britain. Great Britain's full power in that case is the outcome of the Imperial Conference of 1926; the full power of the signatory on behalf of Great Britain was also limited to the area of jurisdiction of the British Parliament. We have a separate instrument of ratification. The ratification instrument will be signed by the King, on the advice of the Executive Council of this State. That, in fact, has been done; that document has already been dispatched to our Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, and if and when the Dáil agrees that the Government of this country should sign the Pact, then, on notification being received that that motion has been carried, our representative in Washington will present that at Washington. There may be a simultaneous presentation of documents, but there is no single document with joint signatures. We had a separate instrument and we had a separate signature.

Senator Johnson queried whether we could say that we were acting independently in this whole matter, and then referred to the passage of documents between Great Britain and America prior to the Kellogg Pact. In that connection he stressed the statement of Great Britain regarding participation jointly and simultaneously with the Dominions. As regards Sir Austen Chamberlain's statement, I can see great embarrassment arising if one member of the Commonwealth stood out and refused to sign. I can see great suspicion arising as regards that particular nation. I can see suspicion attaching to the whole British Commonwealth as a result of it. I do not know whether the attitude of Sir Austen Chamberlain would be persisted in were we to decide not to sign the Kellogg Pact. It gives us a tremendous instrument at the moment. We have clear-cut independence in the matter. Full power for separate negotiation, on the advice of the Executive Council, was given to President Cosgrave in the letter addressed to us in May. Then we have the fact of our separate signature in Paris in August last. This is the first time that it could be said that any international political agreement has been signed by a single member of the commonwealth of Nations other than by Great Britain by a separate instrument of ratification.

Senator Johnson put a series of questions to me. I think I have answered most of them. He asked if there was any question of special and peculiar interpretation understood in the Kellogg Pact that we have signed. As far as we are concerned, no. He asked if there were any special or peculiar interpretations understood between us and the United States of America. The letters show that There is no conflict between the Pact and our commitments under the Covenant of the League of Nations. There are no special or peculiar interpretations as between ourselves and the United States, or between ourselves and Great Britain or any other member of the Commonwealth. I have been asked if there are any reservations between ourselves and the United States. There are none, and the letters show that, and also as between ourselves and Great Britain and other members of the Commonwealth there are none. We are asked if we are committed to the British reservations or interpretations. We are not. I have answered the question as to the Treaty. The reservations mentioned were peculiar to the British themselves, and we had nothing to do with them.

The two letters are short and may be read here. They are:—

Department of External Affairs,

Dublin,

30th May, 1928.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of 22nd May referring to the draft Treaty for the renunciation of war and extending an invitation from your Government to the Government of the Irish Free State to become one of the original parties to the proposed Treaty.

The Government of the Irish Free State warmly welcome the action of the United States Government in initiating this further advance towards the maintenance of general peace. They are in cordial agreement with the general principle of the draft Treaty, which they confidently hope will ensure the peaceful settlement of future international disputes.

Sharing the view expressed by the Secretary of State of the United States in his speech before the American Society of International Law that nothing in the draft Treaty is inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Government of the Irish Free State accept unreservedly the invitation of the United States Government to become a party to the Treaty jointly with the other States similarly invited.

The Government of the Irish Free State will be glad, therefore, to participate in, and to further by every possible means, the negotiations which may be necessary for the conclusion of the Pact.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Sgd.) P. McGILLIGAN.

His Excellency,

F.A. Sterling, Esq.,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America,

Dublin.

Department of External Affairs,

Dublin,

12th July, 1928.

Excellency,

Your Excellency's note of the 23rd June enclosing a revised draft of the proposed Treaty for the Renunciation of War has been carefully studied by the Government of the Irish Free State.

As I informed you in my note of the 30th May, the Government of the Irish Free State were prepared to accept unreservedly the draft Treaty proposed by your Government on the 13th April, holding, as they did, that neither their right of self-defence nor their commitments under the Covenant of the League of Nations were in any way prejudiced by its terms.

The draft Treaty as revised is equally acceptable to the Government of the Irish Free State, and I have the honour to inform you that they are prepared to sign it in conjunction with such other Governments as may be so disposed. As the effectiveness of the proposed Treaty as an instrument for the suppression of war depends to a great extent upon its universal application, the Government of the Irish Free State hope that the Treaty may meet with the approbation of the other Governments to whom it has been sent, and that it may subsequently be accepted by all the other Powers of the world.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) P. McGILLIGAN.

His Excellency,

F.A. Sterling, Esq.,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, Legation of the United States of America,

Dublin.

I hope that the motion to hold up the ratification of the Pact will not be passed. I am prepared to leave in the Library copies of the documents containing these replies and of the letters to which they are answers. Senator Connolly said that we should know everything and anything the Executive Council had done re the Pact. Instead of putting serious questions likely to elicit information as to what we had done, we had a rambling discussion from the Senator as to the rights of oppressed nationalities all over the world, with a series of comments on other Governments. I agree with Senator Sir John Keane in thinking that these were most impolitic and undesirable, however relevant they might have been. There may be a great many things relevant to a discussion which a person of ordinary tact and understanding would refrain from bringing out in the course of debate. We have been told that the Kellogg Pact is an attempt between the "haves" and the "have-nots" to stereotype present conditions. What is the alternative? Refuse to sign the Peace Pact until such time as Senator Connolly and Senator Comyn will lead a series of wars for the liberation of the oppressed people of the world? With the idea of peace among the big nations of the world, is there not more likelihood that the smaller nations are going to work themselves free by peaceful means than they can at the moment? When discussing this Pact, if it can be shown that present conditions are being stereotyped more firmly by signing the Kellogg Pact than by not signing then I would not sign it, but we are certainly not doing that. We are leaving the situation exactly as fluid as before, except that there is general agreement —an agreement Senator Dowdall imagines it to be, of a cynical type. Other people believe that by signing the Kellogg Pact there is a better chance that oppressed people are going to get free by the pressure of world opinion acting in a peaceful way through Governments and not leaving them simply to the mercy of armies and navies, and all the injustice that force can cause.

Senator Connolly refuses to accept the Pact. At the moment he will not subscribe to the occupation of any foreign territory. Later on he went on to announce the national policy which this country should adopt—that we should look for guaranteed neutrality. If the Senator is going to accept guaranteed neutrality for this country while other countries are subject to oppression at the hands of other nations, is our guaranteed neutrality to be refused until such time as all the other oppressed peoples of the world have got their freedom, or are we going to accept in a mood of cynicism, as Senator Connolly said, and not subscribe to any idea of bringing peace to the world because there are some occupied territories? Are we to wait for our guaranteed neutrality until all occupied territory is free from occupying forces? Are we ourselves going to break that neutrality should any country afterwards dare to put a foot on what does not belong to it? What we want is neutrality of this type, that this country is not to be attacked, and that we are going to use a phrase that was used last night in another connection, to make the welkin ring about any country that oppresses another people. We are going to be guaranteed neutrality ourselves, but we are not going to obey any laws, or observe any considerations of decency in debate as long as there are oppressed peoples under the control of any particular Government other than their own. Senator Connolly asked whether the Pact cross-cuts our commitments to the League of Nations. It does not. I am not sure whether that pleases Senator Comyn or not. I expect from what has been said by Senators Connolly, Moore and Comyn that the attempt of Fianna Fáil to get funds from the United States of America for obvious purposes has failed. They feel now they can draw attention to what the United States of America is doing in regard to Nicaragua.

Colonel MOORE

It is an old habit of the Minister to make stupid insinuations.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

It is only an opinion of my own.

CATHAOIRLEACH

Nicaragua was referred to in the debate.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

I cannot recall that I ever hoped that Senator Moore would agree with me. The Senator has censured other nations for double dealing. He says he sees no glimmer of peace in this, but I think there is no great glimmer of peace in the Senator's ideas. Apparently if he did see a glimmer of peace in the Pact he would sign it, although afterwards he went on to say that it was not by signing Kellogg Pacts that we achieved our freedom in 1782 or later, and that we should retain to ourselves the right to fight and struggle by force of arms against England.

Colonel MOORE

As long as there are hostile nations around us, we cannot be peaceful.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

As long as there are hostile nations around, we must be hostile to everybody else, and we must reserve to ourselves the right to attack.

Colonel MOORE

No, the right of self-defence.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

The right of self-defence is reserved. If the Senator had read the document he would understand that. Senator Comyn has a different policy of guaranteed neutrality. All I can gather from his speech is that we have no mercantile marine in this country and no food in the country.

Mr. COMYN

Not enough of food.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

If war broke out to-morrow, and if there was no food in the country, and the ships dealing with this country became belligerent we would have this country landed into the position of a Fianna Fáil paradise, with a wall erected around the country, nothing coming in and nothing going out. So far as this country is concerned in time of war we would have a glut of food.

Mr. COMYN

You would have no food after three months.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

I would like to hear the Senator say how much beef, turnips and oats there is going to be in the country at a given date, and to say whether or not he can stand over the statement that we would have no food.

Mr. COMYN

On a point of order, does the Minister seriously mean to inform this House that we have more than three months' flour, or grain for the manufacture of flour, in this country at any time?

CATHAOIRLEACH

That is not a point of order.

Mr. COMYN

The Minister is misrepresenting me.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

I think we have. I do not say wheaten flour, but I say flour. It is possible to get flour from other grain than wheat. At all events, it is not necessary for a man to live by bread alone. Senator Gogarty spoke of the influences that lead up to war. We have had one constant sign that led up to war in this country, the Barrow drainage scheme. The first time it was attempted, within twelve months the Napoleonic wars broke out, and then the scheme lapsed. When taken up a great many years later, within twelve months the South African War broke out and the scheme lapsed again. It was re-started and again, within twelve months, the Great War of 1914 broke out. The scheme has now been in operation for more than twelve months, without a war following, so that the greatest omen of war that this country ever had has disappeared. If people take cynical views like Senator Dowdall with regard to the Pact, at any rate they might give credit to other people for not having that point of view. The efforts of other people have brought the preparations for peace as much into the limelight as the preparations for war. The idea of peace is abroad, and the preparations for peace are being much more, relatively, attended to than preparations for war. We cannot get universal peace through this Pact, but, at any rate, we should not refuse whatever aid we can give to the people promulgating the idea of peace. For that reason, not because I believe the Kellogg Pact is going to abolish war and bring peace, but because people have brought forward that idea I ask the House to assent to the Government of the Free State ratifying the Kellogg Pact.

Mr. JOHNSON

Would it not be possible for the Minister to insert in some official document the letters which he has promised to place in the library? He has now read out his own letters and these will appear in the records of the House. He has not read the letters to which his were a reply, and I think it is desirable that they should be available for future reference. If that is possible my object shall have been attained.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

I now present to the House the two letters I received, the replies to which I have already read.

Following are the two letters:—

Legation of the United States of America.

Dublin, May 22nd, 1928.

Excellency:

In the note which he addressed to the American Ambassador at London on May 19th, 1928, Sir Austen Chamberlain was good enough to inform my Government that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain had been in communication with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and with the Government of India and had ascertained that they were all in cordial agreement with the general principle of the multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war which the Government of the United States proposed on April 13th, 1928. Sir Austen added that he felt confident therefore that His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and the Government of India were prepared to accept an invitation to participate in the conclusion of such a treaty as that proposed by the Government of the United States.

I have been instructed to state to Your Excellency that my Government has received this information with the keenest satisfaction. My Government has hoped from the outset of the present negotiations that the Governments of the Dominions and the Government of India would feel disposed to become parties to the suggested anti-war treaty. It is, moreover, most gratifying to the Government of the United States to learn that His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and the Government of India are so favourably inclined towards the treaty for the renunciation of war which my Government proposed on April 13th, 1928, as to wish to participate therein individually and as original signatories, and my Government for its part is most happy to accede to the suggestion contained in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of May 19th, 1928, to the American Ambassador at London.

Accordingly I have been instructed to extend to His Majesty's Government in the Irish Free State, in the name of the Government of the United States, a cordial invitation to become one of the original parties to the treaty for the renunciation of war which is now under consideration. Pursuant to my instructions I also have the honour to inform you that the Government of the United States will address to His Majesty's Government in the Irish Free State at the same time and in the same manner as to the other Governments whose participation in the proposed treaty in the first instance is contemplated, any future communications which it may make on the subject of the treaty after it has been acquainted with the views of all the Governments to which its note of April 13th, 1928, was addressed.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

F.A. STERLING.

Legation of the United States of America,

Dublin, 23rd June, 1928.

Excellency:

It will be recalled that, pursuant to the understanding reached between the Government of France and the Government of the United States, the American Ambassadors at London, Berlin, Rome and Tokyo transmitted on the 13th April, 1928, to the Governments to which they were respectively accredited the text of M. Briand's original proposal of the 20th June, 1927, together with copies of the notes subsequently exchanged by France and the United States on the subject of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war. At the same time the Government of the United States also submitted for consideration a preliminary draft of a treaty representing in a general way the form of treaty which it was prepared to sign, and inquired whether the Governments thus addressed were in a position to give favourable consideration thereto. The text of the identic notes of the 13th April, 1928, and a copy of the draft treaty transmitted therewith were also brought to the attention of the Government of France by the American Ambassador at Paris.

It will likewise be recalled that, on the 20th April, 1928, the Government of the French Republic circulated among the other interested Governments, including the Government of the United States, an alternative draft treaty, and that, in an address which he delivered on the 28th April, 1928, before the American Society of International Law, the Secretary of State of the United States explained fully the construction placed by my Government upon the treaty proposed by it, referring as follows to the six major considerations emphasised by France in its alternative draft treaty and prior diplomatic correspondence with my Government:—

"1. Self-defence.

"There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defence. That right is inherent in every sovereign State and is implicit in every Treaty. Every nation is free at all times, and regardless of treaty provisions, to defend its territories from attack or invasion, and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence. If it has a good case, the world will applaud and not condemn its action. Express recognition by treaty of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression. It is the identical question approached from the other side. In this respect, no treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-defence. It is not in the interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defence, since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mould events to accord with an agreed definition.

2. The League Covenant.

"The Covenant imposes no affirmative primary obligation to go to war. The obligation, if any, is secondary, and attaches only when deliberately accepted by a State. Article 10 of the Covenant has, for example, been interpreted by a resolution submitted to the Fourth Assembly, but not formally adopted owing to one adverse vote, to mean that: ‘It is for the constitutional authorities of each member to decide, in reference to the obligations of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of the members, in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.'

"There is, in my opinion, no necessary inconsistency between the Covenant and the idea of an unqualified renunciation of war, The Covenant can, it is true, be construed as authorising war in certain circumstances, but it is an authorisation and not a positive requirement.

3. The Treaties of Locarno.

"If the parties to the treaties of Locarno are under any positive obligation to go to war, such obligation certainly would not attach until one of the parties has resorted to war in violation of its solemn pledges thereunder. It is therefore obvious that, if all the parties to the Locarno treaties become parties to the multilateral anti-war treaty proposed by the United States, there would be a double assurance that the Locarno treaties would not be violated by recourse to arms. In such an event it would follow that resort to war by any State, in violation of the Locarno treaties, would also be a breach of the multilateral anti-war treaty, and the other parties to the anti-war treaty would thus, as a matter of law, be automatically released from their obligations thereunder and free to fulfil their Locarno commitments. The United States is entirely willing that all parties to the Locarno treaties should become parties to its proposed anti-war treaty, either through signature in the first instance, or by immediate accession to the treaty as soon as it comes into force in the manner provided in Article 3 of the American draft, and it will offer no objection when and if such a suggestion is made.

4. Treaties of Neutrality.

"The United States is not informed as to the precise treaties which France has in mind, and cannot, therefore, discuss their provisions. It is not unreasonable to suppose, however, that the relations between France and the States whose neutrality she has guaranteed, are sufficiently close and intimate to make it possible for France to persuade such States to adhere reasonably to the anti-war treaty proposed by the United States. If this were done, no party to the anti-war treaty could attack the neutralised States without violating the treaty, and thereby automatically freeing France and the other Powers in respect of the treaty-breaking State from the obligations of the anti-war treaty. If the neutralised States were attacked by a State not a party to the anti-war treaty, the latter treaty would, of course, have no bearing, and France would be as free to act under the treaties guaranteeing neutrality as if she were not a party to the anti-war treaty. It is difficult to conceive, therefore, how treaties guaranteeing neutrality can be regarded as necessarily preventing the conclusion by France or any other Power of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war.

5. Relations with a Treaty-breaking State.

"As I have already pointed out, there can be no question, as a matter of law, that violation of a multilateral anti-war treaty through resort to war by one party thereto would automatically release the other parties from their obligations to the treaty-breaking States. Any express recognition of this principle of law is wholly unnecessary.

6. Universality.

"From the beginning it has been the hope of the United States that its proposed multilateral anti-war treaty should be world-wide in its application, and appropriate provision therefor was made in the draft submitted to the other Governments on the 13th April. From a practical standpoint, it is clearly preferable, however, not to postpone the coming into force of an anti-war treaty until all the nations of the world can agree upon the text of such a treaty and cause it to be ratified. For one reason or another, a State so situated as to be no menace to the peace of the world might obstruct agreement or delay ratification in such manner as to render abortive the efforts of all the other Powers. It is highly improbable, moreover, that a form of treaty acceptable to the British, French, German, Italian and Japanese Governments, as well as to the United States, would not be equally acceptable to most if not all of the other Powers of the world. Even were this not the case, however, the coming into force among the above-named six Powers of an effective anti-war treaty and their observance thereof would be a practical guaranty against a second world war. This in itself would be a tremendous service to humanity, and the United States is not willing to jeopardise the practical success of the proposal which it has made by conditioning the coming into force of the treaty upon prior universal or almost universal acceptance."

The British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments have now replied to my Government's notes of the 13th April, 1928, and the Governments of the British Dominions and of India have likewise replied to the invitations addressed to them on the 22nd May, 1928, by my Government, pursuant to the suggestion conveyed in the note of the 19th May, 1928, from His Majesty's Government in Great Britain. None of these Governments have expressed any dissent from the above-quoted construction, and none has voiced the least disapproval of the principle underlying the proposal of the United States for the promotion of world peace. Neither has any of the replies received by the Government of the United States suggested any specific modification of the text of the draft treaty proposed by it on the 13th April, 1928, and my Government, for its part, remains convinced that no modification of the text of its proposal for a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war is necessary to safeguard the legitimate interests of any nation. It believes that the right of self-defence is inherent in every sovereign State and implicit in every treaty. No specific reference to that inalienable attribute of sovereignty is therefore necessary or desirable. It is no less evident that resort to war, in violation of the proposed treaty by one of the parties thereto, would release the other parties from their obligations under the treaty towards the belligerent State. This principle is well recognised. So far as the Locarno treaties are concerned, my Government has felt, from the very first, that participation in the anti-war treaty by the Powers which signed the Locarno agreements, either through signature in the first instance or thereafter, would meet every practical requirement of the situation, since, in such event, no State could resort to war in violation of the Locarno treaties without simultaneously violating the anti-war treaty, thus leaving the other parties thereto free so far as the treaty-breaking State is concerned. As your Excellency knows, the Government of the United States has welcomed the idea that all parties to the treaties of Locarno should be among the original signatories of the proposed treaty for the renunciation of war, and provision therefor has been made in the draft treaty which I have the honour to transmit herewith. The same procedure would cover the treaties guaranteeing neutrality to which the Government of France has referred. Adherence to the proposed treaty by all parties to those other treaties would completely safeguard their rights, since subsequent resort to war by any of them, or by any party to the anti-war treaty, would violate the latter treaty as well as the neutrality treaty, and thus leave the other parties to the anti-war treaty free, so far as the treaty-breaking State is concerned. My Government would be entirely willing, however, to agree that the parties to such neutrality treaties should be original signatories of the multilateral anti-war treaty, and it has no reason to believe that such an arrangement would meet with any objection on the part of the other Governments now concerned in the present negotiations.

While my Government is satisfied that the draft treaty proposed by it on the 13th April, 1928, could be properly accepted by the Powers of the world without change, except for including among the original signatories the British Dominions, India, all parties to the treaties of Locarno, and, it may be, all parties to the neutrality treaties mentioned by the Government of France, it has no desire to delay or complicate the present negotiations by rigidly adhering to the precise phraseology of that draft, particularly since it appears that, by modifying the draft in form, though not in substance, the points raised by other Governments can be satisfactorily met and general agreement upon the text of the treaty to be signed be promptly reached. The Government of the United States has therefore decided to submit to the fourteen other Governments now concerned in these negotiations a revised draft of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war. The text of this revised draft is identical with that of the draft proposed by the United States on the 13th April, 1928, except that the preamble now provides that the British Dominions, India and all parties to the treaties of Locarno are to be included among the Powers called upon to sign the treaty in the first instance, and except that the first three paragraphs of the preamble have been changed to read as follows:—

"Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind;

"Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

"Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty."

The revised preamble thus gives express recognition to the principle that, if a State resorts to war in violation of the treaty, the other contracting parties are released from their obligations under the treaty to that State. It also provides for participation in the treaty by all parties to the treaties of Locarno, thus making it certain that resort to war, in violation of the Locarno treaties, would also violate the present treaty and release not only the other signatories of the Locarno treaties but also the other signatories to the anti-war treaty from their obligations to the treaty-breaking State. Moreover, as stated above, my Government would be willing to have included among the original signatories the parties to the neutrality treaties referred to by the Government of the French Republic, although it believes that the interests of those States would be adequately safeguarded if, instead of signing in the first instance, they should choose to adhere to the treaty.

In these circumstances, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the consideration of your Excellency's Government, a draft of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war, containing the changes outlined above. I have been instructed to state in this connexion that the Government of the United States is ready to sign at once a treaty in the form herein proposed, and to express the fervent hope that the Irish Free State Government will be able promptly to indicate its readiness to accept without qualification or reservation the form of treaty suggested by the United States.

If the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, the Irish Free State. Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa and the United States can now agree to conclude this anti-war treaty among themselves, my Government is confident that the other nations of the world will, as soon as the treaty comes into force, gladly adhere thereto, and that this simple procedure will bring mankind's age-long aspirations for universal peace nearer to practical fulfilment than ever before in the history of the world.

I have the honour to state, in conclusion, that the Government of the United States would be pleased to be informed, at as early a date as may be convenient, whether your Excellency's Government is willing to join with the United States and other similarly disposed Governments in signing a definitive treaty for the renunciation of war in the form transmitted herewith.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

F.A. STERLING.

Enclosure.

Seanad Éireann díospóireacht - Thursday, 21 Feb 1929