Vol. 14 No. 4
On behalf of Senator Milroy I move the following motion which appears on the Order Paper in his name:—
That the Seanad approves of the International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament signed at London on the 22nd day of April, 1930, a copy of which was laid on the Table of the Seanad on the 3rd December, 1930, and recommends the Executive Council to take the necessary steps to ratify the said Treaty.
I second.
I ask the House not to agree to this motion. I think it is satisfactory that the powers concerned in naval armaments, who are parties to this agreement, should have arrived at the amount of agreement detailed in this document. It seems to me, however, that the function of the Free State in this matter is not at all clear, and I cannot understand why we should be asked to vote for such a motion. But if the Minister tells me that, according to certain parts of the agreement, the agreement would not come into operation unless it were ratified by this House, then I would not persist in my opposition. I would like to have some explanation given as to why the Free State appeared at this Conference at all. What is the position of the Free State in respect to this Treaty for the limitation of armaments? It will be seen, on reading the document, that it is made by the President of the United States of America, the President of the French Republic, the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the King of Italy, and the Emperor of Japan; and, in respect of the British Dominions, representatives of Great Britain, the Dominions and the Irish Free State were present at the Conference.
So far as I can see there is nothing whatever in the document which has any concern at all of a direct kind with the Irish Free State except Part IV., which is exceptional. It refers to the establishment of rules of international law, and sets forth that certain conditions regarding submarine attacks on merchant ships should apply. I think that is very desirable indeed and very satisfactory. It will be particularly so if this State ever has a mercantile marine. Even though we have not a mercantile marine, such a provision as that will prove satisfactory where citizens of this State are passengers on merchant ships or are seamen on the ships of other countries. That is undoubtedly an advantage—to have such a proposition as that agreed to, but I think it would have been agreed to whether the Free State was represented at this Conference or not.
The point of my objection lies here, that it is implicit within this document that the Free State is associated with Great Britain and the British Dominions in respect to naval armaments and naval policy. I do not think that is in accord with the declarations of Ministers in the past. I do not think it is in accord with what is desirable for this State: that we should be closely associated with, and in fact parties to the naval policy of Great Britain.
It has been pointed out quite recently by Ministers, by the present Minister and his predecessor in the office of Minister for External Affairs, that in regard to diplomatic matters the Free State was not part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, that we are an independent and separate unit. In regard to economic policy, it has been declared that we are not part of an economic unit, that unit being the British Commonwealth. But, in respect of this document, it would appear we are part of the naval unit known as the British Commonwealth of Nations, and, therefore, have some responsibility for naval policy as carried through by Great Britain. Have we such a responsibility? If we have, then it would seem to me necessary that the Dáil and the Seanad should both be fully acquainted with all matters concerned with British naval policy. I say that we are not, and ought not to be, a component part of any association of States, even the British Commonwealth of Nations, for the purpose of naval or military armaments. If there had been included in this Treaty some reference, let us say, to the occupation of Berehaven or Lough Swilly, or Haulbowline, called in the Treaty Queenstown Harbour, and there was some attempt to get away from the Treaty obligations in respect of the British occupation of these ports, then I would say there was something to be gained by entering into this agreement. But that, presumably, has not been discussed, or if discussed there has been no agreement that there should be a modification of Britain's Treaty rights in that respect.
The general objection I make to the motion is that there is implied in this Treaty an agreement that the Free State is part of the unit for naval and military purposes known as the British Commonwealth of Nations. I think that is a mistaken policy, and that it is detrimental to the policy that has been adumbrated and advocated in this House and in the Dáil and outside. There is nothing within the Treaty which either imposes a separate obligation upon the Free State, or which indicates that the Free State is giving something to the other parties to the Treaty. It seems to me that it is possibly quite outside the scope of our activities, and we should not have been represented at that Conference, and because we should not have been represented at the Conference I think the House ought not to agree to the ratification of the Treaty, unless, as I said at the beginning, it could be shown by non-ratification the Treaty as respecting the other signatories would not come into actual effect. If that is a true interpretation, I think, notwithstanding my opposition to the general contents of the agreement, we ought to agree to it. Without that assurance from the Minister I think the House ought to refuse to accept the motion.
The points raised by Senator Johnson are of some interest. I agree with him entirely that we should welcome the extent to which there has been agreement in the Treaty, and probably he and I would agree in expressing dissatisfaction that it was not possible to go a great deal further. Where I quite disagree with him is in his belief that if the Free State had not been represented at that Conference our independence in matters naval would have been emphasised. I think the exact contrary would have been the case. I believe if we had not decided to be separately represented, and if we had not insisted on our right to be separately represented, even though it has little or no immediate effect on our affairs here, for we have no navy, if we did not insist on our right to approve or disapprove of this Treaty, I think that what Senator Johnson is afraid of would have been emphasised, and that in the future, if circumstances change and it became of real importance to insist on our separate naval rights, such as they are, we might find it extremely difficult to do so.
I am of opinion we should pass the motion, not because it does not go as far as we would like, but we welcome it as far as it goes, and because the passing of it emphasises that we are not responsible for the naval policy of Britain, the number of ships that may be voted by the British Parliament, or their policy in which we have no say or control. If we were responsible for that estimates would have to be laid before the Dáil, and we would have some say in the matter. It is because we have no such say or responsibility that we should insist on the right of separately approving or disapproving of treaties of this nature.
It comes to this, that if we refuse to pass this motion it would be tantamount to a want of confidence in our Minister, who was sent to Geneva fully accredited, but the want of confidence I have is in peace treaties and pacts which serve to lull the public while preparations are made uninterruptedly for war. In all these treaties there was not a single attempt made to put under a ban destructive materials, such as poison gas or any kind of explosives, whereas things that are not so dangerous to a nation are strictly prohibited, such as alcohol and drugs. There is a certain amount of dishonesty and a good deal of danger in these pious aspirations which are lulling the public in regard to this condition of affairs, which was never more menacing. There are more people at present under arms in Europe and more engines of war than even in 1913. I saw the other day a comparative table of the number of men under arms and the amount of munitions, tanks, aeroplanes and heavy guns and, without mentioning any nation, it was easy to see that Europe is more prepared for war than ever in the world's history. Agreements made in Geneva and London in face of that seem to me to be only lulling the public as to the danger of war.
The only alternative would be to withdraw from Geneva as we did from Westminster. If we did that it would be to our detriment, for we would be withdrawing from representation among the nations of the world. That is a position that we fought hard to achieve, and having achieved it we should maintain it. In view of the general arming of Europe, the only thing one can do, as far as any law or sentiment can oppose force, is to join in these pious wishes for peace, but pious wishes are of no avail against guns. We are not sufficiently strong to throw any weight, naval or otherwise, into the general balance of Europe. It seems to me that war is a manifestation of a nation's growth, and in view of that nothing will prevent war occurring, but in the interim of fatigue, and while the money changers are not prepared for another war, the only thing we can do is to have those pious wishes, inadequate as they are. There is nothing in the present state of the world's development except to record our disapproval, as this motion does, of war generally and our approval of attempts to curtail it. I do not think there is any other course open to the House but to approve of the Minister's attitude at the London Treaty.
Senator Johnson has raised an objection to this Treaty, that it is tying up the Irish Free State with the British Commonwealth of Nations as a unit for the purpose of naval policy. So far as the Treaty is concerned, our only association is with the British Commonwealth of Nations and with the other parties to the Treaty in regard to two things: (a) a reduction of naval armaments, and (b) a general progress towards peace. The Senator asks could I say if our refusal to pass this motion would in any way hold up the Treaty. It would, distinctly. That emerges from the Treaty itself, as will be seen from Article 24, paragraph 2. That Article provides that there is ratification only as soon as we come in. It reads:—
As soon as the ratifications of the United States of America, of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, in respect of each and all of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations as enumerated in the preamble of the present Treaty, and of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan have been deposited, the Treaty shall come into force in respect of the said High Contracting Parties.
Great pressure has been put upon us, mainly from the United States, but also from the British side, that we should get this ratification through as quickly as possible so that the scrapping of certain capital ships may be begun at once. To refuse to ratify means delay, and may mean the remaking of the Treaty with this State left out. At the moment it certainly means delay. If I could have it pointed out to me that anywhere in this Treaty we are associated in the British Commonwealth of Nations unit for naval purposes, then my objection to the Treaty begins.
Will the Minister explain the purpose of Article 16 (1)?
I shall; there is, of course, a certain association that we recognise with the Commonwealth. The Senator has asked if there are any specific obligations undertaken by us. I ask the Senator to take almost any Article of the Treaty. Take even the absurd point with regard to aircraft carriers. That binds us as much as any of the other high contracting parties. It may be a ludicrous thing to bring this item forward when we are never likely to have aircraft carriers of the type dealt with in that Article. The Treaty binds in certain other Articles with regard to submarines, and with regard to naval combatant vessels of a certain type and above a certain tonnage. It gives us freedom in other matters, as it gives freedom to the High Contracting Parties. It gives to every single one of the individual nations concerned in this Treaty the right to build ships below a certain tonnage to whatever extent is desired, and it gives us in every way the same right.
The absence of the agreement would not prevent your doing that.
Probably not, but the fact that there is a limitation on certain things binds us as much as it binds anybody else. It may be a ludicrous point to make, because we are not likely to build any ships of these types, but there may be some of them, such as of the submarine class, which, we would like, if the Kellogg Fact proved ineffective, to build for purposes of coastal defence. To some Senators this may seem pessimistic from the angle of peace, but the time may come when we shall have to undertake in no uncertain way our own coastal defence, and consequently require to have certain types of ships associated with that type of defence. We have the same rights and have undertaken the same obligations under this Treaty as any of the others. The Senator referred me to Article 16. That refers back to Article 14 which sets out:—
"The naval combatant vessels of the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations and Japan, other than capital ships, aircraft carriers and all vessels exempt from limitation under Article 8, shall be limited during the term of the present Treaty."
The earlier provisions as to capital ships depend on the earlier Washington Treaty and hinge on that, and the other things—aircraft carriers and exempt classifications—are dealt with seriatim in earlier Articles. Then you come to these three categories— cruisers, destroyers and submarines. They are dealt with here, not specifically ship by ship, but under the heading of tonnage. We are in the British Commonwealth of Nations group for maximum tonnage calculations, but there is no limitation as to what is to be done within that group, only that the combined fleets are not to exceed a certain maximum tonnage. There is also a certain right for a transfer from one category to another. That is referred to in the Treaty.
We certainly have undertaken certain specific obligations. We are nowhere, I hold, described as a unit. We are nowhere a unit or under unitary control. If we were I would scrap the Treaty myself, no matter what the repercussions might be in the way of delay. But in Parts 1,2 and 4 we are distinctly placed and clear from any association. There is a grouping in Part 3 for the purpose of defining the amount of tonnage which shall not be exceeded by the combined fleets of the group of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In considering that, it must be remembered in the case of the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations that some of them have definite naval commitments to date, and have undertaken these in definite association with the British Government, entering upon them for their own defensive purposes.
I refer to Australia and New Zealand. Canada has also certain naval commitments, but we recollect that that country refused to be hurried into war on one occasion, and on that occasion had her own view fully expressed. For us—when it came to this question of tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, our position was that we had no craft of these types, nor had we any clear mind as to what we wanted in them. And so, for different reasons and in this limited way, the grouping was allowed.
I would like to express my point of view, that it is too early, I think, to give in to anything like pessimism as to the outcome of this Naval Treaty. This Treaty must be taken in conjunction with the Pact of Paris. There never has been an agreement with regard to the limitation of armaments on sea, air and land with a chance of success equal to that likely in the case of this naval agreement. That is because there have been political agreements beforehand prior to the London Naval Conference. There was the Kellogg Pact, and there was the new orientation, the changed way people were looking at these things. They were no longer looking to navies as instruments of aggression but instruments to be used in safeguarding the peace of the world. The peace atmosphere was better than it ever had been before. This is another step in the right direction. It may be that some sudden crisis will come that will break down and destroy everything accomplished and leading towards peace, but people should not give in too easily to that pessimism.
We have a special interest in this Naval Treaty, particularly because we possess no navy ourselves, and should welcome every effort to revive peace and the gradual disappearance of navies. In this case to have absented ourselves from the Conference would not merely have implied what Senator Gogarty and Senator Douglas said but much more. Here was a serious attempt being made to secure that disputes would be settled peaceably rather than be fought out by the horrible method of war, and two of the parties specially interested were the United States and Great Britain. Could we suffer our absence to be interpreted by either the United States or Great Britain as implying our indifference to that question being solved in a peaceful way? We have taken some slight part in the many matters brought forward at Geneva and elsewhere leaning definitely towards peace, and to this great peace effort in particular we had to lend whatever aid we could, recognising that the whole future of this country depends on a peaceful situation developing and being maintained for years to come. Out of a spirit of cynicism it would be wrong to lightly pass over a Treaty such as this. There will most assuredly be delay if we do not pass it. There is nothing in it that derogates from the position we have taken up with regard to our independence and our separate naval rights. That being the case, I ask the Seanad to hesitate before they object to assenting to the Treaty.
Motion put and declared passed.
