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Seanad Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 13 May 1931

Vol. 14 No. 18

Trustee Bill, 1931—Second Stage.

I beg to move the Second Reading of this Bill. The object of the Bill is quite clearly stated in the long Title. It is entitled "An Act to make provision for the appointment of new trustees and for the exercise of powers by trustees in certain cases where difficulties in regard to such appointment or exercise are occasioned by reason of an office, title or dignity having ceased to exist." The Bill is an extremely technical one and I should like to explain to the House in anything but legal language exactly what it means and what it does.

There are a number of institutions in this country—mostly charitable institutions, but some of them educational—the trustees of which, or some of them, are not appointed because they are private individuals, but are appointed, or are acting as trustees, because they fill or did fill some particular office. In the course of time, a certain number of these offices have disappeared. A good many of them have disappeared before the Free State came into existence. A number of them have disappeared since the Free State was established, because the offices with which they were connected—many of them were connected with the Bench, such as the office of Lord Chief Baron—have disappeared. The result of that is that some of these institutions are left without trustees. I know of one charity in which there is an acting trustee. But though he is acting and doing his best for the charity, I doubt very much that he has any legal authority behind his acts. Be that as it may, a number of these institutions are now finding it practically impossible to administer their trusts, because their trustees were either persons holding offices which have now become extinct, or because their trustees had to be nominated or appointed by persons holding offices which have now become extinct. Under these circumstances, the only course open to these institutions, if a Bill such as this had not been introduced, would have been to proceed by Private Bill. A great many of these institutions are anything but rich, and Private Bill procedure is anything but cheap. After all, it would have been very unfair to put these institutions to the expense and trouble of promoting Private Bills when the cause of their trouble and the necessity for the Private Bills arose entirely from causes outside their control. Hence this Bill.

The Bill is being introduced in this House because of the state of business in the Dáil. It was to have been introduced by the Minister for Justice in the other House, but owing to the state of business there and the desirability of getting this Bill through, if possible, before the recess, it was thought better that it should be introduced in this House. Accordingly, I am now moving the Second Reading. Shortly, the Bill operates by an order of the court. Under the Trustee Act of 1893 the court has the power to appoint trustees where there is nobody able or willing to appoint trustees. The court has got the additional power of vesting trust property without conveyance or any expense of that kind in the trustees it appoints to act alone or with existing trustees.

This Bill is framed on the basis that the court will exercise the power which it had under that old Act in doing what is sought to be done under the Bill. Section 3 of the Bill says that the power which the court has under the old Trustee Act to appoint new trustees is to extend to the case where a vacancy in the trust is caused by the fact that the trustee, or trustees, who acted held office, or offices, which have now become extinct. The Bill gives the court power to appoint new trustees instead of what I might describe as these official trustees. Another case had to be provided for. In some of these institutions the trustees were not holders of offices which have become extinct; but persons who held offices which have become extinct had the power of nominating or appointing the trustees of these institutions. Accordingly, Section 4 gives power to the court, by order, either to appoint the trustees itself or to nominate some person holding an office similar to the office which has become extinct to exercise the power which the former holder of the office exercised in this regard. Section 5 applies to one or two cases to which the importance of this Bill is very great. There are one or two institutions with considerable trust property which are unable to deal with that property either by way of sale or leasing, although they have a power of sale or leasing, because the consent of certain persons is required, those persons holding offices, at the time the trust was created, which have since become extinct. Those cases must also be provided for. Section 5 provides for those cases in much the same way as for the other cases. It gives the court power to give consent itself to the exercise of the power of sale or leasing, or whatever the trust power is, or to nominate some persons holding an office, if possible, similar to that held by the person or persons having the power previously, to give consent to the exercise of the power where such consent is necessary. The court can only appoint a trustee or nominate the holder of an office to appoint a trustee, or nominate the holder of an office to consent to the exercise of powers under trust by a trustee if the person so nominated consents to act. The Bill does not propose to force that kind of duty on the holder of an existing office. This is an extremely technical Bill. It is difficult for anyone to understand it who is not acquainted with the old trustee statute law, but I think I have said sufficient to give the House an idea of what the Bill means.

I second the motion.

Senator Brown is, I think, to be congratulated on the lucidity with which he explained what he described as a very complicated measure. There are certain sections in this Bill which are very desirable, and I think this House is the place in which a Bill of this character ought to be discussed. The same remark applies to a number of measures of a similar character dealing with highly technical subjects. Measures dealing with engineering, public health and other matters of that kind should be introduced in this House, in which we have members of the greatest possible experience and the greatest ability. Having said so much in favour of certain sections of the Bill, I wish to call the attention of the House to some clauses which ought not to be accepted by any legislature. If Senators will look at the Bill, they will see at a glance what I mean. They will see that in Section 4, sub-section (2) power is not merely given to the court to appoint new trustees of an instrument, but it is to be forced to do so.

The court is to have the power to name a person to nominate trustees. That is to say, the court is to delegate its own functions. It may be necessary for me, in order to explain the significance of that, to go a little further into the law relating to trustees. As Senators are aware, the person who is, in the first place, to appoint a new trustee of an instrument relating to a fund is the person nominated in the deed itself for the exercise of that power. The person who has the money and who exercises control over it places it in settlement and appoints trustees and, under his hand, he nominates the person who is to appoint new trustees. By the Act of 1893, to which Senator Brown referred, power is given to another class of person to appoint new trustees. Power is given under that Act to the surviving trustee to appoint a new trustee to act with him. That is as far as the Act of 1893 went, with the exception that if there was no trustee at all in existence the personal representative of the last surviving trustee had power to appoint a new trustee. That is how the law stands so far as the instrument itself is concerned. The Act of 1893 gave power to the court, in a proper case, not to nominate a person who was to appoint trustees, but to appoint trustees itself.

Before the court could exercise that power, three things had to be done. The consent of the designated person had to be obtained; he had to sign a declaration that he would be faithful to his trust. In addition, it was necessary to have an affidavit by an officer of the court that the person proposed was a fit and proper person to act in the trust and that he had no adverse interest. The appointment of a new trustee by the court was regarded—and rightly regarded— as one of the most important functions of a court of justice. True enough, it was a simple matter in the ordinary case. The solicitor concerned came in with the affidavit of fitness, the consent to act, and the statement that the person had no adverse interest and the judge, after looking over the documents, appointed the person suggested as trustee. But it was the judge who made the appointment and that was one of the most important functions of the judge. The law did not venture to go beyond that, but this Bill proposes to go beyond it. It proposes to give the court power to appoint a new trustee—a power which they already had—and also to nominate a person to exercise a function which the court itself previously exercised, with all the restrictions which are imposed upon a court. The judge could not appoint a trustee without the consent to act or the affidavit of fitness. In the exercise of his judicial function, he could not do that, but this Bill proposes that the judge should at his will and pleasure, without any record of the transaction except some document in his hand, have power to give authority to A or B, or C or D, to appoint a new trustee. It is wrong to ask the court to delegate its functions. No reason has been shown for that. The House should not go beyond the well-known rules of law. It should not break through the customary safeguards of the law unless reason is shown. No reason has been shown for that course by Senator Brown.

Further, power is sought to be given in relation to the sale of land or stock or securities held in trust. Section 5 says:

Where a power of sale or any other power (except a power of appointing new trustees) whether special or general, vested in any trustees is by the instrument creating the trust or otherwise, exercisable only with the consent or at the request or subject to the approval of the holder for the time being of a particular office (either alone or in conjunction with another person or persons) and such office has ceased to exist, whether such cesser occurred before or after or by reason of the establishment of Saorstát Eireann or before or after the passing of the Act, the High Court may, on the application of such trustees either:—

(a) make an order consenting to, requesting, or approving of (as the case may require) any particular exercise of such power by such trustees;

I agree with that, but the next paragraph says that the court may

(b) make an order appointing the holder for the time being of a specified office to be, by virtue of and during his tenure of office and in place of the holder of the said office which has ceased to exist, the person or one of the persons entitled to consent to, request, or approve of (as the case may require) the exercise of such power by such trustees.

The court is to be asked to name a person now who, without any sort of restriction, is to be twenty years hence the person who will consent to a transfer of stock or a sale of property which might perhaps be public property. Senator Brown has said that many of these trusts are charitable trusts. Some of them are professional trusts and some of them are denominational trusts. They involve a considerable amount of public money and a vast amount of public property. I think that the transfer of these securities or the sale of this property should be under the supervision of the court itself and not under the supervision of a person who might be appointed twenty years previously by a judge in one of the courts. That is the question which you have to consider here. Should you do that? I urge you most strongly not to do it. I am in favour of the main principle of this Bill. I am in favour of giving the court power to appoint trustees where the trustees were persons designated in the instrument as holding certain offices. I am in favour of giving every facility for the administration of these trusts but I would ask you not to favour the delegation of powers to unknown individuals—powers which ought to be exercised by the judges of the courts who are trusted public officials, who do their business in public and who are subject to the review of Parliament.

There is one other consideration. In the old days, life was simpler than it is now. I ask the House to be careful because modern life has become somewhat complicated; securities are uncertain and it is necessary that there should be some sort of supervision over the accounts of trustees whether they be trustees of charitable funds, professional funds or funds of any other description. The circumstances of modern times require that there should be publicity as far as possible and supervision as strict as possible in connection with these matters and that no person should be appointed as trustee unless there is a judicial determination that he is a fit and proper person so to act and that he has no adverse interest. I ask the House to say that that function should not be delegated by the judge to any other person. I am opposed to the two subsections to which I have referred. Apart from these objections, I am in favour of the Bill and I say, again, with great respect, that Senator Brown introduced this complicated measure with great lucidity.

After what Senator Comyn has said, I do not propose to say much. We considered this Bill very seriously, and we are disposed to oppose the Second Reading unless we have some undertaking that, in Committee, Sections 4 and 5 will be altered in such a way as to prevent the court delegating its powers in respect of trustees. As Senator Comyn has said, we feel that that is a function which belongs to the court. Senator Comyn was hardly fair in stressing that the court was forced to do this. However, the powers embodied in the Bill allow the court to do so. Our view is that the court should not be allowed to delegate its functions. That is a very important section of the Bill, and I think that most lay members of the Seanad would agree that this function should be retained by the High Court and should not be delegated. A greater potential evil in the Bill is, perhaps, the permission to a remaining trustee to nominate a trustee. With these two features rectified, I think the Bill would be a desirable measure. I should be glad to hear from Senator Brown, as mover of the Bill, that he would be prepared to accept, in Committee, such amendments as we have indicated. Otherwise, we shall be forced to oppose the Second Reading of this measure.

This Bill is very technical. It deals with matters that most of us know very little about. I think that it would be advisable to give the Bill a Second Reading and then refer it to a Select Committee. I do not know whether or not this is the correct time to move in that matter.

Cathaoirleach

We must finish the Second Stage of the Bill now. Then we can decide as to whether or not we shall refer the Bill to a Select Committee.

I can give no undertaking that the Bill will be amended in Committee in the mode suggested by my friends Senator Comyn and Senator Connolly. I think that the Bill is one the House should pass in its present form. As regards what Senator Comyn said, I think there is a certain amount of misunderstanding. The power given in Section 4 and Section 5 to the court to appoint somebody else to do what the departed office-holder used to do is purely discretionary. The court need not do it if it does not like. Surely the court can be trusted to do this only in cases where it ought to be done— that is, where it can find a person in a similar office who is thoroughly fit to discharge the duty. In that way expense will be saved. If my friends Senator Comyn and Senator Connolly had their way, every time a new trustee was to be appointed there would have to be an application to the court, with the consequent costs.

About five guineas in a lifetime. A solicitor can make the application.

My friend is quite wrong as regards the cost of appointing new trustees. I have been at that work for nearly half a century, and the costs of appointing new trustees are not negligible, while some of these charities are extremely small. The court is not delegating its power; it is given the alternative of appointing somebody else to do what it might do itself. The court had not that function before. That is a function that some person who held an extinct office had. It is a new function that is being given to the court, and the court is not delegating it at all. These, however, are matters for Committee.

Question put and declared carried.

I move that this Bill be referred to a Select Committee.

I second that.

It would be very difficult to get a Committee for this Bill. I am afraid that those of us who have got sufficient technical skill in this matter are very few.

I do not know whether it would be in order to suggest that we should have a Joint Committee of the Dáil and Seanad on the Bill.

Cathaoirleach

I do not think we ought to do that. We can appoint a Special Committee, but the Senator must name the number to the House.

I generally agree with Senator Dowdall, but I do not find myself in agreement with him in this case. I do not think that the issue involved is a technical one at all. It is not a question of draftsmanship. The issue between Senator Brown and Senator Comyn is one which most of us can reasonably understand. I do not think that anything would be gained by sending the Bill to a Select Committee and having a debate on it when it comes back. Though we might not be able to frame suitable amendments, I think the majority of us can reasonably understand the point at issue.

I suggest that the Committee consist of five members— Senators Brown, Douglas, Comyn, O'Hanlon and Farren.

I oppose the motion, and I agree with what Senator Douglas has said. The point at issue involves a single principle. That principle will be debated in any event when the Bill comes back from Committee, and it would be just as well to debate the matter in the House in the first instance.

In view of what Senator Brown has said, I ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Committee Stage fixed for Wednesday, 20th May.
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