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Seanad Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 6 Mar 1940

Vol. 24 No. 7

Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill, 1940. - Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 1940—Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

The purpose of this Bill, Sir, is to continue in force for another year the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, 1923 to 1939, which will expire on 31st March next.

Personally, I think that Ministers ought to apologise or, if not apologise, to give us some explanation, when coming in here in connection with a Bill of this kind, in view of what used to happen. When I was Minister for Defence I had to bring in a similar Bill every year, and every year, rather wearisomely, I had to deal with the question of when there would be a permanent Act. When the new Government and the new Minister came in, about eight years ago, they said that they would shortly bring in a permanent Bill, and I have never had an apology for all this humbug that was going on when I was Minister. Another point that used to be made, and it was rather unfortunate for those who made it, was as to when Army costs were going to be reduced. Leaders of the Opposition used to get up and argue that the Army should not cost more than £1,500,000. As a matter of fact it duly came down to that. Again, they brought it down to £1,250,000 and £1,000,000. As a matter of fact, when it got so dangerously near the low level of £1,000,000, I think there was a proposal that it should not be more than £750,000. Now, we are being asked to renew the Defence Forces Bill, and, personally, I am not going to vote against it, but it must be remembered that the Government is one, that it is a unit, and that, therefore, the Minister who comes before us now, as a member and as a portion of that unity, has full responsibility, just like every other Minister, and must accept full responsibility, for what has happened under his predecessor. I have no doubt that the Government was very wise in removing the Minister's predecessor from the office of Minister for Defence and putting him into this other office which, I think, is commonly called in Army language a "buckshee" job. On the 23rd of last December people began to query what was wrong with the Army in connection with the rather lamentable event that was able to take place at that time. It is a rather ungracious position to be in, to get up here and say: "I told you so," but I should like to point out that most discussions about the Army flow from the revelation that was made on the night of 23rd December last, and I think it is significant that, before that—I have forgotten how long before, but I think it would be about a month or two previously, as Senators will remember—I got up here in the Seanad and told the Minister that my information with regard to the Army was that its general morale and discipline had seriously disimproved. Not only did I state that just as baldly. I explained the reasons why—or the most important and most effective reasons why— that disimprovement had taken place. Nobody was more grieved than I was when the gloomiest things I had said were adequately proved on the night of the 23rd December last.

First of all, on the cost of the Army, one of the Senators—Senator O Buachalla, I think—actually had got up and said it was absurd that we who had struggled for freedom should now make any query about the cost of the Army to defend that freedom. He did not want any reference to it; he thought we should not lower ourselves by discussing it. The point I tried to bring out was that it does not follow that an Army costing the nation £5,000,000 is necessarily as good as an Army costing £1,000,000; that is, an Army costing near the £5,000,000 mark compared with one costing—I gave the figure—£1,170,000. The assumption that, because an Army is costing more it is going to be better, not only does not flow necessarily but, as I tried to point out on the last occasion, the contrary is the case. When the Army was being run properly and the cost was being cut all the time, rather rigid control had to be maintained. One might have appeared to be rather mean in the control one maintained, nominally and immediately in the interests of economy, but that rigid control, that rigid watching, actually had a good effect on the Army discipline.

The last time I was speaking in the House on this subject, I referred to the fact that, in the case of the mobilisation of these volunteers, I knew of an instance where a two-ton lorry went 100 miles to bring in one reservist. A Senator afterwards came to me—a Senator of the Government Party— and said: "You are an awful man." I said: "What have I been doing now?" He replied: "Bringing in that thing about the two-ton lorry. That is just a mean reference; what does it matter about a thing like that?" I mention that just as an incident that came to my mind to illustrate a point. If you have a condition in the Army in which a two-ton lorry goes 100 miles to bring in a Reservist it means there is a general slackness and a loosening of discipline.

I also gave another reason, as I understood it, for this disimprovement of Army discipline. The Government instituted this system of Volunteers. When I was Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, matters came up before us of looseness in the control of public property and money. One thing brought out by the Comptroller and Auditor-General was that when these Volunteers were started and Volunteer halls were set up around the country, the men's uniform, boots, guns and so on were Government property and should have been safeguarded, but, as a matter of fact, there was constant disappearance of these things. I was a member of the Opposition, Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, and I refused to take a very strong line on that, as I knew that, once the Dáil sanctioned this system of Volunteers as established by the Government, it was quite impossible, if you are going to have Volunteer halls in villages all around the country, to prevent certain troubles arising. The Army system is a hierarchical system, for a body of men living together. It is quite different from the police force. The men live in barracks or camps; there is the O.C. of the camp and there are various grades. There is the responsibility of one man to the other, the responsibility of the man above for the man below. That is the way the Army works, and it was a dangerous thing when these Volunteer halls were distributed all over the country. You might send an N.C.O. or an officer down: we do know times when the behaviour of these people was thoroughly bad. I do not see how central control of the Army could control this as rigidly, under these circumstances, as they could in the normal conditions of the Army.

The Government started this Reserve system, and, as I understand it, when a young man proposed joining these Reservists he was encouraged to join on the ground that if it became burdensome to him or if his mode of life required that he should cease to be a volunteer, he could leave by giving seven days' notice. In all these matters we have to recognise the ordinary slackness of human nature. Men who are in charge of the training and discipline of men are working to an end. They are working to have a disciplined body of men and they may put considerable sweat and labour into trying to create a well disciplined body which will be effective when required. When a man is labouring and striving to discipline men to give them that necessary sense of order, there does seem to be a natural reaction when he realises that, at the end, after his sweat and his struggle, that man can turn round and say that he is giving a week's notice and that he will cease to belong to this body in a week's time. It is natural that a man will not exercise the same energy and control as he would if he thinks the man is going to be there for a fixed and regular time.

That is why it is, when the ordinary soldier joins the Army, he does not come in just as he would to an ordinary job, subject to a week's notice or to a fortnight's notice: a man who joins the Army joins for a stated number of years and if, during that time, he is not on his job when he should be he is arrested as an absentee or a deserter. That code is not just an arbitrary thing; it is because human nature has shown that these men, on whom money has been expended to make them effective soldiers, are not going to be allowed to go anywhere else when they have been made effective soldiers. There is a lien on them, making them available when required. Then, we had this system of Reservists who could resign and cease to be members on seven days' notice; and it was quite natural—I have no blame whatever for the officers—that the same rigid discipline which is only achieved through hard and particularly arduous labour, could not be imposed upon them or demanded of them, as they could resign on seven days' notice.

Another and less worthy thing which was operating, I understand, was this: a great many of these men who came into the Reserve were known to be members of the Fianna Fáil Party, men who were related to the secretary of the local Fianna Fáil club or related to some Minister or Deputy. Unworthily in this case—if what I am told is true—the officers felt a certain diffidence, a certain difficulty, in imposing rigid discipline. Irrespective of whether there is any foundation for that or not, it was in the natural order of things that the same discipline could not be imposed on men who could resign in a week's time and disappear. The ordinary soldier has to attest for a period of years and if he is not available or seeks to get out of the Army, he is dealt with according to military law. What happened here? These men were recruited all over the place. If they had any discipline at all, it was not the discipline necessary and appropriate for men in the regular Army, or in any way comparable with the discipline established and maintained amongst the ordinary members of the Army.

Then, suddenly, the Minister mobilised these men all over the country. To begin with, it was rather unfair to men who had joined on the assumption that they could resign on seven days' notice, when they had failed to do so to find themselves called up. One knew many cases of hardship. Men with good jobs, possibly earning £4 or £5 a week, were called out and in most cases they had not foreseen such a thing. They joined the Volunteers feeling that they could give a week's notice if they felt it was inconvenient for them to continue. This has caused very considerable dislocation in the lives of these men and often in the businesses in which they were employed. I understand—and the Minister can correct me if I am wrong —that it happened that there were battalions or companies of the regular Army men, with a standard of discipline, called up along with companies of the Reservists with a lower standard of discipline. I understand that the policy of the Government was to infiltrate these Reservists into the regular battalions. One might say that the idea of putting them into the regular battalions would tend to lift them up to the standard of the regular soldiers but a little ordinary prudence and judgment would tell one that the contrary is the case. Discipline does not just happen and remain. It only remains in so far as it is actively maintained. An officer in charge of a body of men of the regular Army insists on a certain standard from them and maintains it, but when the regular battalion or company, or whatever it might be, consists of regular troops and these Reservists, you cannot demand of one what you can demand from another. You cannot demand from an elementary school product what you may rightly and appropriately demand from the product of a university, although often the products of the university leave a lot to be desired. The natural effect of that is that the officer in charge cannot expect from men who have not the appropriate training, standards which he can expect from or impose upon the battalion of regular troops. Although you cannot expect the greater from the less, you can get the less from the greater and the effect was to reduce the general standard of discipline in the Army itself. It is much easier to descend than to ascend. I am giving you what I understand and I did not have to wait until the 23rd December to know about it. I say now practically the same as I said four or five months ago. The effect of bringing these new men in was to lower the general standard of discipline in the Army.

I do not want to go over the position of the Army in my period of office. When I left the Army I had a tremendous respect for the men who had worked under me and with me. I did not expect perfection although I am afraid a great many of those men who were under me did feel that I was always demanding an impossible perfection. In handing that body of men over to the Government coming in I did think that I was able to give an assurance that the Government could expect from these men an undeviating loyal service and that these men, although they could not achieve what I might call an impossible perfection, had attained a remarkable degree of discipline, a remarkable degree of efficiency, judged in the light of the opportunities and the experiences of the previous years. I said all this, as I say, a number of months ago. Nobody was more disappointed than I was, nobody felt more sympathy with the men in the Army than I did, when it transpired, on the 23rd December, that a body of blackguards could go into the main Magazine Fort in this country and seize public property and could reveal that the ordinary disciplinary methods, the ordinary routine of an army, was not operative there.

I think Senator Buckley, on the last occasion, demurred that anybody could complain about the cost of the Army. What I have been trying to point out is that the unfortunate people of this country are being robbed of additional millions of money, not to receive greater value, but in fact receiving lesser value. Why was all this additional expense indulged in? In the year before last September there was a general uneasy situation in Europe culminating last September in the declaration of active warfare in Europe. All sorts of countries had to take special measures in the light of what had happened in Europe. When you are taking any special measure, when you are doing anything, you conceive a possibility which you have got to meet and you can see the best way and most appropriate way to meet that possibility. I often notice in listening here, even in this matter of fire brigades which we discussed a while ago, that people think, is it a good thing to have fire brigades? if so, let us have them. As one Senator said, do not let any question of expense operate. In life you have to have a certain amount of danger. Some people think that if you think there could possibly be a fire then at any cost we must have a fire brigade. That is the way the human mind works, particularly the Governmental mind. If there is a possibility of a fire they think it is absolutely necessary to have a fire engine, but, then, that fire engine costs a certain amount of money and you have to weigh up the likelihood of a fire, and even if a fire is likely, its cost and so on, and in the light of such judgment, you might say that although a fire is costly the continued maintenance of fire brigades will be costlier even than an occasional fire. The same thing applies to a war. There is no country at any moment of history that can say: "There is no possibility, whatever, it is actually impossible, that we shall be involved in a war." There is no safety, whatever, in human life.

At the present moment there is a war in Europe. We begin promptly splashing around about 4,000,000 unnecessary pounds on the Army. I am giving my own point of view. In my opinion these are unnecessary pounds. What should the Government do? It should consider, bringing its mind to bear upon the available data, are we likely to be involved in this war. It is clear that we cannot be involved in this war. We cannot go to the war. The only thing is that the war will have to come to us. I admit that that is not as impossible as the proposal in the song when the child sings, "Don't go down the mine, Daddy, let the mine come up to you". Then it should use prudent judgment. I cannot get up here and now and say that there is no possibility, that it is absolutely impossible and cannot happen, that this country will be invaded. Nobody can say that. We may be. But you use your human judgment there and ask what are the possibilities—what is the likelihood? I maintain that the likelihood of our being invaded is 100 to one against. The way I see the situation is this: if we were invaded, by whom are we going to be invaded? The ordinary man will say, possibly by Germany. If the great military power of Germany is able to get here it will mean that it has overcome the British Navy on the high seas and if it has done that I do not see what is our position. You can spend any number of millions, you can rob the unfortunate people of the country, but once that has happened, if the Germans insist on coming here and invading us, and if they succeed in doing so, having wiped the British fleet off the map, then what is our policy? It may be very unpatriotic, it seems the truth very often is unpatriotic, but the best thing we can do is to ask, "What are your terms?". A £5,000,000 £10,000,000 or £1,000,000 Army is not going to make one-half-pence worth of difference.

The defence the Finns are making is wrong so?

The defence the Finns are making is quite a different matter, to begin with.

There is no difference. The principle is the same.

The geographical position of Finland is different. If the Finns had been in the position that the Russians could only get to Finland by overcoming the naval might of England then I maintain that if the Finns had multiplied the cost of their army by five times they would have been robbing their people and throwing their money away. That is the way I see it. Other people, I remember on some occasion, talked about the precautions taken in Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Sweden. Their position is quite different from ours. I want to know what precautions and extra expenditure has been incurred by Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and Ecuador. I submit that our position is more analogous to that of Ecuador than to that of Finland, Holland, Norway, Belgium or Sweden.

A Senator

Portion of our country is occupied by one of the fighting forces —that is the only difference.

That is the sort of futile talk and incompetent thought that takes place. Is the Senator suggesting that members of the British Army in that part of the country which is under a different Government, because the majority of the people in that part have opted to have that different Government and to have that army there—is he suggesting that we are spending £5,000,000 with a view to resisting the imminent invasion and overpowering of us by the British troops in Northern Ireland? If he is not, what is the point in putting it? That type—I will not call it mentality —it is that type of incompetence to think that I sometimes see in the Government action when they go on spending additional money——

It is impatience to have to listen to you.

It is a matter of judgment whether it is harder for the Senator to listen to me than it is for me to listen to him and, unfortunately, there is no machine that I know of which can register the degree of pain inflicted upon a person's feelings. If somebody invented that machine, we should find, I submit, that I suffer a great deal more than the Senator.

Mr. Hayes

It is between you it is.

I am speaking here because I feel the danger facing this country at the moment is not a military danger. I admit anything is possible. There is no certainty in life—the only thing you are sure of in life is that you are going to die, but using human judgment as to what is dangerous is, I suggest, what we should do and then provide against it. In my opinion, the danger is an economic and financial disaster in this country and I submit that that economic and financial danger is the most urgent matter to be considered. That is far more imminent and likely than any invasion by an enemy—England, Germany or anybody else. What is the Government doing in view of the virtual impossibility of invasion? It is spending £4,000,000 of money and, by its actions in spending this money, is imposing a lower standard on the people of this country and leaving this country more than ever open to much more likely financial and economic disaster. We are spending an extra £4,000,000 as I said four months ago—and it was as though somebody went out to prove how right I was—to have a less efficient Army for the purposes for which the Army exists. At the risk of imposing some pain on Senator O'Donovan I must get up here and insist, because that is all I can do—it does not really matter— you have your fixed up majority. The Minister for Industry and Commerce came in here—

There is no majority here. There is no Party here.

I have talked to members on that side of the House who entirely agreed with me in disapproving of the action of the Government and yet as soon as the bell went, they always went into the lobby to vote in favour of the very thing they told me they disapproved of.

Who told you?

Quite a number of Senators.

You have a lot of stories of what you hear.

Is the Senator going to deny it and to say that he has never voted for anything except as a clear result of his enlightened judgment?

Certainly.

That is leading me to believe that Senators on that side of the House are more stupid than they really are. I am not going to vote against the maintenance of the Army, but I do object strongly to the fact that the Government has wasted money on the Army and made it less efficient and I do object strongly also to seeing a lot of men degraded beneath human dignity by being put to accept labour on something that is absolutely futile, ridiculous and useless. That is the digging of holes in Merrion Square and other places in the city on the pretence that there may be air raids on the country, and on the further pretence that if there were air raids those holes would serve some useful purpose. We are just pitching money away at the very time when, as I said, the real danger to this country is financial and economic. We are pitching that money away, not for the betterment of the Army, but demonstrably to have a less useful Army than the one we had when it cost £1,270,000.

I know something of army men and I have got great sympathy for them and I understand human weakness. We had this happening on the 23rd December. At the moment, there was a Minister and there was another Minister in a "buckshee" job and you had the various hierarchy of the Army upwards. When you established a military inquiry—it was an old English principle that a man must be tried by his peers and there must have been some particularly moral foundation for that—it should be obvious that if you take soldiers or officers of the rank of colonel and put them into the position in which their report may have to assign guilt or negligence or fault of some kind, those men are placed in a completely false position when they have to enquire into the conduct of and possibly condemn their colleagues, when they have to hear evidence against men who are their superiors in rank and who hold their fates in their hands.

I have great belief in the faith, conscientiousness and integrity of purpose of officers in the Army but I have no exaggerated idea of human nature. The task they were set would require superhuman virtue. They were going to be put on a board of inquiry and they were told witnesses would come before them and they would have to question and examine them to try to get the complete truth. If it transpired that the witnesses shared the guilt to some extent, then they were expected to cross-question them and to get the full truth. But, remember the Minister is still in office, and when you put men in a position in which they may be required to condemn the Minister or to imply criticism of the Minister, remember this: you may be up before that Minister a couple of weeks later, called on to render account to him of your actions. That Minister has the power, through the Government — he is hierarchically your superior—to ruin your professional life. Is it fair to a man to put him into that position? It imposes a severe strain on a well disciplined Army to put its officers in the position that they may have to condemn a member of the Government for something which occurred through the operation of the policy imposed on the Army by the Executive.

I have not seen the report of the inquiry but, before there was any incident or inquiry, I was able to give some indication that things were wrong in the Army. It does seem to me that it was against all justice and prudence that, while these Ministers remained in office, their subordinates in the Army should have thrust upon them the responsibility of inquiry into the responsibility for what happened on that night. It was most unfair, and if it were a fact that the evidence tended to react against the Minister, against his prudence, his wisdom, his good judgment or efficiency, it was too much to ask those men to go out solely controlled by love of duty, when that love of duty might easily lead them to condemn their superiors and possibly ruin themselves for the rest of their professional careers. Looking at this morning's paper I noticed that the Minister, apropos of something regarding the Army, said that it had had the sanction of the Army experts. I have great respect for the Army, but I am not so much impressed by the experts in relation to European events. When it comes to what should be done with the Army, in the light of circumstances existing in Europe, strictly speaking it is not the Army experts who should be consulted. Strictly speaking, functionally, in relation to whether or not we require to expend more money on the Army, to have more equipment, the possibility of invasion or of our being involved in hostilities, the experts you should apply to are not the military experts but the experts of the Department of External Affairs. That is the Department that should have advised on that point. I am sorry to have taken up so much of the time of the House and to impose such a long drawn-out agony on Senator O'Donovan. He, however, seems more agonised when speaking himself, judging by the tone of his voice, than when he is listening to me. I do think that this House, with its responsibilities to the people of the country, should raise a unanimous voice against pouring out the people's money on disimproving the Army.

Two points arise out of Senator Fitzgerald's speech. I am afraid I cannot agree with his contention as to the constitution of the court of inquiry being wrong. If the officers of the Army are worth anything at all, then they should be able to conduct a court of inquiry within that Army and report, without regard to any views of their superiors, as to the actual facts of the occurrence. There is however one matter upon which I very much agree with Senator Fitzgerald and I speak as a soldier of many years' experience, both as a regimental soldier and a staff officer. I refer to his remarks on the system which apparently has been adopted of infiltrating into the regular units, men who are called up from the reserve and the Volunteers. The result of calling up untrained personnel and fitting them into disciplined units with very high standards of efficiency, with traditions, amongst others, of service to the colours presented to them by the State, has the effect of not only doing harm to that particular unit to which they are infiltrated but also must have very unfortunate results on the units which are called up for service, who have got feelings of their own and who served in peace time in various stages under wholly different conditions. I would suggest that it would be very much better to keep men who had been called up on mobilisation under trained officers in separate sections attached to the various companies and formations which existed in the regular Army.

Apart from that, I hitherto have been very loath to give full value to the statements which have been made here and elsewhere on the subject of Army discipline, particularly as most of the reflections have been levelled at the rank and file. At our last sitting, I raised this question with An Taoiseach and I was amazed to hear him explain the circumstances which surrounded the unfortunate raid on the Magazine Fort as consequent on the difficulty of ensuring that a systematic rule of opening and shutting the gates by order and numbers should be carried out. I do not ask for one moment that there should be a disclosure of the findings of the court of inquiry but I do demand that the Minister should give us an undertaking that there will be a really close overhaul by experienced, and possibly independent, people of the way in which the functions of our commanders and our staff of formations throughout the Army are carried out. I think we are entitled to know one thing. So far as one can see the lower ranks, who were directly responsible, have been brought before the court of inquiry and several junior officers have been retired from the Army but we do not know, and I think we are entitled to know, what preparations, in view of the emergency which apparently existed in the mind of the Government, an emergency which necessitated the passing of a special Act for the defence of the State, were made to ensure that that very large amount of ammunition was kept in safe custody. Were there any alternative means of communication over and above a single telephone line? Were there any patrols outside the guard which was in the Fort itself? Was it considered at any time whether the ammunition might not be safer in the magazine of some barracks elsewhere?

I have already observed that I was inclined to think that the state of indiscipline in the Army was overstated. I held that view and I still hold that view, but I have moderated it somewhat after reading the report of the Government prosecutor's statement in the recent shooting episode in Cork. That was really a most astounding occurrence. The facts roughly are that a non-commissioned officer confined a private for some breach of duty. A friend of this man objected to that and roundly stated two days before to several persons that he would get even with the non-commissioned officer. Then another officer took this man and several others on escort duty and issued them with arms and ball ammunition. On their return from escort duty they were allowed to stop at two places and have drinks. Finally, when they got back to barracks the most incredible slackness, which extended both to officers and non-commissioned officers, was shown in the manner in which the ball ammunition which had been issued to these men was handled. It is a cardinal rule in military life that not a single round of live ammunition should ever reach a barrack room, but this rule was broken on this occasion with the greatest casualness and with results that were extremely unfortunate. I quote this case only because I want to lend weight to my argument that such indiscipline as may be in the Army is due more to an inadequate realisation of their responsibilities on the part of officers than to any direct indiscipline on the part of the rank and file. I think in a country like ours, with our peculiar mentality, it is absolutely essential that an armed force should be kept small and should be trained and disciplined up to the standard of the corps d'elite in other countries and kept up to that standard. Although the standard was maintained at a very high point for many years. it has evidently deteriorated to some little extent for various reasons.

I do not think you can put the entire blame for these irregularities with any justice on men straight from the bogs who say that they are going to take the stripes off a lance corporal. They do not realise where they stand because they have not been sufficiently trained. The amount of training they have had in their local units has possibly been of a slip-shod character and they have not had the benefit of example. Where there is slackness, I think the real blame must fall on the officers, and do not forget that it is the officers who make an army and it is easier to make an army than to maintain it. Once you have made it and got it up to a standard, it is absolutely essential that it should be pushed further and kept in a high state of discipline, or, like many other things, it will go backward.

I think that in this country we are rather prone to rise to great heights and then to slack off. That is a thing we must guard against. It is understandable that possibly this indiscipline is confined to one or two units, and it is a well-known fact that a bad commanding officer can, in a very short time, destroy the esprit de corps and efficiency of a really good regiment. I know, of course, from long experience that continuous training becomes irksome and that weariness which comes from continuous training is a particularly difficult problem in our country where, except under extraordinary circumstances, an ordinary private, unlike a soldier in Napoleon's Army, will not find a baton in his gas mask. For that reason, every care must be taken to maintain the units at the high standard up to which they were built. I think the situation calls for the very closest overhaul of our system and, wherever it is possible, for the elimination of everybody whom our resources do not permit to be trained to the highest standard of efficiency.

Having said all this, I should like to finish on another note. I think the energy displayed in the recovery of the ammunition by the Army was beyond all praise. It points to the fact that the Army is really absolutely sound and just wants sharpening up in one place or another and a readjustment, as Senator Fitzgerald suggested, of the provisions in regard to infiltration together with a reduction of the surplus personnel whom we cannot possibly want. Furthermore, the Magazine Fort incident draws attention to another point, and it is that the quick and almost complete recovery of that ammunition shows that the people in the country are certainly not behind any persons desiring to overthrow the present Government of the State.

I do not want to intrude on this debate, but it is very hard to listen to the arguments of Senator Fitzgerald and the way in which he gives expression to them. He proceeds chiefly on the line of slashing the Government because some ammunition was stolen, and he says that Ministers are solely responsible. Then, when action is taken and certain officers are removed for negligence, or for whatever reason, following the disappearance of that ammunition, Senator Fitzgerald and others of his type of mentality immediately rush forward to condemn the Government for their action. That general principle is brought into every sphere by the Opposition Party—running with the hare and hunting with the hounds continually. That is the worst form of policy and the worst form of debate. There is neither sincerity nor merit in it, and, with all our experience now of Parliamentary usage and procedure, it is nearly time we got down to some basis of merit in the arguments people have to listen to here.

There is one thing, anyhow, which can be said in favour of the Army— and I do not hold any love, personally, for the Army—and it is that in the space of a couple of weeks they recovered practically all the ammunition taken. If they were so incompetent and if there was such negligence or lack of supervision by the Minister concerned, this result could not have been secured and if there were not whole-hearted co-operation and control by the officers concerned, they would not get such results. Let us at least look on the bright side of the situation. The results were good. A coup can always occur once and such a coup can do an army or a country good. Things were jogging along very peacefully in this country since this Government came into power—there has never been such peace in the history of Ireland as there has been since this Government came in—and we were becoming settled and complacent about everything in life, and it is only natural and human to think that a few of the wiseacres could bring off a coup in such circumstances. After all, it is not so serious as to warrant our talking so much about it and advertising it to such an extent that we became the laughing-stock of every country in the world because of a little incident of that sort. It is a very poor form of patriotism to make us such a laughing-stock for such a small incident.

Senator Fitzgerald made a great point about the resignation of a Minister. This House has already been told by the Taoiseach that he can have a Minister's resignation at any time he wants it. Surely to goodness, once is enough to be told that, instead of this business of constantly bringing up such matters. It is the prerogative of the Taoiseach to demand the resignation of a Minister whenever he should think fit to do so, and surely the Taoiseach has more brains and is in a better position to decide whether that prerogative should be used than Senator Fitzgerald.

However, I should like to say this much also in favour of the Army, and this is a matter which I think the Minister should take a note of and convey it to the Minister for Justice. During all the round-up of civilians and others that occurred since the ammunition was taken—and there was considerable annoyance, if you like, caused to the public at large, although the public took it very well and facilitated the people concerned in the recovery of the ammunition in every way they could-it is a well-known fact that the public were facilitated and treated with very much more courtesy by the Army, both the rank and file of the Army and its officers, than by the Guards. Now, it must be remembered that the Guards are very much nearer to the public, and I think it should be only natural to expect that they would be more courteous to the members of the public than the Army, since the essence of the Civic Guards is courtesy; but I am sorry to say that I have heard it stated on more than one occasion, and indeed I have experienced it myself, that very much more courtesy is extended by the rank and file and officers of the Army than by the rank and file and officers of the Civic Guards. Well, perhaps I should not say the officers of the Civic Guards, but I certainly say it is true of the rank and file, and I think that the Minister should have it conveyed to the Minister for Justice that it would seem that some of these people are beginning to forget their manners. After all, courtesy costs nothing, and I think it would be much better to have courtesy, even when crises do arise. However, I shall leave it at that.

There was another point of Senator Fitzgerald's which, if we were to follow his argument to its logical conclusion, would mean that either we should have no Army here at all or one that would cost something like £1,270,000, which is something like the Army he had when he was Minister. However, when the Senator was Minister for Defence, I am sure that if he were asked for some minute detail connected with his Department, he could not have given it without referring to some civil servant. As we all know, he was much more interested at that time in garden parties and top hats than in doing any genuine work.

At any rate, he was not talking through his hat.

Well, I am always listening to Senators here talking through their hats. I may be talking through my own hat now, but the fact remains that that was the position. Now, in connection with this country, there seems to be a complex in the minds of many people here which causes them to be always going around telling us that we are not able to afford to pay for this or that, that we cannot afford an Army and so on. I think that this country can easily afford an Army of a standard sufficient to enable it to defend, at least, the honour and prestige of what has been known for many hundreds of years as the fighting Irish race—the race that fought under many a flag and on many a foreign field, but that at least never turned their backs when there was fighting to be done. If there is anything that this country should stand for, I say that it is in making the necessary preparations for the defence of our national prestige and our national honour and national pride. It is possible that we might be wiped out but, at least, in God's name, let not that be done without making a fight for it.

Who is going to wipe us out?

Senator Fitzgerald.

You never know. I would not trust any of the big fellows. I would not trust any of the big Powers to-day. They are all aggressors so far as we are concerned. I am satisfied, however, and I am sure that the people of this country are quite satisfied, that an Army should be maintained here, regardless of the material-minded people who are constantly going up and down the country and saying every day of the week that we cannot afford these things. I think we can be very proud of the Army, and I am satisfied that the Army will justify itself and maintain the honour and prestige of the fighting Irish race in defence of their own nation. I am satisfied that the expenditure incurred by the Government under existing circumstances was well advised in order to maintain it, and to stand or fall by it. If the people do not want it, that is their own fault. The people will get the Government that they want, and if they want a type of Government that is without a sense of national pride in anything and that is willing to depend on volunteer effort for everything in which we take pride, then the people can get such a Government, but it will not last, and I hope that the Government will show a strong trend towards all matters of national defence in order to see that our people and the homes of our people are rendered more secure.

I suggest that it can only do harm to attempt at this date to minimise the importance of the raid on the Phoenix Park arsenal. It seems to me to be absurd for Senator McEllin to pretend that it is merely partisanship for Senators of the Opposition to talk of that matter as if it were something serious. Nobody could have treated the matter more seriously than the Taoiseach himself treated it in this House when he said that it had made such an impression on him that, if the people were to ask the Government for their resignation as a penalty for what had happened, he could not blame the people. Now, I do not think we ought to go on harping on the Phoenix Park raid, but it can only incite people to go on harping on it if Senators rise up here and try to treat it as a trifle. It was not a trifle. It was a very unfortunate occurrence, but I fully coincide in what Senator The McGillycuddy said, and what Senator McEllin also said, about the efficiency which the Army showed in the recovery of the armaments that had been stolen. In fact, I think I must say that everything Senator The McGillycuddy said was well worthy of the attention of the Minister for Defence, and particularly the Senator's remarks on the matter of discipline in connection with what took place recently in Cork.

There is one other matter to which I should like to refer. I differ absolutely from Senator Fitzgerald when he says, in effect, that we ought not to have an army except for internal police purposes. I think we owe it to ourselves and to the world, as well as to the cause of freedom, that we should have a genuine, efficient and highly-trained army that would be prepared, in case of need, to fight for our freedom. In fact, I would go further than that. There was a meeting, recently reported in the papers, of a new organisation, which calls itself a "Movement", not a Party, and which has undertaken to propagate a republican ideology. I read the programme, if programme it could be called, with interest, and there was little of it indeed with which I could agree, but there was one item which, naturally enough, was selected by the Irish Press and featured by them as probably the most unpopular item in that programme; namely, conscription. Well, to me that was the one item with which I have some sympathy. I believe that democracy implies the duty of every individual citizen, in case of need, to come to the defence of his country, and I should like to see behind our small and highly-trained regular Army, not a mere force of volunteers, of a fluctuating and indeterminate number, but the whole manhood of the nation trained in military service and ready to be called upon in case of need.

It has been suggested that if any invader found his way here—I presume that leaves out the British, but if any invader, such as, let us say, the Germans, should find their way here— it would be all up with us and there would be no use in putting up a fight because the arrival of such an invader would mean that the British Navy had been crushed. That is not necessarily so. During the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, the British Navy was mistress of the seas, as it is to-day; yet French expeditions found their way here—not big ones, it is true. A small German expedition might quite conceivably find its way here, either by sea or air, or perhaps troops might be dropped by parachute, perhaps they would be brought in several vessels and we might find ourselves with a force of a few thousand Germans landed in this country. If so, I certainly think we ought to be in a position to deal with that situation. I am very glad that we have an Army to deal with it—an Army that, I am sure, would carry out the orders of the Government and fight for our freedom against any aggressor who might put his foot in this country.

Ba mhaith liom cúpla focal a rádh, agus níl mórán agam. Senator Fitzgerald seems to have based his whole argument regarding disimprovement of the Army on the incident in the Phoenix Park on the 23rd December last. That seems to have been exaggerated very much. We all realise that, where a secret organisation exists, a coup can be carried out and that the time selected was a very favourable time, being the night before Christmas Eve. We can understand that an incident like that could occur. If what I am saying is not proof enough we certainly have it in the recent raid which was carried out in Ballykinlar, though we do not hear any argument put forth that the British Army discipline has been disimproved in any way as a result of that raid.

These things will occur and, unfortunately, they do occur; but when they do occur one can only see that precautions are taken to prevent their occurring again. I was interested in the argument we hear now and again from the little Imperialists as regards the present position of Germany and England. I do not wish to say anything here which would be looked upon as in any way abusing our neutrality here, as has been decided on by our Government. We hear this talk about the possibility of a German invasion in one form or another. I have some little knowledge of Irish history and I look back to see whether the German nation ever injured this nation, and I find that German scholars—Zeuss and Kuno Meyer, for example—came here and studied our language when British Imperialists——

Leas-Chathaoirleach

I think it would be undesirable that a debate on those lines should continue.

I do not intend to continue any improper debate, but I think it is permitted to me to answer the matter that is trotted out. Kuno Meyer came here when British Imperialists——

Leas-Chathaoirleach

The Senatar should not try to continue the debate on those lines. Having said all he has said, he should let the matter go at that.

I hold that I am in order.

Leas-Chathaoirleach

I hold that the Senator had better obey the ruling of the Chair.

I think that I am justified and entitled to make my point in answer to the gentlemen on the other side.

On a point of order, I do not think Senator Fitzgerald entered at all into the past merits of foreign countries in regard to this country.

Leas-Chathaoirleach

I think it would be very undesirable that we should have a debate developing on those lines at this time, or at any time. The Senator should bear that in mind; I do not wish him to curtail his speech.

I am only making an answer to the points made by the little Imperialists.

What points?

Furthermore, in 1916, the German nation sent guns here, and reasonably so, when British Imperialists endeavoured to break us down; and they came here again, they came into our markets and bought our sheep and cattle when the British endeavoured to break down our economic system. That is an answer to the little Imperialists. I am sorry that I have been forced to stress this, but I could not sit here patiently and listen to speeches made at Seanad meeting after Seanad meeting without making some answer. In view of the attitude the Chair is taking up, I do not intend to proceed further than to say that the incident in the Phoenix Park should not be exaggerated, seeing that a similar coup was carried off at Ballykinlar in the face of the great British Army without a disimprovement in their discipline.

I do not propose to delay the House very long in connection with this debate, but I do not think it is right for Senator MacDermot to suggest that an attempt has been made to minimise the importance of the Magazine Fort raid.

Only by Senator McEllin.

As a matter of fact, I did not gather that from Senator McEllin's speech, but it may have sounded differently to the other side of the House. What I do say is that it would be quite wrong to minimise the importance of the raid—it was certainly an important matter—but it would be just as wrong to exaggerate its importance. If members of this House and of the other House have erred at all, they seem to have erred from the point of view of an exaggeration of the importance of the raid.

Especially the Taoiseach.

Senator MacDermot says: "Especially the Taoiseach." In his speech, the Taoiseach, in my opinion, dealt very thoroughly with the matter, and if other people would take the line he took, things would be very different, and would not have turned out as they did in the debate which followed. We should not try to minimise the importance of the raid—it was one of the most serious things which have happened in this country for a considerable number of years—but the majority of those who have spoken against this Bill, in this House and in the other House, set out to gain political kudos from the Magazine Fort raid. The attitude of any sincere member of the Oireachtas should be to do what he can to prevent that raid from having serious effects on the Army or on the country.

I am not including Senator The McGillycuddy in that connection at all. His statement was a fair statement and, though he may have made a couple of remarks with which I do not agree, his speech was, generally speaking, made with the very best of intentions. When he says that certain things might have been done because of our peculiar mentality, I fail to see what he is aiming at; I do not agree that we have any peculiar mentality, any more than people of any other country. When it comes to the point as to whether we believe there is serious danger that our country may be attacked or that our neutrality may be broken, it is the business of the Government of the country to take the necessary precautions to secure that such things will not happen. Senator Fitzgerald said that an invasion was almost impossible. That may be so: I hope it is so; but anything can happen, as we all know, if this war continues. I am not going to point out where an invasion may occur, or where it might come from, but it would be up to us to take the necessary steps to repel that invasion, and if the Government did not take those steps I would deem them lacking in fulfilling their duty. With regard to the attitude of the politicians in regard to this raid— naturally, it is the politicians on the Opposition that I am referring to——

There are no others.

There are no Parties on this side of the House. I would say that they have gone out of their way to do damage, perhaps not intentionally to do damage to the country, but in the hope that they may get a little political kudos for their own Party out of this misfortune. I make no secret of terming it a misfortune. Since the Magazine Fort raid, on every available opportunity, we have had speakers representing Fine Gael in this and in the other House suggesting that it was a desperate thing that the Minister for Defence and, I believe, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures did not resign immediately. We are quite accustomed to having lectures here as to what has been done in other countries. While I say that we are not concerned so much with what has happened in other countries or what the people do in other countries, but are concerned with our own business, I do not mind referring those people to what happened in England when the Royal Oak was sunk. That-was a far more serious matter for the British Government and for the British people than the raid on the Magazine Fort was for the Irish Government or the people of this country. We did not have anybody standing up in the British Houses of Parliament demanding that the Ministers should resign at that time, so far as I know at any rate, and if they did stand up, the Ministers did not resign. While the inquiry went on in connection with the sinking of the Royal Oak, I think I am right in saying that the same Minister who was responsible for the administration of that Department at that time was still in office. But, because it happens here in this country and because certain people may think they will get a little political kudos from the fact, they have no hesitation at all in making statements which can have no other effect than to create unrest in the country and in the Army.

Has Senator Quirke not heard that Great Britain is at war? He must not have heard it yet.

I do not believe it even yet.

That Great Britain is at war?

I believe they are preparing for it and I hope they will never start it. I hope they will settle it before they really come to blows. If Senator Hayes says so, I must only take it as correct. In any case, I think, as other speakers have said, that the fact that the ammunition was recovered in the very short time in which it was recovered is a sufficient answer to those who would suggest that the Army is completely demoralised and that there is lack of discipline, lack of control and lack of everything else. I would like to join with the others in saying that for a long time nothing has, made such an impression on me as the attitude of those members of the regular Army and the Volunteer force in connection with the round-up following the raid on the Magazine Fort. I was probably held up as many times as anybody else and had my car. searched and I must say that the courtesy with which that procedure was carried out was really an example to the rest of the country and a proof, if such proof were necessary, that the accident in connection with the Magazine Fort was not to be taken as an example of the condition of affairs in the Army as a whole.

I hope Senator Quirke does not give any support to Senator McEllin's attack on the Civic Guards. I must say my experience is that their courtesy is quite equal to the courtesy of the Army.

Perhaps Senator Quirke would allow us to agree on the courtesy with which these searches were carried out, but when he added his conclusions, that is an aguisín which I could not accept. I made the mistake of going out the very first day to make a series of calls. I was stopped nine times, not knowing any search was going on. I agree about the courtesy with which it was carried out by the regular Army and Volunteers, but there is another conclusion of the Deputy's with which I do not agree.

It is a great thing that Senator Hayes and myself can agree on something, and if Senator Hayes had been here he would know that practically every speaker expressed the same ideas and that I merely wanted to include myself with the majority of those who have already spoken. With regard to the expenditure of the money on the Army, we have, naturally, all kinds of experts, not in the Army at all, but here in this House and in the Dáil, telling us that the money should not be spent. Before it was proposed to spend the money we had the very same people getting up and criticising the Government and criticising the Minister for Defence because he was not taking and had not taken the neccessary measures to protect this country in case of war. Surely we cannot have it both ways. I think myself that if anybody is in a position to decide what amount of money is necessary to put us in the desirable position of being capable of defending ourselves, it would be the Minister for Defence and the Army experts, or headquarters staff of the Army. It is scarcely necessary to go into this matter as to whether we should or should not defend ourselves. I am all for defending ourselves. I believe we would be the first generation of Irishmen for very many centuries who took any other line, and I believe that as long as this country remains anything at all like what it is or has been in the past it will never find itself without at least an overwhelming majority of the people of this country being in favour of defending the country in the event of its being attacked.

As to how the country would be defended in the case of attack is another matter altogether, and while Senator Hayes may think that I would be 100 per cent. in agreement with everything the Minister for Defence or the Government would suggest, I would like to say now that there is one point on which I do not agree. There is one item—expenditure on mechanised transport in the Army—which I believe is a matter which really deserves very serious consideration. I cannot see that it is wise to go whole-hog into mechanised transport, for the simple reason that in whatever else we should have self-sufficiency practised, it should be practised in the Army. Of course, while I am driving a motor myself, I cannot say that everybody should be driving horses, but while I do agree that it is necessary and desirable to have a certain number of motor vehicles and a certain amount of motor transport, I think it is a very shortsighted policy to go whole-hog into mechanised transport in the Army in a country like this. We have practically an unlimited supply of horses here. Quite obviously, our intention would be to do any fighting we may have to do in our own country, and if we were to go whole-hog into mechanised transport, it is quite possible that we would find ourselves in the position of being unable to supply the replacements for those mechanised outfits in the event of the war continuing for a considerable number of years.

With regard to the inclusion of Volunteers in the Army, we have had that coming up over a number of years. The controversy started at the time the Volunteer force was formed. People immediately started to raise objections to bringing into the Army men whom it was proposed to put in charge of Volunteer units and who had not previous training in the Army.

Now, in my opinion, that was one of the wisest moves made by this or any other Government. We all know the situation which existed here before that time when the Volunteer force was formed. We all know that when the force was formed that men were brought in who held rank in the I.R.A. before and during the civil war. I happened to be among those present at the commissioning ceremony at Portobello Barracks, and it made an everlasting impression on me, and if the other people who are speaking against the policy of the Government were there at the ceremony, they would agree that it was one of the best things that was done. At that ceremony I met people I had not seen for 20 years, and I am satisfied, as a result of my connection with them, that they went into the Army as soldiers and were accepted as such by the officers and men of the Army that fought against them during the civil war.

I am rather surprised that some of the Senators took Senator Fitzgerald's remarks as seriously as they appeared to have done. I did not take the Senator's remarks in the same serious strain as Senator McEllin or Senator Healy or even Senator Quirke. I wonder if the Senator's colleagues can see the danger signal that is straight in the path of Senator Fitzgerald. He appears to be advancing, slowly but surely, along the path down to the sere and yellow stage. He is talking about the good old times when he was in charge of the Army, those halcyon days when everything was ideal. According to him, it was a Utopia that existed then and that has never existed since. That was the strain of Senator Fitzgerald's remarks. I had occasion in the Dáil to refer to the remarks of Deputy Dillon as being ill-informed. His speech was well informed by comparison with the remarks I have heard from Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Fitzgerald does not seem to realise that the conditions that existed in respect of Volunteers at the period at which he was speaking no longer exist, and have not existed for several months. A Volunteer in the early days had the right to resign, if he so desired, on giving notice to the authorities for seven days. We found certain weaknesses in the operation of that regulation. We found that men came along after they had received specialised training and handed in their resignation, and, according to the regulations, they were able to go away.

A certain amount of expenditure had been incurred in the training of these individuals, and it was felt that the system was wrong. That regulation was revoked and does not exist any longer. A Volunteer now joins the Army for a period of five years, and if he desires to leave the Volunteer movement, there are certain ways in which he can do it. He can purchase himself out in the same manner as a regular soldier can purchase himself out, or he can be dismissed the forces for some indiscretion, or he could be released on compassionate grounds, but these are the only grounds on which a Volunteer can leave the Army, and a Volunteer to-day is as much a regular soldier, except for the fact that he has to do only three months continuous training, as is the regular soldier himself.

The question of the infiltration to which some other Senators seem to take exception, is one which has not been practised so largely as the Senators appear to think. It has certainly taken place. It did, in fact, occur in the garrison that was occupying the Magazine Fort on the night of the raid. That was a mixed garrison of Volunteers and regular soldiers, but I visited several camps and I found the camps to be composed solely of Volunteers. It is true that in the commands, brigades and so on, there are companies of Volunteers, but they are wholly Volunteers. There are battalions of Volunteers, and they, too, are completely Volunteers, but I do not think that there is a case of a regular company being mixed up and blended together with Volunteers.

There have been many derogatory statements made in respect of the Volunteers and the Volunteer movement, and I say that they are most unfair to the Volunteer movement itself, which is a movement which this nation might very easily have to depend on for its protection, and it is a movement we should be proud of, if we ever have to rely on it. It may be one we will be proud of. I could cite many incidents which have been brought to my notice by the executive officers of the Army of acts carried out by the Volunteers, and I will cite two of them that seem to me to be worthy of citation. One is in connection with the raid itself on the Magazine Fort. I wonder if the Senators are aware of the fact that it was a young Volunteer officer, accompanied by a section of Volunteers, who, on very flimsy information, rushed his party from Portobello Barracks to the Magazine Fort and who, very quickly and with tremendous initiative, sized up the situation, captured certain people he saw in the Phoenix Park, went to the Magazine Fort, realised it had been raided, and immediately garrisoned it with his little force and, at the same time, informed the people in Island-bridge that the Magazine Fort had been raised and robbed. I think that young man showed initiative that was worthy of the most experienced officer of the regular Army, and I think he deserves great credit.

Has he been promoted?

No, he is a lieutenant. He has not been promoted, but he has certainly been commended. The other incident which I might cite is in connection with an ordinary Volunteer doing coast watching duty down on a very desolate portion of the south coast. He was on duty by himself and he saw what he believed to be a boat out at a great distance to sea. He got a glass and fixed it on the boat and decided on his own that it was a boat with shipwrecked sailors. He could only see one individual rowing. He immediately went to a nearby house, telephoned to the Gárdaí and then telephone to the command headquarters in Cork City. Again using his own initiative, he asked the people in Cork City to send an ambulance as he believed this boat contained shipwrecked sailors. Command headquarters accepted the message and sent an ambulance to the scene and this young Volunteer, by the aid of semaphore signalling, brought the boat into the only possible place it could have landed on that desolate coast. The sailors themselves who had come in the boat from the wrecked vessel tried to induce this young man to take whatever small amount of money they had on them as a mark of their esteem and appreciation for his initiative and extraordinary action. These are two simple cases of what Volunteers have done. They are two cases of many others, not so outstanding perhaps, that have been brought to my notice.

All I would desire to put to Senators here—and I should like it to go further, to Deputies in the Lower House and to the general public—is that these Volunteers are our own people. They are our own flesh and blood. They have our own weaknesses, no doubt, but they have our own good qualities also. Whatever we may do to encourage them, we should be very careful before we commit ourselves to saying the derogatory things that have been said since this unfortunate incident occurred in December last. I think every crime that could be laid against the Volunteer movement has been made against it since that unfortunate incident. I think the sooner that stops the better. There has, in fact, been too much propagandist use made of that unfortunate incident. It is true it was a serious incident. Every person of responsibility regards it as a serious incident. It is a very sad thing to think that at this period in the life of the nation, these men should be surprised, that there should be a body of individuals in this country prepared to surprise them and prepared to do the things that were done on that night. That is the most regrettable feature of the whole affair. I have no doubt that these men, realising that they were near a season of peace and goodwill, were taking things more easily perhaps than they might take them at another period and the people who set out to raid the Magazine, fortified by the belief that that would be so, used that opportunity to surprise them and to steal ammunition. Senator Fitzgerald would appear to think that these things never happened in his time. They did happen in his time.

Surely not.

Mountjoy Jail, a fortification stronger than the Magazine itself, was raided in a manner just as leisurely and every single person in whom the people who raided that fort or bastille, or whatever you like to call it, was interested, they took out of that prison. That was done too by the element of surprise. Usually when the element of surprise exists, these things will happen.

There is one question which I should like to ask the Minister. I am not pressing the Minister to reply if he does not feel inclined to do so. Is he satisfied that there was no collusion inside in connection with the arsenal raid?

The Senator will have to excuse me if I do not answer that question because there are trials pending.

I do not wish to be taken as suggesting that there was collusion but I should like to see such a suggestion exploded as soon as possible.

I would not be in a position to do that just now. If we make allowance for the little bit of propaganda value which this raid has provided, I do not think that Senators in general, nor even Deputies or the public in general, believe that the Army is in any less efficient state now than it ever was. The fact is that the executive officers of the Army to-day are the same men who were the executive officers of the Army in Senator Fitzgerald's time. Senator Fitzgerald, I do not think, had any more dictatorial power than I have, and he could not do anything more than I do. It is my desire to see the Army as efficient as possible. Perhaps if I were to push my ideas of efficiency as far as I would like, I might burst it instead of achieving the results which I set out to achieve. There is, however, a happy medium and I think the efficiency of the Army is just as high to day as it ever has been. There is no doubt that here and there there may be weaknesses. We are going after these and, wherever they are found, they are being corrected. Wherever it is necessary to make changes, where individuals have been too long in the same positions we deem it good judgment to remove them and to put them into other positions. We are doing these things in the belief that if there is any laxity, such action will settle it.

The Army, as everybody here knows, has not the same continuous flow of new blood as an army like the British army, the German army or the armies of other great countries have. When we get in recruits, they remain in the Army for a very long time. If they are officers, they serve for anything up to 20 years. Chances and openings do not occur as regularly as they would in other greater armies. The men themselves remain in the Army for five, ten or 20 years as the case may be. There again the same state of stagnation, if you like to call it such, exists. That is an unfortunate fact which cannot be got over unless we reduce the periods of service and keep changing the officers. You cannot do that with men who take up soldiering as a profession. You have to offer them something that is at least semipermanent. That is the position that exists to-day.

I do not think that I need say anything further, except that the permanent Bill, which would obviate the bringing in of this continuing Bill, has been practically completed. It consists of, I think, 310 sections. It is a gigantic voluminous document. It is my belief that it would be advisable not to bring that permanent Bill before the Dáil in this present emergency, because I feel confident that, as a result of this emergency, the Defence Forces Regulations would still have to be changed. I am satisfied that arising out of the present emergency there will be need for very many more changes. Because of that I decided that the Defence Forces Regulations Bill, which is at present in the office of the Department of Defence, should not be brought forward. In the near future, I shall be bringing forward a temporary Bill which will give me the necessary powers in regard to the coast-watching service and a few necessary regulations in regard to the Volunteers. I shall have that before the House in the very near future and, no doubt, there will be another opportunity afforded then for debating the whole question.

Question put and agreed to.

I should like to have all stages of the Bill now, if possible.

Does the Minister want all the stages now particularly? Would he not be satisfied with all stages on Wednesday next?

I shall be quite satisfied if I get all stages on next Wednesday.

Committee Stage ordered for Wednesday, 13th March.
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