Public Business. - Broadcasting Authority Bill, 1959—Committee Stage. – Seanad Éireann (9th Seanad) – Wednesday, 3 Feb 1960

Public Business. - Broadcasting Authority Bill, 1959—Committee Stage.

An Cathaoirleach

Sula mbreithneofar Céim an Choiste den Bhille seo, ba mbaith an rud é go gcuirfinn in iúl go bhfuil dhá leasú-Leasuithe a 25 agus a 27—atá in ainm an tSeanadóra Ó Caoinleáin atá as ordú, an chéad cheann toisc go bhféadfadh sé muirear a chur ar Chiste an Stáit, agus an ceann eile toisc é a bheith ar neamhréir le prionsabal an Bhille mar a léadh an dara huair é.

Tá scéala dá réir tughta don Seanadóir.

Before we take up consideration of the Committee Stage of this Bill, it would be well if I indicated that there are two amendments—Amendments 25 and 27—standing in the name of Senator Quinlan which are out of order, the former as it involves a potential charge on State funds and the latter as it conflicts with the principle of the Bill as read a second time.

The Senator has been notified accordingly.

SECTION 1.

Question proposed: "That Section 1 stand part of the Bill."

Seán Ó Donnabháin

I wonder why it is the draftsman seems to try to confuse us instead of helping us in some of these interpretations? It is stated that "the Authority" has the meaning specified in subsection (1) of Section 3. Subsection (1) of Section 3 covers two and a half lines at the bottom of the page. I cannot see why it is necessary to put in that explanatory interpretation of the subsection down below.

Again, in subsection (1) of Section 1 it is stated that "broadcasting licence fee' means a fee paid on a licence granted under Section 5 of the Act in respect of apparatus for receiving only." It is a broadcasting licence fee and it is interpreted to apply to receiving only. The phrase "broadcasting licence fees" occurs later on in Section 22. I think that is the only place in the Bill in which "broadcasting licence fees" are mentioned. If we put in "receiving set" or something like that instead of "broadcasting" it would not be necessary to have this interpretation. Indeed, it appears to me to be somewhat contradictory. It is called a "broadcasting licence fee" but it is really a fee for a receiving set only. I do not think this savours of good draftsmanship. The interpretation is not really necessary.

The same argument holds with regard to "Director-General". It is stated that "‘the Director-General' has the meaning specified in Section 11 of this Act;". There is no necessity for that interpretation. The clause is self-explanatory. This has occurred in other Bills and it has always puzzled me. That is why I draw the Minister's attention to these points now.

Minister for Posts and Telegraphs (Mr. Hilliard)

This is an interpretation section, as the Senator has pointed out. We are amending the Act of 1926 and it is our desire to follow the interpretations given in that Act:

"broadcasting licence fee" means a fee paid on a licence granted under section 5 of the Act of 1926 in respect of apparatus for receiving only.

The type of licence fee is clearly specified there. The Authority will, if a certain agreement is reached, have the power under the Act to collect licence fees. The draftsman believes it is correct that a specific meaning should be given to the term "Director-General". In so far as describing the Authority is concerned, it is made clear that the Authority established under this measure will have the meaning specified in subsections (1) and (2) of Section 3 of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

SECTION 2.

Question proposed: "That Section 2 stand part of the Bill."

Question put and agreed to.

Section 3 agreed to.

SECTION 4.

Mr. Donegan

I move amendment No. 1:—

In subsection (1), line 5, before "and" where it firstly occurs, to insert "after consultation with the Opposition".

I put down this amendment because of the fact that the Commission had recommended consultation with the Opposition on the constitution of the Authority. Paragraph 70 of Chapter V states: "Prior consultation with the Opposition would allay possible political misgivings about appointments." I am fortunate enough to live in an area in which television can be enjoyed. I know the power it has and I think there is grave danger that such power could be misused. I do not suggest that the Government or the Minister have any intention of misusing it but, in appointing persons to any authority or body, very often those who are appointed are those with whom one is well acquainted and whose capabilities one knows. From that point of view there is a danger that the members of the Authority, or the majority of them, might be supporters of the Government Willy-nilly, with the best intentions in the world, they would in that situation be bound to give their little inflection to television and that inflection could amount almost to a propaganda campaign on behalf of the Government in office. The same situation would obtain should there be a change of Government.

On the Second Reading, I gave an instance in which the inter-Party Government, on three different opportunities, did exactly as the Fianna Fáil Government did; we appointed people who were supporters of ours. Appointing such people is all right so long as they are good men. It is very important, however, in the case of the Television Authority that the situation should be safeguarded because of the potential propaganda content and the power of expression there—things that are, I think, quite unappreciated yet in this country. The viewer looking at television is not in the same position as the man who picks up the Irish Times, the Irish Independent or the Irish Press, reads what he wants to read and ignores the rest. He is in the position of a person who is served with a menu with no choice.

If a person can be induced to listen to and look at a particular programme, then he gets a ready-made menu, with that inflection—and again I use that word deliberately—of Government propaganda, an unfair advantage which any Government would hold when in power as long as they had a majority of members on the Television Authority. It is also important because members of the Authority themselves appoint the officers of the Authority. There is no provision for appointment by the Civil Service Commission or anything like that and therefore you have this arrangement of steps of stairs going right up to the top people in the television business, whereby they all could be, and probably would be, appointed willy-nilly through the association, friendship or greater knowledge of people of their type of opinion that a Government would have as compared with the knowledge they would have of the capacity or capability of people who did not hold the same political opinions as themselves.

I think, with all that power, the recommendation of the Television Commission should have been accepted. Mark you, I did not put down an amendment nor did the Party of which I am a member—it was not put to them—offer an amendment here whereby anybody but the Government should appoint those members because, after all, it does look as if, practically speaking, the only people to do it are the Government but, at the same time, consultation with the Opposition in a friendly way would allay the fears—and I think they are very well-justified—held by many people. It would also allay, not only my fears as a politician but also the fears of the Television Commission, the members of which did not include any politician—politicians were specifically excluded—who deliberately made this statement I have quoted and expressed the same fears as I have expressed.

Without being, shall I say, unkind to Senators opposite, they know the power they wield in regard to the Press. I want to assure them that the power that will be wielded in television is certainly a far greater power for good or evil and, therefore, the direction of it is something which should not be left to any one particular side in politics. In the first formative years the Government will appoint all; in succeeding years you will have changing of Governments, and, at different times because of deaths or other reasons —resignations and time limits—the defection of people from the Television Authority and then you will have a better blend but, from the start, if you have no safeguard you will have the position in which the Government appoint the lot, the Television Authority and the officers. They will have exactly the same power as the Government have to do this and appoint as they want all their own supporters on this service and get these supporters to give that inflection to television broadcasting that would be in their favour as the Fianna Fail Party would have, for instance, in the choice of officers and officials in the Press.

Therefore, I suggest to the Minister that he should accept this amendment which would safeguard the situation and place the appointment of the Authority and the officers still in the Government's hands but on a friendly basis.

Mr. Hilliard

This is a matter to which I have given a certain amount of thought. I have no doubt that Senator Donegan in putting forward this amendment did so with the best intentions but I am afraid that if the amendment were accepted it would not, under any circumstances, achieve the end or the aim which he has in mind.

The Government is responsible for appointments to the Authority. That is their responsibility and I think they should be held to it. This Authority will, for good or ill, be responsible for the management of the television service and if we get a certain type of Authority or an inefficient Authority, that should be the responsibility of the Government; we should not be placed in a position, by negotiation or consultation with members of the Opposition or anybody else, of shirking our responsibility in the matter. If we agreed to the amendment, we would be limiting our choice to a panel of people which would be arranged after consultation with the Opposition. I feel we should be left free, or that the Government of the day should be left free, to get the best possible people to put on that Authority irrespective of their political beliefs or leanings.

I do not believe that members of this Authority or the members of any other Authority should be confined entirely to membership or supporters of any political Party. In the appointment of the advisory committee and the announcement made by the Government or the Minister that the people so appointed would become members of the new Authority, we gave an indication that we would be prepared to place on this Authority people who were not affiliated solely to the Fianna Fáil Party. I do not know whether Senator Donegan proposes to press this amendment but I think and feel that the amendment should not be pressed for the reasons I have stated. The principal reason is that the responsibility for appointment to this Authority should be the sole responsibility of the Government.

Mr. O'Quigley

It is a strange thing that when the Government appoint either a commission to examine the the possibility of introducing a television service or any other commission they have regard to representation of different political outlooks and other considerations. If we want to have a television service which will not be subject to criticism on a political basis, then the amendment suggested by Senator Donegan is well designed to achieve a Television Authority that will command universal respect. While the Minister was talking about the Government's responsibility for the television service, I could not help recollecting that about a year ago we were talking here on a Bill entitled an Act to amend the Constitution. Under that Bill, a commission was to be established, concerned only with the relatively unimportant matter, as compared with this television service, of drawing up constituencies, but the Minister or the Government thought it well that the Opposition should be consulted in regard to the membership of that commission.

Indeed, one wonders what attitude the Government really take up in matters of this kind. Here we have a recommendation of a Government Commission and so far the Minister has not made any convincing argument for not accepting the amendment.

All the argument is on Senator Donegan's side, particularly in the light of the Government's act this time last year in putting into a Bill which they were sponsoring here that the Opposition should be consulted when a commission, which was only a phoenix-like body, was being appointed.

Dr. Sheehy Skeffington

I rise to oppose this amendment. I do not think it is a good one and I do not think the case made by Senator O'Quigley is sound. He says that the way to put the Authority beyond criticism is to consult with the Opposition. I think, on the contrary, the Government, if they appoint the Authority, will be open readily to criticism, that is to say, if criticism is merited, it will be made far more readily if the Opposition is in no way responsible for the appointment. I feel that it would be a manner, if you like, of buying the silence of the Opposition if the Government were to consult with them before appointing the Authority. I think free and ready criticism of the Authority is far more likely if the Opposition is not, as a preliminary, consulted. I believe this is a Government responsibility. I think the Government will fulfil it well. I hope they will. If they do not, I am confident that cogent criticism of the appointments is far more likely if they do not consult the Opposition in advance. Therefore, I oppose the amendment.

Mr. Donegan

The Minister makes the point that it is wise and right that responsibility should rest with the Government in this regard. That is a good point. But, while he says that criticism should be levelled against the Government for the direction of the television service by the Authority, I say that perhaps criticism might not be so easily forthcoming because it might be a good service but it might also be one that gave a certain slant to political opinion in this country. For instance—the perfect analogy is there—nobody can say that the direction of the Irish Press Ltd. newspapers has not been good, if one reads the balance sheets over the past five or ten years. It has been excellent but I think nobody will deny that there is a political slant and political inflection in the subject matter that is provided by these newspapers. I do not think that even the Minister would deny that. Therefore, we may have an excellent television service, an excellent television Authority, but all the cards may be played in a certain way, all the programmes, or a certain high proportion of them, may give that slant and that particular line of thought that I fear. It is a menu on which one has no choice. Even though they may serve excellent roast beef, they may serve nothing but roast beef and one has not got the right to have any other dish. In other words, they can, if they wish, have certain programmes included in the television service which will help their particular political policy and they may be very good programmes. When one considers that probably 80 per cent. of the people of this country are not politically awake and not politically very careful, the programmes may be excellently received and yet, at the same time, they may lead these people who are politically unaware down certain alley ways and towards certain views.

That is my impression. I agree with Senator Sheehy Skeffington that the amendment I put down has its flaws but I have thought very deeply on it and can think of no better one, for the very good reason that I think the Government are the group that should appoint the members of the Authority. The only practical way of helping that I could see was to put down an amendment whereby there would be consultation with the Opposition, on a friendly basis, in the hope that this thing I fear very much will not come to pass. I honestly and sincerely believe that if there is friendly consultation, it might not come to pass. Otherwise, I am quite certain that it will.

Finally, without raising any personalities, I want to say that the appointments so far made to the advisory committee, every one of whom will be a member of the Television Authority, have increased my fear and trepidation.

Mr. O'Quigley

Would the Minister clarify a point arising out of what Senator Sheehy Skeffington has said? Senator Sheehy Skeffington believes that consultation with the Opposition in the making of appointments to the Authority would blunt criticism by the Opposition. My understanding of all these semi-State bodies is that when any matter relating to the management —that is what we would be concerned with—of a semi-State body arises, the Minister always washes his hands of it and says that it is a matter of day-to-day administration and that he has no function. It appears to me that this Authority will not be and cannot be subjected to effective criticism by the Opposition if it does the kind of things that Senator Donegan is talking about. I think I conceive the position correctly when I say that the day-to-day running, the kind of programmes it puts on, the kind of slant it gives in its news bulletins, and so on, will not be subject to criticism in Dáil Éireann unless under Section 26, subsection (3), which seems to provide an opportunity for criticism to members of Dáil Éireann.

Consequently, Senator Sheehy Skeffington's view, if my conception of the status of the Television Authority is correct, does not carry any weight. In addition, I think he said that consultation with the Opposition would get rid of criticism on a political basis.

Dr. Sheehy Skeffington

It might be criticised by Independents.

Mr. O'Quigley

The criticism of Independents would be always most valued and most valuable. I want to get rid of criticism on a political basis and, indeed, the tendency sometimes to criticise on a political basis.

Mr. Cole

I must oppose this amendment also. First of all, I do not think it has really any enforceable meaning. After all, the Government might call in the Leader of the Opposition and say: "I am going to appoint So-and-So on this Authority" and may ask his opinion. He has then consulted with the Opposition. Senator Donegan's amendment should have sought to ensure, if anything all all, that the Opposition shall appoint one member of the Authority in some way. The amendment has really no enforceable value at all and, consequently, I agree with what Senator Sheehy Skeffington said. I think it could lead to the Government saying:

"All right. We shall allow you to appoint one member of this Authority" which, I think, would be a bad thing in that it would probably stop criticism of the Government who are solely and should be solely responsible for the appointment of the Authority and running of the service.

Professor Quinlan

I agree with Senator Cole that Senator Donegan's amendment would hardly achieve its purpose but the suggestion made that, perhaps, in some way, the Opposition might appoint one member or might nominate one member to the Minister —I take it having seen the rest of the panel he has appointed—might go a long way towards keeping the Authority neutral in political matters and it is an idea that the Minister, perhaps, might consider further if the Bill goes from here.

Mr. L'Estrange

I and Senators on this side of the House want to see a first-class board set up comprised of men and women who are prepared to do their job, who know their job and who are prepared to do their duty, no matter what Government are in power, irrespective of class, creed or politics. The Minister stated a minute ago— I quote his words—that the membership of the Authority should not be confined to people of one political Party. Unfortunately, that is happening at present in the setting up by the Government of any of these boards. We know what has happened in the case of Bord na gCon.

An Cathaoirleach

The Senator is now going outside the scope of the amendment. The Minister is not responsible for Bord na gCon.

Mr. L'Estrange

I know he is not but we do not want to see the same thing happen now as happened in Bord na gCon and as happened recently on the National Stud Board. I claim that no one political Party has a monopoly of brains in this country.

Mr. O'Quigley

Certainly not Fianna Fáil.

Mr. L'Estrange

I agree with what Senator Quinlan has said that we should have neutrality in politics and we should have a first class Board in order to get that.

Tomás Ó Maoláin

We are dealing with something of which we have no practical experience —that is to say, television. We can only illustrate what is likely to happen by reference to similar types of media which have been in operation here. I propose to recall to the House that on several occasions in the reporting of speeches made on the Third Amendment of the Constitution Bill there was a definite political prejudice against the Opposition. I have already mentioned in this House the manner in which that prejudice was given full effect on Radio Éireann; that is the kind of thing we are seeking to avoid in the television service.

In addition we must have regard to the fact that in reference to this new service the Minister, as reported at Column 12, Volume 52 of the Official Report said:

We are certainly in the dark in relation to this Television Bill and if we cannot be given latitude within Standing Orders to draw from our experience of the past in order to safeguard the future, there is no point in talking any further on the matter.

Éamon Ó Ciosáin

We can conclude from that that the broadcasting authority has given a fair report of the speeches and proceedings of this House. It was always said that in a court of law when an advocate had a bad case he attacked the opposition or somebody else, and that is exactly what the members opposite are doing here to-day. They are making no case for this amendment but they are attacking anybody and everybody outside.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Professor Quinlan

I move amendment No. 2:—

In subsection (2), line 8, to delete "five" and substitute "three."

Would it be possible to take amendments Nos. 2 and 3 together?

An Cathaoirleach

If the Senator wishes. I think the House will agree.

Professor Quinlan

One amendment calls for a reduction in the period of appointment—the maximum period— from five years to three years. In this, I am guided by the recommendation of a Television Commission which travelled abroad and, I presume, examined the governing regulations for television authorities in other countries. In this they were so keenly adamant as to put Paragraph 71 into their Report:

It is important that the Authority should, as far as possible, reflect public opinion and sentiment, and for this reason the Commission feels that three members of the Board should retire each year, and, with the exception of the Chairman, should not be immediately eligible for re-appointment.

That is a very weighty recommendation. It was an effort by the Television Commission to ensure a change and a rotation in the membership of the Television Authority. It is not possible, I think, to introduce an effective rotation on anything more than a three year basis. I am suggesting here that the maximum period be reduced to three years and, as provided in amendment No. 3, ensure that a member shall not be eligible for re-election on more than two occasions. That means that a member, if he has satisfactorily served three periods, or nine years, is not eligible for immediate re-election at the end of that period but must stand down for at least one period.

You cannot obviously change the whole Authority at one stage in any one period. It is desirable that there should be a great deal of continuity. One third of the membership is as much as you could change compulsorily at any one time. That means that six other members come up for re-election and are eligible for re-election in the same period and that the Minister can weed out of those six any of those he considers are not fulfilling their task. It means, in effect, that if he weeds out one or at most two, he is ensuring that half the Commission go forward and there is then a very definite rotation pattern.

I feel strongly on this amendment because, looking at the various committees throughout the country, whether they are committees of co-operative creameries, sports societies, even university governing bodies or semi-State boards appointed by the Government, the same characteristic can be seen running through them all. Once you are re-elected twice, you are there for life. I submit that is not good. I would welcome a study of the boards and other important committees of this country with a view to examining their rotation and I suggest to the Minister that he give this very serious consideration and do something to introduce some measure of rotation into the membership of the Authority.

Mr. Murphy

I should like to support the general principle of rotation in the sense that instead of the members of the Authority as a whole going out of existence at the end of the period, there should be either every year or, as suggested by Senator Quinlan, every three years, a certain number of retirals or a certain number, if necessary, of re-appointments. That would give continuity to the Authority. It would enable the Minister or his successor to change the set-up of the Board of the Authority without a sweeping change. It is desirable that you should have this rotation—the coming in of new blood, maybe new ideas, with, at the same time, some continuity for the Authority. I hope that the Minister will favourably consider this amendment or some other amendment in order to meet this point of view. I think there is much in favour of what Senator Quinlan has said.

Dr. Sheehy Skeffington

It seems to me that here again the amendment, while it is well-intentioned, might have quite bad effects. Very often in this country, I am afraid, when organisations or groups or committees have been going well owing to the work of the members, other people come along and say: "Let us replace the people who have been doing the work by somebody new, bring in fresh blood" and so on, instead of saying: "We have now got people who are running this well, who have got experience, who have shown their capacity, and who should consequently be retained by very reason of the competence they have demonstrated."

Senator Quinlan, on the Second Stage, made the point that we are very much afraid in this country of giving offence, of dropping somebody who has been on a committee for years, and therefore it would be easier for us if automatically we were to have to drop people off the Authority, whether they were good or bad. I am afraid I think that is a cowardly way. I think we should be quite prepared to say of a member of the Authority who has shown himself to be incompetent, or not quite up to the standard that had been hoped: "Right. We shall drop him." Why not do that instead of saying: "We should love to keep you on but our legislation is framed in such a way that there is an obligation on us to get rid of you." That seems to me to be sheer hypocrisy. We should have the right to retain the services on the Authority of anybody who proves himself good, and the right to drop anybody who proves himself incompetent. Both of those rights are contained in the original draft of the Bill. The draft is therefore good and the amendment should not be supported.

Mr. Hilliard

Senator Sheehy Skeffington has put his finger on the pulse of the matter. I should like to point out that the five year period, as stated in the Bill, is a maximum period, but it does not necessarily follow that, in practice, every member will be appointed for the maximum number of years. I feel that the three year period sought by Senator Quinlan would, in fact, be too short. You are establishing a new Authority; you are charging them with certain responsibility and giving them certain functions and certain work to do. I feel that, in the initial stages, the members of the Authority would not attain their best within a three year period. In any event, they will not have in the initial stages five years' experience of operating a television service. There will of necessity be no television service for quite a while and they will be simply operating the sound broadcasting service. It is true that the Television Commission suggested a steady turnover in membership without causing disruption. I agree with that but I think it will take time to arrive at the stage when such a system can be put into operation. We should not be compelled by legislation to follow that method. It should be left to the Government to decide this matter for themselves. The Government should be free to appoint the members for the full period or for a shorter period, as the case may be.

I wish to deal now with the second amendment, amendment No. 3, which concerns eligibility for re-appointment. Straight away, I should like to assure Senator Quinlan that I fully appreciate his purpose in putting down this amendment. It is true that, as the Bill stands, a member could continue indefinitely as a member of the Authority through repeated re-appointments. But it is not the intention to have repeated re-appointments made in order to continue the membership of a person over, say, a lifetime.

I fully realise that it is absolutely essential to have fresh minds on the Authority as the occasion demands. Nevertheless, it would be a fatal mistake to confine the period of membership of the Authority. It might be of very great value to the Authority to retain the membership of a person who, perhaps, by reason of this amendment, would have to leave the Authority. I think the Government and the Minister should be free to determine that question for themselves so that we would have the best possible people on the Authority. That could be achieved by leaving the Government free to decide for themselves to terminate an appointment— as they have authority to do in the Bill—or to say that an appointment should be for a lesser period than five years in certain cases while retaining the right to re-appoint as may be desirable. In order to introduce new blood they should be free to appoint as members of the Authority people with special knowledge who may become available at any particular time and I believe this would be of material benefit in the operation of the service. They should also be in a position to retain on the Authority persons whose service indicates they have given of their best.

Professor Quinlan

I move amendment No. 4:—

To delete subsection (5) and substitute the following subsection:—

"( ) When a member of the Authority is elected to either House of the Oireachtas, or is nominated a member of Seanad Éireann, he shall thereupon cease to be a member of the Authority."

This actually removes the safety valve that Senator O'Reilly found for disposing of those members who stay too long. I believe the approach to membership of the Dáil and Seanad is far too restricted. Even the approach to candidature is too restricted. I cannot understand why a candidate should be ineligible for a board, while a defeated candidate is always most eligible. Surely we could show a little more political maturity now. I see no crime whatsoever in a member of an authority or a board going forward for election to the Oireachtas. To my way of thinking, he ought to be required to do nothing more than simply retire temporarily from the board, or authority, during the election period. Well and good, if he is elected to the Oireachtas, he should automatically cease to be a member of an authority or board. Otherwise, I see no reason why anyone seeking membership of either House of the Oireachtas should have that used against him. That applies even more to membership of the Seanad than to membership of the Dáil, because you have not got in relation to the Seanad, the open canvassing, the rough and tumble of the hustings and all the rest of it that you have in relation to the Dáil. You have a more refined type of approach.

Professor Hayes

Éamon Ó Ciosáin

This will be a whole-time post.

Mr. Hilliard

I do not think there is anything really in what Senator O'Quigley has just said. He has answered this himself by referring to the terms of appointment and the restrictions there could be in the terms of appointment of the Director-General. In any case, I do not think that Directors-General of television or broadcasting Authorities would bother standing for Dáil Éireann or coming into the Seanad and that is not casting any reflection on either body—they will be fully occupied with the business of their office. I do not think the matter has been raised seriously.

It might appear unfair that a member should cease to be a member of the Authority merely on nomination as a candidate for either Dáil or Seanad, but when you look further into the matter, you find that a person who is nominated as a candidate has to come forward publicly and express his opinions and take part in public debate and controversy. I feel that would not be consistent with his membership of the Authority and I think the section should be left as it is, and that the amendment should not be inserted. I believe it is a good principle that members of the Authority, while in office, should not identify themselves with a political Party. Accordingly, I feel that the provision of the Bill should stand. It is a sound provision and will eliminate all criticism of the Authority in regard to that matter of members of the authority offering themselves to any political Party as candidates for election to the Dáil or Seanad. This is a sound provision and should be retained in the Bill. It is a standard section and it applies equally to the other Boards that have been already established under similar sections of similar legislation.

It occurs to me that the real reason for this section and similar sections in other legislation, starting possibly with the original Electricity Supply Acts, and the only justification for it, is that we seem not to be politically mature. It does appear to me that there is a great deal of loosening out, which seems to correspond with the little degree of maturity in these matters that we have reached. The fact that we have had such a discussion on both sides of the House to-day satisfies me that there is necessity for the section as it is.

A Government in power, as well as doing right, have to do what appears to be right. There are such restrictions in the Electricity Supply Acts. They are much more comprehensive in that a person could not be a servant of a State board and a member of the Oireachtas. That has been remedied to some extent by legislation. The restriction applied to a person who was a servant or officer of a huge corporation, like the E.S.B., in which there would be people of different political views, people with no political views and people with views that would not be catered for by any of the existing Parties. Apparently we are becoming gradually more mature politically.

Every sane man has views on politics. If he has not, he is useless as a citizen. The fact that a person may have known views on political matters is no reason why he should not be appointed to this Authority. A strong man holds his views strongly. Because of our political immaturity, simply in order to appear to be right, we are prevented sometimes from selecting the person best qualified for a position. That is not confined to any one side of this House or any one side of the Dáil. We all suffer to some extent in this regard.

While this would be the worst Bill in which to start an experiment in a general way, the fewer restrictions we have in respect of elections to Parliament, the better. Senator Quinlan did mention the question of officers of local authorities. He said that officers of local authorities were debarred from being members of the Oireachtas. I do not think that is so but I do know that in some counties the senior executive officers of local authorities create a position which makes it very undesirable for junior and middle grade officers to take part in politics. That is one of the ways of politically emasculating leadership but I am also aware that an officer of a local authority, who was elected to Dáil Éireann, became a Minister. In fact, I remember that particular person was promoted during that period and there was nothing wrong about that. I am not saying there was; I am not one of those people who wish to suggest corruption because that is a bad thing and the sooner we grow out of it the better.

By this Bill, we are launching a ship in regard to which we have no experience. I think the section should stand as it is and, if necessary, we can have a look at it in five, ten or fifteen years' time, if we feel we can widen the scope.

Mr. Donegan

The whole flavour of the debate is that there is no widening of the scope. This thing is cut and dried and so far it does not seem as if the Government wish to accept any amendments other than their own.

Tomás Ó Maoláin

One, two and three.

Mr. Donegan

The Senator said a very odd thing. I was waiting for some Senator to rise up and metaphorically smite him for suggesting there was nothing wrong in a person being appointed to an authority because he is a member of a political Party. I see everything wrong in that. Suppose a person is eminently suitable for the post; just because he is not a member of a political Party, he cannot get it.

Mr. Hilliard

Senator Quinlan seeks to obtain from me an assurance or indication that the Government would restrict itself in the field of appointees to the Board. I think he is asking for too much in that. I could not give him that assurance and I do not intend to give it to him. It could very well be that persons who are members of Dáil Éireann or Seanad Éireann would be eminently suitable persons to be members of this Authority, or any other public authority set up as a semi-State body. This amendment is not dealing with people who are outside the Authority. This subsection deals with persons who are members of the Authority, whoever they may be, and it restricts them from standing as candidates for election to either House of the Oireachtas. I believe that is sound principle and should be retained.

Professor Quinlan

On a point of explanation, I did not altogether ask the Minister to restrict his field, but I want to ask does he class in the same way candidates for election and defeated candidates after elections as being not suitable for appointment?

Mr. Hilliard

I think I have answered the Senator. I have given him my answer that he is, in fact, seeking an assurance on the point as I have mentioned it. That is really what he wants and any other thing I would offer would be just an opinion, nothing more, and opinions will not affect this thing one way or the other.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Is the amendment being pressed?

Professor Quinlan

No.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed: "That Section 4 stand part of the Bill."

Mr. Murphy

Subsection (1) of this Section provides that the membership of the Authority shall not be less than seven and not more than nine in number. I wish to put it to the Minister that, certainly in making the first appointments, the maximum number should be adhered to, that is, that he should appoint nine to the Television Authority. I do so because television is obviously of very great importance to all sections of the community. The section about which I wish to speak is the trade union people and the workers. Between themselves and their families trade union people comprise, I suppose, one-third of the population and in making appointments to the Authority the Minister should have regard to people with a background of experience in that direction.

I know that the Minister would want competent people and I hope he will get and choose competent people for the Authority, but it would be desirable that regard should be had to trade union interests, to people with a background experience in trade union affairs.

Another aspect which is of importance is education. I hope that television will be utilised not solely for the purpose of entertainment but also for the purpose of education. I think it would be very desirable, in constituting the Authority, that the Minister should have available somebody with actual experience of teaching so that the Authority could draw on his experience for the purpose of utilising the new medium for education.

Mr. P. Crowley

I want to support very emphatically the plea made by Senator Murphy. This is a new venture for this country and, as a number of Senators have already stressed, to a certain extent we are venturing into the unknown. I am quite convinced that the Minister will be subjected to a lot of pressure from various sections of the community, representing all sorts of interests and outlooks. I want to point out that the plea just made by Senator Murphy has been made on behalf of 500,000 citizens and I submit that their outlook and point of view should have proper representation. I also think that the point made by Senator Murphy regarding the educational aspect of this particular matter needs to be more strongly emphasised.

The tremendous possibilities of this medium as an educational medium are hardly realised by anybody. Certainly from what we read and see around us we know that the medium of television has been utilised by many Governments for purposes that go far beyond the imaginations of most of us and, apart from representation for the very solid group of people to whom Senator Murphy referred, the Minister would be very well advised if from the outset he made certain there was somebody on the Authority with a good strong background as well as an expert knowledge of the best methods of applying television to education. As I say, such a person should be on the Authority from the outset.

Professor Hayes

I thoroughly agree with Senator Murphy in one of the things he said but I am afraid I do not agree with him in another. I wanted to make some observations myself on the general position of the Authority and I do not know whether it is fair to ask has the Minister given any consideration to the particular type of person he has in mind. In the beginning I agree that the maximum number should be appointed but I think it would be very undesirable that the Minister, or the Government should begin, in making these appointments, to make them on a basis that would be sectional. I think the notion that this Authority should be representative of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, or that it should be representative of trade unionists and employers. or should be representative of teachers, for example, of whom I happen to be one myself, is rather a bad idea.

This Authority will have an extremely difficult task, a task which, as has been said over and over again here this evening, of which there is very little experience and which involves going into new and unknown fields. It has very serious obligations. Under Section 17 of the Bill, it has an obligation to preserve the Irish language and traditions. Under Section 18, it has the obligation of being impartial. Apart from these two sections, they will have the obligation of keeping up to date in a medium which is constantly changing, and which may indeed see very great technical changes comparatively soon.

Under Section 17, it will be extremely difficult to get the appropriate person because there should be at least one member of the Authority who not only knows Irish—it would be comparatively easy to get such a person—but who has a proper understanding of what Irish literature means and what the people in rural Ireland stand for, some of whom still speak Irish and a great many of whom up to comparatively lately did speak it, somebody who understands that Irish is not merely a collection of irregular verbs, which, I am afraid, a great many people think it is.

Under Section 18, the appointees are bound to impartiality. You want people of very strong character because endeavouring to get impartiality sometimes gives you simply nervousness which immobilises you. It is a matter of very great difficulty to be impartial and the notion that certain people ought to be represented is not the correct approach.

Similarly, some people on this Authority will have to have experience of administration, of how things are run. That is a matter which could not be left entirely to the Director-General or to the staff because if you have an Authority and none of them is familiar with the ordinary problems of administration, they will not be in a position to direct anybody. Administrators, no matter how good they are, do need some direction.

The same thing applies to education. The television service will have considerable influence on schools and it should also be available for adult education. The fact that a person has been a teacher—I speak as one myself—is not a sufficient qualification. It is not sufficient to say: "I have selected Patrick Murphy"—I am taking the name as it is a common one—"because he has been a teacher." He may have been a teacher and a very good teacher, but might not have the necessary vision for running television. Television will be a new thing here and it is quite possible that the person entirely tied by his experience to other media would not be as good as you might imagine. It requires very much more than mere experience as a teacher. The suggestion that the Authority should be set up, so to speak, on a system of proportional representation, where people who have numbers behind them should have a certain representation on the Authority, is not a good one, and if my friend Senator Murphy and Senator Crowley give that consideration, they will, I hope, agree with me.

The Minister will find great difficulty in getting the proper people and he may have to make very serious experiments. Sometimes a person is extremely successful for whom you could not make out a case beforehand. For instance, the first film censor here was extremely good, but one of the things he had and one of the things these people will have to have is considerable breadth of vision and considerable depth and breadth of knowledge and talent. Unless you can get that, I do not think you will get any benefit at all from this venture.

I would be prepared for my own part, to leave the responsibility to the Minister and I feel that the Minister, or any other Minister in his position, would recognise that he will be judged by what he does and that inevitably, whatever he does, he will be criticised, but that over a long period, if he makes the correct choice in the beginning, he will have success. We are all interested in this. There has been a certain amount of talk to-day about the type of people to be put on this Authority. We shall need public money and we must all do our level best to see that this system works satisfactorily. For that reason, I wonder could the Minister tell us if he has any particular type of person in mind. The television medium itself, from the point of view of information, entertainment and education, will be all-important. What has been happening in recent years, since 1922, progressively since we put our faith in the schools, is that the schools are becoming less important than they used to be. The radio has changed that situation and television will change it again.

The matter is one of very great difficulty and I wonder whether the Minister has any specific views on it. However, for my part, I feel he ought to regard himself as entirely free and he must look for a variety on this Authority, not a variety which would bring the Authority to a stand-still, which you could have easily, but considerable variety. It should not be bound to sectional interests nor should we endeavour to have certain types of people represented. On the other hand, we must have people who understand education in its best and widest sense and people who understand entertainment as well. How the Minister is to do that, I do not know, but I should like to hear whether he has anything to say on it in general terms.

Mr. O'Reilly

When Senator Murphy suggested on this amendment there should be representation of the trade unions, it did occur to me that I know of a person—whose name I shall not mention—who has given great service to the trade union movement and to the Irish nation. It could happen that that person or a similar person who has given service to the trade union movement might be appointed to this Authority. I do not intend to make any representations to the Minister or the Government in that regard, but I could readily understand that happening, and if the person who came to my mind were to be appointed, he would be appointed not because he was a trade union official and a great Irishman but because of his ability to be a good member of the Authority.

Mr. L'Estrange

And of Fianna Fáil.

Mr. O'Reilly

This is no laughing matter and if this debate is to progress in a reasonable manner, it should be taken seriously, and it would be helpful if certain people would conduct themselves. Senator Murphy should agree, in all seriousness, that it would be a bad thing that the members of this Authority should be appointed on a sectional basis. If that were to be conceded to Senator Murphy, it would become a question of the strongest pressure groups, those groups that shouted loudest, being heard. That would be a very bad thing. It would be even worse than having members appointed on a political basis, bad as that might be. The next thing that would happen would be that another strong section in society, the farming community, would make a case that they should have a representation of at least three on the Authority.

It would mean that all along the line, even within the trade union movement and within agriculture and industry, the groups that could bring the most pressure on the Government would have their nominees appointed. That situation would be a disaster. In the appointment of the Authority, there should be some balance, and regard should be had to the administrative and business capacity of the persons to be appointed. It is necessary, therefore, that members, or some members, of the Board would have wide business and administrative capacity because the Board must run as a business.

The second important feature in my view would be that it should be weighted in favour of education rather than entertainment. Entertainment as such may be all right but I should think the Board, if this Authority is to give of its best to the Irish nation, can do so only through the medium of education rather than entertainment for entertainment's sake.

After business and administrative capacity, the question of education should be weighted higher up than the question of entertainment as such. How far education and entertainment can be coalesced is a matter on which I am not prepared to make any statement here but I feel certain it is possible to do that by proper presentation of programmes and that a programme can be educational and entertaining. I am satisfied it is along these lines and only along these lines that the Board should be appointed by the Government. When the Board is appointed many of the members of the Board I feel certain, without having any notion who they will be, will be persons who have given much service to the country and, maybe, to different organisations such as trade unions and different political Parties in the past. There is nothing wrong with that.

Mr. Barry

Hear, hear!—if you find the right man.

Mr. Hilliard

So far as the number of members of the Authority is concerned, I can say at once that the Government intend to fill the membership by the appointment of nine persons. The Government are responsible for the appointment of the members to the Authority, not the Minister, as Section 4 points out; Senators know that themselves.

I agree almost entirely with the advice given here by Senator Hayes in relation to the type of person the Government should have in mind when seeking nominations for this Authority. I believe it is important that we should take persons representative of the various broad aspects of national life and that we should not seek to appoint persons as representatives of sectional interests.

Mr. Murphy

I am not asking for that but for the broad aspects.

Mr. Hilliard

I know. I am telling the Seanad exactly what I feel myself. I do not intend to repeat the speech made by Senator Hayes; I fully accept it. I am certain the Government will bear in mind the considerations he has so ably put forward.

Question put and agreed to.

SECTION 5.

Amendment No. 5 not moved.

Professor Hayes

I move amendment No. 6:—

To add to the section a new subsection as follows:—

"( ) The Minister shall cause the terms of employment and remuneration of the members of the Authority to be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas."

There are a number of such amendments. I do not want to take up the time of the House too long with them. The Bill gives the Minister very considerable powers in a great many sections. It seems to me that where the Minister exercises a power there will be an accompanying Parliamentary power of debate or of question and answer. That is inevitable. Once the Minister has power, then there is power in the Oireachtas to ask the Minister questions.

I suggest that in this instance where a member of the Authority is to hold office on such terms as the Government may determine from time to time, the Minister should cause the terms of employment and remuneration of the members of the Authority to be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas as a piece of information.

I have repeated that type of amendment in other cases. For instance, in Section 13, amendment 10:

In subsection (4) to add the following paragraph:—

"( ) The Minister shall cause notice of the appointment or removal of the Director-General or of the alteration of his remuneration or of his terms and conditions of holding office, to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas."

I take that view generally. I should like, if I may, from the point of view of the Chair, to ask the Minister his general view on that. Perhaps we may be in agreement or we may be in partial agreement. My reasons are that since the Minister has the power, since the matter is one of great public interest, the members of the Dáil and Seanad should be acquainted with the way the Minister from time to time exercises his power.

I have not in any case put down an amendment to the effect that something should not be put into operation until the House agrees. That is put down in regard to another matter. In the exercise of this power, in a matter of great public interest which will influence a great many people's lives, everyone is entitled to say that the information should be available to the members of both Houses.

Mr. Hilliard

As Senator Hayes has already pointed out, if this amendment were accepted, this would be the first Bill on which such an amendment was accepted. He has already indicated that, if a member is removed from office, the matter can be raised publicly by public question or by notice of motion, I presume, in either House if that conforms with the Standing Orders of the Houses.

It would be a very rare occasion on which a member would be removed from office.

Professor Hayes

It is Section 5— terms of employment.

Mr. Hilliard

Sorry. I did not know. The amendment is No. 6. In so far as that amendment is concerned, we feel that in asking a person to become a member of this Authority we should not be obliged to say to the person concerned: "The terms of your employment"—that is what is here; the terms of appointment I presume is what is meant—"shall be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas and particulars of the remuneration shall be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas." I do not think I could accept that amendment.

I know that the matter can be raised by public question and that the practice is to give the necessary information when it is asked for. It is a matter on which we can have two opinions—whether it would be better when the person is appointed just to let both Houses know exactly what the terms of appointment are and the remuneration—it will be known, anyway—or whether the practice should be continued that obtains in other legislation of a similar character. Then, if anybody wished to know, he could raise the matter by public question. I do not think it advisable to have matters such as this raised by public question in the Houses of the Oireachtas. That is my view.

Mr. Barry

The Minister does not think it wise that the matter should be raised by question?

Mr. Hilliard

I do not think it is, and that has been the practice down the years. You are asking people to serve on a public authority. It is generally conceded that their terms of appointment will be in conformity with an Act of the Oireachtas, that the remuneration certainly will not be out of line with that paid to people in similar appointments on similar boards, and that it is bringing public attention to the individual concerned. I feel that is not a very good thing in a public service of this character and that the amendment should not be pressed. For these reasons, I am reluctantly opposed to the amendment.

Mr. Barry

I cannot agree with the Minister. I do not see reasons for any shyness about this. If anything, you are going to do more injury to the members of this body if you do not publish.

Mr. Hilliard

It is not a question of shyness; it is a question of the principle involved. It has not been the practice in legislation in regard to other bodies. There is no obligation in any of the other Acts to lay on the Table of the Houses of the Oireachtas the terms of appointment or the remuneration given to members of a number of boards and semi-public bodies established already.

Mr. Donegan

In regard to the Civil Service, it is a fact that all one has to do is to consult the Book of Estimates to find out. I would regard these members of the Authority as being on a par with members of the Civil Service, as well as on a par with members of semi-State bodies. It would be wise to allow the remuneration to be publicly known, rather than have it sought for by way of public question and perhaps sought with an innuendo. It would be far better to have it stated and have all remunerations known, rather than have a question raised in relation to the remuneration of an individual, a remuneration which might be greater than another for obvious reasons. The post might be whole-time or part-time. In regard to the question in both Houses, there might be an innuendo as to an underhand reason for a person getting more money than another.

Mr. Carter

I think the Minister is wise in rejecting the amendment. After all, we have 20 odd statutory corporations in this country and I am not aware that the conditions sought in this amendment apply to them. As the Minister pointed out, there is ample scope by means of question and answer to get this type of information. If you want to make the Authority independent and at the same time, want to have your finger in the pie, I do not see how the Authority can look so independent. I think that we should, as far as possible, try to divorce it from the terms of the amendment.

Professor Hayes

In the first instance, the Bill contains ample provision to see that the Authority is not independent. There is no doubt about that. You cannot call the Authority independent when the Minister has power to prevent it from broadcasting particular things and to compel it to broadcast certain things. There is no independence there. That is quite plain. He appoints them and they have to appoint a Director-General and the Minister's consent must be obtained.

I am not thirsting for any information for the purposes of making any capital out of it. It seems to me that in the situation we are in where people are employed on public boards, there is no use in being thin-skinned or mealy-mouthed. The salaries paid to the members of the E.S.B. are well known. As Senator Donegan said, I think, civil servants and judges have their remuneration which is well known and easily ascertained.

This is a new Bill and I do not see any reason why, when the Minister has the power to fix not alone the remuneration but the terms of appointment, the members of the Dáil and Seanad should not know as soon as may be of the terms. I think this is a much better scheme. People might be quite satisfied with that rather than that attention should be drawn to the matter by way of Parliamentary Question.

The argument is used that this provision is not made with regard to other boards. That may be, but, as the Minister has pointed out, questions are frequently asked in the Dáil with regard to remuneration and the questions are answered. It seems to me that it would be a much better thing in this instance and, indeed, for other boards like this—I am not saying that they should be published beforehand—when remuneration has been fixed and people have accepted posts, that they should be made known.

The argument against this runs rather on the basis that it is an indelicate operation, that in some way it is indelicate to have it put on the Table of the Dáil and Seanad. Once we accept this kind of system, we have to accept with it the indelicacies. It is a public matter. I think it should be known to the members of the Dáil and Seanad and then they can use their discretion afterwards as to what they may do about it. There is nothing shameful about it. If you accept public office, you have to accept certain things that go with it. It is one of those things. Parliament have a right to inquire into the terms of office and the amount of remuneration.

Amendment put.

The Committee divided: Tá, 23 23; Níl, 23.

Tá

Barry, Anthony.
Burke, Denis.
Carton, Victor.
Connolly O'Brien, Nora.
Connor, Patrick.
Crowe, Patrick.
Crowley, Patrick.
Davidson, Mary F.
Donegan, Patrick.
Hayes, Michael.
L'Estrange, Gerald.
Murphy, Dominick F.
O'Brien, George A.T.
O'Donovan, John.
O'Keeffe, James J.
O'Quigley, John B.
O'Sullivan, John L.
Prendergast, Micheál A.
Quinlan, Patrick M.
Roddy, Joseph.
Sheehy Skeffington, Owen I.
Stanford, William B.
Tunney, James.

Níl

Ahern, Liam.
Brady, Seán.
Carter, Frank.
Cole, John C.
Colley, Harry.
Crowley, Tadhg.
Farnan, Robert P.
Fitzsimons, Patrick.
Hayes, Seán.
Hogan, Daniel.
Lahiffe, Robert.
Lenihan, Brian.
Ó Ciosáin, Éamon.
Ó Donnabháin, Seán.
Ó Grádaigh, Seán.
Ó Maoláin, Tomás.
O'Reilly, Patrick.
O'Sullivan, Ted.
Ruane, Thomas.
Ryan, Eoin.
Teehan, Patrick J.
Walsh, Laurence J.
Walsh, Louis.

Tellers:—Tá: Senators Donegan and O'Quigley; Níl: Senators Seán Ó Donnabháin and Carter.

Amendment declared carried.

An Cathaoirleach

The voting is equal. In accordance with precedent I shall have to cast my vote for the amendment on the ground that, were I to do otherwise, I should be depriving the House of a further opportunity of reviewing the matter. The matter may be raised again on the Report Stage.

Business suspended at 6 p.m. and resumed at 7 p.m.

Question proposed: "That Section 5, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

Seán Ó Donnabháin

I should like to ask the Minister if there is any difference between the allowance given to the Chairman and the other members? Judging by the wording of the section, there would appear to be no difference. A member shall be paid "such remuneration as shall be fixed from time to time by the Government." It does not indicate that they will pay any special remuneration to the Chairman and I assume the Chairman will have more onerous duties than the other members.

Mr. Hilliard

It does not say the Chairman will be paid any less. It does not prevent him from getting more.

Question put and agreed to.

Amendment No. 7 not moved.

Except of course if the Chairman in this instance were full-time, obviously, his relationship with the Director-General would surely be different from the relationship of the chairman of a board to the managing director. However, that is a matter for the future, as the Minister says. Analogies are never quite satisfactory and while there is a good deal in what Senator Ryan says, being Chairman of this Authority is not quite the same as being chairman of a board of directors because there will be a great many things to be decided from time to time and the Director-General and the Chairman would have to "hit it off" together just as the managing director of a company and the chairman of the board have to do.

Mr. Hilliard

The Bill gives no authority to the Chairman to interfere or to give a direction to the Director-General but the Authority is, as I have said, the policy-making body and, as is normal in any business board or executive, the Authority can at a meeting or in its discussions authorise the Chairman to convey its direction to the Director-General, if it so desires. I mean, it is quite free to do it that way or to send its general directions to him in writing. It may not be always feasible to send it in writing and the Authority could tell the Chairman or ask the Chairman, or have it agreed amongst themselves, that the Chairman would see the Director-General and convey some item in regard to the general policy as operated in the service by interview or word of mouth.

Question put and agreed to.

NEW SECTION

Mr. O'Quigley

I move amendment No. 8:

Before section 8 to insert a new section as follows:—

"8. Before appointing a person to be a member of the Authority the Government shall satisfy themselves that that person will have no such financial or other interest (and in particular no such financial or other interest in any advertising agency or in any business concerned with the manufacture or sale of apparatus for wireless telegraphy or other telegraphic equipment or in any business consisting or intended to consist in whole or in part in entering into or carrying out contracts with the Authority for the provision of programmes or parts of programmes) as is likely to affect prejudicially the discharge by him of his functions as member of the Authority and the Government shall also satisfy themselves from time to time with respect to any member of the Authority that he has no such interest and any person who is, or whom the Government propose to appoint to be, a member of the Authority shall, whenever requested by the Minister so to do, furnish to the Minister such information as the Minister shall consider necessary for the performance by the Government of their duties under this section."

This involves the substitution of the amendment for Section 8 of the Bill as drafted. I take it that we are all agreed that the fundamental thing to be sought after in this Bill is to establish an Authority that will be as independent as it can be, consistent with the necessary restrictions which the Minister may from time to time impose upon it. What we are trying to achieve is the establishment of an Authority which will be completely free from all kinds of influences and in the earlier sections we have provided that people will be free, as far as legislation can make them free, from political influences.

In the Authority of nine people there will be various kinds of interests represented, not so much various interests, but people with different types of experience, all of which will conduce to the provision of the best television service that the limited financial resources and the considerable talents of this country can produce. I do not think that Section 8 of the Bill is at all helpful to the establishment of the kind of Authority that we have in mind or to the establishment of an Authority which will achieve the objectives which everybody is agreed upon.

The section, as it is set out in the Bill, enables people who have interests in companies and concerns which will, we can take it, be dealing directly with the Authority, to remain members of the Authority and it provides that such members of the Authority shall merely disclose that fact to the Authority and that they will not take part in any discussion.

What is proposed in the amendment is that, before the Government appoints any member to the Authority, the Government shall make such inquiries as are necessary to satisfy themselves that every one of the seven to nine people they appoint will not have any such financial interest in any matter as would be likely to affect prejudicially the discharge by such people of their functions as members of the Authority and in the amendment I particularly specify the type of interest which, if people had it, would be likely prejudicially to affect the discharge of their functions as members of the Authority. These interests are: interest in any advertising agency, since the Authority will be concerned with advertisements and will be deriving a large part of its revenue from advertising; interest in any business concerned with the manufacture or sale of apparatus for wireless telegraphy or other telegraphic equipment—that embraces the whole range of apparatus and equipment which the Authority would be purchasing from time to time or, indeed, the kind of receiver which the Authority would decide should be the type of receiver that would be necessary to operate upon the line standard with which they would be dealing—or any business connected with the putting on of programmes for entertainment in any shape or form.

I think there are very good practical reasons why the amendment suggested should be accepted as against the section as it stands in the Bill. First of all, the section in the Bill has no real practical value. It merely means that if X, Y, Z and A, B, C, are members of the Authority and X indicates to Y, Z, A, B, C on a contract which they are proposing to make with a firm of engineers or with an advertising agency, or with somebody interested in putting on programmes, that he has an interest in that firm, X shall then take no part in the proceedings having disclosed his interest in the firm. We hope the members of the Authority will be supermen, will be a great deal above the average, but they will not be gods or will not partake of a divine nature to the extent that they will shed themselves of all the infirmities of human nature. Being human beings, as X has an interest in a particular contract it must follow in the ordinary course of events—and this must be the experience and judgment of members of the House—the other members of the Authority are more likely to find reasons for giving a contract, whether it be for the building of a transmitter on Kippure, or supplying certain apparatus, or putting on a programme, to the firm with which he is connected rather than to a firm they know nothing about.

For that reason alone, if we want to establish an Authority which will not be subject to adverse criticism, and a service which will not develop in people's minds a particular prejudice because of the type of people who are on the Authority, we should seek to appoint to it people who have no interest in television, or television service other than the provision of the best service they can get for the people of this country.

The whole aim of the Bill, as I say, has been to create an independent Authority but I can see that, since the Director-General is to be the key man in this service, if we have on the Authority people who have interests in companies and concerns interested in advertising, in putting on programmes and entertainment, the Director-General, as a matter of practice, will have an extremely difficult job and the difficulties with which he would be faced would be of such a calibre and such a type that the television service will be less efficient, less useful, and less profitable to the country than if these difficulties did not arise.

For instance, if you have on the Authority a person who has an interest in an advertising agency and his agency wants advertisements dealt with by the Television Authority in a particular way and the Director-General, in the exercise of his discretion in that capacity, decides that is not the way best suited to programmes, that best meets the reasonable requirements of the tele-viewers or accords with good taste and good programming, if the member of the Authority interested in the advertising agency is a strong character, or a truculent character, the Director-General will be faced with a problem with which he ought not to be faced as to whether or not he will decide to overrule the wishes of the agency with which the member of the Authority is connected, or row in with its wishes. I do not think that if we want to achieve a really first class television service within our resources that we ought to put the Director-General in that kind of position.

Similarly, if a member of the Television Authority is concerned in the production of programmes, if he has an organisation with which he is associated in putting on particular types of shows and entertainment, and the Director-General is satisfied that perhaps too much of that particular type of programme is being put on, he will then have to meet with the vested interest of a member of the Authority to deal with that. The member of the Authority, sitting with his colleagues, will be able to produce all classes of convincing reasons and—since the Director-General is merely an executive and a subordinate of the Authority—the member interested in that kind of venture, such as putting on programmes, will carry a great deal more weight than merely the paid officer of the Authority.

Apart altogether from that, if you have on the Board people who are interested in contracts, who have business and private profit interests in matters with which the Authority may be concerned, and who—mind you— may be fairly expert on these matters by reason of their knowledge and their position, they will be able to exert an influence over the Board which will sway the Board into making a decision which, if they were free from that kind of influence, the Board would not make. If we want to have a completely independent Television Authority we should provide that it will be uninhibited by any consideration, on the part of any member, of private profit or gain, and the only way to do that is to exclude from the Board all people who would have any interest in any concern of any kind which would impinge upon the activities of the Authority.

I want to point out to the House that this section is by no means a precedent. We have had it in a number of Bills which have come before us, even in my time, and it is to be found in quite a number of other statutes.

Mr. Lenihan

Where?

Mr. O'Quigley

If you look up the recent Bill dealing with Coras Tráchtála, the Bill dealing with Bord na gCon, and so on, you will find it in all of them. Senator Lenihan is asking for something for which he has not bargained but I want to point out that the real precedent for this kind of section is to be found in the Electricity Supply Act, 1927. Earlier this evening we discussed Cumann na nGaedheal precedents and that very section, Section 8, is an exact reproduction of Section 10 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1927.

For the benefit of the House I want to read Section 11 of that Act:

(1) Every person appointed to be a member of the Board shall within three months after his appointment absolutely sell and dispose of all shares in any electrical undertaking which he shall at the time of his appointment own or be interested in for his own benefit, and if any shares in any electrical undertaking shall come to or vest in a member of the Board by will or succession for his own benefit, he shall within three months after the same shall have so come to or vested in him, absolutely sell and dispose of the same or his interest therein.

I shall read on, if the House will grant me the indulgence. It continues:

(2) A member of the Board shall not, while he holds that office, purchase, take, or become interested in for his own benefit any shares in any electrical undertaking.

(3) Any member of the Board who shall retain, purchase, take, or become or remain interested in any shares in any electrical undertaking in contravention of this section shall be disqualified for and be deemed to have vacated his office as such member.

(4) In this section the expression "shares in any electrical undertaking" means and includes any stock, shares, debentures, debenture stock, bonds, or other securities of any company engaged in the generation, distribution, or supply of electricity or the manufacture of or wholesale or retail dealing in electrical apparatus and includes any share or interest in any unincorporated undertaking similarly engaged.

These were Procrustean standards and these were the standards upon which the first semi-State body in this country was established. If the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in his opening speech on this Bill advances as one of the arguments for creating a new independent television Authority as a semi-State body that a number of other such semi-State bodies have functioned satisfactorily in this country and refers to the E.S.B. as one such, which indeed was the prototype of all such semi-State bodies, it is a great pity the Minister did not observe the standards of integrity and impartiality that were adopted away back in 1927 on the establishment of the very successful undertaking, the Electricity Supply Board.

The provisions of Section 11 of the Electricity Supply Act, which has formed the pattern for all semi-State organisations that have since been established, apply today to the members of the Electricity Supply Board. The supply of electricity, while of the greatest moment and consequence to the people of this country, and indeed was a great venture when it was established, is nothing compared with the tremendous power for good or ill which has been vested in the Authority under this Bill.

The House should accept this amendment for the purpose of ensuring that the members of the Authority will not be inhibited in any way that legislation can provide from giving a completely impartial view of every matter that comes before them in the discharge of their functions as members of the Authority.

Section 8, as it stands, is a sham. It would have no effect in practice and it is merely a pretence. As Senator O'Reilly said earlier this evening, the Government are appearing to do what is right in Section 8 as it stands. If we want to be really sincere in establishing an Authority that would be uninhibited in every respect and free from any prejudice in the discharge of its functions, this amendment should be substituted for the Section. However, I do not think that merely the appointment is sufficient. It is also provided in the amendment that from time to time—it is a matter for the discretion of the Government—they shall make such inquiries as the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs deems necessary to satisfy themselves that no person has been appointed who at the time of his appointment has any interest which is likely to affect prejudicially the discharge of his functions as a member of the Authority or, in the intervening period, has acquired such an interest.

Mr. Ryan

This is a rather clumsy amendment and if it were accepted it would not be effective. The object of both Section 8 and the proposed section is to prevent the members of the Authority from being influenced by financial reasons in exercising their functions as members of the Authority but in the amendment all the onus in ensuring that the member has no financial interest elsewhere is placed on the Government. The Government have to make sure, in the first place, that the person whom they are about to appoint has no interest, has no connections, which would prevent his being unprejudiced in carrying out his functions as a member of the Authority. That would be relatively simple. The Government could, I am sure, find out a certain amount about a person and make reasonably sure that he did not have interests which would affect him, but the second thing that the Government have to do is to make sure from time to time that the person has not acquired interests.

One of the reasons I say this is a somewhat clumsy amendment is that the amendment starts off by saying: "Before appointing a person to be a member of the Authority the Government shall satisfy themselves that that person will have no such financial or other interest..." How the Government are to make sure that the person will have no financial interest, as apart from deciding at a given moment that he has no financial interest, is something I find it hard to understand and something which the Government would find it very hard to do.

Leaving aside for the moment that rather peculiar wording, the Government have to ensure from time to time that the member has not acquired any interest. How are they going to do that? Will they constantly check on the activities of a member? Will they appoint a special civil servant or ask for the help of the police constantly to go around to check on the activities of the members to see if they have acquired any interest in anything that would affect their position? The Government could not, in practice, do it. If the Government had this obligation laid on them and if they took their duties seriously, it would be a most objectionable business because if they took their duties seriously they would have to spy on the members of the Authority to see were they acquiring any interests which would affect their position on the Authority. No Government will constantly check like that on the members of a board. It would be most objectionable if they did, and I am quite sure that in practice the Government would not take any steps to check constantly on the activities of such members. Consequently this amendment would be quite useless.

The difference between this amendment and the original section is that under this amendment there is no obligation on the member to disclose any interest he may have. Under the amendment, as it stands, the member could go on acquiring interests in radio factories, advertising firms or anything else. He could go into meetings of the Authority and vote in such a way that his firm or company would benefit and he would be under no obligation whatever under the amendment to disclose the fact that he had an interest. He can carry on until such time as the Government or the Minister taps him on the shoulder and says: "No. We have made inquiries. We find you have an interest. You must not take any further action or make any further decisions in this matter." Therefore, the onus is entirely thrown on the Government to check on his activities and tell the member he may not take any action or continue as a member because he has acquired an interest whereas, under the original section, the onus is cast on the member.

Section 8 of the Bill corresponds very much to the usual clause which appears in the Articles of Association of a company applying to directors and saying what the duties and obligations of a director are in regard to contacts which may be entered into by the company and by some other firm in which the director has an interest. By and large, the obligations of a director under the Articles of Association as normally drafted are very much the same as the obligations of a member of the Authority as set out in Section 8. I think it is a very much better approach to this problem and a very much more effective one.

If the member fails to disclose at any time the interest in any particular contract or the interest in any particular firm or company with which the Authority proposes to have dealings then appropriate action can be taken against him by the Minister. I believe the original section is a much more practical one and very much more effective. It obviates the possibility of the Government's having to indulge in the very objectionable course of action of constantly checking on the affairs of members of the Authority.

Quite apart from all that, there is another consideration involved. Under the proposed amendment the Government would be precluded from appointing any person who had any connection with or interest in any firm which might be likely to have dealings with the Authority. It might rule out the appointment of a person who would be eminently suitable as a member of the Authority.

There are very few people in this country who have any experience of television and broadcasting. With regard to the few who have any experience and who would be useful members of the Authority, quite a large proportion must have some interest in factories that make radio equipment, or advertising firms, and so on. To introduce an amendment which would positively preclude any person of that sort from being a member of an Authority would be a bad thing because it would rule out the possibility of appointing a person who might be eminently suitable and very valuable as a member of the Authority.

If the person is well known to have an interest in some firm which would have dealings with the Authority, the very fact that he is well known to have that interest would be a sufficient safeguard to prevent his abusing his position on the Authority. The better known he is to have that connection, the more certain it is that he will not abuse his position because it would be quite obvious to everybody if he did.

On the other hand, under Section 8, even if people do not know originally that he has this interest, he is obliged to disclose the interest. He is obliged not to take part in any discussion or decision affecting a contract or anything like that between the Authority and the firm in which he is interested. There is quite sufficient safeguard in Section 8 to prevent any person of that kind from abusing his position as a member of the Authority. Therefore, I believe the amendment would not be effective from the point of view of preventing a person abusing his position. It might also do positive harm in preventing the Government appointing a person who might be very suitable as a member of the Authority.

Mr. Donegan

This is a very small country. I feel that in many business undertakings there is a situation where if you are one of the "boys" you can get everything. If you are in the swim you are within the closed shop circle and nobody else can buy or sell except you. You have it in many industries. It is inevitable in a small country such as this.

If an industry becomes big enough in this country there is no room for anyone else. The television industry is a perfect example. The Minister in a reply to me said there will be no others. Therefore, these people who have things to sell to television, whether it be an act, some sort of entertainment, whether it be some goods—it does not matter—have only one person to whom they can sell it. The case was made so well by my colleague, Senator O'Quigley, that there is no point in my labouring it further.

I want to deal now with prior information. I know of instances where prior information in regard to decisions taken but not yet implemented was most valuable. I know of a factory which is extending its premises to do something new because of prior information that the Government intended to set up a Television Authority. It is quite right that that should emanate from the Government, that somebody should tell these people that we should manufacture in this country things that would be used in television. That has happened. It is excellent that the Government have done so.

Let us suppose, however, that the Authority is making some decision and that a member of the Authority discloses the probable decision, or if he has withdrawn because of his interest and goes out and meets socially other members of the Authority afterwards and finds out that the majority are in favour of a certain decision, and passes on the word to his business associate, then if he is in the particular business providing this service or these goods, he will be in first. In such circumstances prior information is most important.

If you are to have a board on which you have people involved in the television business, as such, you must have this weakness of prior information. I know of a public board—it has nothing to do with entertainment— and it was bitterly complained to me that because a member of it had prior information on things that were happening he had made a very fine business out of that prior information. Whether that is true or whether it was just a case of ordinary competition succeeding in bringing the person out in front of his counterparts, I do not know, but he is a member of the board and he has made a fine business out of it.

Therefore, you have that worry. It is a more natural one than the ordinary thing that comes to mind of a contract coming up and a person voting against his conscience. That is bringing it to the ultimate. Prior information is a thing almost anybody would give if they were involved in business —say, a director—and left a meeting of the Television Authority and knew a decision would be likely to be taken in three weeks.

Senator Ryan made the point that the passing of this amendment might mean the exclusion of people who were excellent and who would be the best people for the Authority. It would exclude a lot of people but I feel that the standard of integrity we must demand insists that we do not place people in this position of having a business interest that will interfere with their membership of the Authority.

This will be big business. The biggest expansion in business in terms of turnover and profits in Britain in the boom years of the past five years was Independent Television. The greatest profits that were made and the greatest advances in any shares were the profits and advances made by the Independent Television Authority. As I said in my speech on Second Stage, though we may not except such spectacular results, we must expect a good business result. In that situation, I can imagine members of the Television Authority being asked to become directors of firms who will have interests which would mean that they would wish to know just what the Authority was thinking of doing.

I know that if I were involved in a business or company which had a service to give or goods to sell to a television authority and was making a good profit and I saw another chance of a good profit, I would not think twice, as a businessman, about asking a member of the Television Authority to become a member of my Board and giving him £250 a year. I submit that businessmen are not little tin gods. When you are in business, and someone raises the ante, you have to raise it again. Nobody knows that better than Senator Lenihan. That is no charge against him or me.

That danger is there. I think it would be quite true to say that if we carry on as we are to carry on under the Bill, certain members of the Television Authority will be members of companies selling goods to the Television Authority. Senator O'Quigley has made an excellent case. I merely want to make the point about prior information and the fact that the television authority in Britain has shown us that big profits will exist for advertising firms and firms supplying services

Mr. Louis Walsh

It is difficult to see the analogous position between a director of the E.S.B. in 1927 who would have an interest in an electrical undertaking and a member of the Authority, for the reason that in that year, there was a tremendous number of electrical undertakings all over the country and it was the policy of the E.S.B. to acquire these undertakings at the best possible price at which they could get them. Accordingly, these were rival industries, one competing against the other and, therefore, there is no analogous position in regard to the present position.

Senator O'Quigley referred to the fact that people with vested interests might give reasons why a certain programme should be put on but the section, as drafted, prevents that person having any discussion whatsoever because he has to disclose the fact that he has an interest. For that reason, he is not permitted to take part in any discussion. I think the section, as drafted, could be improved. I should like to suggest to the Minister that, apart from the member not being allowed to take part in discussion, he should actually withdraw during the discussion of any matter in which he has any interest. That might make it more effective because if a member of the Authority did not take part in the discussion, it might not be sufficient. Somebody referred to the fact that he might prejudice the discussion to some extent.

Senator Ryan referred to the fact that if the person does not disclose his interest, the Minister can take appropriate action. I should like to see it embodied in the Bill that the Minister would be prepared to dismiss him or do something of a positive nature. Senator Ryan very properly pointed out that practically any useful member of the Authority would have some interest in a company, in the promotion of a programme or some such thing and that that individual would be a very desirable member of the Authority.

Senator Hayes referred to the fact that considerable experience should be possessed by a member of the Authority. I could name a number of people who would be, in my opinion, very desirable members of the Authority. They would have experience; they would have knowledge; and they would be competent, as Senator Murphy mentioned, and they would be extremely useful in an advisory capacity. It would be very wrong, I think, that the Authority should be deprived of their knowledge and experience.

The amendment, as drafted, in my opinion, would mean that any person who has shares in any company which is advertising on television would thereby be excluded from membership of the Authority. In other words, the amendment, as drafted, is much too restrictive. We must also remember that there are to be nine members on the Authority and even if one individual had an interest, there will still be eight others. You could never visualise one person dominating all the others. These people would be men with minds of their own and they would, therefore, be able to assert themselves.

Apart from that, however, the Director-General will have the day-to-day administration. It will be a matter largely for him to decide as to the programmes to be put on by the Authority. The Authority is simply a policy-making Authority which will meet occasionally. The members being only part-time members, they will not have that power which some people suggest they would have. The Authority would have to delegate most of the day-to-day work to the Director-General. It is right that he should not have any financial interest. For these reasons, I think the amendment, as drafted by Senator O'Quigley, should not be accepted.

Mr. Cole

It seems to me that if this amendment were accepted, it would throw an extraordinary onus on the Minister. The operative words are: "Before appointing a person to be a member of the Authority the Government shall satisfy themselves that that person will have no such financial or other interest... as is likely to affect prejudicially the discharge by him of his functions." It does not at all exclude apparently anybody with an interest but only if the Government decide, according to the amendment, that it will affect "the discharge by him of his functions as member of the Authority." I think it throws an extraordinary onus on the Minister if he has to decide at what stage a man's financial interests will have an effect. If he himself had shares, does that put him out? If his wife has shares, does that put him out? If his brother has shares, does that put him out? It does not prevent any man from being a member of the Authority. I think that is one of the defects in the proposed amendment.

As Senator Ryan and others said, it will exclude an extraordinary number of men who probably would be the best men we could get here to advise on at least the business side of this whole proposition of television. We could hardly afford to lose their experience. I imagine that the number of men outside who would be conversant with the business side of it and who themselves had no financial interest in it would be very small indeed. I could conceive of a man who perhaps took an interest in television from the very beginning, who saw that it was something that was going to be great, not alone in power but also as a business proposition. Perhaps he invested a few pounds in it because he believed it was the coming thing. Here is a man who would probably be an ideal man to have on such an Authority, but according to Senator Quigley he must go.

We had a very good example of roughly the same thing in the inquiry that was held in the last 12 months in England where it transpired that the directors of the Bank of England were men who had interests in, and were directors of, huge international finance companies. Their companies, it was discovered, profited by the steps taken by the Bank of England. They were directors of their companies and also directors of the Bank of England. They would not have been directors of the Bank of England unless they were in close touch with day-to-day international business and finance. To a great extent that is what we are doing here if we completely exclude all men connected in any way with financial matters in television, broadcasting and even advertising. The section as it is drafted is much more suitable, but I am not quite sure on that one point: that the disclosure should be made to the Minister and not to the Authority. It would be much more suitable to make it to the Minister. The Minister could then ask the man not to take action when that contract was being discussed.

Professor Quinlan

It seems to me that there is agreement between the two sides that something more is necessary than is in the section, that there could be a certain amount of abuse. It would seem that the original two sections, as quoted from the Electricity Supply Board Act, seemed to meet the case better than Section 8 and the amendment proposed by Senator O'Quigley. Section 8 appears very defective in that, as mentioned by Senator Louis Walsh, there is not the obligation on the member to withdraw from the meeting. Senators all know that the fact of having a silent member present at a meeting, when he knows what is said and what goes on at the meeting, is in itself a grave embarrassment especially when dealing with something that concerns his firm and so on. Secondly, I note in this Section 8 there is no penalty provided for failure to disclose, which seems to be a grave weakness, as in the Electricity Supply Board Act the penalty provided was automatic disqualification. I think that should be provided here too.

I always wonder at the scarcity there is of good men, when there is such concern that we might miss a good man as if we have not 12 jobs to do for every good man we have got. It is to the credit of those who drafted the E.S.B. regulations that, as quoted by Senator Walsh, they actually excluded from membership those who at that time might be regarded as having intimate knowledge of electricity and its working—those who were responsible and in charge of the local electricity companies throughout the country. That was a very wise decision, and if you have to exclude those who are connected with television or radio services at present, you are doing only what was done in 1927 and, I think, done wisely.

One other point. It does seem again that unless some deterrent is provided there will be this development of appointing members of the Television Authority as sleeping partners or directors on various agencies that hope to profit by the development of television here. I wonder whether the Minister would use the section in the Act which says he has power to remove? I wonder would he immediately remove a member who accepted a directorship on some firm of radio or television manufacturers or who would be likely to give scandal by being connected with a firm that might ultimately profit?

The example given by Senator Cole sets no standard for us. In fact, I could imagine it in many countries being the subject of a public outcry that financial institutions with which these directors were concerned actually made a profit that could be traced back to the decisions of the bank itself. If that is not approaching graft, I do not know what graft really is.

Mr. Cole

On a point of fact, I think the inquiry in that case decided that they did not disclose anything at all—that it was purely business acumen on the part of the companies.

Professor Quinlan

And purely accidental?

Professor Stanford

I should like to support what Senator Cole has said. It would be a great pity if we drafted this section in such a way as to exclude genuine experts. It is true that, as Senator Quinlan said, we are on the whole short of experts in matters of this kind in this country. It seems to me if the section were as stringently drafted as Senator O'Quigley suggests, we might simply be excluding very valuable men. It would be like excluding medical men, because they have some financial interest, from a committee dealing with medical matters; or University men from some committee dealing with University matters. It is very hard to draw the line in this case.

I agree with Senator Quinlan that this section is perhaps not quite stringently enough drafted, and I think the Minister might reconsider it before Report Stage. I agree with Senator Quinlan that there ought to be some provision that a person with financial interests should be bound to withdraw and that possibly there should be a penalty imposed if he did not withdraw in such circumstances. I suggest to the Minister it might be worth while looking into the wording of this clause before the Report Stage. I think also that Senator O'Quigley's amendment is rather too far-reaching, and if we adopted it we would probably lose some very valuable men.

Mr. Hilliard

The Government will in the ordinary way consider before appointing anybody to the Authority whether such person is suitable. This consideration will include the question of whether he has an interest which would conflict with the general performance of his duty as a member. I take the same view, as was expressed here by several Senators, that the amendment proposed by Senator O'Quigley restricts the choice of the Government too much.

It is the same in the Transport Act, 1950; it is the same in the Turf Development Act, 1946; it is the same in the Sea Fisheries Act, 1942; it is the same in the Gaeltacht Industries Act, 1957, and in the Export Promotion Act, 1959. Under all those Acts, there are people contracting with the authorities set up and probably the contracts are more valuable and more continuous in their nature than will be contracts under this Bill. It is a fact that the public service rendered by these authorities is of a very high standard. I know of no case in which it has come to light that any member of a board has interested himself in securing contracts for firms in which he may have an interest. If we accept this amendment, there will have to be an inquisition into the private affairs of every individual considered for appointment to this Authority. We should have to exclude people who perhaps have shares in a Company, as has been pointed out by some of the speakers.

May I say, in conclusion, that the best case for leaving it as it is, has been made by Senator Ryan? Let us have as few restrictions as possible. Let us rely on the honour of the men who are to be members of this Authority. The voice of Parliament and of the people is a powerful weapon. If it should ever happen—I hope and trust it never will—that sharp practice such as appears to be in the minds of people who, I think, are over-suspicious, should occur, Parliament would still be there. In the long run, that is the best way of righting such matters.

Dr. Sheehy Skeffington

I found myself in substantial agreement with Senator O'Reilly—which does not always happen to me. I think he is quite right in what he says on several points. In the first place, I think in regard to many of the provisions of this Bill, we must demonstrate our trust in the Authority. We must not draw up a Bill so framed that it makes it appear that we have an Authority of scoundrels. We must place trust in them in relation to this clause and others about which I shall speak later. As Senator O'Reilly said, we must have faith in the people appointed. Furthermore, I think the section as drafted is very carefully drafted. It sets out three provisions about people who might have some interest in contracts. The first is that they shall disclose this interest to the Authority; the second is that they shall take no part in deliberations or decisions of the Authority in regard to such contracts; and the third is that the disclosure shall be recorded in the minutes of the Authority.

If somebody had such an interest and failed to disclose it, there would be grounds for a major scandal and it is quite obvious that he will, by very force of circumstances, in every case disclose it. Secondly, he has no power to affect a contract because he is not allowed to take part in the deliberations. Then there is the fact that these minutes must be recorded. These provisions, I think, provided we have any trust at all in the people we appoint, give full guarantee that the kind of trickery anticipated by some of the supporters of this amendment will not take place.

On the amendment itself, if the Parliamentary draftsman were to commit a section like this to paper and to send it up to the Seanad, I should imagine Senator O'Quigley being one of the first to be bitingly sarcastic about a section which contains one sentence but 186 words. It is clear, of course, that from a lawyer's point of view that makes it an extremely interesting section. Consider the fun you could have construing it legally and reading words 53 to 74 in the light of what comes between words 122 and 127 and wondering whether the first 16 words are all to be taken together or whether we are to understand that what is contained in the bracket in the middle also applies to what is outside of it and to the second portion, in which the Minister is to look into these things. In other words, for lawyers who want to have fun in court and to enjoy being paid for construing complicated Acts, this is an excellent amendment. It is not only unnecessary but so cumbrous, as Senator O'Reilly pointed out—a much better amendment would be briefer—and tries to cover so many things in a single sentence, that it is bad by reason of that alone. I do not think it is necessary. I do not think it is a well-drafted amendment and we should not contemplate it further.

Mr. Murphy

Being a Corkman, I am naturally suspicious of human nature in other human beings and even though I am a bit uneasy about Senator O'Quigley's amendment—like Senator Sheehy Skeffington, I think it has much too many words in one sentence— nevertheless, I am far from happy about the section as it stands and I was anxious to hear the Minister because I hoped that he would say to us that he would reconsider the position between now and Report Stage. I am beginning to fear, however, that this Bill is being discussed on a political basis rather than on the merits of the various sections, which I think is regrettable.

Mr. Lenihan

I have the British Television Act here before me and it refers to the Paymaster-General.

Mr. O'Quigley

Postmaster-General.

Mr. Lenihan

Senator O'Quigley changed it to Postmaster-General. I submit that this section, taken in conjunction with Section 6, gives the Government blanket powers to remove at any time a member of the Authority from office. Taking Sections 6 and 8 together, you have all the authority in the world that any Government want in regard to this matter.

Another point made was that Section 8 should be tightened up, particularly in relation to the provision that such a person having such an interest in a contract or in any such matters shall take no part in any deliberation or decision of the Authority. I interpret that to mean that he should not be in the room at all, then. In my view, if a director of this Authority stayed at a meeting, did not take any part in the deliberations but was present in the room at the meeting and was minuted in the minutes as being present, that, in itself, would be evidence that he took part in the deliberations and the decisions of the Authority at that meeting. I have no doubt in the world——

Mr. L'Estrange

What would happen to him then?

Mr. Lenihan

——that that makes nonsense of the point that there should be any requirement on him to get out of the room. You cannot have that legislation.

Sections 6 and 8 are cleanly drafted and easily understood. They give the Government all the authority they want in this case.

Professor Quinlan

We seem to be approaching this in rather a wrong spirit. There seems to be far more anxiety to score lawyers' points from one side of the House to the other than to face the issue squarely, which is: Can gain be made by a private company from passing on knowledge from inside?

As has been stated here repeatedly, it is not sufficient to do justice: you must show that justice has been done. Would the Minister answer two questions now and it might clarify the discussion considerably? The first question is: What is the penalty for failure by a member of the Authority to disclose his interest? The second question is: If a member of the Authority is, subsequent to his appointment to the Authority, appointed, say, a director of a professional entertainment group, a group that stands to gain quite a lot from contracts with the Television Authority, what action will the Minister take when such an appointment is brought to his notice or does he consider that it would be wrong for any member of the Authority to accept the appointment?

Mr. Hilliard

Professor Quinlan

In general, I take it the view of the Government and the Minister would be that it would not be desirable that members of the Authority should become directors of such companies after appointment. If it is a general view, it would seem as well to cover it by legislation and make it hold for all such appointments.

Mr. Hilliard

The fact is, of course, that you would have to consider each case on its merits. There is no doubt about that. It would depend upon the volume of business the company would contract to do with the Authority. It boils down to the question of determining the interest the individual would have in the contract, the value of the contract and the value of what he could get out of the contract. If you were to go down to a very small business or a person contracting for a small programme and a member of the Authority had some small interest in it, you would be limiting yourself to programme content in a matter of that kind.

Each case would have to be decided on its merits but if a member of the Authority failed to disclose to the Authority that he had an interest in the contract, a company or a concern with which the Authority was proposing to make a contract, one would expect that such person would immediately make that known to the other members of the Authority when he had read the Act. It would be regarded as a flagrant breach of trust for a person not to make that disclosure, in my view.

Professor Quinlan

In setting up what is to be an independent Authority, we are giving great powers to it and asking it to do a lot on its own. Would it not seem desirable to limit Government interference in that Company? Would it not be well automatically to disqualify a member of the Authority immediately he accepted a directorship in any one of a stated number of types of enterprise?

Mr. Ryan

The amendment to this section gives much more power and discretion to the Government. It talks about the Government satisfying themselves that no person shall have such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially the discharge by him of his functions. The amendment gives far more discretion to the Government than the original section.

Professor Quinlan

I am not talking for the amendment. I am really supporting the plea to the Minister that he should agree to have another look at the section and bring it back again on Report Stage. Perhaps, he may bring back the section as it is. As laymen, I think we have benefited to a great extent from the battle between the lawyers. In making up our own minds, we have grave misgivings about the section and we have raised what we consider to be some rather important points. While I, for one, would not be in complete agreement with Senator O'Quigley's amendment, if it were redrafted or if I saw it put into English, as it were, I should feel much easier if the Minister would agree to leave the section stand over until Report Stage. Then he may come back with the section as it is or he may come back with a modification of it.

Mr. Hilliard

Mr. O'Quigley

I ask leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Section 8 agreed to.

The members would presumably attend, because they are paid, but there may be formal occasions when you want a meeting when a bare quorum would be sufficient. I think, as a minimum, three is sound enough.

Since he acts for the Board, I think it is proper that I should raise this question. I really would like to address it, through the Chair, to Senator Barry, since he envisages a position in which the Director will be a person armed with such powers and with such capacity as to make the Board merely a rubber stamp for the activities of the Authority. In fact, the Director would be the only person who matters. What I should like to see are harmony and understanding and—I know it is difficult—that the limits of the powers and functions would be pretty well defined so that the Board and the Chairman would be able to render useful service and that the Director would implement the policy of the Authority.

I should be alarmed, however, if the situation arose, as envisaged by Senator Barry, that the Director would be Director of the Board, that he would be the only stable influence in the whole menagerie. I hope I am not wronging the Senator in putting it that way, but that is the conclusion I would come to. I hope and trust that will not happen. I should like to hear from the Minister what he thinks the functions of the Director and the Board will be and if the Director will be the all-powerful influence.

Mr. McGuire

This is my first intervention at this stage. When introducing the Bill the Minister said he wished to give as much freedom and autonomy as possible to the Authority. The fault I had to find with the Bill was that there was far too much Minister and far too little Authority through the Bill and, from this point onward, that is very apparent. I am glad now to find the Authority rather than the Minister appointing the Director-General. That is a good thing. If the Authority is to work with a certain amount of freedom the man at the top should have the confidence of the people with whom he works. That is the usual pattern in all forms of life from business to sport. I am glad it is the Authority who will appoint the Director-General.

On the matter of his qualifications, it is wrong to ask the Minister now too much about the kind of man we shall have. I agree with Senator Barry in this matter. I make no apology for our copying Britain where they do the right thing. When they do the right thing we can copy them without any danger of our faces becoming red subsequently. I do not think a single expert has been put in charge of I.T.V. or the BBC. I.T.V. is under control of Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick who was prior to his appointment Secretary of the Foreign Office. Those are his qualifications. We have already heard the qualifications in the case of the BBC. I think it is very well run and we cannot go far wrong if we copy the right things they do. I shall have more to say on the other sections. I should like to see what is set out in this section set out in other sections as well, namely, that the Authority will be brought as much as possible into the Bill.

Mr. Hilliard

If I were asked to stipulate the qualifications I would simply say that the Authority should get the best possible person with all the qualifications essential in a Director-General. The Director-General will be appointed by the Authority, as the section lays down, with the qualifications in the succeeding section. He will be the chief executive officer and responsible for staff and for the administration of the activities of the Authority. He will be responsible for the introduction of the policy of the Authority, as Senator O'Quigley has pointed out. Those are his main functions. He will be the executive officer the same as the executive officer in any other body or institution in the country.

Professor Quinlan

Arising out of what Senator McGuire has said and some other speakers have implied, it seems that being an expert would be a disqualification. I want to emphasise that that approach is completely wrong. The expert is the ideal appointment. The man who knows a little about a great many things and nothing about something is a menace. We have too many of such men in our public positions. We would do better if we gave the experts more of a say in all our affairs. It would be a step forward if we put our experts into business and other walks of life while they are still young enough to broaden out.

Mr. McGuire

I quite agree with Senator Quinlan. I did not mean to give the impression that I excluded experts. The danger the Minister seems to imply, perhaps unwittingly, is that the expert is the person who is in his mind. If we confine ourselves to experts on television in this country we know immediately the people who spring to mind. With a wider field there is a much greater scope in choice. I would not exclude the expert if he had the other broad qualifications.

Tomás Ó Maoláin

I should like to draw the attention of the Seanad to the fact that we are appointing this Authority and the Director-General for the purpose of providing a national television and sound broadcasting service. Running through the debate I sense an emphasis on television. There does not seem to be very much concern with the fact that the Authority and the Director-General will be responsible for the continuation of the sound broadcasting service. An amount of concern was expressed when the provisions of this Bill were first announced because of the suggested amalgamation of the two under the one Authority.

I hope the trend of the discussion here, in which the emphasis has been on television, is not symptomatic of what the Seanad hopes the Authority will do in relation to its dual function of inaugurating and operating a television service and, at the same time, maintaining and operating a sound broadcasting service. The Director-General, irrespective of any qualifications he may have, will have that very serious and heavy responsibility of being the operation agent for the Authority in connection with this wonderful new medium and at the same time, of continuing that which has been established and is operating successfully, and of improving it and continuing it to the satisfaction of the public.

Mr. Burke

This is one of the most important sections in this Bill because, as we know, the power of the Executive is very much greater to-day than it ever was, and no matter how detailed the policy laid down by the board may be, no matter how competent the board, a great deal will depend on the person who will be Director-General of sound and television broadcasting. While it may not be desirable to make the Minister responsible for the appointment, he will be indirectly responsible because he will have the appointment of the Authority that will appoint the Director-General. I believe a man of the widest possible culture and knowledge ought to be appointed to this post, a person of whom everybody in this island will feel proud. As I said on the Second Reading, a great deal of prestige is involved in a television service and unless we get the best man and the man recognised to be such, we shall be letting down this new service on which we are about to embark.

The Authority will be aware of that point but it is no harm to express it in this House as the measure has been introduced here and first discussed here. I should hate to think that a person would be appointed because he had some technical knowledge of the operation of a television service. There will be plenty of technicians employed who will deal with technical matters. The whole tone and stamp of the service to a great extent, and the interpretation of the policy of the board will be entrusted to the Director-General and, please God, we shall get a man of whom we can all be proud.

Mr. Donegan

The success of Irish television depends on the filling of this post, which we will all agree is the most important post. We want the best Director-General available because we all want Irish television to be the very best possible and to be above all suspicion. We admit that the supply of eligible people is very small but we sincerely hope that the board will succeed in getting a first-rate man. I sincerely hope that when a good Director-General is appointed, he will have the same freedom of action as the manager or director-general of other State bodies such as Bord na Móna, the Irish Sugar Company, or the E.S.B. I should like to ask the Minister if that will be the case because I believe that if so, Irish television can be a success.

Mr. Hilliard

I am sure everybody appreciates that it is difficult to know in advance the worth of a person as Director-General until that person has been appointed and until one has some experience of his conduct of the business. It is very hard to evaluate his worth until then. I am sure that the Authority which will be primarily responsible for his selection will bear mind all the considerations dvanced here by Senators. I hope they will be fortunate enough to get the best possible person as the first Director-General, because I realise, as, I am sure, members of the Authority and Senators realise, that it is an all-important and key appointment. On the worth and work of the Director-General will depend to a large extent the successful operation of this service.

Mr. Barry

Are we to understand that the Authority will make the appointment without consulting the Minister?

Mr. Hilliard

No; it is with the consent of the Minister, but I shall bear in mind all the considerations advanced here when giving that consent. So far as I personally can, I shall give full and due consideration to the views and advice put forward here.

Question put and agreed to.

SECTION 12

Professor Quinlan

I move amendment No. 9:

In subsection (2) to delete paragraph (iii), lines 16 to 18, inclusive.

A certain number of offices are excluded from being filled by public competition and my amendment seeks to remove No. (iii) from the list. Subsection 2, paragraph (iii) reads:

an office for which, in the opinion of the Authority, specialised qualifications not commonly held are required,

That almost matches the drafting difficulty we encountered before. First of all, specialised qualifications are required. What is meant by "specialised qualifications"? Secondly "not commonly held"? Who is to decide they are not commonly held? This Authority we are discussing is a broad Authority and there is de-emphasis on specialisation in the constitution of the Authority. Yet the Authority has to make the decision as to what are "specialised qualifications" and what qualifications are "not commonly held".

I think it is a mistake not to let these posts go with the other posts by public competition, because if the qualifications are not commonly held, it is quite possible—more than possible —that the number of people holding such qualifications may be one or two, perhaps, at home—if we have that number—or several Irishmen who have emigrated to England, America or elsewhere and who actually have great experience in that line of work. Far from closing down when you think of qualifications that are rare, you need to advertise far more widely, because I take it the specialised qualifications, or many of them, may relate to graduates and perhaps to those who have gone to Britain, America or to Europe and have gone into academic, industrial or research work and have been there for a number of years. These people are as much entitled to be considered for these posts as the local specialist who remained at home and did not attain the heights these men have attained, or did not set out to broaden and equip himself as they have done.

I feel very strongly on this as senior representative of the National University and I do not think Senator Barniville or anybody else can query my view on this, that these are posts that should be far more widely advertised. Consequently, speaking on behalf of the National University of Ireland, which I have the honour to represent here, I appeal to the Minister to throw these posts wide open. Let us have the best men and take account of our graduates who have had the courage to go away and to train themselves.

Mr. Hilliard

If I enumerate the classes of people who will be excepted, Senators may be able to get a better understanding of subsection (2) (iii). The people I have in mind would be actors, musicians, news reporters, announcers, highly qualified or experienced television specialists, such as producers, directors, script-writers or senior specialist staff who would be recruited. They are the classes of persons we have in mind in subsection (2) (iii).

Let me say straight away that I am in favour of public competition as a general method of recruitment to public bodies and to this body for the persons that we have named here. However, I feel there are special reasons why these exceptions I have mentioned, or anything like them, should be provided for in a different way. Experience in Radio Éireann has shown that in the specialist fields it is often necessary for the radio authority to act quickly and to take people individually in a scarce field when they are available.

But I strongly object, and did object to the Director of Broadcasting, to the broadcasting on our national radio station of "Ireland" in the guise of "Árland". That is the kind of standard we have. I do not know what form of selection enabled that kind of announcer to get on Radio Éireann. For the purpose of the record, the word may be spelled as "Árland". "Ár" is the Irish for "slaughter". It seems to me to be most desirable to have public competition and that the Minister has advanced no reason whatever why there should not be public competition.

I want to put this point to the Minister. Actors, musicians and announcers are every year the subject of marking in public competition. The Minister must be aware of such institutions as the Feis Ceoil and the Father Mathew Feis. There you have actor So-and-So awarded 90 marks. So-and-So is awarded other marks. In relation to announcers, there are elocution competitions. So-and-So can be awarded particular marks. In relation to musicians there are competitions for violinists, pianists, and all the rest of them. Examinations are conducted by the Royal Irish Academy of Music. In this Bill we are saying that it is not possible to measure the competency of actors, musicians and announcers by public competition. I think the Minister must have misconceived the section.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again.

The Seanad adjourned at 10 p.m. until 11 a.m. on Thursday, 4th February, 1960.

Seanad Éireann díospóireacht - Wednesday, 3 Feb 1960

Public Business. - Broadcasting Authority Bill, 1959—Committee Stage.

Seanad Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 3 Feb 1960