Seanad Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 9 Mar 1966

Vol. 60 No. 18

Private Business. - Houses of the Oireachtas (Laying of Documents) Bill, 1965—Report and Final Stages.

Mr. Sheldon

I move amendment No. 1:-

In page 3, between lines 45 and 46, to insert a new section as follows:-

"For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that the power conferred by section 35 of the Registry of Deeds (Ireland) Act, 1832 to establish, reduce, alter or vary fees shall be exercised, and shall be deemed always to have been exercisable, only by order."

On Committee Stage I argued this amendment in considerable detail, and the Minister for Finance who was then present said he was not completely briefed on the points raised and asked for time to have the matter considered. Fortunately, I re-entered this amendment for this Stage because apparently whatever consideration was given was not of the type that would be satisfactory to me. That is one of the advantages of having some Parliamentary experience, and not being too easily led to the belief that Ministers are about to be suddenly reasonable.

I said on Committee Stage that the section which the amendment deals with was not the function of the Minister for Finance but was more properly the function of the Minister for Justice. I am glad to see the Minister for Justice here to-day, and I suppose he will be better briefed than the Minister for Finance said he was. I had a certain amount of difficulty since. I do not wish to weary the House by going in detail through what I have already said. There is the added difficulty that the printed report of Committee Stage is still not available. If it were, I might have been able to refer to things which were said on Committee Stage. I propose to run through the salient points and elaborate in respect of one or two additional arguments which have occurred to me since.

Section 4 presumes that the fees prescribed under section 35 of the Registry of Deeds (Ireland) Act, 1832, were made by order. I believe that if there is any doubt as to whether these fees were, in fact, to be promulgated by order, section 4 ceases to have any meaning at all. I do not feel it is necessary for me to prove beyond yea or nay that the 1832 Act did not, in fact, envisage these fees being prescribed by order.

Since Committee Stage I have gone through this again, and I am as convinced as ever that there is reasonable doubt. Under the 1832 Act these powers were vested in the Treasury, whose natural successor would be the Minister for Finance, and under an adaptation order of 1956 these powers were given to the Minister for Justice. I am sorry the Minister for Finance is not here, because I was hoping to drive a wedge between the two Ministers on this point, by suggesting that the Minister for Finance should take a very hard look at what powers the Minister for Justice has, because they do not relate only to prescribing fees. They relate to the entire regulation of this office and without any reference to Finance at all.

Nowadays when questions of fees or any type of charge such as that arises, whatever Department is immediately concerned, there is usually a proviso either that the thing shall be done with the sanction of the Minister for Finance, or after consultation with the Minister for Finance. The Minister for Justice finds himself in the odd position that he has the last word under the adaptation order. However, that is more or less by the way, and whatever trouble I might have made for the Minister for Finance, I suppose I am not likely to make any trouble for the Minister for Justice by saying he has too much power.

As I see it, the trouble is that the 1832 Act does not specifically indicate how the Treasury shall establish, alter or vary fees. I suggested, and I still suggest, that with the background of the 1832 Act in mind, it is doubtful whether anyone at that time had the intention that these alterations and variations should be brought to the notice of Parliament my way of order. Even in the title of the Act there is a fair indication that this was not so. The proper title is: "An Act to Regulate the Office for Registering Deeds, Conveyances and Wills in Ireland". That was its function. The force of the word is "to regulate" in this context. Up to then the Registrar collected the fees and paid himself out of the fees. Under the new way of looking at things at that time there was a continual process of bringing all these offices under a regular system by which the officers were paid salaries, and fees and emoluments coming to the office did not go to them. It went one way or another to the Treasury.

In this case it is fairly clear that the whole thing was very involved. Under the 1832 Act the fees went to pay the salaries and expenses of the office and if there was any surplus it was to go into the consolidation fund but on its way there it was earmarked for the expenses of the office. In fact, its main task was that it should be used to make the office more convenient for the public. It is not very clear what was supposed to happen if the fees did not meet the salaries but since the Treasury had power to sack anybody in the office or to reduce the salary of anybody, it is obvious they had also the power to adjust the salaries so that the fees would meet them. I presume that under the old set up it was not considered likely that the fees would not meet them. Whether in every year since 1832 there was a surplus over and above the salaries and expenses I do not know, but if there was and all this was properly directed, as the Act states, towards making the office convenient, by this time it ought to be about the most convenient office one could think about because it had more than 130 years to become so.

There is a reference in Halsbury in relation to a question not the same but it has to do with statutory rules and their publication and here a clear distinction is drawn between orders which are legislative and orders which are executive. Legislative orders are those proper to be laid before Parliament but executive orders did not have to be dealt with in that way. My argument is that in 1832 there does not seem to have been very much doubt that the fees in relation to the salaries and expenses were looked on as an executive matter for the Treasury, the whole thing being under their control.

I should like to be able to produce evidence one way or the other on this matter but I am not able to say that between 1832 and 1875 the fees were ever altered or varied. I do not know whether between 1875 and 1956 they were altered or varied. There were two Treasury orders about 50 years ago but I cannot find them in the Library so I do not know what they purported to do, but I have at the back of my mind a recollection that in 1956, when a new schedule of fees was brought in, somewhere there was reference to the necessity for this change because the existing fees were of such long standing.

The Transfer of Land (Ireland) Act, 1848, is of no assistance in clearing the matter up, as I pointed out on Committee Stage. The fees prescribed in the schedule to that Act are described in the Act as capable of being varied and altered by order under the hands of the Treasury, but, unfortunately, the Act does not say anything about orders, regulations, rules or anything else being laid before Parliament. There is nothing in it and the intention in 1848 was that the fees should be prescribed by order. It is not without significance that no suggestion occurs in the 1848 Act that Treasury orders should be laid before parliament. In the 1875 Act, there is a presumption that fees under the 1832 Act will be made by order but this reference is in the preamble and not in the section of the Act. This, I admit, poses a certain amount of difficulty because what exactly is the force of the preamble is not always very clear. There is one sidelight on it—I am not very sure of the date—in Halsbury's citing of Coke on Littleton:

By the authority of our author, the rehearsal or preamble of a statute is to be taken for truth: for it cannot be thought that a statute which is made by authority of the whole realm, as well of the King as of the lords spiritual and temporal and of all the commons, will recite a thing against the truth.

I hope the Minister has not relied on this rather ancient quotation because every indication I can get is to the effect that if there is in a section of an Act something which is ambiguous the preamble can be cited to clarify its ambiguity and the courts shall have reference to it, but I cannot find anything to suggest you can use the preamble of an Act to clarify a section of an Act 40 years earlier. It is probably fortunate that it is in the 1875 Act that it is the preamble which is in question. Before 1851 you had the odd effect that there is no section 1 in any Act. You get the preamble and the first section is marked II. From 1851 on, this is changed and there is a preamble followed by section 1 and so on. Therefore, I would be very doubtful about the pramble of an Act before 1851 because of the curious way parts of the Act were marked out. The preamble to the 1875 Act does no more than state the reasons for the enactment and I think that is all one can hope a preamble will do. It is not so different from a speech made by a Minister introducing a Bill, stating why it was desirable the legislation should go through. If a mistake occurred in 1875, the parliamentary draftsmen of that time somewhat rashly assumed that the fees in the 1832 Act must be done by order. It is quite understandable because in between the two dates there were the 1860s in which the whole system of parliamentary control was very much revised particularly in financial matters. It is not too difficult to envisage that a parliamentary draftsman in 1875 would have got into difficulties because of the control of moneys which came in with the appearance of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee in the 1860s. He could very easily walk into such a trap.

I am only saying this to show that there is a doubt in this matter and I suggest that even if it is only a very slight doubt it is very easy to put it right. What I am suggesting should be added into the Bill will not do any harm even if it may not do a tremendous amount of good. There is nothing in it to injure anyone except possibly the parliamentary draftsman who may think, by allowing this to be accepted, that it is a criticism of himself for not having seen the point. I suggest that is silly. No such question arises at all. If there is a doubt, we ought to clear it and it is very simple to clear it.

The Minister for Finance was slightly confused in the reading of the amendment. He thought I was talking about the past, whereas it refers to any power which shall be exercised and shall be deemed always to have been exercisable so it deals with the present and the future as well as the past. The reason for dealing with the past was that the order of 1956 was presented on the presumption that this business could be done by a statutory instrument and that that was the proper way to deal with it. If there is a doubt, then I think that particular instrument needs to be bolstered up by making it clear that it is now assumed to have been a proper statutory instrument for laying before the Houses.

The Minister, of course, may have more information. It is very natural he should and I must admit I would be very impressed if he could show that between 1832 and 1875 these orders were altered, varied and established and that this was done by order laid before the Houses of Parliament. I have not been able to discover it. I would not be as impressed by anything done after 1875 because such an order would be relying on what I think is a defective Act in the sense that it assumes something which is not proper to assume so I trust the Minister will not rely on some possible way of reading the 1875 preamble into the 1832 Act.

It is important that this matter should be cleared beyond doubt and it is only for the avoidance of doubt I am suggesting this amendment. I do not see whatever good it may or may not do but I suggest it cannot do any harm. It would be safer to include it in and make absolutely sure that any orders made in regard to fees have been properly made and will in future only be made by order.

Minister for Justice (Mr. B. Lenihan)

First of all, on the point just made by Senator Sheldon, as a matter of practice, Treasury Orders, as they were then known, made under the Registry of Deeds (Ireland) Act, 1832, were laid on the Table of the House. It is a matter of practice, although it does not go the whole way to meet the Senator's point, and irrespective of what view he or I might take on the interpretation of the statutes concerned so the nub of the issue between Senator Sheldon and myself comes down to a matter of interpretation. In order to remove any doubt Senator Sheldon suggests in the amendment:

that the power conferred by section 35 of the Registry of Deeds (Ireland) Act, 1832 to establish, reduce, alter or vary fees shall be exercised and shall be deemed always to have been exercisable only by order.

In fact, it has always been done by way of order laid on the Table of the House. I suggest that the preamble to the 1875 Act, as a statutory declaration—this is the advice I have received, and is the advice with which I would concur—does, in fact, refer to fees orders, which were known as Treasury Orders then, and are now Registry of Deeds (Fees) Orders. In relation to the preamble there is nothing between the Senator and me. Reference is made to regulations, orders and declarations and such fees and moneys received. In other words, fees are referred to in the preamble and further on there is provision that such fees orders shall be laid before Parliament. Looking at it in this way the only issue between us concerns the effect of that preamble. The practice that has always obtained with regard to Treasury Orders, and has since obtained in regard to Registry of Deeds Orders, bears out the practical interpretation of the preamble to the 1875 Act. In other words, the Act, in effect, cleared up any ambiguity in the 1832 Act by making it plain that Treasury Orders, as they were then known, had to be laid on the Table of the House.

Section 4, of course, is concerned only with the very limited matter of the date on which the order is to come into operation. It merely carries on a practice written into this preamble, which is a statutory declaration and which in turn interprets the 1832 Act and clears up any ambiguity which may have been in that Act. I will not argue as to the ambiguity or otherwise of laying these Fees Orders before Parliament. Senator Sheldon made the point that this was a preamble to a separate piece of legislation from the 1832 Act. I do not think he can take the two Acts in isolation because the 1875 Act, introduced precisely to amend the 1832 Act, is a continuing piece of legislation dealing with the laying of those orders on the Table of the House. The preamble in that Act relates back to the 1832 Act, which it amends, so it is a continuing legislative process. The advice I have on the interpretation issue is borne out by the practice pursued over the years in regard to the British Parliament and our own Parliament whereby those fees orders were, in fact, laid before the House, and rightly so, having regard to the statutory nature of the preamble to the 1875 Act.

The nub of the issue between Senator Sheldon and myself appears to be this question of the preamble to the 1875 Act, whether that can be regarded as a statute or not, and, in particular, whether it can be regarded as a statute following the earlier Act, that is, the 1832 Act. In my view it does and in the Senator's view it does not. He seems to confine that preamble to the actual piece of legislation itself. That is not my view. In my view anything incorporated in a statute must be taken as amending or extending an earlier Act. This is a view of interpretation that has been taken by the courts over the years particularly when a later Act is related to an earlier Act. I would say that on this issue of interpretation my view would be upheld. I am not arguing that a very good case has not been made by Senator Sheldon.

I do not see the need for his amendment for this reason—we are concerned here in section 4 with a very limited matter, merely a matter of time and date in regard to the order. The Senator's point is an arguable one and can be examined in conjunction with the preparation of legislation in the Department of Justice to amend and consolidate all the old statutes governing registration of deeds. Despite what Senator Sheldon said about the Minister's promises being shortlived and designed to ensure an easy passage, I will see that his point is borne in mind in the contemplated legislation. But we are solely concerned in this section with the date of coming into force of fees orders and it would not be proper to concern ourselves here with defects or anomalies in the old statutes, particularly as in my view the point raised is adequately covered by the preamble which amends the earlier statute. To remove any ambiguity whatever, I will certainly bring the Senator's point to the notice of people drafting the contemplated new legislation.

Professor Dooge

Before Senator Sheldon concludes I should like to intervene. I am rather disappointed that the Minister has not dealt with this particular amendment more clearly. The Minister has ended up by saying that there is sufficient ambiguity left in the particular case to warrant investigation of the matter by his Department. He said earlier that this was an arguable case and I think there is no doubt that, as a result of the perambulations through preambles which have been made by both Senator Sheldon and by the Minister, there is still doubt; there is still a basis for argument; there is still ambiguity in regard to this matter. It is a pity that, in cases like this, the inevitable reaction of Ministers seems to be—"Oh, better not do anything, we will have the whole matter examined". It would be far better legislative practice, when there is even a glimmer of ambiguity, when there is even the slightest doubt, that the matter should be put beyond doubt and beyond ambiguity at the earliest possible moment.

The Minister made his case as regards the effect of the preamble of 1875 and the previous statute of 1832. Several times he has said it is my view against Senator Sheldon's. He adduced little authority in support of that view and, indeed, there is very little in what the Minister has said that would convince me there is not still in this matter doubt which could well be removed.

Mr. Sheldon

I should like to thank Senator Dooge for having drawn attention to this. It struck me, too, that the Minister had thrown away his case when he said that this was his view; I had my view and it was arguable. It is precisely because it is arguable that I want the doubt removed. If the Minister had been able to prove there was no doubt, then I would have been satisfied but he is going to ask his officials to look at this and make sure that any doubt is removed in regard to comprehensive legislation. If the amendment could hamper anyone, then I would not worry and I would be quite happy to let it run. It is merely a matter as to whether or not these orders are statutory presentations. Whether or not they are statutory presentations does not affect the validity of this in regard to whoever has to pay the fees.

Mr. B. Lenihan

That is what I get for being nice.

Mr. Sheldon

But surely the Minister did say it was arguable. May I make this point? I have not suggested that if the Treasury brought in new fees or altered or varied fees by order that anything could happen except that that order would have to be laid before Parliament. My point is that there is nothing in the 1832 Act to show that it is by order that that should be done. If they just prescribed fees or declared that the new fee would be so-and-so, then these would not be orders and would not properly be laid before Parliament. I am not suggesting that they do wish to use it or that they ever attempted to use it and the Minister for Justice could prescribe the fee for the Registry of Deeds and he need not do it by order under the 1832 Act. So, the doubt still remains.

If this amendment could in any way confine anyone, I would not push it; I would be quite happy knowing that it is not every day that any change is made in these fees. Then I would be quite happy to await the type of legislation the Minister has said is envisaged but it cannot do any harm, and it would be a very good idea, that such doubt as exists—and the Minister more or less admitted it—should be removed.

Mr. B. Lenihan

I have no doubt at all that my interpretation is right.

Mr. Sheldon

I have doubts.

Amendment put and declared lost.

Mr. Sheldon

I move amendment No. 2:-

In page 3, line 49, to delete "only".

I trust the Minister will find it possible to accept this amendment because, on the wording of the existing section, it makes no sense at all. When I raised this on Second Reading, the Minister for Finance said he only wanted it to refer to orders dealing with fees. This, of course, is not what the section says. It is not the same thing to say "I only wish it to refer to orders dealing with fees" as to say —"I wish it to deal with orders only relating to fees"—because the second way of putting it excludes anything which deals with fees and something else. The word "only" has no force at all. All it does is make for confusion.

If the word "only" was left out this section would then read:

This section applies to any order under section 35 of the Registry of Deeds (Ireland) Act, 1832, or under that section and section 9 of the Land Transfer (Ireland) Act, 1848, which relates to fees.

which seems to me to make sense. It says precisely what it wants. But the addition of the word "only" merely brings in this curious business that, if the Minister makes an order which relates to fees and something else, it is no longer an order which relates only to fees. I trust the Minister follows me in that argument—that it is like the Mad Hatter's Tea Party where it is not the same thing to say —"I breathe when I sleep" as "I sleep when I breathe".

It is very unfortunate that this phraseology has crept in. I am not suggesting for a moment that the Minister has some deep plot in mind in which he will vary fees and do something else in the same order and so escape the new restrictions of section 4 but he could do it and if the word "only" is left out he could still do what he wants, that is the order relating to fees prescribed in section 4. I shall be very glad to hear from the Minister as to why the word "only" was put in. It is not any good to say: "Because I only want this to deal with orders made relating to fees".

Mr. B. Lenihan

Why not?

Mr. Sheldon

Because that is not what it says. The Minister said he wants this to apply to orders which relate only to fees. If the word "only" had appeared somewhere else I would not have a word to say. The section says: "... any order ... which relates only to fees". I cannot see that that means anything, except that if the order relates to fees and something else, it shall not be dealt with according to the provisions of this section. It is merely when the order refers only to fees and nothing else that it is dealt with under the section. Probably when one is drafting this sort of thing, it appears easy because one is looking for a particular thing to be done, and in doing it one does not necessarily see that it is capable of some other interpretation. I think it is capable of the interpretation which I am saying it has, that is, that only one particular type of order comes under the section and that is one restricted to fees and nothing else.

Mr. B. Lenihan

That is the purpose of the drafting.

Mr. Sheldon

The Minister wants to be able to make an order which relates to fees and something else, and the section will not apply.

Mr. B. Lenihan

I want the section to apply to fees orders and nothing else.

Mr. Sheldon

I am objecting to the way it is being done. The Minister is looking for greater powers than he apparently needs, or different powers from what he apparently wants. Might I suggest that sort of thing might be done by the Treasury by order or by regulation or by description under the 1832 Act which the Minister can now do in regard to salaries and expenses and all he has to do is to make an order relating to fees. Section 4 says it must relate only to fees. That may be the intention but it is not what the Minister is saying.

Mr. B. Lenihan

I believe in plain language and in plain English, apart from the gymnastics of drafting. As I see it, this subsection is very explicit. It relates only to fees. It properly confines me to the intention in the legislation, which is that section 4 deals only with fees orders. It emphasises the point which Senator Sheldon sought to make which was to confine me strictly in the laying of any such orders, and that they should be fees orders and fees orders alone, and that no extraneous matter should be involved. That is what we have set out in fairly plain English by using the plain word "only" in subsection (1).

I want to emphasise that this Bill is very limited and that section 4 is more limited still. We are concerned only with fees orders and no more. We are not concerned with the exercise of any other power in section 35 of the 1832 Act or in any other Act. I am not seeking to get any powers in regard to any orders which might include fees and other extraneous matters. I want to bring the Seanad back to the realities of the Bill we are discussing, which is a very limited Bill concerned with the laying of documents. Under section 4, fees orders will have to be laid on the Table of the Houses of the Oireachtas, but proper provision is made in regard to the time and date of coming into force of the orders. My anxiety is to ensure that we do only what we want to do, and what we want to do under section 4 is to remove doubts as to the effective date of fees orders. The rights or wrongs of any other type of order under section 35 of the 1832 Act are not being touched on in this section.

Professor Dooge

I find it difficult to follow why the Minister is so insistent on this point. As I see it, there would be three types of orders : orders which relate to fees and absolutely nothing else; orders which we may describe as orders of a mixed type which would relate to fees and other matters; and orders which would relate to matters other than fees and make absolutely no reference to fees. It seems to me that the basis of the difference of opinion here is in regard to what might be described as the mixed orders, that is, orders which can contain a reference to fees and other matters. The Minister may say that he has no intention of breeding any such animal, no intention of making any order which refers to fees and other matters, but it is open to the Minister and his successors, so far as I read it, to make these mixed orders which would refer to fees and other matters. If it is open to the Minister to make these mixed orders, they should be dealt with in this legislation.

The position is that as this is drafted, it clearly applies to orders which relate to fees and fees alone, and equally clearly, it does not apply to orders which deal with matters other than fees, but so long as it is open to the Minister to make orders of this mixed type, then I think that if an order which relates to fees only properly comes before the House, a hybrid order which mentions fees in one section and something else in another should come before the Houses also. If these are to be a matter for review in an order dealing solely with fees, they should be a matter for review also if they are made by means of a mixed order, as I have called it. Otherwise the Minister should bring in a self-denying ordinance which would preclude him from making orders which relate to fees and other matters. Then the issue would be clear.

Mr. B. Lenihan

Subsection (2) will keep me quiet there—the date.

Professor Dooge

I would have expected it to take a larger section than subsection (2) to keep the Minister quiet. The Minister assures me that there is no possibility of a mixed order?

Mr. B. Lenihan

Not if I want to prescribe an effective date. Subsection (2) enables me to put in a date but only if the order relates to fees and not to any other matters. The date will be important.

Mr. Sheldon

Why?

Professor Dooge

Perhaps we are in grave danger that the Chair will recommit us, or someone else will commit us, if we take this much further. It seems to me that on the face of it a reasonable case has been made by Senator Sheldon that such orders may possibly be mixed orders and should be covered. What the Minister wanted to do is very proper but I suggest the word "only" got into the wrong part of the sentence. To give effect properly it should have read: "This section only applies to any order which relates to fees." It is the unfortunate position of the word "only" in the last clause which produces this odd effect and it would be possible to have a mixed order which then would not be subject to the control of section 4. All I want is to ensure there is no foolishness or doubt in the provision. I would be happy if the Minister promised to have another look at it.

Mr. B. Lenihan

I think "only" is much better where it is. Placed where the Senator suggests it should be, it would weaken the section.

Mr. Sheldon

I hope the Minister is fortified in his belief.

Mr. O'Quigley

The Minister is acting the advocate.

Mr. Sheldon

I am quite sure the Minister is wrong. "Only to fees" merely means the order must relate to fees and nothing else.

Mr. B. Lenihan

Precisely; that is what we want.

Mr. Sheldon

It is not what is in the section. It would be possible for the Minister to make a mixed order and then snap his fingers at the Houses of the Oireachtas. If the Minister cannot see this now, it is no use my labouring it any further.

Mr. B. Lenihan

A mixed order or any order under the 1832 Act must be presented.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Bill received for final consideration.

Agreed to take the Final Stage today, Mr. Murphy dissenting.

Question proposed: "That the Bill do now pass."

Professor Dooge

If I had my way with the House on the Committee Stage of this Bill, what I have to say now would be out of order because university statutes would not be part of the Bill. However, the House has determined that the Bill shall apply to university statutes and there is one small comment on the position which I think I should make. The House has, by rejecting the amendment on Committee Stage, made it clear that it wishes the intention of the 1908 Act which allowed university statutes to lie before the Houses of the Oireachtas to be kept in effect through the provisions of this Bill. Long before this Bill was brought in, in 1942, a statutory order was made to the same effect. It was a Government order and it laid down that in the case of university statutes that the minimum of the prorogation of Dáil Éireann should be a period of 21 days on which Dáil Éireann would not sit.

It appears there is a reasonable case for arguing, and I should like to bring it to the notice of the Minister and ask him, in turn, to bring it to the notice of the Government, that the statutory order of 1942 is now redundant by reason of the passage of this Bill. It may not be possible readily to revoke that order, but on the face of it, the order appears to apply only to the count of time during prorogation which is now covered by four sitting weeks in the present Bill. The simpler things can be made in regard to this the better and, as I pointed out, the better it will be for the universities in the matter of the difficulties they may run into in the recruitment of staff. I ask the Minister if the matter of the possible revocation of the statutory instrument of 1942 which appears now to be redundant could be favourably considered.

Mr. Sheldon

Having queried quite a number of things in regard to detail, I should like to say that this is indeed a very welcome Bill, one that does something very desirable in clarifying the laying of documents before the House. Even section 4 has wrought some clarification in regard to them. I should like to take this opportunity of indicating my welcome for the Bill. I might have left some doubts in the Minister's mind earlier in the day. A great deal of the Bill might have been expressed more clearly. In essence, the possible lack of clarity in reading it is not of great importance. This is a Bill very much for the officials of the House. Once they know its provisions, they know it is not necessary to say things this way and that way.

All this relates particularly to sections one to three. I am still not happy about the phraseology of section 4. It is very important that care is being taken to see that control of delegated legislation is precise in the way it operates. I trust that whatever difficulties I envisage in relation to section 4 will be dealt with fairly fully when legislation in regard to the Registry Office is introduced.

Question put and agreed to.