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Select Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 29 Nov 2023

Finance (State Guarantees, International Financial Institution Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2023: Committee Stage

We are joined by the Minister of State at the Department of Finance, Deputy Carroll MacNeill, to consider Committee Stage of the Bill.

Members' privilege is covered if they are in the precincts of Leinster House, but if they are joining us remotely they may not have full privilege. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable.

The Minister of State is very welcome. Perhaps she would like to make an opening statement.

I thank the Chair, all the committee officials and colleagues on the committee. Pursuant to Standing Orders 95(3)(a) and 181(1), I welcome the opportunity to address the committee on the Finance (State Guarantees, International Financial Institution Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2023, which was published on Monday, 18 September and passed Second Stage on 5 October 2023. The Bill is important in the context of how Ireland is seen to respond to the current Ukraine crisis and, indeed, future crises where Ireland may play a role in a multinational response. I reiterate the importance of the swift passage of the Bill to ensure that Ireland can fulfil its commitments at EU level regarding financial supports for Ukraine for 2022 and 2023. It is vital that Ireland participate fully in this initiative, which demonstrates clearly the solidarity of the EU with the people of Ukraine. Ireland recognises the scale of challenge faced by Ukraine in both the short term and long term. I look forward to good engagement on the Bill, recognising it was exempted from pre-legislative scrutiny for the reasons I have outlined.

As far as I am aware, neither the Opposition nor the Government has tabled amendments for this Stage. There was a good discussion and general agreement on the essence of the legislation on Second Stage. I can give an overview of the operation of the Bill or we can take it as the Chair wishes.

There are no amendments to the Bill and we had a good debate on Second Stage. If the Minister of State wants to comment on any particular aspect of the Bill or give a short overview, she is welcome to do so. In the absence of amendments and given the urgency relating to passing the Bill, however, we can conclude, unless Deputy Durkan wants to raise anything.

No, as long as we move the Bill forward as required and approve whatever has to be approved to ensure maximum progress.

Sections 1 and 2 agreed to.
SECTION 3
Question proposed: "That section 3 stand part of the Bill."

In this particular time, we have an obligation to engage and take into account issues arising outside this jurisdiction, in Europe and the global community. Maybe the Minister of State will make a general comment on that because we have wider responsibilities and cannot retreat into our own little nook and fail to observe that things are happening abroad that some believe we have no responsibility to address, although we do. Today's crisis in the wider global sense could be tomorrow's crisis on our doorstep. We need to keep that in mind and context all the time. We also need to ensure that anything that happens here is not seen as a disincentive to people to come, invest and work here. We have a duty to ourselves and the European Union in this regard. Regardless of whether the European Union is at one, and whether it may seem unfair to burden one or another country with the fallout of circumstances outside its control, which we have seen in the past, we must recognise and have a meaningful input into the situation as it emerges. I have another issue I will comment on at a later stage.

I could not agree more. The Bill attempts to provide the legal basis to facilitate our participation in multilateral support. It is the very essence of supporting multilateral institutions. Of course, we regard that as an appropriate response to the global instability we see. The Bill would facilitate, at a more micro level, our contribution agreements with the European Investment Bank, the Council of Europe Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to enable contributions to trust and donor funds established by them and really help Ireland's timely participation in the international responses by those international financial institutions in support of Ukraine, or indeed provide the basis for our support in dealing with any as-yet-unanticipated crises.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 4 to 18, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 19
Question proposed: "That Section 19 stand part of the Bill."

These sections allow for money to be paid out of the central Exchequer. This goes to the core of the legislation before us. We discussed this on Second Stage. There is agreement on the legislation, we waived pre-legislative scrutiny of it and we support it, but it is important, probably on Committee Stage, to tease out the exact implications. While we support this legislation, it is really important to fully understand the financial contribution the State is on the hook for. This relates in the first instance to guarantees concerning the MFA, but also the three institutions in which we have shareholdings, the implication being that repayments may not be made. The core of this is that there is an increased risk that Ukraine may not pay back or may not be in a position to pay back, given what Russia has done to its country, its economy and, most important, its citizens. This is about member states guaranteeing a portion of the grants. Can the Minister of State outline how much the Exchequer would be on the hook for in a worst-case scenario across each of the four programmes in which Ireland would be participating, either directly through the European Union through the MFA or through the EIB or other bodies in which we have shareholdings?

Will the Minister of State take us through that, please?

Yes, it is important to focus on what the Bill covers. Our intention was always to be clear on the sums involved and to be able to have this discussion. The Bill will allow for a potential Irish contribution of up to €76.9 million in respect of EU member state guarantees for the 2022 macrofinancial assistance programme for Ukraine and for a contribution of up to €63.65 million regarding interest rate subsidies for the 2023 macrofinancial assistance programme. The MFA for 2023 is designed such that the EU budget will be called on first to cover those subsidies, but in the event it falls short, some or all of that €63.65 million could be sought from us. Of course, we cannot predict what that may be, but that is the exposure.

Separately, the Bill will provide for the possibility, if required, to make once-off payments of up to €35 million in respect of the work of the European Investment Bank, up to €10 million to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and up to €10 million for the Council of Europe Development Bank. Ireland has committed to supporting the accession of Ukraine as a member state and we are, obviously, very against, and always have been, Russian aggression against both Ukraine and the EU generally. We hope to see Ukraine very much on a path to membership and be able to look at everything in that context over time. As for a direct answer to the Deputy's very fair question, that is the exposure for which the Bill will provide.

In a worst-case scenario, therefore, the State, through this legislation, would be on the hook for €35 million to the European Investment Bank, €10 million for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and €10 million through the Council of Europe Development Bank, amounting to €55 million. On top of that, we would be on the hook for, potentially, nearly €77 million under the 2022 MFA for Ukraine and, potentially, just over €63 million for the MFA from 2023 onwards in terms of interest rates. The potential exposure, therefore, would be about €195 million. Is that correct?

A total of €175 million is the overall limit. What I set out was per fund but €175 million is the overall limit.

Where do we get the €175 million figure from?

That is the absolute headroom position in the Bill.

So there is an upper cap. Even though the total exposure among the four programmes is €195 million, the maximum exposure to the State can be only €175 million. Is that correct?

Yes, that is what is in the legislation.

Is that for all four programmes?

Yes. It is €175 million for the EIB, and the other programmes are there.

Our contribution to the EIB, however, is capped at €35 million.

That is in this fund, but there is potential for other funds. If other funds were created, the overall exposure could be €175 million-----

-----so it is very much, as the Deputy asked for, the worst-case scenario. The commitment is €35 million.

Under this legislation, the exposure to the State will be in excess of €175 million and will be actually €195 million across the four programmes. Is that correct?

It is €140 million on the EU side.

It is €140 million on the EU side, plus €35 million on the EIB side, €10 million for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and €10 million for the Council of Europe Development Bank. Are those the correct figures?

It is about the extent to which we commit. We have committed €7 million to the EIB and we are providing extra headroom and extra exposure. We are trying to provide a structure under the 2022 and 2023 MFA programmes and make provision for the future. We have committed €7 million and are leaving ourselves some capacity in case we need to go further.

I understand that, but the legislation allows for a cap of €35 million. My question related to the worst-case scenario. Is the exposure under this legislation - let us forget about what comes after it - €195 million to the State?

It is only what we sign up to. In the case of the EU fund for Ukraine, that is €7 million.

That is at this point-----

-----but the legislation allows for that to increase to €35 million.

I know we have so far agreed to only €7 million but the legislation enables us to increase that, does it not?

It is for future funds that may or may not be created. That is the reason for the extra.

That is my point. In the worst-case scenario, what does this legislation expose the State to? The worst-case scenario is that we go to the cap, which is €35 million. Am I right in saying the exposure the State could be on the hook for through this legislation is a maximum of €195 million?

Let me clarify. We have a figure of €175 million-----

That is in only one programme, however. Four programmes are referred to in this legislation.

The difference relates to the different caps set for the various funds, as the Deputy noted. Our commitment is what is covered in the legislation, but that may be extended, depending on the scale of the number of funds created. It will differ for the different financial institutions over time.

The maximum exposure allowed for under the legislation, therefore, is just over €195 million at this point.

I would like to revert to the Deputy specifically on this because there is a big difference between the contributions to which we are committing and the creation of a number of additional funds. I would like to get further clarity on that because it is very much speculative. I do not want to say something in response to the Deputy that is not correct. They are very much speculative and have not necessarily been created yet, and I have to be careful to distinguish between, on the one hand, what the State has committed to and the contributions and, on the other, any future position. Will the Deputy allow me to make that distinction? We are talking about funds that have not been created.

With respect, we are talking about what is in this legislation. There are caps in the legislation regarding liabilities, and I am asking what happens if you add up all the caps on liabilities. I understand those liabilities have not, at this point, been created in full but I think it is a fair question. The caps on liabilities are in the legislation. My understanding is that that liability to EIB is capped at €35 million, that to EBRD is capped at €10 million and that to CEDB is capped at €10 million, and that two other caps on EU funds, as the Minister of State outlined, are in the region of €140 million.

We need to be cautious and mindful of the events that surrounded us all in this jurisdiction after the financial crash, when stability was a critical issue. We waited every day in this House to see how over European colleagues would react to our requests at the time for solidarity and assistance. It was touch and go for a long time, until the Italian representative came forward with a famous remark. Asked how long support for the banking system would go on, he said it would go on long as it took. That put an end to all the speculation and stabilised everything. It was then possible to visualise what was likely to happen in the future.

We need, on the one hand, to be certain of how far this can go and what our liabilities are likely to be in the future.

At the same time, we need to assure our colleagues in Europe that we are part of the European Community, we are strong supporters of the European Community and that, collectively, the European Community is a powerful entity and should remain so. In the face of this kind of threat to a country, although it is not a member of the European Union, that country has the potential to become a member in some shape or form in the future.

Notwithstanding all that, there are signs of possible instability within the European Union in recognition of or in response to what, I do not know, other than historically, after oppression or unrest, there comes a time of peace all over the world. After a time of peace, there is always a tendency to become picky about those parts of peace and stability we want to support. We cannot afford to do that. Therefore, we need stability to be part and parcel of what we are involved in. We need to have an assurance that we cannot have the situation advanced over our heads without us having a right to intervene or without our permission. That is important, including for the stability of Europe. If we do not retain that right, Europe will be poorer and, collectively, we will not stand for anything. If we want to fight every case individually, we are always going to find some country in Europe that will say it is not its issue and we will not intervene. That will set a precedent for possible interventions and supports in the future and we eventually become a less powerful entity. By "we" I mean this country, which is part of that European entity. Europe also becomes lessened.

As I noted in our meeting last week, there is a tendency whereby the European Union, or one of its representatives, infers some wrongdoing where none exists. This was the Advocate General's response to similar issues a couple of weeks ago on the economic and financial front. The European Union should not be so fast to prosecute member states because it sets a precedent. It may be good fun from a global perspective to punish some countries that appear to be operating outside the thinking circle of some members of the European Commission, for example, but it does not always follow that it is to the benefit of either the Union or the individual country that supports those views. In that regard, I refer to the changing situation in one central European country where there appears to be a swing in a particular direction, which is not in the interests of the European Union, the country in question, this country or any country in the European Union. We need to be cautious and careful and let the powers in Europe know that the EU has a population of 240 million or 250 million, so there are many people involved. We have to think about everybody. At any given time, we have to put ourselves in the shoes of every member state and all those countries that wish to be members of the European Union. I am sorry for going on about this issue but I feel strongly about it.

I could not agree more. The reality of the programme of assistance is that it will be through a period. We hope that Ukraine joining it will be through a longer period of reconstruction. The Bill is trying to make provision today and capacity for tomorrow, but much of that has not been structured and created yet.

In response to Deputy Doherty's question, the contribution to the EU programme is approximately €140 million when we add the €76.9 million and €63.3 million figures. We are making provision for once-off payments of €35 million to the European Investment Bank, EIB, €10 million to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD, and €10 million to the Council of Europe Development Bank, CEB. Where there is speculation and uncertainty is on the overall maximum provision that could ultimately be made to those multinational financial institutions. That number is considerably larger but they are trusts and figures that may not solely relate to Ukraine but to a whole range of other projects and have not yet been created. Those figures are different. They are for the EIB. There is a maximum aggregate limit across all the different programmes, both created and not yet created, of €175 million. In the same way, for the EBRD, both created and not created, the absolute aggregate over time is €100 million, and for the CEDB, it is €100 million. However, that is not the provision that is committed to in the Bill. I am simply trying to set out the two different approaches. The second one is very much speculative and in the future. It does not only relate to Ukraine and does not, obviously, only relate to this Bill.

I thank the Minister of State for responding. Given the size of the contribution so far and the amount of money for which taxpayers are on the hook and given that, as she said, further contributions through the EIB or other entities could increase our contribution or exposure way beyond €250 million, it is important to tease out with the Minister of State some of the possibilities with regard to this money being called upon. The European Court of Auditors has indicated that the EU's budget's exposure to Ukraine has more than doubled in 2022 compared with the previous year. It went from €7 billion to €16 billion and an additional €18 billion was approved through the macro-financial assistance plus, MFA+, at the end of last year. The court stated this will significantly increase the exposure for future budgets. It continued:

Furthermore, as the additional €18 billion do not require any provisioning, the risk for future EU budgets increases. Any related losses will have to be covered by future EU budgets or by the budgetary ‘headroom’ between the MFF ceiling and the own resources ceiling.

Has the Department done an assessment of the risks and exposures to the EU budget under these programmes outlined by the European Court of Auditors?

As the Deputy knows, the EU is currently considering the multi-annual financial framework, MFF, which is not anywhere close to being agreed at this point. However, the proposal within the MFF does envisage a new special instrument, namely, the Ukraine reserve, for an amount of €17 billion. In addition to that amount in grants and provisioning, the Ukraine facility would also cover €33 billion in loans, amounting to a total levy of support under the Ukraine facility of €50 billion. That is under the current EU discussions regarding the MFF. There is a very strong view, which is correctly held, that this money should be targeted at Ukrainian response and should not be diverted into other parts of the EU budget. It is very important that this happens. As the Deputy knows, the current multi-annual financial framework programme concludes at the end of 2023. It is important, therefore, that the next MFF is agreed in advance of that in order that there is certainty going into 2024 regarding the provision by the EU of funding for Ukraine. However, that has not been agreed yet. It is not, therefore, possible for me to speak to it beyond that at this stage.

The question in terms of the substantial financial assistance being provided to Ukraine in the form of loans in the main relates to assessment. Has the Department done any assessment with regard to the risk? There is a risk. There is an assessment of the risk being done by the European Commission. The risk is huge compared with other third-party countries where there would be a normal provision of 9%. The European Commission is saying we have to make a provision of 70% because of the appalling circumstance in which Ukraine finds itself. Has the Department done any assessment with regard to the risk here and, therefore, the likely exposure of the Exchequer in relation to the-----

Is the Deputy referring to a risk of default?

The Deputy will be aware that Ireland's participation in Europe is very strong and active. We are engaged in the negotiations with regard to the MFF as a very strong, committed European partner. The new MFF has not been agreed yet. Clearly, there is some risk of default at some point and in that scenario all member states would be exposed. We would hope the exposure would be extremely limited or could be avoided, however. At this point, when we do not have any clarity on what is likely to happen in Ukraine, I am not sure it is helpful to speculate on the future of that state. We are trying to provide support and get it through this very difficult period. We are also trying to support its passage into the EU as a member state.

It is very important to remember that this is much like the case of Ireland, when there were calls to default and do different things and a long-term profile approach was taken that helped to avoid too much early repayment of the principal amounts. In fairness, that approach reduces the risk of non-payment.

We have seen structures like that in the past elsewhere in other parts of the European Union.

There is a grace period being factored in of ten years for principal repayments and steady repayment of principal in relatively small amounts up to 35 years. The Deputy is quite correct to highlight the risk in the worst possible scenario but there is an attempt to mitigate that risk, both through the accession of Ukraine as an EU member - there would be a lot of work done in relation to that - but also in relation to the structure of the loans in terms of interest and the principal repayments. Of course there is form in this way with the EU in terms of managing some of these instances previously. We only have to look to ourselves as a successful example of how we have been able to prudently repay and go from being a considerable net recipient to a net contributor of EU funds. In particular, our position as a net contributor of EU funds, the experience of having been a net recipient and the experience of recipient of emergency donations makes us all the more alive to the need to structure loans in a way that is sustainable for a new member state coming into the EU, developing and being able to flourish, as we hope will happen. We hope not to have that difficulty.

The Deputy will be as well aware as I that there are longer term matters of political engagement and geopolitical stability. I am quite sure that the Deputy, like me, would work to make sure that works over time in the EU.

I absolutely agree with the Minister of State in her latter points but I will go back to my original question. The legislation has got a guarantee which could be called upon which is to the tune of hundreds of millions of euro. Has the Department carried out its own assessment in relation to the risk of this guarantee being called upon? It is a fair question.

The Department carries out risk assessments at all times throughout all of this process. The way in which it is engaged means that there is a constant risk assessment and a constant attempt to work out the exposure to Ireland. However, it is not possible to work out at this stage what will happen in Ukraine in June next year, never mind in June five years from now, and the extent to which that is a reasonable assessment to make. I want to be realistic with the Deputy.

Is there a risk assessment in relation to this legislation in terms of the likely or potential exposure to the State? Has a piece of work been done within the Department on this? That is what I want to know. If I put in an FOI request in the morning, will I get a document from the Department stating where it sees things? Will it set out that when certain things are added up, and if the principal payments are low, etc., the risk here could be 10% or 20%? Is such an assessment done within the Department?

The exercise in preparation for this Bill is an exercise in risk assessment and working out what Ireland's possible exposure is. I would stress that the Bill covers the interest subsidy. Ireland's share of it is capped, by the EU and in this Bill, at €63.625 million. Any potential exposure much later would come via the EU budget contributions, which are covered by the European Communities Act. All of the documents in preparation for this Bill encompass the State's liability now. I cannot tell the Deputy what the risk assessment is for events that have not been and cannot be foreseen yet for the broader contribution over time but this exercise is trying to work out what the State's possible exposure is.

The definition of risk is that one is not able to say that this is exactly what will happen in the future but risk assessments are supposed to weigh up the possibility. In the legislation, we know what the ultimate exposure is because it has caps built into it but that is not the risk unless we are suggesting that there will be 100% default-----

-----and that the European Union will not pick up any of this through its own budgeting. That would mean the cap is there. The likely risk is something very different. That is what I am trying to get at. Has the Department looked at what is the likely risk at this point in time, bearing in mind that things can change in relation to the State's exposure under this legislation?

The Commission, which obviously we are working within, has taken the risk and the uncertainty in relation to a war context. Generally, a 9% provisioning rate applies for MFA loans to countries addressing a balance of payments crisis. Generally, that is the nature of it but there is the broader longer-term risk of default. Applying the current GNI key as a measure of estimating Ireland's potential liability overall in an absolutely worst-case scenario where Ukraine defaults in repayment of the full €18 billion, Ireland's share in that entirely hypothetical scenario would obviously be 2.43% of €18 billion, or circa €450 million.

At every stage, there is a risk assessment built into this as we try to work out our exposure under it. As for whether there is a single document that says "Risk Assessment" on the top of it that I can send to the Deputy, it really is all preparatory work. Ireland's engagement in the Commission - the engagement of the Permanent Representation - is about trying to assess what is our contribution and what is our exposure, and how we can limit that and avoid it. The structure of the funds themselves is an effort to mitigate the risk to Ireland.

I do not think I will get a satisfactory answer from the Minister of State in relation to this.

I do not know how else to answer.

Let me put it like this. The Minister of State mentioned the Commission. I mentioned the Commission earlier on. The Commission carried out an assessment in relation to the risk. In 2022, on the €6 billion loans that were provided to Ukraine, the Commission recognised that there was a 70% provisioning that would have to be done. I am asking whether this country has done an assessment of the impact in terms of Ireland? The Commission did not turn around and say it is 100% because that would be the ultimate risk. They are saying it is 70% because of the weighed-up factors, etc. It is risk. It may not materialise but they have said that that is the provisioning that has to be done. Has the Department done any assessment in that regard, and is there a percentage?

Yes. That is what I am trying to give the Deputy.

What is the percentage?

What I am trying to say is how closely Ireland is working within the EU on the development of these programmes. When the Deputy says the Commission has conducted this assessment, it has done so with Ireland as a partner in that work. All of the work that is being done with the Commission - the work between the Irish State, the Department of Finance, the Permanent Representation and the engagement by officials in the Department of Finance at EU level - is done absolutely together. The risk assessment is one that is shared. We do not take a separate view. We work it out.

What is the risk? The Commission's assessment was 70% in 2022. The Minister of State has brought forward legislation now. What is the risk? Has the Department done that? If it has, what is the risk? Is it 60%? Is it 70%? Is it 5%?

We take the same view as the Commission. As the Deputy said, the Commission took a view that 70% was set to contain the risk of non-repayment in line with the principles of sound financial management. The composition of the guarantee coverage is allocated to paid-in provisioning of 9% from the EU budget and callable guarantees from member states of a further 61% of the total loan amounts. We do not take a separate view of risk to the Commission risk.

Is the Minister of State's view that the 70% extends across all of the products - the four different categories - at this point in time because that is what the legislation deals with?

We share the same risk assessment as the Commission, having contributed to it. That is a reasonable inference. What I am trying to say to the Deputy is the overall risk, of course, is the ultimate non-repayment. We are trying to do everything we can to mitigate the risk, the 70% risk, the ultimate risk of non-repayment, but we have done these assessments collectively together over time.

Okay. I am not sure that the Commission's view is that 70% is the case now but it was in 2022. Obviously, there are no loans being provided. If that is the case, then that is the case. I am not sure that the EIB has the same provisioning rate that the Minister of State outlined to the committee here today.

Can the Minister of State give us an overview of the funding objectives under each of the programmes that she is asking the committee to agree these guarantees towards? What are the funding objectives in terms of each of the four programmes?

Could the Deputy be more specific? Is the Deputy asking what we envisage it will be spent on in Ukraine?

Exactly, the objectives. Obviously, there is a brutal illegal war being waged by Russia on Ukraine. It is important that taxpayers would know exactly where our money is going to and what safeguards are there. Is it to help to rebuild the infrastructure there? Is it humanitarian aid? Are there objectives in terms of the loans that are being provided?

The memorandum of understanding which is entered into between the European Commission and the Ukraine Government makes clear that the objective is to support Ukraine's macrofinancial stability given the astute financing needs triggered by the war circumstances. It aims to support structural reforms aimed at improving overall macroeconomic management, strengthening economic governance and transparency and improving conditions for sustainable growth.

These are all obviously necessary preconditions for developing Ukraine to the point where it will be an EU member. It is part of our ultimate hope that would happen. In the MOU, Ukraine commits to ensuring the funds received are spent in an efficient, transparent and accountable manner, which I acknowledge is extremely difficult to do in a war scenario. However, setting up and operating a reporting system will help with that and ensure the availability of sound budgetary information to the Commission in an accessible, timely and comprehensive way. For example, Article 5 of the MOU ensures that the Ukrainian authorities provide monthly reports on revenues and expenditures on the state budget at the level of the major expenditure headings.

I will move to an overview of the European Investment Bank EU for Ukraine Fund. The EIB, in co-operation with the Commission and member states, has made some progress. The fund will enable the EU bank to sustain its support for Ukraine through temporary bridging solutions until longer term EU measures become available. Specifically, the fund will facilitate deployment of public and private sector projects with a major focus on municipal infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals, transport networks, water, wastewater treatment facilities, digital cybersecurity capability and improved access to finance for Ukrainian entrepreneurs. It is coming to things from slightly different angles but this is about stabilisation, redevelopment, reconstruction, and helping Ukraine move to the sort of reporting and transparency requirements that would ultimately be on an EU candidate state.

This is an important discussion. Deputy Doherty is right to probe this particular area. We were at the centre of the storm not so many years ago in relation to something of a similar nature, although from different origins. I remember being at a meeting in the oval room where the Commission meets. I think Viscount Davignon was its chair at the time and chaired that meeting. We were presented as the bold children of Europe, who departed from the rules laid down and took upon ourselves trends and policies that were to the detriment of European stability. That is how our actions were seen. We were chastised openly at that meeting, which was not a nice place to be. It was embarrassing, especially when some of our fellow member states had been the very first to depart from the economic and financial restrictions laid down by the European Union some years previously. However, those states were bigger than us and were able to withstand more. The small country that was on the agenda at that meeting appeared to be at the centre of the storm. It had an effect on the European Union in general, which took some time to recover its independence, stability and sense of purpose. That will always be the case. It is extremely difficult to determine, at this stage, what the risk might be because it can change from time to time.

There are two issues in that regard. The first is whether we are perceived to be restricting ourselves at this stage. We are then dependent on our friends in Europe to drive forward and proceed cautiously in the clear knowledge that this is the European Union and a mistake by one is a mistake by all. That was the situation at the time. We are right to probe it but we have to also recognise that if we set a border or an upper limit to what we are prepared to do to ensure stability, growth and safe policies throughout Europe, that has an impact as well, and there is nothing we can do about it because it is in the future. If things go wrong for one, they go wrong for all. The danger from Ukraine's point of view is that the European Union might be seen to falter at this stage at a crucial time for Ukraine. The invading country, Russia, does not need to have any regard whatsoever for the feelings of the European Union, which it has completely ignored heretofore, or the feelings of its individual member states, which it is ready to ignore. Let us never forget that the Russian ambassador gave a firm commitment that he and his country had no interest in invading Ukraine. Those are famous words, which Russia broke a couple of weeks later. This is to provide everybody with the knowledge that we can make famous statements that we intend to break.

Another thing that has happened in Europe, which we all know about, is Brexit. We now have an indication from a country at the centre of Europe, the Netherlands, to the effect that a leading political party there intends to have a referendum on the future of that country remaining in Europe. That is serious stuff. It affects every country in the European Union because it could be seen as the beginning of the end. Europe has to do what it has to do to ensure the stability of the overall European map in the face of threats that occur now and threats that are likely. Its response has to be balanced, but it has to give some kind of recognition to the threats that are there and how Europe as a whole is likely to respond.

Like every other country, we are beneficiaries as well as net contributors. We have the benefits of the European Single Market. I heard somebody commenting on pharmaceuticals or something and the scene in this country as she saw it. She said that we are a small country and insignificant in the European Union. We are not. We are the same as everybody else in the European Union. We are participants and contributors to the Single Market, which means that every country in that Single Market, and committed to it, has the right of access to it and the right to the benefits of it. If there are negative parts we have to shoulder, we have to shoulder them, in the short term at least. However, there is a need to inform our colleagues across Europe because they occasionally take their eye off the ball and make grand speeches and so on and so forth, and sometimes become very popular for the stands they take. The European Commission needs to remember that at all times. Insofar as all the countries of Europe are concerned, while it was a Single Market a few years ago, it is not the same Single Market it was before Brexit.

If there is another threat to the European unity that was in existence heretofore, that will diminish the sum total of what Europe represents, whether we like it or not. We can talk about it afterwards, and point out the mistakes that were made, but we should not ignore some of the signs and some of the concerns that have been expressed. We need to look at them again. We have to take a risk, which is a difficult thing to do. We are in the position of being in the Single Market and are an integral part of the community. We have equal rights, albeit under qualified majority voting and so on.

It was always recognised that the member state is the ultimate authority on taxation matters. That is no longer certain because an approach has been made under competition rules that seems to run across that previous entitlement. The qualified voting majority now applies, which can also have an impact. The point at issue has to be whether somebody in the Commission or whatever sees an opportunity in the future to reduce the importance of each member state and the contribution, especially the positive contribution, each member state can make to the Union. It is also about whether the Commission takes its eye off the ball on that and tries to apportion blame around the place, distribute the negative impacts of it, and assume unto itself areas that were previously clearly set out as being part and parcel of an issue that was the preserve of the member state only. It is a very important issue as regards such things as a corporate profits tax and so on. How dare the Commission identify this country as a tax haven? That was done deliberately to discredit the country. It knows full well what that does but it still persists. The Advocate General, unfortunately, should have thought more about it before issuing a non-binding conclusion regarding issues that were before that office at the time.

Like everybody around this table, I am a committed European.

I believe Europe has to prevail, and the positive side of Europe has to prevail. We also have a contribution to make in relation to its stability, its growth and its economic progress into the future. We also have to take into account and take some responsibility, collectively, for the issues that confront Europe as a whole, and how best to deal with them. Apologies, Chairman, but I spent time at those meetings and I did not like what I was hearing. Every time issues I hear related to them again, I think about it and I get angrier every time.

Deputy Doherty has raised a number of questions in terms of the language used throughout the Bill, which cause me to flick through it. I would like the Minister of State to comment on a number of aspects of it. Section 3(1) of the Bill states that "The Minister may by order prescribe...". It goes on to say, under section 3(4)(a), that the Minister "may execute". Under section 3(9), the it states that "There may be paid out of the Central Fund...." There is a lot of loose commentary in the Bill about how the Minister may or may not do things, or have the power to do things. The sums of money are quite substantial. I agree with the thrust of the Bill and what is trying to be achieved here. It also refers to the Minister taking action "as may be required to enable the State to comply with its obligations under each prescribed EIB Contribution Agreement." It is talking about the future contributions. Likewise, in section 6 it is stated that "The Minister may by order prescribe a contribution agreement..", and that "Where any amendment is proposed to be made to a prescribed EBRD Contribution Agreement, a draft of the proposed agreement providing for the amendment and containing the text of the amendment shall be laid by the Minister before Dáil Éireann..." From my experience, laying it before the Dáil does not mean there is any scrutiny of any kind. It is just laid before the Dáil. We see motions every day that are taken without debate, and other documents that are laid before the Dáil that are taken without debate and just presented as information.

In terms of the reporting of what is drawn down, what is being spent or how it is being spent, the Bill states that the Minister may "cause a report to be laid before Dáil Éireann which includes the following information..." Again, it is a maybe. When we are dealing with this kind of money and with the other institutions and how they perceive things, I think that for the money that we allocate or the schemes in Europe that we participate in, there should be a greater onus on the Ministers and government of the time to openly inform the Members of what is going on, where the decision originated from and how much money was involved. We are leaving it loose by saying the Minister may to this and we may do that, and I think that we may very well regret that in the future, even though we are trying to do the best we can and doing good in the context of that. The Minister of State will see that right through all of the different sections a lot is left up to the State and the Ministers to respond to the Dáil. Perhaps the Minister of State would comment on that. In making the funds available and participating in all of this with Europe, we cannot forget where the money came from. We have to make the Minister of the government of the day far more accountable not just in terms of laying a report, but in having those reports discussed by a committee, by the House itself or by the Seanad, because an awful lot goes by the by here in terms of EU regulation that we find in Irish law later on. I think we need to scrutinise things a bit more.

I thank the Chair for highlighting that and I am more than happy to answer his very reasonable question. Sections 3 and 6 are very alike and use some of the same structure and format in terms of legislative drafting. This Bill is the overall enabling provision for how the funds may be used for the future. Obviously, in terms of legislative drafting, the words "may" and "shall" are very different things. "May" is enabling and "shall" is a requirement. Because this overarching piece of legislation is enabling, it then creates an opportunity for the Minister who, within the terms of the legislation which of course will theoretically have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas by that point, may then execute the provisions of the Bill, rather than shall execute them. They really only are the two options in terms of drafting. This Bill gives the Minister the opportunity to do that for the future. The Minister may then execute part of the Bill.

What I would say, in terms of oversight, is that the Minister must lay the order prescribing the contribution agreement between the State and the EIB before the Houses of the Oireachtas as soon as possible, and the House may annul that order within 21 sitting days of the order being laid. It is also a requirement, not an option, for the Minister to lay the report before Dáil Éireann for each reporting period, outlining the aggregate amount of payments. That is a requirement, not a possibility, for the Minister. Of course, it is available to this committee or other committees to have a debate or discussion in relation to that. They are the oversight provisions within the Bill once the Bill has passed.

In response to Deputy Durkan, he is quite correct to point out the political challenges in Europe that make decision-making very difficult. I suggest that is one of the reasons why we need decisions on Ukraine funding in a strong way, not just from this State but from the EU. As we look at the global political headwinds, I think it is even more important than ever that the EU has taken a really strong position on funding Ukraine at this point at the beginning of 2024.

Deputy Bernard Durkan took the Chair.

I thank the Minister of State for her comments. In scrutinising this Bill, I do not think there is anybody who is opposed to it, but they can speak for themselves. At least on Second Stage, we did not see that in terms of supporting the principle of solidarity which is at heart of the European Union supporting a country that, through no fault of its own, has found its economy in free fall and its infrastructure destroyed, and for member states across the European Union to support it. Notwithstanding that, obviously, we need to tease out the technical details of the legislation. Sections 17 and 18 and Schedule 4, as well as section 19 which we are discussing, also deal with the issues of the MFA+ contribution agreement and, as was mentioned, allows for contributions of up to €63 million, or just in excess of it, to be paid by Ireland or Ireland to be on the hook for that amount. This new proposed Ukraine facility is going to replace the previous loans. Does the Minister of State have a forecast of the State's envisaged contributions over the medium term, inclusive of the Ukraine facility in relation to this? I ask her to perhaps on touch on Schedule 4 in her response, and what it is asking of us.

I cannot answer that at this stage because it has not been agreed yet. It is the subject of discussions at EU level at this stage. I am certainly happy to come back to the Deputy once that is agreed, but we cannot comment on it yet because the next MFF has not been agreed. It is being agreed within that context.

I am talking about the MFA+.

I ask the Deputy to forgive me. I thought he was talking about the next Ukraine facility.

No. In the context of the MFA+, which is dealt with in Part 6 of the legislation, does the Minister of State have any forecast in relation to the State's envisaged contributions? Schedule 4 deals with the schedule between us and the EU in terms of the MFA+, is that correct?

Is the Deputy referring to section 6 of the Bill?

Section 6 is part of what we have just discussed.

It is the provision for the EBRD for the-----

To clarify, I am not referring to section 6 but to Part 6 of the Bill and to sections 17, 18 and 19 which we are discussing, which deal with the issue of-----

We have agreed sections 17 and 18.

-----MFA+ and the contribution agreement. The contribution agreement is in Schedule 4 to the Bill.

To clarify, I think we have agreed sections 17 and 18. Is that correct, Chair?

I am happy to go back over it, however. Section 18, which is the substantive piece in that regard, provides for our entry into the MFA+ contribution agreement. It is required to facilitate the MFA+ package for 2023. As we have discussed, Ireland may contribute to the support to an aggregate amount of more than €63.625 million to comply with the obligations under the MFA+ agreement, which are moneys paid out of the Central Fund. That is what we have been discussing.

Is Schedule 4 to the Bill connected to the MFA+?

Forgive me, let me get-----

This section allows, for the first time, the State to enter into an MFA+ contribution agreement. Therefore, it is enabling legislation. That is what section 18 does. The terms of that agreement are set out in Schedule 4. Is that not correct?

I ask the Minister of State to explain the terms of this agreement in the context of what we are being asked to agree.

On the MFA+ contribution agreement, the Commission has agreed the signature process with 25 member states for the MFA 2 guarantee agreements guaranteeing €5.72 billion out of €6 billion of loans. Ireland and Denmark have to finalise the agreement. As of last month, 21 member states were on schedule to have contribution agreements finished, with France, Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Greece and Spain yet to complete their national procedures. This is part of the natural procedures. The overall tentative cost of funding for the MFA+ in 2024 under contribution agreements is €573 million with Ireland's share estimated at €13.9 million based on our 2.43% of GNI key. Once the final costs are fixed, the Commission will communicate the definitive amount per member state, which will then be stable for the years covered by the agreement.

Does that mean there will be no variation regardless of the GNI of each member state during the lifetime of the agreement?

Once the final costs are fixed, the Commission will communicate that. However, yes, that is our key.

When will the final-----

On current planning, the first payment call will be sent in early February. I do not have a date for when the final costs are likely to be fixed. It is the same agreement text for all member states, of course.

I am not exactly sure when that is. Let me come back to the Deputy on that. The costs will be stable over the three-year period and so we will know that, but I just do not know when the final costs will be fixed.

Section 19 deals with the call on the Exchequer, which is why I wanted to raise these in this context. I may table amendments on Report Stage. As the Minister of State knows, we are very supportive of the legislation and particularly EU support for Ukraine. In that context, as we know, support may be required directly from either the European Union or the bodies in which we have shareholdings that may fall to Irish taxpayers sometime in the future. That is a risk worthy of taking given where that country is at the minute. Given that the taxpayers are potentially on the hook for a large amount of money, is the Minister of State concerned about issues of corruption in Ukraine?

The efforts by the European Union to try to place as much oversight, reporting and transparency as can be placed on any state that is on a war footing are very important. They are the sorts of efforts that this national Parliament would want to see and that the European Union would want to see not just in terms of good governance now, but also as a pathway for Ukraine to move to this state. In any conflict or war scenario, corruption is often a concern. The correct allocation of funds in order that the correct people receive the funds for the redevelopment and governance of Ukraine is extremely important. The EU is trying to make provision to Ukraine in order that it gets the necessary funding to enable it to get through this period but also to develop its structures as any candidate country would. That is probably the best and fairest way for me to answer that.

The Minister of State made the point that in a war scenario, there is always a risk or fear of corruption. Does she have concerns about corruption in the pre-war period in Ukraine?

I do not have enough information about that to be able to answer that now. Ukraine is under attack from Russia and we have a period of extreme global instability. The EU, as a stable group of countries committed to the values of human rights and democracy, needs to provide appropriate support for a democratic state that is under attack. We need to help it develop its systems within that context and move to a period of accession. I cannot comment on what happened before then as I do not have the information nor do I think it would be fair and appropriate. We are dealing with where we are now. I am very glad to have the Deputy's support for this Bill. I interpret it, I hope correctly, as support for the European Union project, for solidarity within the EU and its position. It is a strong democratic group of nations trying to work together against Russian aggression.

Of course, and that goes without saying.

Returning to the legislation we are scrutinising and which I support, it is important to ensure that large amounts of Irish and EU taxpayers' money is actually reaching where it is supposed to go. The Minister of State mentioned that she has no information on corruption prior to the war. This issue has been well documented and I suggest that she should read up on it.

It is not that I am not capable of reading up on it. It is not that I am not aware. It is just that I am aware that I am here commenting as Minister of State and I am trying to be as careful, factual and reasonable as I possibly can be. It is not that I am uneducated on the point.

Nobody suggested that, with respect.

The Deputy suggested I read up.

The Minister of State said she was unaware earlier and I suggested that she reads up on it. I ask her to let me finish my comment. Nobody suggested that she is uneducated and she should not try cheap shots. I am making the point about accountability for European money. I was suggesting that she read up on the special report on reducing grand corruption in Ukraine which was published in 2021. The European Court of Auditors has stated:

However, in our 2021 report on reducing grand corruption in Ukraine, we concluded that grand corruption and state capture were still widespread in Ukraine despite EU action to address the issue as a cross-cutting priority. In particular, the report highlighted [a number of areas]...

The report found that oligarchs and vested interests across Ukraine were the root cause of corruption, and posed the main obstacle to the rule of law and economic development in the country.

The European Court of Auditors has further noted that "The European External Action Service ... and the Commission were well aware of the multiple connections between oligarchs, high-level officials, the government, parliament, the judiciary and State Owned Enterprises". That is what I am asking the Minister of State to read up on, with respect. I asked her a very clear question. Is she concerned about corruption in Ukraine prior to the war? In fairness, she answered that she did not have the information. The point I am making is that State funding is going in here, potentially hundreds of millions of euro of taxpayers' money from Ireland and from across the European Union. We need to ensure oversight, particularly now in a war context which I acknowledge is much more difficult. However, before the war the European Court of Auditors had pointed these issues out. What are the mechanisms that the Minister of State is aware of that are in place to deal with this situation? I accept that we need to support Ukraine 100%.

I am supportive of this legislation for that reason but we need to make sure the funding gets to the people and authorities that need it and is spent in the intended way. Therefore, given what the European Court of Auditors has said - I had the opportunity to meet with its president last week – what oversights and accountability mechanisms are now in place and adjoin this legislation to make sure that money is targeted and well spent?

Deputy Doherty has been finance spokesperson for many years, much longer than I have been involved in the Department of Finance or in this portfolio. He will therefore know a great deal better than I do the institutions such as the EIB, the EBRD and others, and that they have oversight personnel not just working throughout those institutions but on the ground where funds are going to make sure they are used appropriately and in the best way possible, insofar as they can be. The EU has structured these funds largely through those institutions precisely because they have the structure, governance, oversight, resources and experience over some time to try to avoid corruption. Deputy Doherty will already be familiar with that having worked in his portfolio for as long as he has. They are the oversights and mechanisms by which the EU, with the Irish State, is trying to oversee the distribution and allocation of these funds.

What are the mechanisms?

All of the different institutions, the EU, the EIB and in particular the EBRD, have a series of-----

Let us deal with the EU. This is a substantial increase in State or EU loans or grants being provided. What are the additional mechanisms that adjoin this and that deal with the concerns of the European Court of Auditors? The court has made the point that oligarchs and vested interests across Ukraine are the root cause of corruption and pose the main obstacles to the rule of law and the economic development of the country. What additionality is there?

We talked about the memorandum of understanding between the Commission and the Ukraine Government, making very clear the purpose of the funds and how they were to be used. Article 5 of the memorandum of understanding, which I set out earlier, clearly sets out that the authorities provide monthly reports on revenues and expenditures of the state budget at the level of the major expenditure headings.

I indicated that the MOU stipulates that Ukraine will provide the Commission with all of the information that is relevant for transparent monitoring of its economic and financial situation and for the assessment of the implementation of the reporting system. The Commission also has the right to carry out operational assessments and independent ex-post evaluations of the MFA, in consultation with Ukraine, the IMF and other international organisations. The MFA is liable to verification control and the auditing procedures of the Commission, including the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Court of Auditors.

On the other side, the various institutions I have described already have in place extremely robust mechanisms for overseeing, insofar as possible, the allocation of resources, including on-the-ground personnel who assess where the resources are going and how they are being used. They are the oversight mechanisms, both under the memorandum of understanding and under the different international institutions which we were responsible for setting up and that have been operational for some time.

EU supports have been paid to Ukraine in recent years and they have, rightly, dramatically increased in the past two years. Does the Minister of State or the Department have knowledge of any incidents that gave rise in the European Commission to concern about corruption, where the money has been paid and it is questioning whether it has got to the right end point?

I am not in a position to answer that question.

If there is, maybe the Minister of State could provide a note. Perhaps that is something that could be checked with either the European Commission or the Department at a later stage.

I thank the Minister of State. We are dealing with this legislation in the context of an ongoing war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, it is difficult because Russia is not listening and the sanctions have not yet had the desired impact in regard to Russia's activities. We also have another almighty war in the Middle East, in Palestine. Does the Minister of State support a similar type of support package coming from the European Union to support the people of Gaza and Palestine to rebuild their economy, country, lives and livelihoods when, hopefully, please God, we enter into some type of a lasting ceasefire and a peace process emerges from that?

Yes. It is already the case. When the EU budget was agreed last month the Commissioners set out proposals both to provide increased support for humanitarian need – the Deputy must forgive me as I do not have the figure to hand – and also funding to combat antisemitism in civil society. I thought that was a very important reflection on the budget negotiations between the Council and the Parliament last month. I was very pleased to hear that stated so openly and proactively by the Commission at the outset of the negotiations. I think that answers the Deputy's question.

I thank the Minister of State.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 20 to 22, inclusive, agreed to.
Schedules 1 to 4, inclusive, agreed to.
TITLE
Question proposed: "That the Title be the Title to the Bill."

We are all concerned about liabilities incurred now and in the future. The Minister of State is equally and rightly concerned about it. We do not know the day or the hour when an emergency could arise and all of a sudden we would have a choice to make, either to stand together or stand apart. If we stand apart, we contribute to the dissolution of a powerful financial and economic group. Other countries, likewise, have the same responsibilities but I would like to think that other countries have the same reservations and common goal that we have because, like us, they contribute to the sum total of what is the European Union in all its trappings and with all its warts, bureaucracy being one. We all fear bureaucracy. We can never tell when something will pop out of a page to say: "By the way, you agreed to this." We have agreed to this as well, but we correctly have concerns. The Minister of State has concerns as well, rightly so. Members have to go through the procedure of assessing the risks in all situations nationally and in regard to Europe. It is appropriate that we are alert to those matters.

I suggest that occasionally we should invite a Commissioner along to a committee meeting or other forum. In the days of old, I remember being in a position to invite a Commissioner who conceded at the time to only attend the meeting in secret and that there would be no publication of the issue discussed. Needless to say, the committee rejected that proposal on the basis that it was an extension of bureaucracy, of a failure by the Commissioner to engage with the member state, or the relevant committee of the member state's Parliament, in order to discuss issues of common concern. What concerns any of us concerns all of us. We stand together or we stand apart but there are consequences in each case. We know on which side we are supposed to stand. I am sure our European colleagues are fully familiar with the necessity to ensure that issues of concern to us are also of concern to them and that, together, we strive on an ongoing basis to make sure that Europe, as envisaged, continues into the future.

Threats, which are likely to arise in the future, must have a measured and united response that takes into account the internal affairs of the member states, but is mindful of the fact that some member states may decide to depart from the general discussion and opt out. Brexit is a classic example. We are not all bound by those decisions either. When countries separate from Europe it makes Europe and the member state weaker. There are implications and complications for us all.

Question put and agreed to.

Do members want to ask any further questions or make final comments?

I have one short question. I welcome the unanimity on the Bill on Committee Stage. When does the Minister of State intend to have Report Stage in the Dáil Chamber? Is it envisaged before the end of the year?

It will be as soon as possible. I am subject to the Whip and the House on timing but I am agitating for it to happen as soon as possible.

While I know the Minister of State will have to find a time slot, is it the intention to have it completed before the end of the year?

Does the Minister of State wish to make any closing remarks?

I thank the committee for its engagement and support. This is an important Bill. It is important to focus on the repayment and the exposure of the State, but I remember it is not long ago that the EU was concerned about Ireland's capacity to repay funding that was provided to us in our time of need. We worked hard to make sure it was done, have come out of it well and are now net contributors, so we have an obligation to make sure we provide the same support to others who need it as we did.

I thank the Minister of State and her officials for assisting the committee with its consideration of the Bill.

Bill reported without amendment.
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