I move amendment No. 63:
In page 23, between lines 10 and 11, to insert the following:
"(17) (a) Where, on completion of an inquiry under subsection (3) of this section, the Disciplinary Tribunal find that there has been no misconduct on the part of the respondent solicitor and, in addition, are satisfied that the evidence adduced at such inquiry was false or misleading in a material respect that the application which gave rise to the inquiry could not, on that account, have been made in good faith, the Disciplinary Tribunal shall have power, by order, to direct that the society or other person whose application under subsection (1) of this section gave rise to such inquiry pay to the respondent solicitor a sum, not exceeding £1,000, towards the cost reasonably incurred by the respondent solicitor in relation to his participation in such inquiry.
(b) The Society or other person in respect of whom an order has been made by the Disciplinary Tribunal under paragraph (b) of this subsection, may within a period of 21 days from the date of receipt by him of notification in writing of such order, appeal to the High Court to rescind or vary the order in whole or in part and the Court may, on hearing such appeal—
(i) rescind of vary the order, or
(ii) confirm that it was proper for the Disciplinary Tribunal to make the order.
(c) If the Society or other person refuses, neglects or otherwise fails to comply with an order made under paragraph (a) of this subsection (to the extent that such order has not been rescinded or varied by the High Court consequent on an appeal to the Court under paragraph (b) of this subsection), the respondent solicitor may recover the sum or any outstanding part of the sum in question as a liquidated debt".
This amendment raises the spectre of, on the completion of an inquiry under subsection (3), the Disciplinary Tribunal finds that there has been no misconduct and the evidence which came out during the course of the inquiry shows that the process was based on lies, perjury or mala fides on the part of the complainant. It is designed to discourage unfounded applications to the Disciplinary Tribunal based on false or misleading evidence. It is not geared to affect bona fide applicants.
Where the Disciplinary Tribunal is satisfied that evidence brought before it by an applicant, either the society or another person, was false or misleading in a material respect and that the application could not have been made in good faith, this amendment would allow the tribunal to direct the applicant to pay up to £1,000. It introduces a balance and recognises that in some cases we are not only dealing with rogue solicitors or solicitors found guilty of misconduct. In some cases one may find applicants, complainants or litigants acting in bad faith and with malicious intent against their solicitor.
This direction as set out in the amendment could be appealed to the High Court and the new subsection balances subsections (9) (b) and (c) in page 21 where a solicitor may be directed to pay up to £1,000 where misconduct has been found. It reintroduces an element of balance into the legislation. We are introducing procedures which tilt the basis of the tribunal, inquiry and the investigation of complaints toward the consumer of legal services. At the same time there should be some recognition that in rare occasions one finds a complainant or a litigant who is acting in bad faith. I will be interested in the Minister's response and whether he believes this amendment is reasonable.