I propose to take Questions Nos. 756 and 757 together.
Clearly this is an important judgment and its full implications are being examined carefully. The Court itself recognises the complexities around this issue in that it acknowledges the Executive function in not only controlling who should enter the State but also to regulate the activities of non-citizens while in the State and has had to consider the distinctions of rights between citizens and non-citizens in the context of Article 40.1 of the Constitution. It has concluded that an absolute ban on the right to work (as distinct from a time limit being set in legislation or some other means), is contrary to rights under Article 40.1 of the Constitution. The Court recognises that this is a matter for the Executive and Legislature to consider and accordingly has adjourned consideration of the Order the Court should make for a period of six months. Full consideration of the judgment will be given over the coming period and it is expected that the State will make submissions to the Court in relation to the format of the order the Court is to make at the appropriate time.
In many EU Member States, the right to work is not an unfettered right, often arising after a particular period of time – usually 9 months to a year – and in many instances may be limited to particular job categories or the withdrawal of other financial supports, etc. One of the principal aims of the International Protection Act, which was commenced at the end of last year, is to process cases as quickly as possible so that persons in need of international protection are granted status quickly, thereby giving them an automatic right to work.
The judgment raises obvious policy, legal and operational issues spanning a number of Departments and agencies and my Department, working with the Office of the Attorney General, and in consultation with other Departments, will be examining the impacts of the judgment and the legislative options in the coming period.