Dáil Éireann Debate, Tuesday - 16 May 2023
5. Deputy Bernard J. Durkan asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence the extent to which emergency action can be taken to protect Ireland’s infrastructure, on and offshore, inside and outside territorial waters; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [22875/23]
Amharc ar fhreagra18. Deputy Bernard J. Durkan asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence the extent to which sufficient attention has been drawn to the exercise of Russian war ships off the Irish coast, with particular reference to ensuring the protection of vital infrastructure; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [22874/23]
Amharc ar fhreagraThese questions seek to ascertain the extent to which our security forces can intercept, in an emergency, if necessary, to intervene to protect vital national or international infrastructure, given the unusual interest shown by foreign powers in these areas in recent times.
I propose to take Questions Nos. 5 and 18 together.
As Minister for Defence, I chair the Government task force on emergency planning, which supported by the office of emergency planning, OEP, in my Department. A subgroup of the task force on emergency planning was assigned responsibility to develop guidance on critical infrastructure resilience in 2017. The subgroup produced the first guideline document on critical infrastructure resilience in February 2019. This document was subsequently revised and updated in July 2021. While the primary responsibility for safeguarding critical infrastructure rests with its owner or operator, the guideline document provides the methodology for operators of essential services to follow to enhance their resilience. It also outlines that it is the responsibility of each Government Department to foster links and work closely with the semi-State and private sector operators of critical infrastructure in their respective policy areas to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure from a wide variety of threats.
The OEP in my Department is working to transpose the new critical entities resilience directive. In advance of the enactment of this directive and because of the increased threat to critical infrastructure, the Department of Defence is working with the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications to stress test critical infrastructure in the energy sector in Ireland. These stress tests will be completed before the end of 2023.
Regarding the protection of Ireland’s offshore infrastructure, the Naval Service, as the State's principal seagoing agency, is tasked with a variety of defence and other roles. While the main daily tasking of the Naval Service is to provide a fishery protection service in accordance with our obligations as a member of the EU, it also carries out several other non-fisheries related tasks, including contraband interdiction duties, search and rescue, and maritime defence and security operations. As such, any Naval Service patrol should be viewed as a multifaceted activity. These patrols are augmented by the Air Corps maritime patrol squadron in patrolling the Irish exclusive economic zone, EEZ, using the two CASA CN235 maritime patrol aircraft which are equipped with state-of-the-art surveillance and communication equipment.
Following an extraordinary EU Energy Council meeting in October 2022 to discuss the EU’s energy security in response to the attacks on Nord Stream 1 and 2, the Minister for the Environment, Climate and Communications sought support from my Department concerning additional measures that could be put in place by the Defence Forces to ensure the protection of critical off-shore infrastructure, including data cables.
My officials and the Defence Forces continue to engage with the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications regarding the protection of Ireland’s offshore infrastructure. While the Defence Forces have limited subsea capabilities, enhanced maritime patrolling of the Irish Sea in the vicinity of priority offshore infrastructure is taking place by a mixture of air and naval platforms.
A number of Russian ships have been observed inside the Irish EEZ in recent weeks. These ships were monitored by Naval Service and Air Corps maritime patrol aircraft as they transited through the Irish EEZ. Their transit appears to have been routine. Regarding Ireland's EEZ, it is not unusual for naval ships or civilian vessels of other states to carry out training exercises within this area or to pass through it.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, allows for all vessels, including military vessels, to transit through the territorial waters of coastal states when conducting innocent passage, as defined by Article 19 of the UNCLOS. Any vessels transiting Irish waters must do so in compliance with international law and may be subject to sighting and observation by the Naval Service and Air Corps without their innocent passage being infringed.
I thank the Tánaiste for that detailed reply. My question also focuses on the ability of the military services here to take the necessary action to dissuade those who might want to loiter, for want of a better description, in territorial waters, or non-territorial waters for that matter, close to the Irish shoreline. I refer to the degree to which it might be possible to receive assistance or support from other EU countries in the event of large-scale intrusions whose purpose it may not be possible to verify. It must also be kept in mind that some countries, to wit Russia, do not seem to be all that hurried in terms of giving any explanation in this regard.
As I said in my original reply, and again I think it is important to have a calmer perspective here, maritime vessels and ships are allowed passage through our waters and EEZ. I am not sure if there is a specific definition in military terms for the word "loiter".
It is a new one that I invented myself.
Well, we loitered in schools. We were loitering on the football pitch and many places.
It depends on the intent.
There has been a great deal of noise and publicity about this issue. The mere sighting of certain ships in the context of the war in Ukraine has created the impression this is all something new. It is not. Ships are being monitored all the time by our Navy and Air Corps and by others. In the vast majority of cases, as I said earlier, these transit passages appear to be routine. Obviously, there is a heightened focus and interest because of the war in Ukraine and because of the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosion. Equally, on the cyber front, we know there have been significant attacks on state infrastructures across Europe. We all collaborate, therefore, on sharing information with each other.
When the cyberattack on the Irish health service happened, the Polish Government, the British Government and other governments immediately contacted us. An Garda Síochána and other authorities pursued this issue and we then shared information in respect of the knowledge we had as a result of such investigations with other countries as well. The basic message in this regard is that because we are members of the CSDP framework, we share information and expertise and we work together in this context in observing and understanding what is going on. This is the future. I refer to co-operation through the CSDP.
I thank the Tánaiste again for that response. In view of the heightened level of anxiety about the operations of certain vessels in our territorial waters, and given that we have a long shoreline and are off the west coast of Europe, albeit not directly because one country stands between us and it, can we be assured, and can the Tánaiste be assured from the information available to him, that we have sufficiently invested in the necessary resources to be able to identify a threat well in advance concerning sensitive communications, power lines, communications lines or whatever may be the case in this regard?
As I said in an earlier reply, there are many responsibilities in respect of protecting critical infrastructure. There are responsibilities on the owners and operators and on the Defence Forces in terms of surveillance, etc., but the Naval Service has no unilateral powers of enforcement regarding damage, criminal or otherwise, to undersea cables or other communication links in Ireland's EEZ. The Naval Service retains certain capabilities that allow for underwater search and surveying, including an underwater remotely operated vehicle and a magnetometer system.
We must, however, improve this and, again, the Commission on the Defence Forces was clear on this point. On the future development of subsea capabilities, the report of that commission considered that the step up to the level of ambition, LOA, 2 should seek to deliver enhancement of subsurface capabilities to monitor subsea cables. It also states that to achieve this would mean that the naval fleet should have enhanced air, surface and subsurface search capabilities, with the latter allowing the Naval Service to monitor activity in the vicinity of subsea cables. The Government is committed to doing this and we published a high-level action plan in this regard. We will, therefore, continue to improve this capability.
Is the Deputy okay with that response?
I thank the Tánaiste.
