This Article provides machinery by which the assent of the King shall be given to legislation under this Constitution. That assent like so many other things in the Constitution, bears on this matter of the powers of the King or his representative as a purely automatic process in matters of domestic legislation. It is recognised as such by all those who claim to be authorities on Constitutional matters and to be accepted as writers on Constitutional matters. The veto is as dead in the Dominions as it is in England, where ordinary domestic legislation is concerned. It could be exercised in matters affecting either England or any of the Dominions, but to say that the Veto is entirely obsolete, and to suggest that it must be automatic on the advice of the Executive Council, is not accurate, inasmuch as the most forward of the Dominion statesmen say that if an Act were passed repealing this Treaty or an Act were passed repudiating the Crown, you cannot write it down as part and parcel of the function of the Representative of the Crown to signify the King's assent to that, but there may be no real fear of this Veto. This is a nominal and theoretical veto, and there need be no tendency to take what is set out here in this Article at its literal or face value.
DEBATES ON ADJOURNMENT. - ARTICLE 40.
Mr. O'HIGGINS:
Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS:
I move an amendment to Article 40:—
"To omit in the first paragraph, after the words ‘provided that the Representative of the Crown shall in the withholding of such assent to or reservation of any Bill act' all further words and to substitute the following, ‘on the advice of the Executive Council.' "
It is not suggested there is any difference in meaning between the two; the law, practice and constitutional usage in Canada is that there shall be no disallowance except on the advice of the Executive Council and that where any difference should occur it is not to be over the reservation or disallowance or veto, but a question for the determination of the Courts. In that connection I would like to read the words respecting this that it should be on the records. Sir Robert Borden says the following on the Canadian law, practice and constitutional usage:—
"It appears that but one Act of the Dominion Parliament has been disallowed. It was passed in 1873, and empowered any committee of the Senate or House of Commons to examine witnesses upon oath when so authorised by resolution. There was confusion of opinion as to the competency of Parliament to enact it. The law officers of the United Kingdom eventually advised that the Act was ultra vires, and it was accordingly disallowed for that reason and not upon considerations of policy. Disallowance of either Dominion or Provincial legislation on this ground is practically obsolete. Such questions are properly for the Courts. Several Acts, however, have been reserved, and some of them have not gone into operation as they did not receive the assent of the Queen in Council.
"Probably this course was taken with the consent, if not at the instance, of the Canadian Government. The power of disallowance has not been exercised by the British Government for more than fifty years, and while it still has a legal existence, it may be regarded as constitutionally dead."
I need not stress these words because they were written by a man who was at the time Canadian Premier, and he had access to the records in that particular instance. He would not have used words so grave if he had not very good reason for it. Having stated that the power of disallowance may be regarded as constitutionally dead, he proceeded:—
"Similarly the power of reservation has been little used in recent practice, as a suspending clause is usually inserted in any measure, the provisions of which require negotiation with the British Government or further consideration or action by the Dominion Government before they may properly become operative."
There are other quotations one could give. Quite clearly it is laid down that the law, practice and constitutional usage in Canada, according to the authority of the Canadian Premier at the time he wrote that book, is that no such withholding of assent and no such reservation should proceed in the law, practice and constitutional usage in Canada except on the advice of the Executive Council. It may be asked if there is no difference, why ask for the substitution of one form of words if they both mean the same thing. That would be a reasonable objection to make to the amendment except for one little matter. The question may arise where urgency was the very essence of the problem. If we had it exactly in these words which define the usage in Canada to-day it would not be possible that an urgent question of that kind could be held up while negotiations were proceeding across the Atlantic to discover what was the usage. In any case, knowing what the usage is, it is better to put it in the Constitution clearly and definitely what that usage is.
Mr. G. GAVAN DUFFY:
I support this amendment very strongly, or alternatively one that is down in my name, namely, to the "law, practice, and Constitutional usage, etc., of Canada," to add the words "where the power of veto is obsolete." I think that it will be more profitable to discuss this matter on the next Reading than now, because I realise this is a Clause which Ministers will have to consider very carefully before they agree to alter and it is one that is worth considering carefully. I think the view expressed by the Minister just now understates the rights ths Dominions have. One of the troubles in dealing with this question at the moment is that the Constitutional Conference has not met. I maintain the veto is dead literally, and where there is a dispute between Downing Street and the Dominions, that dispute must be settled by arbitration. It may be by the Dominion Council or other arbitration. But the veto is definitely gone, and arbitration will take its place. Now, if that be so, and if Ministers do not see their way to meet some of us in this matter we will have to press it later on, and give chapter and verse for that assertion. If that be so it is obviously dan gerous to insert words which imply the existence of a real live veto "Provided that the Representative of the Crown shall in the withholding such assent to or the reservation of any Bill." Referring to the withholding or reservation as a thing he intends to do, as a real live thing in constitutional usage, as a real live thing that is going on to-day, these words are extremely objectionable, because they give colour to the suggestion that is put forward in certain quarters in England that this veto is not dead, or, at least, is not dead for certain purposes. I should like to see these words changed or qualified. Here you have a case where the old law has gone in, which we want to get rid of. If England is en titled to say "we must have the law there," we are entitled to say, "well, then we must have the constitutional usage." Deputy Figgis suggests the addition of that. My motion suggests, if you must put down the law, at least tell us the law is dead. Be clear and explicit in cases like this. Either the veto is dead or alive. If it is alive we should know how far it is alive. I think that we can satisfy the Dáil that it is no longer exercisable. Even in the case of Queensland the other day two Bills were withheld from Royal assent because they were confiscatory. These Bills appeared to be unfair. Nevertheless, Downing Street was compelled in the end to agree to these Bills, and the Royal assent was given, because even in the case of a Colony, not a Dominion, the veto is dead. There is another objection I should like to point out before passing from this Clause Every time you mention the Crown you are mentioning something which will be apt to be interpreted in practice in London if you have a reactionary. Ministry, as the equivalent of Downing Street. One knows it is Downing Street decides these things. Where you propose to put down an explicit power given to the Crown as a real thing, you are putting down something which British statesmen will only be too glad hereafter to translate as another power for Downing Street. The people who will function and exercise the power of veto will not be an Irish Ministry, but the Ministry in Downing Street. That is why I am very anxious to see these words changed, so as to express what is, in fact, the present right of veto. If the veto is dead let us say so.
Professor MAGENNIS:
I rise to oppose the amendment, and in doing so I shall be very brief, because I agree that the Third Reading is the proper place for a full discussion. It seems to me that Deputy Figgis's amendment substitutes one form of words for another, of which in the resolution they are the equivalent, and does not leave it any better; in fact, I venture to suggest it leaves us a great deal worse, because in all this debate, wherever the phrase "In accordance with the law, practice and Constitutional usage of Canada" comes in, Deputy Gavan Duffy has been meticulously careful to insist that we should take these three together, not as separate factors, but as conjoint factors, so that whatever Canada has achieved in its Constitutional development, is to be ours. Supposing that view prevails which is the most favourable view of the Irish interpretation of the Treaty? In Article 40, it is provided:—"So soon as any Bill shall have been passed or deemed to have been passed by both Houses, the Executive Council shall present the same to the Representative of the Crown for the signification by him, in the King's name, of the King's assent, and such Representative may withhold the King's assent or reserve the Bill for the signification of the King's pleasure; Provided that the Representative of the Crown shall in the withholding of such assent to or the reservation of any Bill, act in accordance with the law, practice, and Constitutional usage governing the like withholding of assent or reservation in the Dominion of Canada." The result of Mr. Duffy's amendment is that the King is to act through and by the advice of his Ministers. The speech of General Smuts in the Union Parliament on September 18th, 1919, declares in unmistakable language the veto is dead, the veto is obsolete; and again in connection with the third passage he says the veto is dead. We have the declaration of Sir Robert Borden—"The veto is dead." That, I know, was in the minds of many Deputies here when discussing the relations of the King and our Legislature. Now on yesterday in regard to the oath we again had the idea here that the King is the British King and under the English Constitutional usage is pledged to act by the advice of his Ministers; but we must not lose sight of the fact that the King in relation to the Dominions is obliged to act on the advice of his Ministers, and our status, in the Union of Free Nations, is the status of Canada. Therefore, taking that view, it seems to me that Deputy Darrell Figgis' amendment is really puting us at the best in the same position as Article 40. So long as the words of the Treaty are retained we shall be able to look round at the Canadian practice and the practice in other Dominions and say, "Good, this being so, that is what Ireland is entitled to," whereas in the words of Deputy Darrell Figgis they are merely a declaration on the part of this Dáil, apparently detached, speaking for itself, and with no authority, but an authority that the British Cabinet in Downing Street would not recognise. Then, he put forward on the part of Ireland a claim to the fullest extent of sovereignty. I therefore think the amendment is objectionable on one interpretation, and is undoubtedly uncalled for.
Mr. JOHNSON:
There are two amendments under discussion. It seems to me that the second is much more desirable than the first. If the first were adopted we would be in this position, that the withholding of assent is to be on the advice of the Executive Council, which is a body subject to the Dáil or to the Oireachtas, which has passed the legislation, and it would mean that the Executive Council is going against the will of the Oireachtas in advising the Government to withhold assent. I don't think that is intended. On the other hand, the second amendment asks us to insert the words "where the power of the veto is obsolete." I take it that the implication there is, that there may be a withholding or a reservation of assent, but that there is no veto. That seems to me to fill the bill fairly well, but I would repeat the argument that I used, and I think I was called over the coals for in another respect, that this Clause as it is framed practically invites the British Parliament to put down in an Act at the start of Saorstát Eireann the contention that there is a power of veto over Canadian legislation. And in this matter I think we ought to range ourselves alongside the more forward and independent statesmen in the Dominions rather than on the side of those members of the British Government who maintain that the King's veto is still prevalent. And, touching the argument of the Minister in introducing this Clause I also remembered the quotation from General Smuts, which was read by Deputy Magennis a few days ago. It was Smuts declared that there was no veto in ordinary legislation. The only veto that prevailed was that if they desired to secede, the King would then be bound to stand by the Constitution. And the Minister for Home Affairs suggests that that is the effective veto that is still held, and that will be held by the Crown in the case of the Irish Legislature. But you are safeguarded from any risks of that kind by your preliminary Clause, by your statement of the fact that nothing in this Constitution will be repugnant to the Clauses of the Treaty, so that there is no necessity for putting this particular clause in regard to the reservation of the Crown in the body of the Constitution. If the veto is obsolete in ordinary legislation the introduction of the phrase to the effect that it is obsolete cannot do any harm, and would support the contention of those Ministers of Canada, South Africa, and Australia that there is no ground of veto from the legislation of these Dominions; and I think we ought to support those contentions by our conduct in the draft of this Constitution, because we are led to believe that that Constitution will have to go through the British Legislature, and if they in formulating it or confirming it confirm a clause to the effect that the law, practice, and constitutional usage in respect of the Dominion of Canada includes the withholding of the assent, you are practically denying the contentions of those Dominion Ministers.
Mr. O'HIGGINS:
A Chinn Chomhairle, it seems to me that these amendments are not improvements in the Article "providing that the Representative of the Crown shall in the withholding of such assent to, or reservation of any Bill, act in accordance with the law, practice, and constitutional usage governing the like withholding of assent or reservation in the Dominion of Canada."
AN LEAS CHEANN COMHAIRLE:
There is only one amendment before the Dáil at the present time. Members discussed both.
Mr. O'HIGGINS:
Which amendment is now before the Dáil?
AN LEAS CHEANN COMHAIRLE:
The amendment by Deputy Figgis to omit in the first paragraph after the words "provided that the Representative of the Crown shall in the withholding of such assent."
Mr. O'HIGGINS:
The discussion ranged pretty generally on the Article and on the amendments.
AN LEAS CHEANN COMHAIRLE:
On both.
Mr. O'HIGGINS:
Deputy Gavan Duffy speaks of the Imperial Conference which is to bring the millennium. In his mind he set more store on the writen word than on the fact. I do not know about these conferences. I saw a letter from Mr. Harrison in the papers which said that that conference sat last year and decided to do nothing. We do not know whether the conference which Deputy Gavan Duffy has his eye on will ever meet, and I really do not care. If you have the fact, that is the thing that matters, not the ink and the paper. Now, we are told that the fact is such and such in Canada, and you have set down here that this business was to be carried out in accordance with the law, practice and constitutional usage of Canada, and you get from this position that if there be any attempt to claim a right here that is a challenge to Canada and to every other Dominion, and you get that kind of joint interest and joint protection because of the common challenge that you would not get if you stood on your own footing by accepting this particular amendment of Deputy Darrell Figgis. England could not claim to assert a right of veto here that would not be a deliberate and cold-blooded challenge to the Canadian Constitutional position. I think that particular formula there is the formula we are aiming at, and, if possible, we should have in every matter affecting our relations with Great Britain. The challenge here or the attempt to advance here is a challenge all round and will be resented all round. That is the position. Deputies ought not to run away with the idea that only they appreciate these things and only they realise their importance, and that some brain wave they had to-day, or yesterday, or the day before on this matter deserves consideration by the Government. This Constitution was carefully considered by the Government, and any important matters in it were carefully discussed with the help of people who were undoubtedly experts, and any point that was considered of importance here was pushed as far and as hard in our relations with the British as we deemed it in the interests of this country to push it. If people are not satisfied with the result, if they think we made an error of judgment, then let them take on, in God's name, and push it further if they can.
Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS:
There are one or two matters I would like to urge still further on these points—just three issues. The argument of Dominion Ministers has been quoted by Deputy Magennis and also by myself. Sir Robert Borden and General Smuts have been brought in, and it is just as well to recognise the protestations they have made are not protestations which are admitted in Downing Street. That is the essential fact. Downing Street does not admit what Sir Robert Borden says on the veto, and the objection to the amendment is that we should align ourselves with regard to the arguments of the majority of the Members to the coequal members of the community rather than with the minority. I do state here that this form of wording has aroused a certain amount of criticism in Canada—governing the withholding of consent in Canada. That is the point of view in Downing Street. The point in Canada is that there is no such withholding. Since Deputy Gavan Duffy's amendment has been urged as being preferable to mine, it is a matter of indifference. But on the veto, using the word "obsolete" in this connection in reference to "reserve," I believe it is applicable to veto, but not to "reservation." It has occurred—and Sir Robert Borden gives an instance—when the Executive Council has advised that certain matters be reserved. It has been suggested that that might bring the law of one community into conflict with the law of another community, and thereby create a certain amount of friction.
CATHAL O'SHANNON:
Although I do not like the form in which Deputy Figgis puts his amendment—I prefer Deputy Gavan Duffy's—but actually I agree, in essence, perhaps, that the Article as it stands may express the position. But I think consideration should be given to the argument. Deputy Figgis has mentioned now that, while Constitutional Authorities in the Dominions, like Borden and Smuts, and their Governments and peoples take one view, it is perfectly true that Downing Street does not take that view, and outside what I may call the theoretical constitutions that are mentioned those who in England occupy positions, such as Borden and Smuts in Canada and South Africa, you will not find Lloyd George, or Curzon, or Churchill, or any of these who are the actual powers, taking or expressing, at all events, the views expressed by Borden and Smuts. Now, in my opinion, the veto is certainly dead and damned. The power of reservation may not be dead; but if we have got to take the exact constitutional position as it is, let us remember, as far as Canada is concerned, the thing might be made clear long ago. There is no power in the Canadian law and the Canadian Constitution of amending the Constitution. There is the power in this Constitution before us, and there might be in another form I can foresee, and I should like to know if the Government is going to stand up for the position that if we do things here Britain does not like, and that Britain's interference with these things constitutes a challenge to the Dominions, well and good; well, I think my friends and myself would be with the Government in that. This amendment is one of the things on which I think we ought to stand up and have it out with Britain. There is no use in throwing in the face of the Dáil that if we do stand up Ministers here will chuck office and let ourselves carry on. You know that is childish, and not at all in keeping with realities as this is. Now, if the representative of the Crown with his power is going to be the real thing, and if it is going to be of any effective use, it seems to me where it can possibly be of effective use it would be as a kind of referee as between one constituent State of this Commonwealth and the others. And the form, or something in the Article to this effect, might suit. Supposing that during the passage of a Bill, or a certain length of time after the passage of a Bill, one other Member of the Commonwealth, or even Great Britain, expressed misgivings, and said that Bill, or something in it, affected very vitally some interest of other members of the Commonwealth, I think it would be a fair thing if the Representatives of the Crown—if you take the Crown as a link between the States—thereupon withheld assent from this measure for the time being in order that the State that brought about the intervention of the Representative of the Crown might have time to settle to mutual advantage the point raised. I think there could be no reasonable objection to withholding that assent for a certain time, maybe for days or months. I do not think the withholding of consent in such case could be very well objected to. In that case, and this is a most important thing, the co-equality of this State with the other States, even with Britain, would be asserted. I think that would be a most important thing to have asserted, and I would suggest, if the Government is at all willing to consider this thing, that that is a consideration that it might well take into account, if it does not accept the amendment and re-draft it in such a way that the arguments that have been put up might be met. We would have here these definite things in allying ourselves with other peoples. There are many people in the Dáil who think that we are quite good enough to go on on our own. Give us a decision or test. It would not only be a test, but a re-assertion of our co-equality. If the Government would stand up on a thing like this I think they would get a good deal of support in the Dáil
Professor MAGENNIS:
May I intrude myself, for one moment, in reply to what Deputy Darrell Figgis said just now? I think I could provide him with quotations to show he is not quite correct in saying that while these declarations of the Dominion Ministers are good enough they do not represent what Downing Street accepts. One quotation—I cannot give the exact words—is from a speech of Mr. Lloyd George, in which he said there was a time when Downing Street controlled the Dominions, but now the Dominions control Downing Street. At that Imperial Conference, which was of such vast importance—the first time the Representatives of the various Dominions were called upon to confer on external policy and relations— the representatives of Canada distinctly declared, in the most unmistakeable way, the very thing which we are attempting to formulate here, and it was not contested. It is true, as a piece of law that because another man does not contest my claim specifically, or at the moment, it is not tantamount to an acceptance of it, but in a matter of high politics like this I think it would be taken to be an estoppel. With regard to Deputy O'Shannon's remarks just now, I would like to say the King is the link and bond and outward symbol of unity. There is a power of reserved legislation in one Dominion if it is thought likely to interfere with, or destroy, or impair, the interests of another Dominion, until a conference can be held upon it. That is a sort of reservation that hurts no one, because as the Deputy put it, it is really acting like an arbitrator or referee, and it is a most useful thing to have. It seems to me, that as regards Deputy Darrell Figgis's amendment, that we are better off with the wording of the clause as it stands, because we have the wording of the Treaty, and that is a most decided advantage. If someone complains that the wording seems to imply that there is a reservation, I think that it is forcing the thing unfairly. Surely to say that the reservation shall be on the advice of the Ministers of the Free State does not commit us to the doctrine that there shall be such a reservation. Such a situation may never arise. As a piece of history, between the passing of the British North America Act in 1867 and 1877—about 10 years—a large number of Canadian Bills were interfered with from Downing Street until the Canadians determined to stand it no longer. They put in a protest, and ever since nothing of the kind has occurred. You must notice this, that while the Constitutions of Australia, Canada, and our own Constitution, will be written Constitutions, yet in the case of the oldest of the Dominions there has been allowed on the part of Downing Street to grow up the development of an unwritten Constitution, and it is because that is so—and that is a very important historical fact—that this thing takes on a new significance. All the relations of the Irish Free State to the British Crown shall be regulated by law, practice and constitutional usage. If the law stood alone, we should be governed by the written Constitution, but with the practice and constitutional usage we get the benefit of the new development of the unwritten Constitution. Therefore, I think there is much virtue in the words of the Treaty, even though retaining them also involves a retention of some verbiage.
CATHAL O'SHANNON:
With reference to what Mr. Lloyd George said, Deputy Magennis knows that that was a generalisation Mr. Lloyd George was making, as to the relations between the Dominions and Great Britain. It was not with reference to the specific power of withholding, or reserving, or vetoing. I doubt if Deputy Magennis, or any other Deputy, can show an authoritative statement on this specific point from a British statesman, such as the statements we have heard from Borden and Smuts.
Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS:
I am pressing this amendment, but if it is not going to be accepted by the Ministry, I would like the Minister, in any remarks he makes, to deal with the wording of this "Provided that the Representative of the Crown shall in the withholding of such assent to order reservation of any Bill, act in accordance with the law, practice, and constitutional usage governing the like withholding of assent or reservation in the Dominion of Canada."
Mr. BLYTHE:
In reply to the question or suggestion of Deputy O'Shannon, the second last time he spoke, I need only say we will not accept the amendment, we will not withdraw the clause for consideration or amendment, and we do not think that the arguments put forward have any great weight. Much has been made of the alleged difference of view between Downing Street and the Dominion Ministers. If such differences existed, then it is rather an argument for retaining the clause as it is than an argument for accepting either of the amendments. A few days ago Deputy Gavan Duffy made a very lengthy plea to us to wait for this Constitutional Conference, and not to attempt to define what was the practice and Constitutional usage of the Dominions. Now we have Deputies upon the other tack, and the suggestion is that we shall here set down what is the practice and Constitutional usage of, say, Canada. In the Treaty we accepted the law, practice and constitutional usage of Canada, and we are bound to it, except in so far as the other side might agree to vary the strict interpretation, and except in so far as the law might not he applicable. In this clause we have the law set down in the first part—the clause beginning "provided" gives us the Constitutional usage. It does not attempt to define precisely what the Constitutional usage is, and any statements as to that being in dispute are only arguments for retaining the clause as it is, and not for taking sides in a matter which is not in dispute. It does not really fall upon us to fight the battle of the Canadians. We know that over all domestic legislation the veto is obsolete. In the case of Queensland— the case referred to—it was admitted that no matter how objectionable some people may feel certain legislation to be, legislation dealing with domestic matters was not by Constitutional usage subject to the veto, and assent could not be withheld. As to this clause giving offence to Canada, I do not think that that is a matter to be taken at all seriously.
Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS:
As a question of personal explanation, I simply refer to the offence to indicate that there was a discrepancy indicated in the wording.
Mr. BLYTHE:
It has been stated here that reservation of Bills does take place, and might rightly take place. There are cases in which I believe myself it would be the duty of the Representative of the Crown to withhold assent; for instance, in the case of a law which proposes secession or the abolition of the Crown. Consequently there is nothing objectionable from our point of view in the assertion of the words here "or in withholding such assent or reservation of any Bill not in accordance with the law and practice." These words are not, from our point of view, objectionable, and we are not concerned with any Canadian point of view.
Mr. GAVAN DUFFY:
I think it is necessary to point out where the Minister spoke of the importance of our not taking sides in these international questions that the feeling that motived my amendment and Deputy Figgis's amendment is the fact that in the Clause we do purport to take sides—the side advocated by Downing Street—against the side advocated by the progressive Dominions.
I must say we dispute that point absolutely and entirely. The position we take up in regard to this is exactly what is in the Treaty. We know, as Deputy Figgis, Deputy Gavan Duffy, and Deputy O'Shannon know, that the withholding of assent is practically obsolete. We may say it is entirely obsolete. Deputy Figgis mentioned one incident in forty years, or something like that, in Canada. That is your guarantee. If I was to sign a document to say I would pay a man an annuity the same as I had paid him for the last forty years, and had not paid him a fraction in forty years, would he be entitled to get an annuity from me? I do not think he would. And that is the position with regard to this matter here.
Mr. GAVAN DUFFY:
I gather the President accepts my amendment stating that this law is obsolete.
Certainly not, sir; you do not gather any such thing.
Amendment put and negatived without division.
Mr. GAVAN DUFFY:
There are two further amendments to this clause upon the paper in my name, but I propose to defer them until the next reading.
Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS:
I beg to move as an amendment to delete the second paragraph of Article 40, and to insert instead thereof the following paragraph:—"The King's pleasure in respect of any Bill reserved shall be made known within one year. If the King's assent is withheld, and a similar or substantially similar Bill is presented within three years thereafter, the King's assent may be withheld only on the advice of the Imperial Conference." Now, in the amendment as it stands here I have deliberately adopted a certain form of wording which admittedly is not very pleasing, but it is the wording of the original Article. I think it is not very pleasant to talk in any democratic country of the King's pleasure, but the wording is the same as that of the original Article I recommend this amendment to the President because it raises a matter of very great importance. There is nothing so far as the form of words is concerned very offensive, and I believe this form of words would be accepted on the other side instead of the second paragraph of the Article as it stands. The recommendation was made by one who had some experience in these matters, in another place, and he proposed that this form of words would prevent a deadlock in the future. Very often it did happen that this royal pleasure was withdrawn for over a year, and it was used to facilitate motions which are frequently put down in the English House merely as blocking motions, namely, to prevent all such business in the future. The kind of legislation to which this applies is legislation which comes within the ambit of the review of what is known as an Imperial Conference, that is to say, that matters dealt with by one member of the community of nations is not its sole and only concern, but is the concern of other members of the community of nations. Just, for example, as such questions as emigration from one part of the community to another part, or a prohibition of such emigration, are matters that will arise, not between ourselves and Australia, say, but between ourselves and England, as two co-equal members, and it would impede progress and be destructive of harmony, if Bills of this kind are going to be held up indefinitely. I urge that the President might consider this article, because I believe it would be accepted in other places and it would lead to more rapid and smoother working.
Mr. BLYTHE:
The view of the Ministry in regard to this amendment is that it is distinctly a weakening amendment, and that the likelihood of any trouble in this respect, or of any attempt to withhold assent from a Bill, will be less with the clause as it stands than it would be if we were to provide brand new machinery to advise the King to withhold assent. I think Deputies reading the clause will be of that opinion, and it is not necessary to labour the point.
Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS:
I will not press the amendment. I am withdrawing it.
Motion made and question put: "That Article 40 stand part of the Bill."
Agreed.