DÁIL IN COMMITTEE. - CIVIL SERVICE REGULATION (No. 2) BILL, 1923. THIRD STAGE.
(1) It shall be lawful for the Executive Council from time to time to appoint fit and proper persons to be Civil Service Commissioners (in this Act referred to as "the Commissioners") to fulfil the functions assigned to such Commissioners by this Act.
(2) The number of such Commissioners shall not at any time be more than three.
(3) Every person appointed under this section to be a Commissioner shall hold office during the pleasure of the Executive Council.
I ask leave to take my two amendments together. They are (1) in sub-section (2) line 23, to delete the words "not at any time," and (2) In sub-section (2) line 24 to delete the words "more than." The object of these amendments is to establish the principle that there shall always be three Commissioners. Under the Bill as it stands, it would be possible that there might be merely one Commissioner, and that is a matter to which the Civil Service, in so far as their views are represented by the Civil Service Federation, attach considerable importance.
They feel that though they are beyond the reach of examination themselves that recruitment of the service is a matter of considerable importance to them both as regards the efficiency of their work and as regards the prestige of the service, and they are anxious to preserve this independence and the independence of the Civil Service Commissioners as far as possible. I think the amendment has another point in its favour, and it is that we have in this country two systems certainly not hostile, not conflicting, but slightly divergent types of University education, the system represented by Trinity and the system represented by the National University. It is desirable, I think, that one of the Commissioners should represent each of these points of view, and that the third Commissioner, attached to neither school, should act as arbiter between them. I ask the Minister for Finance if he will consider, and make it quite clear in the Bill, that the normal number of Commissioners should be three instead of "not more than" three; and also if he will secure that under no circumstances will this vast and considerable power be entrusted to one Commissioner only.
On a point of order, I desire to ask if there is not some mistake about amendment 1. If it were passed it would read that the number of Commissioners should be more than three.
As I have already stated, Amendment 2 is being taken with amendment 1.
But supposing amendment 1 is passed, and amendment 2 is not passed?
The two amendments are being taken together, and Deputy Johnson must direct his attention to the effect of their being passed or negatived together.
Would I be in order to ask Deputy Bryan Cooper to what exactly he refers when he speaks of two divergent types of education as represented by Trinity College and the National University of Ireland so divergent as to require two separate Commissioners to represent them?
I thought it was common knowledge, but, if the Deputy contradicts me, I will take his word for it, because I had not the advantage of a University education. I have read that there is a certain peculiar mould into which Trinity, at any rate, casts its Graduates, and I assume that the National University, though young, is in process of acquiring a somewhat similar, but not identical, mould. I expressly said that there was no hostility between the two Universities, but you might have a difference in point of view, and I think it would be undesirable if one Commissioner, representing one University, were to be appointed to the exclusion of the other.
I do not propose to accept the amendment. The volume of work which the Commissioners will have to carry out will be small, comparatively. Even at the present time, when there are arrears of work to be undertaken, the work of the Civil Service Commissioners is very much part-time work. As a matter of fact, at the present time, the work is being carried out by three Commissioners who have other responsibilities and greater responsibilities, and it is possible for them to do it. When we have settled down, the holding of examinations, at regular intervals, will be, for the most part, the work of the Commission, and will require a very small amount of time from the Commissioners themselves, and consequently, from the point of view of the volume of work, there is nothing to be said for binding ourselves to three. It might quite well be desirable in the future that we would rather have one than three, and I do not see that we need actually bind ourselves to any particular number. We might very well be able to get on with two, and in fact we might cease to employ Civil Service Commissioners at all, and get in people from outside. It may not be desirable then that we should actually have three, because the question of remuneration in that case might be a somewhat serious one. I think there is going to be no disposition to make the Civil Service Commission other than a reasonable body or a reasonable institution, to carry on the work which is to be carried on, and I think we may leave it to the Government, or to the Executive Council that may be in existence at any particular time, to make the best arrangements they can for the carrying out of that work. It seems to me to be entirely wrong to take up the point of view, as some Deputies appear to do, that the Civil Service Commissioners will continually have to fight the Government of the day. I think that point of view is entirely fallacious and that we should not act on it. If we are not going to have Governments that will observe the letter and also the spirit of the law, I think we will not be able to have our Civil Service what it ought to be, and I think that we will gain nothing by trying to hedge round these Civil Service Commissioners with too many precautions and safeguards.
The Bill provides in this Section the machinery for holding examinations, and for the holding of them with fair and reasonable safeguards. I think we ought to take the point of view that every Government, and not alone the Civil Service Commissioners, will desire to have its Civil Service recruited so that it will get the best possible material, and that it will give an equal and a fair opportunity to all classes of citizens, and one also that will make the arrangements that may be necessary to have the work done efficiently. For that reason I see no need for specifying three in particular. There is a reason for specifying that there should not be more than three, because there may be a question of salaries and charges, and I think it is necessary to limit the maximum number. I see no reason for fixing a minimum number, and I really look upon this amendment as one that is unnecessary, and one that might tie up the hands of the Executive for making what it may regard as the best arrangement, from time to time, for carrying on the work of the Civil Service Commission.
I desire to ask for leave to withdraw the two amendments.
Amendments, one and two, by leave withdrawn.
I beg to move as an amendment to delete sub-section (3), and to add at the end of the Section a new sub-section as follows:—
"The office of any person appointed under this section to be a Commissioner may be vacated by resignation in writing under his hand, but failing such resignation no Commissioner shall be removed from his office save for incapacity or physical or mental infirmity, or misbehaviour in office or misconduct, which shall be certified under the hand of the Minister for Finance. It shall be the duty of the Minister for Finance to give such certificate in case he is satisfied that such incapacity or infirmity exists or that such misbehaviour or misconduct has taken place. No such certificate shall be questioned or made the subject of proceedings in any Court."
In moving this, I have, first of all, to apologise to the Minister and to the Dáil for a mis-statement I made in my speech on the Second Reading. I said I was under the impression that in England the Commissioners do not hold office permanently. My memory misled me, but that is not to be wondered at when one has to read eight or nine Bills in a few days. Now, with regard to this question, I was told by Deputy Johnson on the Second Reading that I was exaggerating the importance of the Civil Service Commission, and that they were really only persons for conducting examinations. I do not think that is entirely correct, because of an answer to a question which I put to the Minister for Home Affairs to-day. I did not put the question for that purpose, but in his answer he stated that "before appointment to the permanent Civil Service candidates will be required to satisfy the Civil Service Commissioners that their character and health are satisfactory."
Besides conducting examinations, the Commissioners will have to inquire into the character and health of the candidates. That means that they will have to arrange for the holding of a medical examination, and will require to have a certificate of character from some person knowing the candidate, such as a clergyman. If it were only a question of conducting examinations, I have sat for a good many examinations with varying success, and I can assure Deputy Johnson that it makes a good deal of difference as to who sets the examination papers. If I were to imagine the ghastly possibility that all members of the Dáil had to pass an examination in the subject, say of economies, it would, I suggest, make a big difference as to whether the papers were set by Deputy Johnson or by Deputy Gorey. The only prophecy I can make is that the Minister for Agriculture would probably be plucked by both of them. If you had the examiners selected from a certain school of thought, it would be regarded as a grievance by those educated under another system. As regards the body that selects the examiners, it is very desirable that it should be in a position of absolute independence. I am not suggesting, as Deputy Johnson assumed, that the examiners should take the status of a Judge of the High Court. I have taken a very much humbler official, the District Justice, as my model in this amendment, but the Sub-section in the Bill is modelled on a Section in the Courts of Justice Bill which gives the District Justice precisely the same immunity from removal from office. The Minister, on the Second Reading of the Bill, and also inferentially to-day, said something about Governments always acting for the best, and trying to establish the best kind of Civil Service. That is not the case in the United States of America. The Government of the United States, under the influence of the founders of the Constitution, just as we are now under the influence of the founders of this State, set up an impartial and excellent Civil Service Commission which made its appointments in the most laudable manner, and these appointments were permanent.
After the Constitution had been in existence about 40 years, there came a wild man from the West called Andrew Jackson — not Johnson — who swept out every office-holder and every Civil Service Commissioner and introduced the "spoil" system, which made every Civil Service appointment — postmaster, Customs officer and others—dependent on the support of the party which was victorious. From that day until this the United States have been struggling to free themselves from that system and have not completely succeeded. If that state of affairs can exist in the United States, which has a rather larger Irish population than the Saorstát, it might conceivably exist here. I, like the Minister, would prefer to rely on the spirit in which the Act would be administered. I have no love of paper safeguards. But when you have a paper Constitution you must have paper safeguards. The spirit of the Constitution is what counts. But when you have a Constitution on paper you must have paper safeguards. I do most earnestly ask the Minister to consider this question of making the Civil Service Commissioners immune and safe from removal upon any change of Government. I am not censuring the Government. I am expressing the most extreme confidence in it. I want to see the persons they nominate remain in office for the rest of their lives. I am perfectly sure they will make a good selection. I do not want the Commissioners, who will have to determine the different standards of examination, to go out every time there is a change of Government or any time a Government may think it necessary to reward its own supporters.
I would be prepared to go a little way to meet Deputy Bryan Cooper in this matter. I would be prepared, on the Report Stage, to introduce a provision that the appointment and removal of every Civil Service Commissioner should be gazetted. That would mean that it would be assured that it would be done as a public act. There are other officials, just as important as the Civil Service Commissioners, who are removable at the pleasure of the Executive Council — the Revenue Commissioners, for instance. The Revenue Commissioners discharge extremely responsible duties, and duties in which the Executive Council might be tempted to interfere far more than in the case of the Civil Service Commissioners. The Revenue Commissioners are removable at pleasure. I do not know that what Deputy Cooper has said about the Civil Service of the United States tells against my point of view at all, which is that if you provide the machinery and system for doing things you have to rely on the Government observing the spirit of that system in using the machinery. The Government may change the system, and if you have a Government that desires to change the system it will change it in spite of any safeguards you provide. There may be reasons — very good reasons — why you would change your Civil Service Commissioners, without any question of incapacity or misconduct being involved. It might be done simply for convenience. For instance, the Ceann Comhairle, who is a Civil Service Commissioner at the moment, might cease to be Ceann Comhairle here.
He might, perhaps, be engaged in some business elsewhere in the country, which would make it difficult and perhaps costly and inconvenient for him to act as Civil Service Commissioner. Still, he could do the work and he could not be removed, although he would not be on the spot. He might not want to resign. You might have a situation of that sort. You might have a Commissioner who is a Civil Servant—say, the Secretary of the Ministry of Education. He might cease to be in the Ministry of Education and it might be considered desirable that the new Secretary of the Ministry of Education should take up his duties. Remember, that as Secretary to the Ministry of Education he is under the will and pleasure of the Executive Council, and his services can be dispensed with at any time. I think it would be somewhat absurd to have the Executive Council able to dismiss him from the lucrative position and not able to dismiss him from the honorary position. I think what I suggested might meet Deputy Bryan Cooper, that any changes in the personnel of the Civil Service Commission should be required to be mentioned in the "Gazette." That would give an opportunity to any Deputy who thought there was anything queer about the matter to have it thrashed out in the Dáil. After all, the Dáil will be the ultimate tribunal, and if it does not deal with the matter there will be no hope.
Has not the Minister argued very cogently against constituting the Civil Service Commission in the way he at present contends. If the Secretary of the Ministry of Education is to be a Civil Service Commissioner, and if he is to be gazetted as removed because he has ceased to be Secretary of the Ministry of Education, it follows, I think, very clearly, that in the mind of the Minister for Finance it is an ex-officio office. I see that he dissents from that. It is true that I have over-stated the case. It is not necessarily true that it will be always an ex-officio office, but it leaves room for removing a Commissioner merely because he has ceased to hold the Secretaryship of the Education Ministry. The Minister spoke also on the last amendment as if he conceived the Civil Service Commissioners as always part-time officials. When going into this question of “the spoils to the victors” and “corruption” and all the rest, is it a good thing for the staffing of the Civil Service of the nation that the entire administration of it, on the side of determination of programmes and standards for all posts, and the conduct of examinations, should be in the hands of part-time officials? Is it desirable that these men should occupy other public offices from which they are dismissable on other grounds? It does not seem to be an ideal system to set up.
I should have preferred if the Minister had, in the interests of economy, appointed only one Commissioner and had put an Advisory Board, constituted in whatever way might be determined, at the service of such one Commissioner. The entire responsibility would then be placed upon him. I think that what he proposed leads in that direction — I mean not what he proposed officially but what he proposed in reply.
I would say that if Deputy Bryan Cooper's amendment was passed it would become much more difficult to appoint one Commissioner.
I am afraid I am very stupid because I am not quite convinced that because the Revenue Commissioners have been placed in a bad position, or in a position they should not be placed in, the Civil Service Commissioners should be placed in the same position. I am grateful to the Minister for meeting me — I will not say half way but one-eighth of the distance. I will withdraw the amendment on the undertaking of the Minister that he will deal with the point on the Report Stage.
Amendments 3 and 4 by leave withdrawn. Section 1 put and agreed to.
SECTION 2.
(1) Every person appointed to be a Commissioner under this Act shall receive such remuneration as the Minister for Finance shall determine.
(2) The Minister for Finance shall appoint such and so many persons as he may consider necessary to be officers of the Commissioners, and such persons shall hold office upon such terms and be remunerated at such rates and in such manner as the Minister for Finance shall determine.
(3) The remuneration of the Commissioners and their officers and such other expenses of carrying this Act into effect as may be sanctioned by the Minister for Finance shall be paid out of moneys provided by the Oireachtas.
Amendment 5. To insert before Section 2 a new Section as follows:—
"The age of retirement of all Commissioners shall be 65 years, but the Executive Council may on the advice of the Minister for Finance extend the age of retirement in the case of any Commissioner to 75 years."
This amendment is really consequential on the previous one, which I have withdrawn. It is obviously necessary where you make a Commissioner a permanent official that you should fix some retiring age, when he will become pensionable. I am not much in love with this part-time system in regard to the Commissioners. They may be too much under official influence. It would be much better to have an independent Civil Service Commission, composed of independent officials who would become pensionable at the normal pensionable age. I took the District Justice as my model and I followed the Courts of Justice Bill as far as I could. As the previous amendment has been withdrawn, I do not see that there would be any use in pressing this amendment and therefore I withdraw it.
Amendment not moved.
I move:
"In sub-section (2), line 31, to delete the words `The Minister for Finance' and to substitute therefor the words `The Commissioners, with the consent of the Minister for Finance.' "
Here I am on stronger ground, and I hope very much that the Minister will accept this amendment. Surely the ordinary staff of the Commissioners should be appointed by the Commissioners themselves. The Commissioners should appoint them because the staff have to work under them. Surely they should select the men they think most fit for the work, subject to the consent of the Minister for Finance. This would give the Minister for Finance the power of exercising his veto. As the thing stands the Minister for Finance may — I am sure in the present case he would not — appoint anybody on the staff of the Commissioners. The Commissioners might have to accept unsuitable men according to the provisions of this Bill. I think the rule in every other Government Department is that the staff is appointed by the people for whom they are to work. In practice, I suppose, the Commissioners would make recommendations to the Minister for Finance, but this should be included in the Bill. I would urge the Minister to accept this amendment.
I think this amendment arises from a difference in point of view. The Minister for Finance will be the Minister responsible. He is the Minister who will answer in the Dáil. That is one aspect of it. Then it should be remembered that in the case of the Comptroller and Auditor General, where there would be a much stronger case for not vesting the appointment in the Minister for Finance, the appointment of the staff is actually vested in the Minister for Finance. The Comptroller and Auditor General is an officer, as you might say, of a much higher status than the Civil Service Commissioner. He is appointed by, and responsible to the Dáil. He is irremovable. He has the standing almost of a Judge. Yet his staff is appointed by the Minister for Finance. I think there is no case for the appointment of the staff by the Civil Service Commissioners. Then there is the other fact that you would have a part-time staff. You will have some of your staff that will be working in the Civil Service. You may have one person permanently employed in the Civil Service, others will be employed only from time to time. It is obvious they should not be appointed by the Commissioners. You would have your difficulties about putting them on to other work when not required for the work of the Civil Service Commission. I do not think that there would be any throwing of duds on the Commission, so that it would be prevented from doing its work. I do not think that could occur.
Can the Minister say how the Staff of the Commissioners of Public Works are appointed? They are under the Minister for Finance? Does he appoint them?
As he appoints the others. The Minister does not look for somebody himself and appoint him. He appoints people put up to him, if he is satisfied that they are competent.
I do not want to press this amendment, if I get an undertaking that the point will be considered on the Report Stage and some words inserted like "on the advice of the Commissioners," or "after consultation with the Commissioners." I do not want to press the amendment, as the Minister's undertaking has done something already to meet my point. I hope he will consider the possibility of meeting the amendment. Those apprehensions I have mentioned are felt in the Civil Service, and it is desirable that they should be dispelled as soon as possible.
I will consider the question of consultation with the Commissioners. There is a clause in the Ministry's Bill which says: "The Executive Council shall, on the recommendation of the Minister, appoint the principal officer of each of the said Departments, and each of the said Ministers may appoint such other officers and servants to serve in the Department of which he is the head, as such Minister may, with the sanction of the Minister for Finance, determine." This might be a case for appointment by the Executive Council, but I think it would be on the recommendation of the Minister for Finance.
If the Minister considers the point again, I will withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments 7 and 9 are taken together. This has given me some food for consideration. I have decided to allow amendment 7 to be moved. Amendment 9, however, brings a new class of persons within a section of the Superannuation Act which would impose a further charge for pensions on the State, and could not be moved by an ordinary member. I am, therefore, not allowing amendment 9 to be moved.
I move:
In Sub-section (2), line 33, to delete all words from "upon such terms" to the end of the Sub-section, and to substitute therefor the words:
"by the same tenure, and upon the same terms and conditions (including conditions as to salaries and superannuation) as other Civil Servants in the Saorstát."
Amendment 7 merely seeks to place the Staff of the Commissioners of the Civil Service in the same position as any other civil servants. It seeks to establish that they shall be entitled to all the privileges of the Civil Service and not merely liable to dismissal. The functions they have to perform are important and they should not be allowed to become the subject of undue influence. There was an American politician who said he did not care how the elections were carried on, provided he counted the votes. Those officials will have to count the marks, and it is desirable that they should be removed from the influence of candidates. If they are part-time officials they are already entitled to those rights. If you take on a man to act as Secretary to the Commission, he should have the same pensionable rights, surely, as any other civil servant. It is highly desirable that the body recruiting the Civil Service should not be inferior to any other body in the Civil Service.
The intention of the Deputy is our intention, but this amendment goes a little further than he intends. The amendment talks of the same tenure, and the same terms and conditions as other civil servants in the Saorstát. There are various sorts of civil servants, and civil servants who hold varying sorts of tenure. Prison warders are civil servants for the purpose of the Superannuation Acts, and have peculiar rights. The civil servants who are transferred on a change of Government have peculiar tenure and rights. There is a further point. It is an objection to the use of the words "Civil Service." Under the Superannuation Acts, a civil servant is an officer who is entitled to a pension as holding a permanent and established post. Now the words of the amendment might tend to convert a temporary clerk or temporary typist into a person holding "a permanent and established post." I think there is no necessity for the amendment. If a person is appointed to a permanent and established post, he is entitled to superannuation, as a right, under the Superannuation Acts. The Minister for Finance, of course, is entitled to prescribe terms and conditions, just as in the case of other civil servants. I think the Staff of the Civil Service Commission will be suitable persons drawn from the Civil Service.
Having obtained that assurance, I will withdraw the amendment.
Amendment by leave withdrawn.
The next amendment is also out of order because it conflicts with the resolution we passed yesterday, "That the sums prescribed shall be paid out of funds provided by the Oireachtas." I cannot over-rule a resolution of the Dáil without giving a certain amount of notice, and to avoid the point I will not move the amendment.
Amendment not moved.
Amendment by Major Cooper:
To add at the end a new sub-section as follows:—
(4) Subject to his being in good health at the date of his appointment, the office of a Civil Service Commissioner shall be a pensionable office within the Superannuation Acts, 1834 to 1919, and the pension, gratuity or allowances granted to or in respect of a Civil Service Commissioner on his retirement or death shall be ascertained in the manner and subject to the conditions prescribed by those Acts, and a certificate by the Minister for Finance shall be a sufficient certificate for the purpose of Section 8 of the Superannuation Act, 1859.
This amendment cannot be moved.
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
SECTION 8.
(1) The Commissioners shall conduct all examinations in Saorstát Eireann which are now by any statute required to be conducted by Civil Service Commissioners, and also shall if so required by the Executive Council conduct examinations, competitive or qualifying as the case may be, for all or any situations in the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann, or in the Dublin Metropolitan Police, the Civic Guard, or any other police force in Saorstát Eireann or in the service of any local authority or authorities, and all or any such other examinations as the Executive Council may from time to time require.
(2) The Commissioners may, with the consent of the Minister for Finance, from time to time make regulations for the conduct of examinations to be held by them under this section.
The amendment which I have is a very small one, but it is really a drafting one, and I hope the Minister's heart will melt towards it. It is, in sub-section (1), line 31, after the word "statute" to insert the words "or other authority," and it is to meet the case of examinations prescribed by Order in Council, or anything else of that kind. The Civil Service Commission were themselves in Great Britain created by Order in Council and not by statute, and it is just possible that under some Order in Council that we do not know of there may be some provision for examinations. I do not see that the insertion of these words can possibly injure the Bill in any way, and they leave it so that if anything of the kind is found it will not be necessary to bring in an amending Bill to deal with it.
I am not able to understand the intention of the amendment, and I do not like it because I do not know what it means, or what its effect would or might be. If there is any examination which the Civil Service Commissioners were, by Order in Council, required to hold, the Executive Council could now, by Order in Council, require them to hold it; and I do not know that we ought to pass an amendment without knowing that it will serve a purpose, or what particular purpose it will serve. The particular passage, "The Commissioners shall conduct all examinations in Saorstát Eireann which are now by statute required to be conducted by the Civil Service Commissioners" was put in to cover, I think, the County Surveyors; that is, it was necessary that a man should pass a Civil Service examination before he could be appointed a County Surveyor, and this particular phrase was put in, obliging the Civil Service Commissioners to hold such examinations.
If there are any other examinations which they ought to hold, the Executive Council can direct them to do so, and I think that that is sufficient. I do not think this matters, but as I do not really know what the effect, if any, would be, I rather object to it.
took the Chair at this stage.
Will the Minister make further enquiries before the Report Stage and see if he can possibly adopt it? In that case I will withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I should like to ask the Minister one question under Section 8, because it seems to lay down that the Civil Service Commissioners may institute examinations for anybody in the Civil Service, and any local authority or authorities, but in the margin it merely says County Surveyors. I think it would be a very desirable thing to have Civil Service examinations not merely for County Surveyors but for clerkships and secretaryships in local bodies, and to bring these things into the sphere of competitive examination and out of the sphere of jobbery.
I think that perhaps the marginal note requires amendment, and I will look into it. There is power under the Clause to require the Commissioners to hold an examination for any position under a local authority, but I think that certain legislation will be necessary from the Local Government side to oblige a local authority to appoint persons who might pass an examination. At present the local authorities might ask the Commissioners to hold an examination, or the Executive Council might require them to do it, but when it was held the local authority might refuse to appoint the person who had passed, so that legislation from the Local Government side would be necessary before we do that.
Question —"That Section 8 stand part of the Bill"— put and agreed to.
SECTION 9.
The Minister for Finance may from time to time make regulations for controlling the Civil Service of the Government of Saorstát Eireann and providing for the classification, remuneration and other conditions and terms of service of all persons employed therein whether permanently or temporarily; and may at any time revoke or vary any such regulation.
I move, in line 47, after the word "employed" to insert the words "or to be employed." This amendment is also merely a drafting one, and I hope the Minister will consider it. It is to cover the setting up of any new departments, so that conditions may be laid down in advance, and Civil Servants will know what they have to expect if they transfer to this department, or if they are going up for examination. It is merely, in case a new Government department is found necessary, that the Civil Service Commissioners will be able to make regulations in advance and people in the Civil Service will know where they are.
I have looked into this and I am informed that the clause as it stands is all right. I think that the conditions and terms of the service cannot apply to anybody until he is actually employed. It is really a drafting matter and I will look into it further, but I am told that as it stands it does what Deputy Cooper has in mind.
Very well, I withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move:
At the end of the section to add a new paragraph:—
"Every regulation made by the Minister for Finance under this section shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas at least one month before it becomes operative, and if both such Houses shall, within the next 21 days on which either House has sat after such regulation is laid before both Houses, pass resolutions annulling such regulation, such regulation shall be annulled."
This is an amendment laying down that all regulations made by the Minister for Finance under this Section shall be laid on the table of both Houses of the Oireachtas at least one month before they become operative, and if both Houses pass resolutions annulling them that they shall be void. I think it is necessary to have both the Dáil and the Seanad in agreement upon this. I am not trying to limit the Government unduly and it is only in a case where both the Dáil and the Seanad agree in annulling them that they will be annulled. I think we should have some cognisance of the conditions of employment in the Civil Service, and I think it is desirable that these regulations should be laid on the Table and that we should have an opportunity for discussing them.
Clause 9, to which it is sought to add a new paragraph, deals with the functions of the Minister for Finance in controlling the public services. It has no relation really to the Civil Service Commission, which is purely a body for controlling the recruitment of the services. The Clause does no more than express in a statutory form the power of the Minister for Finance to control staff expenditure, both as regards the number of officers to be employed, salaries, conditions of employment, hours of service, etc. It is identical with the power vested in the Chancellor of the Exchequer under the British Government for controlling staff expenditure in the British service. The proposed addition would have the effect that the Minister for Finance could not fix the hours of service, or numbers of staff, or any matter relating to staff expenditure, without putting his proposals before the Dáil from time to time, and waiting 21 days.
It would also, of course, have the effect of giving an opportunity to the Civil Service Commissioners, or any such body, to have all sorts of such matters thrashed out in a way that would probably be satisfactory to them, but of no particular benefit to anybody else. It would enable a sort of agitation to be got up, that we know could very well be got up, and turn the Dáil into a debating society for dealing with some matters it would not be worth the while of the Dáil wasting its time on. We know we always can get people to take up any point put to them, and a good deal of time may be wasted. I think it is not desirable that the functions of the Minister for Finance in dealing with this matter of staffs, which is always a delicate and difficult matter, and which could be made a great deal more difficult by unnecessary discussions at critical junctures, should be interfered with. If the Dáil does not like the way the Minister for Finance deals with the matter, it can easily deal with the Minister for Finance. I think that is the way the matter should remain. The British arrangement, which we adopt here, is, I think, an arrangement which has worked well enough, and at any rate at present we would not be disposed to change it. If we felt after our Government had been functioning, and our services had been working for some time, it was desirable to make a change, we could and will make the change.
The voice is the voice of the Minister, but the words are the words of the permanent official which I have been hearing all my life: "No Parliamentary interference with Government offices." I cannot accept the Minister's reply. I think there is a great question of principle at stake in this, and though I am loath to embarrass the Government, I will not withdraw the amendment without a more satisfactory and convincing reply.
I support this amendment, and I am urged to do so by the example of very recent history. "The Minister may, from time to time, make regulations providing for the remuneration and other conditions and terms of service of all persons employed in the Civil Service." The Minister for Education made a statement the week before last, I think, which made it clear to me that in his view, and I presume in the view of the Minister for Finance, it is not only competent, but reasonable for the Minister for the time being to be able to say that a man who is to-day working for £1,000 a year, next week will work for £100 a year, that the salaries of Civil Servants may be cut down 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 per cent., as he wishes, without any reference to the Dáil or to anybody but his own conscience. That was the implication of the statement of the Minister for Education when he said that the State was sovereign, and there was and could be no such thing as agreement or contract between the servants of the State and the State which the State could not annul at will. Something like that was implied by the statement of the Minister for Education on the discussion regarding teachers' salaries. The clause asks the Dail to agree that the Minister for Finance may, from time to time, without any reference, or any period of suspense, declare that salaries and terms of service are alterable at his will. I do not think that that is a position we should agree to, and I think that the proposed amendment is one which would at least limit the power of the Minister in that respect. The Minister may say, as he said earlier, that the Government or the Executive Council for the time being must be trusted to use ordinary discretion, and if they cannot be so trusted they ought to be removed. That is very nice theoretically, but unfortunately the Minister may do a very unjust thing in its application to a single individual which may not warrant the dismissal of the Government. After all, I imagine we would have new Governments every week if every unjust act of the Government was followed by dismissal from office.
Mr. O'HIGGINS
I do not understand the interruption, whether the interrupter was asking me to keep to the question, or whether he is querying the statement I made. It is a fact that under this Section as it stands the Minister would have the power, without notice, to alter the remuneration and terms of service of any servant. That, I think, is not a power which should be continued, and consequently I support the amendment, which seeks to impose upon the Minister the obligation, before making any new regulation, that he should lay it before the Oireachtas.
I support this amendment as I consider it is necessary. Indeed, had I the framing of it, I would go somewhat further. The whole curse of the Civil Service, so far as I have known, lay in the fact that official insolence on the part of superiors has no redress on the part of the Civil Service. To some extent the amendment provides against that. Though the present Minister for Finance would do nothing to interfere with the Civil Service, yet a new Minister may follow who would do so. I think it is well that the provision in this amendment should be accepted.
I think that that support from the Government benches justifies me in pressing the amendment. Earlier in the debate the Minister asked us to rely on the spirit of Governments in future. Cannot we rely on the spirit of the Oireachtas in future? What is there wrong in suggesting that? Nothing but a manifest scandal would induce both Houses to annul a regulation of this kind. That is certain. You have got the Seanad as a conservative force and the Dáil as a democratic one. If they are both in agreement, therefore, a very strong case will have been made. It will not be a matter of a snap division. You must get both Houses. It does give some control over the proceedings of an arbitrary Minister, and that is a constitutional point of great importance. The individual Civil Servant has very little remedy against injustice. He is one man against an organised department, and the existence of this power—which may never be used, which probably never will be used — will in the last resort assist him to obtain justice.
I should like to support this amendment, if only in the interests of what I have stood for so frequently here, and that is democratic control as against bureaucracy. I cannot see that anyone is aggrieved who is a permanent official or a Minister, if he is subject to what, after all, is in the spirit of the Constitution, that regulations that are practically given the force of law should, before becoming operative, have the endorsement of the Houses of Parliament.
There is a certain amount of misapprehension about this, and I think it would be very undesirable that the Executive should be hampered in carrying out its executive duties in this way. We have had in the past several difficulties. We had, for instance, a very considerable difficulty in the Post Office strike of last year. I think that when we have had experience of that we should give the Executive Minister responsible the necessary authority to deal with any situation that may arise — to deal with the whole question of regulating the staff which I think is necessary to ensure that we shall not have trouble created which might not arise if we do not invite debate. Dealing with staffs, and especially with large orgainsed staffs, is a matter of considerable difficulty. It is a matter in which you want somebody to have authority and to be able to act without leaving intervals in which all sorts of trouble might possibly be organised. I believe that the essence of democratic government is to control your Executive. It is not necessarily in curbing or limiting the functions of your Executive. It is in holding them responsible; in watching them; in deposing them if you disapprove of what they are doing. But I entirely reject the notion that there is anything essentially democratic in curbing the functions of an executive officer, especially an executive officer holding office from day to day at the will of a majority. If you had executive officers, as they have in the United States and other places, who are not responsible to a Parliament in the way that the Executive Ministers here are, who cannot be removed at any time, the way the Ministers can be removed here, there would be a case, in many instances, for limitations of powers, that are not necessary or justifiable here.
The whole idea in our Constitution is that executive functions should rest with the Executive as far as possible without limitation, and that the Executive should be held responsible. There is nothing in this that has got anything to do with matters that are at all in the nature of making legislation. It is not a matter to be threshed out here, necessarily, whether a lunch-hour shall be one and a quarter or one hour. That is a matter which the Minister for Finance should have power to deal with from time to time, as he thinks desirable, and, then, if the Dáil disapproves of what he is doing, it can deal with him. But there are a multitude of matters arising that the Minister for Finance should have power to deal with, and that he should be responsible for. Even the making of arrangements about pay, about numbers, or grading is a matter that ought to be left to the responsible Minister to deal with in the first instance as part of his ordinary everyday routine, and if there is disapproval of his act he can certainly be held up to criticism.
I desire to support the amendment, and in doing so I might venture to remark that this seems to me to be one of the occasions on which the Government are unnecessarily following the British precedent. That may seem so upon the surface, but as far as I know, according to the spirit of the British system no civil servant's salary can be reduced or seriously affected without his receiving compensation and, as there is no undertaking to that effect suggested by the Minister for Finance, I think that it is well for us to pass this provision. What is the objection from the point of view of the Government? There is no doubt that this amendment will not interfere in the slightest with the Executive in the operation of its duties. It will only give the Oireachtas as a whole an opportunity of, shortly and within a space of time, perhaps, expressing the disapproval which the Minister for Finance has already stated they are entitled to do. As Deputy Cooper has pointed out it surely will be an exceedingly serious question which both the Dáil and the Seanad will agree to express their disapproval of, and if it is so serious a matter, then, I think, that it should be subject to immediate approval or otherwise. The Minister for Finance has stated that this might lead to unnecessary discussion. Who is to be the judge of whether the discussion is to be necessary or unnecessary? I think that is a matter that rests with the Dáil as a whole and not with the Government, or even with the Minister for Finance. Therefore, I think that it would be in no degree lessening the power or authority of the Executive; that it would in no way deprive them of their rights or the Minister for Finance of his authority in the matter, and I cannot see, except for pure official cussedness — to use a slang expression — why the Minister for Finance and the Government cannot accept this amendment. I certainly hope that Deputy Cooper will put this amendment to a division. If he does so I shall support it.
In this matter I would like to say that I cannot see the point of view of the mover of the amendment considering the big responsibility that he takes upon himself in putting it forward. The amendment proposes that any alteration of the regulations shall be laid before the Dáil for a certain period. Let us see what that would mean. The Minister for Finance considers it necessary to make some trivial alteration in the regulations governing the Civil Service—it may be trivial or a matter of greater importance — but at all events every alteration that he requires to make in the regulations will have to be brought before the Dáil.
It is not proposed it should be brought before the Dáil. As far as I understand the amendment it is that it should be laid upon the Table of the Dáil.
I am glad of the interruption by Deputy Redmond, but I think in principle it is brought before the Dáil. The disgruntled civil servants get busy immediately amongst Deputies and by the time the Minister could act we would be all ready for a full dress debate on perhaps a matter of very little importance, as far as the alteration is concerned, but a vital matter in connection with the discipline of the Civil Service. This is the sort of thing that would tend to cut at the root of discipline in every office in connection with the Civil Service. And what is it for? If there is general dissatisfaction in the Civil Service, and with the treatment meted out to civil servants, surely there is not much difficulty in bringing forward the grievance as a whole. I should think not. There will be plenty of sympathisers in the Dáil who will do it readily. To put in the Bill a Section such as this Section, if amended, would weaken the whole administration very much. As far as I am concerned I will vote with the Government in opposing this amendment.
Mr. O'CONNELL
I will support this amendment. It seems to me the question involved is who is to control — the Oireachtas or the Ministry? That seems to be the issue. The amendment only seeks to bring under review an action of the Ministry with regard to any particular service or body of civil servants. If no injustice is done the matter would not come before the Dáil. If an injustice is done it is right that it should come before the Dáil. I thoroughly agree with Deputy Redmond when he stated that the Dáil, and the Dáil alone, must be the judge of the importance of any matter which a Deputy thinks it right should be brought before it. If it is unimportant the Dáil will know how to deal with it, but it should not rest with the Ministry, or with any member of the Ministry, to say that any particular matter is, or is not, of importance to the country. The Dáil is the body that has to find the money, and it has a right to call the tune in the last instance. I think it is not unreasonable that the Dáil should be given an opportunity of knowing what is being done. The Minister stated that if he does anything that should not be done there is a method of dealing with the matter. But an injustice might be done or something might happen to give cause for complaint. It might be smouldering for months before it came to the notice of the Dáil, or until an opportunity would arise for dealing with it on the Estimates or something of that kind. Smouldering discontent in the civil service is not good for the service, and the sooner it is brought to the surface and exposed the better. The Minister will have an opportunity of meeting any argument or agitation that might be put up, and of giving his explanation, which, I have no doubt, in the vast majority of cases, would meet with the full satisfaction of the Dáil. That, I think, will make for a healthier administration rather than trying to keep under ground any discontent that might arise from a Minister's action.
I am very much amused at the description Deputy O'Connell gave of the discontent that might arise. He ventures to say that smouldering discontent could exist in Dublin for months without anyone knowing anything about it. I do not think I could conceive a more impossible position. I do not think discontent could exist for two days without Deputy O'Connell or some of us knowing everything about it. If every regulation or change in a regulation has to be laid on the Table of the Dáil, and has to be the subject of a discussion——
Not necessarily discussion.
I can conceive the position when every Civil Servant with a grievance, or a fancied grievance, will put up some friend to make a case.
Mr. O'CONNELL
Deputy O'Connell wants the Dáil to be occupied with nothing else but dealing with questions of this description.
What is the Parliament for?
Judging by the interruptions, Parliament is for dealing with every disgruntled civil servant who has a grievance.
I can conceive a position when the Dáil will be occupied with nothing else. That might be agreeable to some Deputies, but I do not think it would suit the Dáil, or add to the dignity of the Dáil, to be dealing with petty grievances and with every petty dispute in the Civil Service.
I would like to support the view taken by the Minister for Finance on this particular amendment. It appears to me that if the Dáil wants to encourage and create the difficulties that have been pointed out, then it ought to pass this amendment. The Dáil, as I understand the position, appoints a Minister to discharge certain duties. If the Dáil on the one hand is going to appoint a Minister in whom it has confidence to discharge the duties, and is now going by amendment to take away and undermine his authority, surely it is an exceedingly weak proceeding. To take a business man's view of the matter, when a question arises in a business house it is absolutely necessary to have some man to settle these questions, someone in authority whose decision is final. After all, Government is like a big business concern, and if it is to be carried on successfully, we must trust somebody. For these reasons I will support the Government.
There is a very important constitutional principle involved in this. We are told we elected Ministers, and that we repose confidence in them. Of course, we do, but not such absolute, unsuspecting confidence as would amount to discharge of our responsibilities as representatives of the people, leaving the entire administration without criticism or revision whatever.
I do not stand for any amendment that would take from the head of a Department his rightful control. In so far as a Department is a business, it must be conducted on business principles. So far, I agree with Deputy Gorey; but it is more than a business. We are dealing here with civil servants and not with clerks. We are not dealing with employees in the ordinary sense, and therefore the thing must be seen in its rightful perspective. Many of those men are administrative, too, like the Minister. It is a difference of degree merely, and the total control of administration may be vested momentarily in the Executive Council. But that is always, under the Constitution, subject to control, when the necessity arises for it, on the part of the Dáil. By what agency or through what contrivance is the control of the Dáil to be exercised if all the administration is to be done, so to speak, in the dark? It can only be by question asked or answered in the Dáil, or special debates raised on the adjournment.
All these grievances can be obviated before they arise. Prevention, says the old tag, is better than cure. It would be much better if, in the exercise of all these administrative acts of making regulations, the Ministry or those acting in the name of the Ministry, had always before their eyes the wholesome recollection that the regulation would be laid on the Table of the Dáil, and that it would be canvassed and criticised, and if it were found to be faulty or ineffective or unfair, it would then become the subject of a special debate here. Deputy Gorey forgets this is one of the most important functions of Parliament for the safeguarding of personal freedom and of efficient administration. If we are asked to give carte blanche to a Minister, then we may as well close the Dáil altogether.
I am inclined to support this amendment. I would press upon the Government to consider it again. It is not that any of us wish to interfere unreasonably with the necessary authority and disciplinary power of the Minister. We realise, as clearly as the Minister himself does, that to produce efficiency in each Department of the Civil Service he must have certain powers; but the sweeping character of the powers we are asked to give under Section 9 would render the position of the civil servant a truly hopeless one. Personally, if I were in the Civil Service, I would not care to think that at any time, at the whim of a Minister, my conditions of service could be altered. We may not always have such strong and trustworthy Ministers as we have at the present time. A civil servant might realise that any day the terms of his salary, his pension, and his promotion might be interfered with by the ipse dixit of the Minister. It is not that we want to put any trivial restrictions on the powers of the Minister, but these powers that we are asked to give in the Section should be subject to some safeguard, and I think the safeguard suggested in the amendment is a reasonable one. I am sure that when such regulations are laid on the Table of the Dáil, no Deputy will, in a trivial or vexatious spirit, raise a question upon them. In the interests of the Civil Service there should be given some feeling of security, and for that reason I am inclined to support the amendment.
Deputy Gorey does not understand the import of the proposal contained in the Bill, and I am afraid Deputy Good has also failed to understand it. The Minister tried to illustrate the case for the Bill, as it stands in opposition to the amendment, by referring to a regulation under which Civil Servants have an hour or an hour and a quarter for lunch. If he will say that this proposal has only to do with such trivial things, then I am sure Deputy Cooper will not press the amendment. Deputy Gorey, perhaps, if he were following the proceedings as closely as he should, would know that there have been many occasions when Bills have been passed dealing with the laying on the Table of regulations. A considerable number of regulations have been laid upon the Table, and within my memory not once has any regulation been the subject of a debate. Therefore, it is quite foolish to suggest that because there is an amendment added to this Bill which provides for regulations being laid upon the Table, there must necessarily follow a debate. Let us read the proposal in the Bill:
"The Minister for Finance may from time to time make regulations for controlling the Civil Service of the Government of Saorstát Eireann and providing for the classification, remuneration and other conditions and terms of service of all persons employed therein, whether permanently or temporarily; and may at any time revoke or vary any such regulation."
Civil Servants are appointed to the Civil Service on certain understandings. There is a certain scale for a particular office, beginning at so-and-so and rising by annual increments of so-and-so. They enter the Civil Service on some general understanding of that kind under regulations that are fixed. They have a right to assume that those terms of service will be the terms of service under which they will be serving. The Minister here asks for power to alter those terms of service, to alter the rate of remuneration, to alter the conditions as he may wish, and without reference to the Dáil, or even without any period of suspension. Deputy Gorey and Deputy Good seem to suggest that that is a normal condition of affairs that ought to apply even to private undertakings. I do not think that Deputy Good would attempt to enforce any such provision in any private undertaking with which he is associated. He would not attempt to use his power of dismissal or power of altering terms of service without notice. He would not attempt to make arrangements to-day and make new arrangements to-morrow without consultation. That is what the proposition in the Bill provides for.
I would have thought that the amendment would have been readily acceptable. It still remains with the Minister for Finance to regulate the conditions within the establishment and even to decide for himself that the prevailing conditions shall be altered at any time he wishes. What we seek is that there should be a proviso that new regulations shall be brought to our notice. The point that was made by one Deputy — I think it was Deputy Good — that any attempt to alter the terms and conditions of service would be held in suspense for this period, would very easily be met by adding to this amendment the condition which is generally added to such proposals — the condition which reads in the Judiciary Bill; "such annulment shall not prejudice any matter or thing previously done under such regulations." That is provided there has been annulment by the vote of the Dáil. Then any matter or thing previously done during the period of suspension shall not be invalid. That, I suggest, might well be aded to this amendment, and I asked Deputy Cooper and he agrees that that fits in with his conception. It seems to me that the Minister is asking for power and authority in this section which ought not be given. He is asking for power to make alterations in the terms of service under which men and women have been engaged and under which they have been working, and he declines to allow these regulations to be brought formally before the Dáil. He invites — I ask Deputies to mark this — by his refusal to accept this amendment, the very thing which Deputies deprecate; he invites civil servants, if they have grievances, to canvas the Deputies to bring those grievances before the Dáil. That is what we are invited to do by the refusal to accept this amendment. Papers are laid on the Table and it is our duty to know something about these regulations. If they are not laid on the Table civil servants, who have any grievance, have no option but go to Deputies and plead with them to make a fuss to bring the matter under the notice of the Dáil. I wonder at Deputies who resent such action refusing to accept this amendment. I am glad that Deputy Cooper proposes to divide the Dáil upon it if the Minister will not accept it, and I hope it will be carried.
Deputy Johnson would seem to me, from the trend of his remarks, not to have read the amendment, because this is not the form that such provision usually takes in the Acts that have been passed in this Dáil. It does not propose that the regulations shall be made as usual and become operative and be annulled by the Dáil, if a resolution so deciding is passed within twenty-one days. It proposes that the regulations shall lie on the table one month before they become operative, and everybody is invited to come along and raise a row. It is quite a different thing. I would have no objection to have the usual type of clause put in the Bill. That is that the regulations shall lie on the table for twenty-one days, but in the meantime they should become operative. That would enable the Minister for Finance to deal with the matter. As a matter of fact regulations are in existence. There is no reason why the form of publication should not be the laying of the regulations on the table. That is a different thing to the amendment of Deputy Cooper.
That is something quite new. If the Minister had said that half an hour ago we would have been saved all this discussion. If he had come a yard to meet me I would gladly have gone more than half way to meet him. If he will undertake to put in the usual form I am satisfied. All I want is that the Dáil shall have some power to review these regulations.
I have no objection to the usual regulations.
If you undertake to do that I withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question: "That Section 9 stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.
Sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 were agreed to.
SCHEDULE.
Question —"That the Schedule be the Schedule of the Bill"— put and agreed to.
Question —"That the Title stand part of the Bill"— put and agreed to.
