The Dáil remains in Committee, and we will now take the Civil Service Regulation Bill, from the Seanad.
DÁIL IN COMMITTEE. - CIVIL SERVICE REGULATION (No. 2) BILL, 1923—FROM THE SEANAD.
The first amendment to the Civil Service Regulation (No.2) Bill, 1923, which was passed in the Seanad, is one to Section 4, sub-section 4. A similar amendment was passed to a later clause. The Bill, as it went up to the Seanad, provided that special regulations should be laid before each House of the Oireachtas at least one month before the Examination, and that that regulation might be annulled by a resolution of both Houses. The Seanad amendment provides that such regulations may be annulled by resolution of one House. I do not know exactly what position would be taken up by the Seanad in this matter if it were to be discussed at length. In the amount of discussion that took place, the Seanad seemed to object to such a provision on the grounds that the provision in the Bill appeared to give the Seanad and the Dáil equal power in the matter, and in reality did not give them equal power.
In regard to the later clause in the Bill, there was a motion proposed or suggested by a Senator that the provision for annulment should be deleted altogether. It is possible that such an amendment as I propose might meet with the approval of the Seanad. I think it is desirable, when we can meet the Seanad in any particular matter that arises, that we should, as seldom as possible, simply throw back their amendments as rejected. I think it is undesirable that the Seanad amendment, as it comes down to us, should be accepted. The position with regard to Section 4 of the Bill is that it was put in in order to establish the principle of competitive examination. In Great Britain at the present time the Order in Council under which the Civil Service Commission operates, is practically in the terms of Section 5 of the Bill.
The Commissioners have power in Great Britain to make regulations prescribing the manner in which, and the conditions under which, persons are to be admitted either temporarily or permanently. In Great Britain the matter is entirely at the discretion of the Civil Service Commissioners, with the consent of the Treasury. It was thought necessary here to put in the clause which was in the old British Order in Council prescribing open competitive examination as the normal means by which entry could be made into the Civil Service. That is put in to establish a principle and allay fears that may have arisen, or may have been aroused, by any sort of propaganda that has taken place. It is undesirable, however, that we should be in a position in which there might be a dispute about special regulations. For instance, they might be annulled by the Seanad and might be supported by the Dáil. In that particular case, if there were to be any strong feeling over it, I fear there might be a danger of an abusive use of the special powers given in Section 6 of the Bill, which prescribes that in certain cases the Commissioners may, if they think fit, grant their certificate of qualification in respect of such situation, upon any evidence which is satisfactory to them that the person proposed to be appointed to such situation is fully qualified therefore in respect of age, health, character, knowledge and ability. I think we should not leave ourselves in a position whereby the Dáil and the Executive for the time being would desire a special regulation as regards, for instance, providing that certain appointments should be exclusively reserved for ex-soldiers. I do not anticipate that the Seanad would annul any such special regulation at the present time. I am simply suggesting this as an example. Suppose that the Executive and the Dáil should be strongly in favour of such a regulation, and that the Seanad should annul it, then there might probably be a considerable danger of the abuse of the powers given under Section 6, and that is not intended.
I think the whole case for preserving the principle of open competitive examination as a general rule in regard to the Service would be made by the amendment which I suggest to the Seanad amendment. It provides that all regulations made by the Commissioners under this Section shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas at least one month before any examination is held thereunder. That means that if it is intended in the case of examinations to confine the appointments to any particular class of persons, regulations will be laid on the Table, and it will be possible for the Dáil or Seanad to express an opinion or to ask that the examinations should not be held, or to pass any resolution which would, in this House, be quite sufficient to cause an examination not to be held. I suggest this as a compromise which might be accepted in the Seanad. I am sure, from the discussion in the Seanad, it would be. There is really no Civil Service Commission at the moment. The temporary Bill has lapsed, and it is desirable that this Bill should become law as soon as possible, so that the work that is necessary for the Commission to do may be done. I move the following:—
(a) That the Dáil do not agree with the Seanad in Amendment No. 1, but make the following amendment in lieu thereof, viz., to delete Section 4 (4) and to substitute therefor the following new sub-section:—
All regulations made by the Commissioners under this Section shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas at least one month before any examination is held thereunder.
I wish to raise a point of order of some importance. There are several amendments from the Seanad. Only two are referred to on the Order Paper. I do not know what the intention of the Minister is in regard to the other amendments. The motion that is before the Dáil is that we do not agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 1. I submit we have a right to decide that question before proceeding any further. I raise the question, as a matter of order, whether, if we do not agree with the Seanad amendment, we are at liberty to take the Bill and amend it on the motion of any Deputy. It means dealing with the Bill anew, if we have not agreed with the Seanad amendments. It means that we have passed the Bill in a way that we thought perfect, and sent it to the Seanad. They suggest amendments and we do not agree with them, and can we then reconsider the Bill and make new amendments? I submit we cannot, and that the utmost we can do is to make suggestions to the Seanad as to what we might be willing to accept. I put it forward without arguing, and purely as a matter of order, as to whether we are at liberty, if we refuse the Seanad amendments, to propose a new amendment on our own initiative.
On the first point it is desired to change this motion of the Minister for Finance and to make the beginning "That the Dáil do not agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 1" into a separate motion. I agree that that would have to be put separately. The other point is that if we disagreed with the Seanad amendment we are then in the position that we cannot amend the Bill any more. It seems to me that we can, if we choose, insert not a wholly new amendment, but an amendment that would be an alternative to the Seanad amendment, in order to see whether the Bill, as now amended, would suit the Seanad point of view. I do not think we could start to reamend the Bill in parts which had not been touched by the Seanad when the Seanad amendment had been rejected. So far this is my interpretation with regard to our powers.
We have not decided whether it may not be the better procedure to suggest to the Seanad that if they made an amendment in a particular form we would be prepared to agree with it. I know that is done in some places, but we have no decision as to what we would do in such a matter. I would not be inclined to rule that any amendment could not be made after disagreement with the Seanad amendment if the new amendment proposed was, in my judgment, one relative to the Seanad amendment which had been rejected and one which would be deemed possible of acceptance in the Seanad and which would therefore lead to agreement between the two Houses.
I would like to argue that, accepting your ruling, it is undesirable that we should formally propose to pass an amendment to a Bill in this way which has already passed the Dáil, and on which the Seanad has proposed certain amendments. If we cannot agree with the Seanad amendments, I submit it would be wiser to adopt the procedure of making a recommendation, or a suggestion, of what would be acceptable.
I must say Deputy Johnson's suggestion does recommend itself to me. I would be inclined to fall in with the suggestion of the Deputy, and propose to make a recommendation to the Seanad.
That procedure would have the advantage, that if the Seanad did not accept the recommendation, we would have nothing more to do with the Bill. The Bill would have passed in the form in which we originally sent it up, whereas, if we now insert an amendment ourselves in endeavouring to agree with the Seanad, and that that amendment is rejected by the Seanad, we may then have to reconsider the Bill again. The motion is that the Dáil do not agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 1.
Will the Minister explain whether it is intended in connection with those two matters to go through all the amendments circulated to us on a former day, but which do not appear before us on the Order Paper to-day?
The other amendments were circulated previously, and with regard to those other amendments, I intend to recommend to the Dáil that they be accepted.
They are to be gone into now while we are on this business?
Yes, I think those amendments were circulated some time ago, and the matter was postponed.
Deputy Figgis made a suggestion that I promised to consider, but we never had a new case since. This is the same case still.
We are to take the Paper of the 30th January, and take the amendments of the Seanad, 1, 2, 3, and so on?
Yes, we can take a motion on each. The motion on amendment No. 1 is that we do not agree.
On that motion, I want to oppose the Minister for Finance, and to ask the Dáil to accept the amendment of the Seanad, for the reason that it does maintain to the Houses the right to approve or to veto any regulation which had been laid upon the Table, and it places the Seanad, in regard to this matter, which is tantamount to legislation, in a position of having the same authority, and it leaves the Dáil with the power which originally it was intended the Dáil should have, of passing resolutions disapproving of any item in the regulation, and with that power to disapprove as explicitly stated in the Bill. The Minister has suggested that the form of the amendment which he would have accepted, would be one which would allow the Dáil to initiate a motion on some item in the regulations, and if the Dáil disapproved then the Minister would have to take notice of it. But I think that the form that has been embodied in other measures is more desirable, and that there should be specifically set forth a statement that if a resolution was passed by the Dáil within so many days, that the regulation shall be null and void. I think that form is better than the one proposed, although I admit that if even the form suggested is likely to be acceptable, the Dáil could not be deprived of the right to move in the matter, but I think in the Seanad amendment either House might take action in this matter, and that if either House does not within 21 days pass a resolution disapproving that the regulation shall then be, in the language of the local authorities, referred back for reconsideration. I think that form is better than the one proposed and is likely to be acceptable, and that we should, in consequence, accept the Seanad amendment in this respect. Would a formal resolution be required?
No; if we decided against the motion not to agree, I think we agree.
I do not think the Minister for Finance will jump to the conclusion that, because I am standing in defence of the amendment put forward by the Seanad, that therefore I am moved by some singular and extraordinary pertinacity or recalcitrancy in the matter. That is obvious, because in it the Seanad have made out a very important matter that is going to affect the future of the Constitution very deeply. The Constitution has placed the final responsibility in regard to legislation on one of the two Houses. In the end, the Dáil can have its will to prevail in regard to any question of legislation. It is also true that the Executive is responsible to this Dáil, but in regard to matters that deal with administration, the matter is not quite so clearly put in the Constitution, and there, I take it, each of the two Houses has its own function in what I may call—I believe the Minister for Home Affairs used this phrase in this or in an earlier Dáil—sub-legislative functions, functions that are not wholly legislative but that are partly legislative and partly executive. Supposing now that the original clause were to stand, as it was in the Bill as it left this House, it was there stated that it required a joint resolution of both Houses to turn down any matter of regulation that was adopted by the Commission or that was suggested by the Commission—regulations that have been put upon the tables of both Houses.
Supposing, in that case, that both Houses did not join, in such a resolution but that only one did, and supposing that that one House happened to be the Dáil, obviously whatever the form of the words in the Act might happen to be, the Executive could not afford to proceed in the face of a hostile vote of the Dáil even though the Act stated that both were required. Supposing, however, that the one House was not the Dáil but the Seanad, in that case, although the Act stated that both were required and that only one House did join and that the one House to pass such a resolution were the Seanad, the Executive could afford and would readily feel that it was responsible to the Dáil and not to the Seanad, and it could afford to neglect such a resolution so passed. Clearly an anomaly occurred there which the Seanad was quite right to remove. One has heard the argument—I believe it has been actually used in this House from Benches representative of all parties in this House—that this is the House of the two Houses that holds the democratic sanction. Well, whatever the Seanad may or may not be at the present moment, and I am not going to go into that point at all, the time will arise when the precedents we establish here will affect the Seanad which, in twelve years' time, will be influenced by the precedents now established, although the Seanad of that time will have been drawn from a representation in which all the electorate of the Free State has voted equally with the Deputies who will be returned to this Dáil.
Electors over 30.
Yes, with that slight difference that I had forgotten, the representation in both Houses will be substantially the same. Therefore, in putting forward any amendment to a Bill, or in adopting any draft of a Bill that would seem to place one House in a peculiar position of advantage that the other had not got in regard to these sub-legislative, semi-Executive functions such as are contemplated in this amendment, it is very desirable that we should at this stage keep the position of the Seanad in respect of the Dáil perfectly clear and on a parity. I take the meaning of the Seanad amendment to be that they are struggling to preserve that parity which, in the case that I have represented, was not preserved to it in the original form of the Bill. Not only is there a question there in regard to general rights and general equities as between the two Houses, but there is a question of convenience. It is quite conceivable, and more than conceivable—it is even highly probable —that in the future when some such regulations are tabled, the Dáil may happen to be very busy and it would be the Seanad that would then be able to give to them the time and attention that Deputies in the Dáil may not be able to give.
I do not know exactly how many Deputies in the Dáil there are who read all the various regulations that are presumed to be on the Table for their attention. I confess that I, for one, am not able to read very many of them or to give many of them that attention that they require. It is also a matter of knowledge and of fact that members of the Seanad have, whether they desire it or not, greater leisure than members of the Dáil have, and it would be right to expect that a degree of vigilance could be given by members of the Seanad that would not be expected from members of the Dáil. That question of convenience is not of primary importance, it merely supplements the other; but the fact is, that in the normal working out of the original provisions of the Bill the Seanad would not be placed equally, although the intention was to have placed the Seanad and the Dáil equally in the matter, and the result would be that the Dáil would have an advantage that the Seanad would not have. I imagine that the Minister for Finance partly appreciated that point in the amendments and in the substitutions that it had been his intention to have moved. I think that his substitutions would very largely have met the case put forward by the Seanad on that occasion. These substitutions are not now before the Dáil, but what is before the Dáil is the point put forward by the Seanad, and it is a point with which I agree.
at this stage took the Chair.
I would say again that I think there is a danger in allowing ourselves to arrive at a position in which certain special regulations put forward by the Civil Service Commission with the consent of the Minister for Finance—that is to say with the consent of the Executive Council, and made with the approval of the Dáil— are then to be annulled by the Seanad. In such circumstances there would be great danger that there might be a use of Clause 6, which, while perhaps of no great harm in itself might lead to real abuses in connection with that particular clause. Clause 6 is the one which provides that in certain cases examinations need not be held. It says:—
"In case the Minister for Finance and the Minister in charge of a Government Department shall consider that the qualifications in respect of knowledge and ability deemed requisite for any particular situation to which this Act applies in that Government Department are wholly or in part professional or otherwise peculiar and not ordinarily to be acquired in the Civil Service,"
and so on.
It might be quite easy for them, and there might be a temptation if a special regulation confining certain examinations to army officers were turned down while holding that the people we want for these are the people who have been in the army, yet to let people into the service under Clause 6 who ought not to be let in under that clause, but who ought to be let in under a limited competitive examination. I do not think that at the present time there is the slightest danger that the Seanad would turn down any special regulation confining an examination to men who were being demobilised from the army.
A situation somewhat similar might arise, and I think it is undesirable that we should be in the position of having this particular clash between the two Houses, and of leaving the possibility of getting round the clause in a way which is not intended, and in a way which may not be wrong in itself, but which might lead to real abuses. I do think that if a resolution is passed by the Seanad and it is seen to be a reasonable resolution in favour of the amendment of any particular special regulation, it would not be possible for the Executive to ignore it. It certainly would have to re-examine the regulations very carefully and to withdraw them if the reasons put forward in the Seanad seemed to be substantial, even if the Dáil were not to pass a similar resolution at all. I think that there is ample security in the Bill as sent up to the Seanad, and I think that we do get out of the difficulty that might arise through the Seanad annulling the regulation which the Dáil was in favour of, and which it might be attempted to give effect to by a certain round-about method. I do not think we should accept the position that every regulation which may be annulled by resolution should be annulled by resolution of one House only. I know that in Great Britain there are sometimes regulations that may be annulled by resolution of either the House of Commons or the House of Lords, and there are other regulations which require a resolution of both Houses. For instance, under the Government of Ireland Act there were certain Orders which could be annulled by one House only, and others, such as putting the Act into effect, which could only be annulled by resolution of both Houses. I made a suggestion which I thought would get over the need for looking at any Constitutional issue, but I certainly would not be in favour of accepting the position that any regulation, even a purely administrative regulation, should be annulled by resolution of one House only. I do not want to say anything in argument here that might make it more difficult to argue in favour of the acceptance of something when I am speaking in the Seanad. I would like to say simply that I do not think that the Dáil should take up a position that in the future all regulations that were annullable by resolution should be annulled by resolution of one House only.
Ministers always have two lines of argument. Either the Minister for Finance explains to us the practice in Great Britain and points out that we are following that, or else the Minister informs us that we are sweeping away an old British practice and making a desirable change. You are running two horses and you stand to win on one or other of them. I do not think myself that the Minister at the moment fully realises the difference between power conferred by statute and power conferred by goodwill, when he argues that if the Seanad were to pass a resolution, even though it would have no force and would have no more effect than an expression of opinion in a Debating Society, that nevertheless the Government would be bound to take it into careful consideration. That is no substitute for statutory power. The Minister's proposal is to take away the rights of both Houses in this matter. The Minister appears to have taken the saying of the poet to heart, that he did not care who made the people's laws so long as he made their songs. I do not think Ministers care how we make laws so long as they make rules and regulations. I do not like the Seanad's proposal as well as the original form in the Bill, but I infinitely prefer it to the olive branch the Minister is proposing to hold out.
One other point I should like to make is, that the powers that would be in the hands of the Government, the Minister for the time being, on the proposition of the Minister for Finance, are such, that no matter what resolutions might be passed as far as the law goes, they would be able to pass these resolutions by, and take no notice of them. The Minister's position seems to be this: the Civil Service in Britain has grown up out of a personal service to the Crown. It is not statutory in any way, and they were at the disposal of the Crown in any conditions it might like to impose. That has come down the years, and the Treasury has the authority it now exercises of this power over the Civil Service. It has gradually been modified by practice in Great Britain, but the Ministry here is taking the line that the same relations shall continue to exist between the Civil Service and the Executive, even though we are starting on entirely new lines, and even though the relationship should be different. The Ministry evidently desires to maintain the relationship which theoretically has existed between the Crown and the Civil Service in Great Britain, and to transfer that condition of things to this country. Even in Great Britain they have, recognising the necessities of the times, modified the practices in such a way as to allow the Civil Servants certain rights—certain privileges, if you like—but privileges that have developed and almost become rights. The Civil Service Associations, for instance, are consulted in matters affecting the Service. The Ministry here, or some of the Departments, at any rate, have refused that, and I think that we ought to recognise that we are establishing a somewhat different relationship, and that Civil Servants are being given certain statutory rights, not merely personal rights, and will henceforth be somewhat different from the Civil Servants of the past, who were merely creatures and servants of the Crown, whose conditions of service might be variable and alterable at will. Civil Servants may be engaged on certain terms and those terms may be revoked simply by the judgement of the Minister for the time being without any consideration or consultation with the Dáil, or Seanad, or the Service itself. I think that is not a desirable state of things to allow to develop or continue, and I think that while the regulations we are dealing with now are merely in regard to competitive examinations, the principle involved affects the status of Civil Servants generally, and we should allow the Dáil and the Seanad to have something to say to the regulations under which these Civil Servants are either to be appointed or retained, the conditions, and the remunerations. It is because of the issue that is involved that I urge the House to accept the Seanad's amendment.
Motion put.
The Dáil divided; Tá, 39; Níl, 25.
Tá.
- Earnán de Blaghd.
- Séamus Breathnach.
- Seoirse de Bhulbh.
- Louis D'Alton.
- Máighréad Ní Choileáin Bean Uí Dhrisceóil.
- Patrick J. Egan.
- Osmond Grattan Esmonde.
- Henry J. Finlay.
- Desmond Fitzgerald.
- Domhnall Mac Cárthaigh.
- Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
- Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.
- Pádraig Mac Fadain.
- Pádraig Mac Giollagáin.
- Seán P. Mac Giobúin.
- Séan Mac Giolla 'n Ríogh.
- Eoin Mac Néill.
- Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
- Liam Mag Aonghusa.
- Seosamh Mag Craith.
- Martin M. Nally.
- John T. Nolan.
- Peadar O hAodha.
- Mícheál O hAonghusa. Criostóir O Broin.
- Próinsias O Cathail.
- Aodh Ua Cinnéidigh.
- Eoghan O Dochartaigh.
- Séamus N. O Dóláin.
- Peadar S. O Dubhghaill.
- Pádraig O Dubhthaigh.
- Eamon S. O Dúgáin.
- Donchadh S. O Guaire.
- Séamus O Leadáin.
- Fionán O Loingsigh.
- Séamus O Murchadha.
- Seán M. O Suilleabháin.
- Caoimhghin O hUigín.
- Seán Príomhdháil.
Níl.
- Pádraig F. Baxter.
- John Conlan.
- Bryan R. Cooper.
- Sir James Craig.
- Séamus Eabhróid.
- Darrell Figgis.
- William Hewat.
- Séamus Mac Cosgair.
- Tomás Mac Eoin.
- Risteard Mac Fheorais.
- Pádraig Mac Fhlannchadha.
- Risteárd Mac Liam.
- Patrick J. Mulvany.
- Tomás de Nógla.
- Tomás O Conaill.
- Liam O Daimhín.
- Tadhg S. O Donnabháin.
- Eamon O Dubhghaill.
- Míchéal O hIfearnáin.
- Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
- Tadhg O Murchadha.
- Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).
- Patrick K. Hogan (Luimneach).
- William A. Redmond.
- Liam Thrift.
Motion declared carried.
I have spoken in the interval to the Ceann Comhairle and he suggests that as this suggestion of making a recommendation to the Seanad rather than passing a resolution is a new matter, we ought to consider the form and that we should postpone dealing with my suggestion of an amendment to the Seanad amendment until to-morrow, and proceed to deal with the Seanad amendments as they came down to us for the present. That means that we should simply take this paper of the 30th January and deal with the next amendment that appears on it.
Is the Minister going to move to disagree with No. 3 now?
When we come to it, I propose to ask the Dáil to agree with amendment No. 2 sent down by the Seanad. It makes very little change in the clause of the Bill sent to the Seanad, except that it does provide that the Civil Service Commissioners may hold examinations for situations in the Defence Forces, the Metropolitan Police and the Civic Guard. The amendment of the Seanad provides that any examinations, competitive or qualifying, as required by law to be held in these Forces, shall be held by the Civil Service Commissioners. The amendment is slight, and I propose that it should be accepted.
Question put and agreed to.
I propose:—
"That the Dáil do not agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 3, but make the following amendment in lieu thereof, viz., to delete Section 9 (2) and to substitute therefor the following new sub-section:—
"All regulations made by the Minister under this Section shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after they are made."
This amendment is the same as that on which the Dáil has just voted.
This is really a more important matter than that on which we have voted. The amendment on which we voted merely dealt with regulations governing certain examinations, whereas this one deals with the whole Civil Service—its pay, status, grading, pensions, etc. The Minister, when tracing the genesis of this amendment and when dealing with it in the Seanad, found himself attacked from two quarters. He was under attack from a quarter which desired to maintain a check on the Minister by the Seanad as well as the Dáil. He also found himself attacked by those who wished to restore the Minister to that position of autocrat which he held when the Bill was first introduced. I notice from the Official Reports of the Seanad that Senator Guinness said, on the 20th of December, "Would the Minister accept an amendment to delete the Section?" The Minister for Finance: "I opposed this in the Dáil, but under considerable pressure it was inserted." Senator Guinness: "It might assist the Minister if we delete it." So far as the official records show, the Minister did not say anything in answer to that, but I have a suspicion that under his breath he said, "It might."
No.
I cannot help feeling that it would have been a little fairer to the Dáil, since the Minister appears to have said nothing, if the Minister had said that he was pledged to the Dáil and did not wish to amend it. Having, under considerable pressure, accepted an amendment which gave the Dáil and Seanad power to revise these regulations, and to pass resolutions dispensing with or altering them, the Minister should have said so to them, even though a section in the Seanad was anxious that he should not. I must recall the history of this sub-section. It will be remembered that the Bill as brought in gave the Minister absolute power over the whole Civil Service, powers to revise pay, pension, grading, hours of work, and everything. He defended this in the Dáil by saying that the English Chancellor of the Exchequer possesses the same power, but he found he got very little support from any section but one. He was attacked by his own supporters, and the only support he got was from Deputy Hewat and Deputy Good, who came in at the end of the discussion, and nailed their flags to a mast from which the Minister unostentatiously had hauled his down, but upon which he has now nailed it again. I think the Dáil would be wise to agree to the Seanad amendment. The Minister did not like an amendment which I moved in the Committee Stage, because it was not in the usual form. What is the usual form? I tried to study it under the best masters. I looked in the Firearms Bill and found that the regulations could be annulled by a resolution of either the Dáil or the Seanad. The Minister will, no doubt, say that that Bill has nothing to do with finance. I looked in the Housing Bill, which has very much to do with finance, and found that the regulations made there can be annulled by either House. The usual form is the very form of the Seanad amendment, and the form which the Minister will propose to us to-morrow is a form never yet seen on sea or land. It is more the usual form than the form which, under pressure, he inserted. I infinitely prefer the Seanad amendment. Apart from anything else, let us consider what the actual position would be if we were to disagree with the Seanad amendment, and the Seanad were to disagree with ours. It would mean that to alter any one of these regulations it would have to be introduced by a private member, but it is impossible for a private member to get support to carry a Bill of that kind through all its stages. It may be said: "You have a remedy, and you can bring in a Bill." That is simply making a mockery of the Dáil, and I venture to hope that we shall not disagree with the Seanad amendment.
I hope that the Dáil realises that Deputy Cooper has been talking nonsense, pure and unadulterated. First, he suggested an amendment of the Dáil which was, of course, not in the least like the amendment which I afterwards inserted, or like the Seanad's amendment. He professed to be quite satisfied with the amendment which I brought in. He now professes to be quite satisfied with the Seanad in altering an amendment with which he previously was quite satisfied.
No, no.
In any case to insist on bringing in a Bill to alter a resolution by the Minister for Finance, is ridiculous. The Minister for Finance is a member of the Executive Council and cannot resist a resolution passed by the Dáil. It would be just as easy to get support for a resolution disagreeing with a particular order of the Minister for Finance or recommending its withdrawal as it would be to get a resolution annulling it. A resolution of the Dáil would not be altered by inserting an amendment for which there was support here and would not be altered by the Seanad's amendment. The Seanad's amendment proposes to limit the power of the Minister for Finance, representing this House, to make regulations dealing as they all would, directly or indirectly, with financial matters. I hold that the Minister for Finance, with the support of the Dáil, should have complete powers of dealing with scales of salaries, conditions of service and hours of work of Civil Servants, and it ought not be possible for the Seanad, apart from the Dáil, to annul the regulations made by the Minister for Finance on any one of those matters.
I agree with Deputy Cooper that this amendment of the Seanad deals with a very much more important matter than the previous one and I feel more strongly on it. I have no objection at all to the insertion of the particular sub-section now in the Bill. I opposed it simply because it was unnecessary, because it did not increase the power of the Dáil in any respect, and the idea of the sub-section only emerged after undesirable discussion of the amendment put forward by Deputy Cooper and for which there was no large support. I do not want the particular Section that is in the Bill omitted from the Bill at all. I only suggest the form that is on the paper for the purpose of avoiding any clash with the Seanad. In any case I would ask the Dáil to reject the Seanad's amendment. That is a matter about which I do care and I feel it is important. It would be utterly impossible to regulate the finances of the country if a regulation of the Minister fixing the grades of service or scales of pay were to be turned down by the Seanad and if it were impossible to put that into effect, no matter how much the Dáil desired it without the formality of a Bill which might be held up for nine months by the Seanad. It is very desirable that the control of this House in matters of finance should be untrammelled, that the Minister of this House in charge of finance should be responsible to this House, and that the power of the Seanad in financial matters in particular should not be enlarged in any degree. It is more important still that it ought not to be possible that the sort of agitation which Civil Servants could carry on, and which they naturally will carry on, in regard to their own privileges and grade of pay, should have scope in the Seanad. There have been cases where a section of Civil Servants were able to get up a considerable agitation for higher rates of pay in the Dáil. I do not want such an agitation to be got up in the Seanad and that the Seanad should be able to turn down the Minister for Finance who is not responsible to it. Whatever may happen, I suggest that for the purpose of avoiding conflict with the Seanad, the Seanad's amendment itself should be rejected. I think we need hardly discuss the compromise I suggest at this stage, as the matter proposed now is the rejection of the Seanad's amendment.
The Bill as it left the Dáil, in my opinion, is much better than the Bill as it would be amended with the proposed compromise, as the Minister calls it, which he has suggested, but I would ask the House to remember what is in question. It is not merely a financial question. I agree with the Minister that it is desirable that the Dáil should retain control in financial matters, but the Section refers to the classification, remuneration, and other conditions and terms of service of all persons employed in the Civil Service, whether permanently or temporarily, and may at any time revoke or vary any such regulations. I submit that it should not be left to the Minister for Finance to have complete power over all the conditions of service, classification, remuneration and of other terms and conditions of service which he may vary and revoke at his own will at any time without reference to the Dáil.
Deputy Johnson on this motion is out of order. The motion I have proposed now—I do not know whether it is fully understood—is simply to reject the Seanad's amendment. I am making no proposal at the moment in regard to the other matter on the paper.
Tell us what you are reading from.
I am reading from the Bill which we are supposed to be considering and which every Deputy is supposed to have in his hand. The Minister asks me to deal with the motion which he proposes without regard to the subject which is under consideration. He may be able to do that, but I cannot. I always feel that it is necessary to have regard to the question under discussion when we are dealing with any motion relating thereto, and the question under discussion is the terms and conditions of service which may be revoked by the Minister for Finance. If the amendment of the Seanad is accepted or adopted it modifies to some extent his power and authority in this matter. The Minister has on this occasion, as he has frequently done before, suggested that the Dáil has power whether it is in the Bill or not. Of course the Dáil has power. The Dáil has power to refuse confidence in the Ministry, and if no confidence is expressed, then of course the Ministry cannot get its money to carry on. But the Minister suggests, in saying that, that every question must be a question of confidence in the Government; that if the Dáil differs from a Regulation affecting a particular class or grade of the Civil Service and thinks that it should be amended, that the Ministry must fall.
I can understand that that view is acceptable to the Ministry, and to the followers of the Ministry; that view being that anything said by the Ministry must be approved, willingly or not, that the Dáil is simply to be a registration office of the decisions of the Ministry. If one held that view, then I can understand the arguments of the Minister. But I suggest that this Dáil has some other functions; that we have the right to be critical of administrative affairs and, as in this case, quasi-legislative affairs, without necessarily desiring that the Government shall vacate office; that we ought to be given an opportunity of saying whether a certain course is approved or disapproved without having to compel the resignation of the Government. When we are dealing with a large number of citizens who are in the Civil Service—and bear in mind that this deals with all classes of the Civil Service, whether permanently or temporarily engaged or employed—we ought to know, and they ought to know, beforehand what are the terms of their engagement, and those terms of engagement and conditions of employment ought not to be revokable simply at the discretion of the Minister for Finance.
The Bill as it left the Dáil, and as it would be if this motion were passed, would say that any such alteration in conditions would have to be placed before the Dáil. The Bill, as it would be if the amendment of the Seanad were accepted, would say that any such alteration in conditions would have to be placed before the Dáil and the Seanad —any re-classification, any new terms of service—and that either the Dáil or the Seanad would have the right to veto such classification or new terms of service. I think that the case for allowing the Seanad to consider any such Regulation equally with the Dáil is fully made out, inasmuch as this kind of legislation—and bear in mind that that is the effect of these Regulations; they are legislation—has just as much right to come before the two Houses as much of the other minor legislation that is brought before us under the Constitution. As Deputy Cooper has pointed out, while the same principle is involved, it has a very much wider application in Section 9 than it had under the previous Section. I think that we should agree with the Seanad amendment in this case rather even than the proposed modification which the Minister touches upon because it will give some greater assurance, than they would have under the Bill as it left the Dáil, to the Civil Service, that their conditions, classifications, and the like, are not to be altered without the due consideration of the Oireachtas, and the Ministry of Finance will be bound to feel greater responsibility and to hesitate longer before making drastic alterations in the terms of service than would otherwise be the case.
All the arguments that I used before avail with regard to this amendment, which in form is the same as the one that preceded it, but in substance affects so much wider an issue. I do not propose to repeat anything I stated. I had not intended to have spoken on this particular amendment, inasmuch as the arguments that availed, or that seemed to me to be of importance in respect of it, had already been mentioned by me in regard to the last, but for one sentence used by the Minister for Finance. That sentence was this. He said it ought not to be possible for the Seanad, apart from the Dáil, to annul a Regulation. Accepting that, on the very terms of the Bill, as amended and passed in this Dáil, it equally ought not to be possible, if that is to be a true and right statement, for the Dáil, apart from the Seanad, to amend a resolution. But the fact is, things being as they are, that although it states that both Houses are required to pass the resolution, if the resolution be originated and passed here and sent to the Seanad the Ministry will heed it. But if it be originated in the Seanad and sent here, the Ministry need not, because the Ministry is responsible to this Dáil, and not responsible to the Seanad. That is the actual effect of the Bill in its present form. It is to amend that and to give to each of the two Houses its own proper part in legislation—seeing that they are both parts of the legislative machine, and that these Regulations are sub-legislative of character and of kind— that the Seanad ought to have preserved for it its Constitutional right to have an equal effect—within a certain period of time, if you like—in respect of any such Regulations as the Dáil itself. It has not got it in the Bill as it stands. It does get it in the Seanad amendment.
I think it is pretty clear from the Constitution that the Seanad has not an equal right in matters of finance with the Dáil.
I did not say finance.
These particular matters will be practically and entirely financial. I did not put in a form here that would have confined the power of annulment to the Dáil only, simply because other matters than finance will come in incidentally. But matters of classification and remuneration and the terms and conditions of the Civil Service are really matters of finance. They are matters between the State as employer and its employees. They are financial matters, and in no way matters of legislation. In these particular matters it certainly is not the fact that the Seanad has an equal right, and I think that it would be most unwise for the Dáil to take steps towards any division of financial control. I think it is most desirable that the one House in this country which will be elected at intervals of not more than four years, and which will have a wider franchise, should in this particular matter of finance have undivided control.
If you make it impossible for the Dáil, through its own officers, to regulate the Civil Service, you will certainly be parting with a good share of financial control. I do not think it is desirable to do anything more than the good sense of any Executive that may be appointed, or of any Dáil that may be elected from time to time, will do to make more secure the position of the civil servant. Everyone knows that the civil servant—or the permanent official as he is called—has, and must have, extremely great influence at the present time. His position is really one of being in office at will and pleasure. If you increase the security he gets by custom and make it more difficult to remove him, if he requires removal, you will find that Ministers who may be appointed from time to time, will have less power in carrying on administra- tion than they ought to have. It is most important that the Civil Service should reflect as closely and as quickly as possible the views of Ministers placed in charge of the various Departments. I do not think it is at all desirable to fetter the powers of Ministers in control of the Civil Service, as seems to be the aim of Deputy Johnson. I think if you had a Civil Service, given the sort of tenure that Local Government servants have throughout the country, it would produce very undesirable results and would very much diminish the democratic control of Parliament over the administration of the country.
The Minister has twitted me with inconsistency. I admit that when I first brought this proposal forward, I looked at it solely from the point of view of the Dáil. When I read the discussion in the Seanad, I saw that there was something to be said from their point of view—a capacity which I fancy permanently disqualifies me from Ministerial office. I see, to a certain extent, by the Seanad's proposal that a compromise might be accepted. But I still prefer the original form of the Bill.
I will do the Minister justice, and say that he is certainly consistent and has always been consistent. In this matter, he has always wanted to get as much power as possible over the Civil Service. It is the natural tendency of an able Minister to exalt his office, but it is a very dangerous one, particularly now when we are working a new Constitution, and setting up a new machine. I cannot accept his assurance about amending statutes by resolution. I notice that the Attorney-General does not venture to suggest that that is a very valid remedy. My objection to his proposal, to disagree with the Seanad's amendment, is that it is a stepping stone to a compromise that he is going to put forward to-morrow. If he thinks I am going to be so inconsistent as to agree to that compromise, he is nourishing an illusion which will be very speedily shattered. He will only have to wait until to-morrow. My objection is really to that compromise. This is the first stage on the way to it. I will make a suggestion to the Minister. Would he be prepared to consider leaving the two suggestions that he is going to put forward to-morrow to the free judgment of the Dáil without putting on the Whips? I am not asking for an immediate answer. I shall talk his motion out until 6.30 and he can answer me at 7.30 if he wishes to do so. If not, he can assist in talking it out. That would withdraw some of my opposition. In that case by disagreeing with the Seanad amendment we would revert to the original form of the Bill.
After all, this is a matter for the Dáil and not for the Executive or the Government. It is a matter on which the Dáil might be allowed to have its own views. It is a new method of suggestion rather than amendment. If he will do that, I personally would not be disposed to press this to a division. Of course, I cannot bind others, but that is my personal view. I think it would be an advantage, from every point of view, that we should have a frank discussion and find out where Deputies stand in regard to this. We should then be in precisely the same constitutional position that we are in now. It would mean merely that the Bill would go back to the Seanad in its original form, and that we should not make any suggestions. Any suggestions that might be made, or might have to be made, would come from them. I gather that a consultation is proceeding. I do not know if the Government are prepared to say what they are going to do now, or if I am to go on talking till 6.30.
If it is blackmail, I suggest that the Deputy should talk on.
Very good. I must compliment the Minister on his fine fighting form. It is extremely interesting to see him when he takes his coat off, like a character in Dickens, but he did not announce he was going to begin; he went on. That is in itself a very valuable gain for the Dáil as a whole. The Minister told us, at an earlier stage, that there is no Civil Service Commission at present. I gather, from an answer given by the President at Questions, that there is shortly going to be held a Civil Service Examination, confined to officers of the army. Who is going to hold it, when there are no Commissioners, I cannot imagine. If, by disagreeing with the Seanad, we leave it possible for the Bill to be held up for 270 days, surely that is in itself a somewhat dangerous matter. Therefore, unless I can get some assurance of the kind that I have asked the Minister for, I shall be reluctantly compelled to put this matter to a division. As I am sure the Minister will have the courtesy to answer me, I shall now sit down.
I would like to dissociate myself from the interpretation that the Minister for Finance gave of what I said before. I agree with him that the intention of the Constitution is perfectly clear, that so far as finance is concerned, the final power lies with the Dáil. There is no question about that. But finance is a very wide term, and it has a very ambiguous meaning if it is going to be given the interpretation that the Minister for Finance has given it. He spoke about the classification of Civil Servants. Well, obviously a Civil Servant's pay must in some degree be commensurate with this classification. Classification might be called finance, but it is not finance all the same. He spoke about their qualifications. Well, one would like to assume that at least finance is going to be somewhat commensurate with qualifications. But to decide upon qualification is not a financial consideration. The majority of matters to be considered here are not financial nor essentially financial, but are ordinary legislative or quasi-legislative matters; in these matters, inasmuch as they are not financial, it is perfectly clear that the Seanad has equal power with the Dáil in a decision on legislative matters of that kind and in their amendment they are merely insisting on what is their right.
Question: "That the Committee do not agree with the Seanad amendment No. 3"—put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 39; Níl, 13.
Tá.
- Richard Beamish.
- Earnán de Blaghd.
- Seoirse de Bhulbh.
- Louis J. D'Alton.
- Máighréad Ni Choileáin Bean Uí Dhrisceoil.
- Patrick J. Egan.
- Henry J. Finlay.
- Desmond Fitzgerald.
- Domhnall Mac Cárthaigh.
- Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
- Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.
- Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
- Pádraig Mac Giollagáin.
- Seán P. Mac Giobúin.
- Seán Mac Giolla 'n Ríogh.
- Eoin Mac Néill.
- Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
- Liam Mag Aonghusa.
- Seosamh Mag Craith.
- Martin M. Nally.
- John T. Nolan.
- Peadar O hAodha.
- Mícheál O hAonghusa.
- Criostóir O Broin. Próinsias O Cathail.
- Aodh Ua Cinnéidigh.
- Eoghan O Dochartaigh.
- Séamus N. O Dóláin.
- Peadar S. O Dubhghaill.
- Pádraig O Dubhthaigh.
- Eamon S. O Dúgáin.
- Séamus O Leadáin.
- Fionán O Loingsigh.
- Séamus O Murchadha.
- Seán M. O Súilleabháin.
- Caoimhgheán O hUigín.
- Seán Priomhdhail.
- John Hennigan.
- Liam Thrift.
Níl.
- Bryan R. Cooper.
- Darrell Figgis.
- Séamus Mac Cosgair.
- Tomás Mac Eoin.
- Pádraig Mac Fhlannchadha.
- Tomás de Nógla.
- Tomás O Conaill.
- Liam O Daimhín.
- Eamon O Dubhghaill.
- Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
- Tadhg O Murchadha.
- Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).
- Patrick K. Hogan (Luimneach).
Motion declared carried.
took the Chair.
Amendment 4. In Section 10 (2) to insert after the word "Department," in line 64, the words "other than a permanent situation."
I propose that the Committee agrees with the Seanad in this amendment. It simply means that no situation except those situations that are not permanent can be added to the Schedule of Situations which are exempt from the purview of the Civil Service Commissioners.
Question put and agreed to.
Amendment No. 5. In Section 11 (2) to add after the word "certificate," in line 7, the words "and every such notice shall indicate whether the certificate is issued after competitive examination or qualifying examination or upon such evidence as is mentioned in Section 6 of this Act."
This provides that a certificate of the Civil Service Commissioners of qualification is published in Iris Oifigiúil and shall state that a competitive examination or qualifying examination was held, and shall state whether a person was appointed after an examination or otherwise. I move that we agree with the Seanad in this amendment.
Question put and agreed to.
Amendment No. 6. In Section 13 to delete in line 11 the words "(No. 2) Act, 1923," and to substitute therefor the words "Act, 1924."
This is necessitated by the time which has elapsed between the introduction and the passage of the Bill.
I move we agree with the amendment.
Question put and agreed to.
Amendment No. 7. In the Schedule to delete in lines 25-26 the words "Civic Guard," and to substitute therefor the words "Gárda Siochána."
Amendment agreed to.
Report fixed for Thursday, February 28th.