I beg to move:—
I dtreo ná beidh aon amhrus réasúnta i dtaobh staid na síochána do bheith socair idir Shaorstát Eireann agus an Phoblacht Thurcach, go n-údaruíonn an Dáil don Ard-Chomhairle aontú le daingniú Chonnra Lausanne, ach go dtuigfar go soléir ná fuil aon cheangail ag an Saorstát á chur air féin leis sin lasmuich de bhunú na síochána (mara ndinidh an tOireachtas ina dhiaidh seo na ceangail sin do chur air féin le reachtúchán). |
That the Dáil, in order that the state of peace may be established beyond all reasonable doubt as between Saorstát Eireann and the Turkish Republic, authorises the Executive Council to acquiesce in the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, provided that it be clearly understood that (unless the Oireachtas shall hereafter undertake such commitments by legislation) the Saorstát thereby incurs no commitments other than the definite establishment of peace. |
I think I had better give a little explanation and a little historical statement about this. The Treaty as it stands effects, or purports to effect, roughly three things. One is a clear definition of a state of peace with Turkey, between the ratifying parties on the one side and Turkey on the other. It makes certain conventions with regard to the protection of the Straits, and it has also an arrangement which permits of the submitting of contract cases, and other similar cases, to a body known as a mixed arbitral tribunal.
When the Saorstát came into formal legal existence, the position was that the condition of war which had been declared on November 5th, 1914, had not been formally declared at an end, owing to the non-ratification of the Treaty of Sevres. Further negotiations for a Treaty had already been begun at Lausanne. These negotiations had been suspended but were recommenced in February, 1923. During the later stages of the negotiations we were kept informed of their progress, but it will be observed we were not consulted as to the initiation of these negotiations, nor were we invited to be represented by an Irish plenipotentiary at Lausanne. When the Treaty became due for signature, we were not invited to be signatories. It will also be seen that when we came into existence, a state of technical war might be held to exist and that a Treaty of Peace was already being negotiated to establish a state of peace beyond question, and to settle various legal questions connected therewith.
The Irish Free State, therefore, cannot in any way be held responsible for the existing circumstances, and for that reason the Executive Council do not propose to ask the Dáil to recommend ratification, as by doing so the Dáil might appear to be accepting post factum responsibility. At the same time, it might be held that a state of war exists between the Irish Free State and the Turkish Republic. A Treaty of peace has been negotiated and signed, purporting to be made on behalf of all the nations of the community. The negotiation of that Treaty has been very protracted, extending over a period considerably more than a year. That Treaty cannot be constitutionally ratified without the acquiescence of the Irish Free State. To start negotiations now for a new Treaty might easily lead to considerable complications in the Near East. The main feature of the Treaty is the declaration of peace, and as that appears to be the only aspect of the Treaty really affecting the Irish Free State, we think that we may safely acquiesce in its ratification. The two other main features of the Treaty are the Convention with regard to the Straits. Great Britain, under this Convention, would be bound, under certain circumstances, to take such warlike steps as might be decided upon by the Council of the League of Nations.
Ireland and the other nations of the Commonwealth are not in that position. The other point of the Treaty is that relating to contracts, etc., under the terms of which the Oireachtas might by legislation arrange that disputes would be referred to a mixed arbitral tribunal instead of to the ordinary courts. But as apparently none of our Nationals are affected this matter does not arise, and in any case would be subject to future legislation by the Dáil. The Executive Council will, therefore, acquiesce in the ratification of the Treaty on the clear understanding that unless the Oireachtas shall hereafter undertake such commitments by legislation the Saorstát incurs no commitments other than the definite establishment of peace; on the clear understanding also that in the initiation, negotiation and signature of any future Treaties the terms of the Imperial Conference Resolutions shall be rigidly adhered to; and on the assurance given that the existing form of Royal Title be used in the preamble, that steps are now taken to put Royal Titles used in the preamble, in accord with fact as brought about by the Treaty of December 6th, 1921.
The Treaty is an extremely long document, going into many details, practically all of which are of no interest to this country, and do not affect this country in any way. Clause 1 declares a state of peace to exist. As I have said, it might be argued that at the present moment we are in a technical state of war with Turkey. On the other hand it might be argued that we are not. We propose to make it perfectly clear beyond all reasonable doubt, as we say in the resolution, that we are not at war with Turkey. There may be some question about the Straits Convention. Under the Straits Convention in this Treaty if the Council of the League of Nations decide that warlike action should be taken Great Britain is certainly committed to warlike action. Other members of the British community of nations would not be committed by any decision of the Council, but the matter might go before the Assembly of the League of Nations. Before we entered the League of Nations I wrote to the League of Nations a letter embodying a statement I made in the Seanad when I was proposing the League of Nations Bill. I may as well, perhaps, give the text of that letter:—
"Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that the Irish delegation to the League of Nations, at present in Geneva, is instructed to call special attention to two documents amongst those submitted to the League of Nations, viz.: the copy of the Treaty between Ireland and Great Britain, and the copy of the Constitution of the Irish Free State, with particular reference to Article 49 of the Constitution; and to say that the application of the Irish Free State for membership of the League is made subject to an authority obtained expressly in our Legislature, and such authority is governed by the terms of those two documents, and in particular by the aforesaid Article 49 of the Constitution."
I do not need to remind Deputies that Clause 49 of the Constitution states that this country cannot actively participate in war without the express sanction of the Oireachtas, and, therefore, as we pointed that clearly out, and as our joining the League of Nations was subject to the acceptance of that letter, we cannot be committed to any warlike action under this Treaty. The other tangible effect of the Treaty relates to the mixed arbitral tribunal, and as none of our Nationals are affected by that, future legislation that we indicate in the resolution, apparently, will never be required, and, of course, if we did find that certain of our Nationals were affected, the ratification of the Treaty would not affect us unless we passed definite legislation here to provide for the hearing of such case by the mixed arbitral tribunal. I do not pretend that the way this Treaty was initiated, negotiated and signed was in any way satisfactory. I do not pretend that we agreed to acquiesce in the ratification of this Treaty for any other reason than for the reason I have indicated, namely, that its non-ratification is creating a very unsettled state in the Near East of Europe, and that unsatisfactory state might easily lead to a far more unsatisfactory state. The ratification of this Treaty will tend to do away with that unsatisfactory state, and we hope, to establish fairly quiet conditions there. This Treaty cannot be ratified without our express sanction, because, as I say, it was without reference to us it was begun; it was negotiated in the name of the whole British community. If we refuse to ratify it, the only course I see would be that the whole negotiation would have to be begun over again, which would involve the British Commonwealth, and France and Italy and Japan, and Turkey as well as other countries in a secondary way. The negotiation of it took over a year, and I feel that, on the whole, it is better to recommend that we acquiesce in its ratification than that we should run the risk that would be inevitable in postponing some such Treaty being made for another year or more, that the negotiation of another Treaty would take.