When I raised this question generally on the last occasion I regret that I was not cognisant of the aspects of it on which I wish to touch to-day. I wish to say, very clearly, that in raising this matter I want to have no misunderstanding and I desire that there shall be no apprehension that I have any desire that the Executive Council of this State should trespass upon matters that do not concern them. I said on a recent occasion that I did not question the competence of the British Government to seek for information in whatever quarter they desired which would elucidate for them what appeared to them to be a constitutional dilemma. I am not questioning the competence of the British Government to invoke the advice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in matters concerning them alone. Why I am raising this question at the moment is because they have invoked the intervention of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on a matter which concerns this State more vitally, perhaps, than even the British Government itself. That is my reason for raising the matter. This matter has been brought acutely to my notice by the publication within the past few days of the names of certain distinguished lawyers who are to act as a tribunal in regard to certain aspects of Clause 12 of the Treaty. These gentlemen are called into being as a tribunal under a certain British statute. I want to draw attention to the purpose and the scope and the object of that statute, and to draw attention to and challenge the competence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to adjudicate on this matter at all. This Act, which deals with the constitution of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, is an Act of William IV., passed in the year 1833— ninety-one years ago. The President smiles at this weighty to me which I hold before me. I hope this Act is not going to be as heavy upon the Free State as I feel it at the present time. It is an Act which has to be taken seriously. It was passed in this particular year for a certain specific purpose, which is stated in the preamble of the Act, portion of which I will read:—
"... And whereas, by Letters Patent under the Great Seal of Great Britain, certain Persons, Members of His Majesty's Privy Council, together with others, being Judges and Barons of His Majesty's Courts of Record at Westminster, have been from time to time appointed to be His Majesty's Commissioners for receiving, hearing, and determining Appeals from His Majesty's Courts of Admiralty in causes of Prize"— captures at sea.
That is the purpose for which this body was set up. This Statute was enacted that they might consider cases like that, and to make that more emphatic, the concluding clause of this Statute—Section 31—states:—
Provided always, and be it enacted, that nothing herein contained shall be held to impeach or render void any Treaty or Engagement already entered into by or on behalf of His Majesty, or be taken to restrain His Majesty from acceding to any Treaty with any foreign prince, potentate or power in which Treaty it shall be stipulated that any person or persons other than the said Judicial Committee shall hear and finally adjudicate appeals from His Majesty's Court of Admiralty in causes of prize, but that the judgments, decrees and orders of such other person or persons so appointed by Treaty shall be of the same force and effect of which they would respectively have been if this Act had not been passed."
That is the purpose, and the sole and entire purpose of this Act—to consider cases of prizes or captures at sea. I come to another section of that Act. One day last month the London Times had an article on this matter, in which it quoted Section 4 of this Act. I want to make it clear that the wording of this section is not contrary to the assertions I have made. Section 4 says:—
And be it further enacted that it shall be lawful for His Majesty to refer to the said Judicial Committee for hearing or consideration any such other matters whatsoever as His Majesty shall think fit, and such Committee shall thereupon hear or consider the same, and shall advise His Majesty thereon in manner aforesaid.
I want the House, and especially the Government, to consider the meaning of these words, and to consider the sections of the Act which I previously quoted; how they indicate the purpose of this Act, and how that purpose is not merely indicated but emphasised and reiterated in the concluding section of the Act. I want the House to remember that this Statute was enacted in 1833—91 years ago. I want the Dáil to put to themselves seriously the question whether an Act passed at a time so remote from the present and having a specific purpose for its objective is to be invoked and construed as having any bearing whatever upon such a grave matter as the construing or meaning of an Article of an International Treaty. If we were to acquiesce in the idea that Section 4 could have a bearing upon this, we would be committing ourselves to something that would have implications of a much more far-reaching character than we at the moment can realise. "It shall be lawful for His Majesty to refer to the said Judicial Committee for hearing and consideration any such other matters whatsoever as His Majesty shall think fit.""Matters whatsoever !" Are we going to assent to that? If the interpretation that the British Executive has put upon that section of the Act were true, it would have been quite competent for this Dáil to agree in all seriousness that the dilemma regarding the Liquor Bill should have been referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for decision. According to those words, "any such other matters whatsoever," the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council might be called upon by His Majesty to decide whether or not members of this House ought to wear straw hats or tall hats.