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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 17 Jul 1928

Vol. 25 No. 5

SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE. - CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT NO. 7) BILL, 1928—SECOND STAGE (RESUMED).

Question again proposed: That the Bill be now read a Second Time.
Debate resumed on the following amendment: To delete all the words after the word "That" and substitute the following:—
"the Bill be not further considered until the Dáil has come to a decision on the total number of members that should constitute the Seanad."— (Eamon de Valera.)

To resume the debate on this particular Bill at this Stage is very much like recounting tales of far off things and battles long ago. I think when most of us were discussing this measure we were suffering under the disabilities of those who steal the best hours of the night. I think the debate on it was taken after the all-night sitting which the President imposed on this Dáil. I think the President, no less than the rest of us, was suffering from that disability also, for before resuming the debate on this Bill I had taken the opportunity of reading his speech, and I must say he seems to have dealt entirely then with the size of the Seanad and not with the term of office. He gave one the impression that after the labours of the preceding night he was feeling like the rest of us, a sunbeam that has lost its way. At any rate, as I said, he advanced no reason whatsoever for reducing the term of office for Senators from twelve to nine years. I am sure the President must have very good reasons for making the reduction suggested, and the only thing I regret is that he should keep them locked up within his own breast and not disclose them to the Dáil. I do not say that those reasons would be convincing, but I am sure they would be substantial ones, and if the President is prepared to state them now I would, with the permission of the Chair, give way momentarily while he does disclose them to us. As I said on the occasion of the Second Reading of this Bill, he devoted his attention entirely, I think, to one of the amendments to the Bill which appeared on the Order Paper. That was the amendment proposed by Deputy de Valera, that the Bill be not further considered unless the Dáil has come to a decision on the total numbers that should constitute the Seanad. I suggest that it was not sufficient to deal with the Bill in relation to the amendment, and that he should give the positive reasons that actuated him in introducing it.

I do not see any virtue in the number nine, and seven is a mystical number. These are the seven deadly sins and the seven contrary virtues. I am not going to suggest that the President is more familiar with one than with the other. I hope he, as a matter of fact, has a very practical and intimate acquaintance with one, and that he only knows the other by reputation and hearsay. But I do suggest that if there is any good reason for reducing the term of office, the reason was equally strong, and would have been equally applicable towards reducing the term from twelve to six or five years. Deputy de Valera in opposing this Bill gave very cogent reasons why the term of office of the Senators should be reduced to six years. It would seem to me that if we did reduce it to six years it would be possible at the same time to reduce the number of Senators very considerably. There is a very good practical reason for that. If we were able to reduce the number of Senators to twenty-five or thirty we would save a considerable sum of money each year. I am perfectly certain, judging by the record of attendances of Senators in the Seanad, that the legislative efficiency of that Chamber would not be affected adversely. Possibly, in view of the fact that the number of positions were more limited, competition for them would be keener, and you would get a better type of Senator who would attend more regularly and fulfil the duties entrusted to him much more conscientiously. As I said, one is at a disadvantage in discussing constitutional amendments of this sort, because when a Bill of this description is introduced one would have expected that the President would have examined the term of office and discussed it with reference to the duties which the Senators have to perform.

I do not see very much point in allowing a Senator to hold office for nine years. I do not see that it is going to make that Senator any more conscientious in the discharge of his duties. It is going to give him a certain feeling of security in office for a long term. The first year, being a new broom, he might attend very regularly and be very keen in performing the functions of a Senator, but when the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh years are passing you will probably find that particular Senator is dormant and that he is rusticating down the country. In the ninth year, if his name is coming before the Dáil and Seanad, or before the public in any way, he might awake and return to his duties. The very fact that he is elected for a long term makes him feel independent of the body that has elected him. I think the danger in that regard has increased very much by reason of the fact that he does not have to submit himself to the direct suffrage of the people, but is elected by the Dáil and Seanad combined, where his personal pull and influence, particularly with the majority Party in both Houses, will count, I am afraid, for a great deal more than any personal merit of his or any attention he has devoted to his office. For that reason it would seem to me there is a good deal to be said for making the term of office of a Senator shorter.

If a Senator is elected for, say, three years or five years—well, the wheel of polities turning may put other people in power in this House who will not have the same political views as he has, and he would be inclined, I think, to justify himself, at least the best of the Senators, the men of the strongest character, would be inclined to justify themselves before that adverse majority in this House by being particularly painstaking and conscientious in the discharge of their duties, and particularly constant in their attendance in the Seanad, and in that way proving that they fulfil the qualifications expected from them in the Constitution. Another point to be considered is, and I think we can look at it from the point of view that the Government have disclosed, that their mental attitude towards legislation is this: That, provided the majority in the Dáil think any legislative proposal is a good one and sound one, then it must be passed through this House with the greatest haste, and passed through the Seanad with the greatest haste, and be made law. If it should happen that the majority in the Dáil passed from one Party to the other, and a Nationalist Government sits on the benches opposite, a Republican Government sits on the benches opposite——

The Deputy makes a very clever distinction.

I do not. I am enforcing one with the other. I am emphasising the fact that the only Government which can be a Nationalist Government is a Republican Government.

We maintain we are Republicans.

We are the Republicans here. If Deputies on the Labour Benches do not want to associate with us as Republicans we cannot help it, but the Republicans in this country are those on these benches.

Mr. O'CONNELL

We maintain we have as good a right to call ourselves Republicans as you.

Do I take it, then, from the Chairman of the Labour Party that their political objective is the same as ours? That they wish to amend the Constitution, to delete the objectionable clauses in it, and instead of making it a monarchical constitution to make it a republican constitution?

When he knows more clearly what the Deputy's objective is he will be able to say.

I do not think there can be any doubt as to the Deputy's objective or the objective of the Party to which he has the honour to belong. It is the establishment of a Republican Government for the whole of Ireland. I do not think that there can be any doubt in the mind of any member of this House, in the minds of the public outside, or in the minds of those who have elected us upon our election pledges, as to what our objective is. I am asking the Leader of the Labour Party if he associates himself with it.

Perhaps the Deputy, having said that, will continue on the Bill.

However, to get back, I think I was saying that, supposing public opinion outside does change, and notwithstanding everything that the President and the members of the Executive Council may allege against us, does decide to entrust the government of the country to us, to carry through the programme which we have set before them, I take it that we should be placed in exactly the same position in relation to the Seanad, or in relation to the legislative proposals which we may wish to submit to this House, in fulfilment of our pledges to the people, as the President and the members of the Government have been. Their attitude has been this, that once they have decided upon certain legislative proposals, they are to be rushed through this House, rushed through the Seanad, and made law by a declaration that their immediate enactment is essential to the preservation of the public peace and safety, and that they cannot any longer be referred to the people or in any way held up, even by the Seanad. That was the position before the President introduced the Constitutional amendments which have already gone through this House and which have been adopted by the Seanad.

But we submit that it is not a desirable thing that the privilege which this Government has enjoyed should be denied to its successors, and therefore we say that since those Articles which provide for the immediate enactment of legislation adopted by this House have been deleted from the Bill, the Senators themselves, by virtue of the fact that they enjoy a prolonged term of office, should not be in a position to defy, as they would be under this, for a considerable period of time the wishes of a majority Party in this House, and that therefore the term of office of a Senator ought not very greatly exceed the lifetime of the Dáil. In that way, in case a constitutional crisis should come, it would be capable of an easy and a peaceful solution in so far as retiring Senators would be compelled to present one-third of them. selves for election to this Dáil after two years, and then, before the Dáil would dissolve, another third would be compelled to present themselves also to the Dáil for election. In that way we feel that the majority Party in this House would be able to modify the personnel of the Seanad so as to make it conform to Party divisions here.

It might be argued, of course, that in that way we would not be strengthening the Seanad. We agree, and we admit that. We do not see that there is any reason whatsoever under the present Constitution why the Seanad should be strengthened or in any way improved. My own feeling is that since we are out to amend the Constitution fundamentally we should dispense with the Second House, or with any corporate body which would in any way impede the Constitutional changes which we are anxious to bring about. For that reason, therefore, we would like to make it possible for us, without too much strife, and without engendering bitterness and ill-feeling, to make quickly the composition of the Party divisions in the Seanad conform to the Party divisions which exist in this House, so that the majority Party in this House would quickly become the majority in the Seanad.

For that reason we would like the term of office of Senators to be the shortest possible. We do not wish it to be unduly lengthened, and we think that a period of nine years is too long. I think we have to that extent the qualified support of the Labour Party. Deputy O'Connell, speaking, I think, against the Bill, intimated that at the same time he was prepared to vote for it because of the fact that it did propose to reduce the term from twelve years to nine. That was the equivalent, it seems to me, to saying that the Bill, like the curate's egg, was bad only in parts. He appealed to us to let the Bill go through. I do submit that it is not fair for him to ask us to swallow the Bill simply on the grounds that it does not contain the fully-fledged chicken. That may be a very sound principle for a landlady to adopt so far as our breakfast table is concerned but I do not think it is a good principle for a legislature.

The Bill is bad and wrong in so far as it does not curtail the term of office of the Seanad sufficiently. If you make it six years, or five years, you could reduce the number of Senators and make an appreciable saving. If you make it five or six years you could enable the majority party in this House to make the composition of the Seanad conform more nearly to the political divisions which exist in this House, and in view of the Constitutional changes which we are anxious to make, and which I believe the Irish people desire, every impediment and every obstacle in the way of a majority party which seeks to bring about these changes is a danger to the nation and a danger to the public peace. For that reason, therefore, we wish, as I said, to disable the Seanad, if you like. We do not believe it exists there for the people's good, or for the good of the country generally. It has been forced upon us. I do not believe that the Constitution Committee, when sitting, if they were free agents in the matter, would have selected a Seanad composed of this type at all. They might have selected some other revising body, but I do not think they would have taken the line they took. There is absolutely no difference of function or of class, no quality which differentiates the Seanad from the Dáil, except possibly the accident in some cases of birth or wealth or position. Senators generally do not represent a separate distinct interest in this nation or a separate distinct class with special powers and functions. They have simply been selected at random and they have had these honours and these duties imposed on them, and from the first day they began to act they have failed to fulfil a single duty imposed on them by the Constitution, and they have signally failed to justify themselves as a Seanad. Therefore we are opposed to prolonging the term of office of these people, who do not fulfil any useful function in the State.

Ba mhaith an smaoineamh é an tréimhse a laghdú ó 12 bliain go dtí 9 mbliana, mar is túisce a bhéas comhaltaí uile an tSeanaid fé chomhacht na Dála. Ach ní thuigim cé'n fá nach dtéightar níos sia ar an mbealach ceart agus an tréimhse a chiorrú go dtí 6 bliana. Cad tá in a choinnibh sin? Ní fheicim aon ní in a choinnibh. Dá ndéanfaí é sin féin, bheadh tréimhse níos fuide ag an Seanad ná mar a bheadh ag an Dáil. Tá fhios agam gur maith leis an Aireacht buaine agus seasamhacht a bheith ann agus bheadh an sgéal mar sin da ndéanfadh siad mar a adeirim.

Dá mba rud é gurab iad na daoine a dhéanfadh an togha, bheadh leithscéal éigin ag an Rialtas. Bheadh costas trom ag baint leis an togha sin, agus mar sin de. Ach is dócha nách fada go mbéidh an Bille ina Reacht, ag fágaint toghachan an tSeanaid fé'n Dáil. Is beag costas a bhéas ag baint leis mar sin agus ní féidir leis an Rialtas é sin do chur os ár gcóir mar leithsgéal.

Rud eile,. tá comhaltaí ar an Seanad anois nár dhein a gcuid dualgaisí do chólíona. Ba dheas an rud liosta no tuairisc d'fháil ar an méid lá a bhí an Seanad in a shuidhe agus ar an méid oibre a rinne na comhaltaí so. Ba mhaith an rud é tuairisc chruinn a fhoillsiú ar an sgéal san. Dá ghiorracht é an téarma, seadh is cúramaí agus is dúthrachtaí a bheidís. Thiocfadh leis na daoine an liosta do sgrúdú agus is beag seans a bheadh ag cuid de na comhaltaí ag an togha.

An oráid a thug an t-Uachtarán uaidh le linn an Bille seo bheith os ar gcóir roinnt seachtain ó shoin, tá sé léighte agam agus thugas fé ndeara nár mhinigh sé dhúinn cad 'na thaobh gur chuir sé naoi mbliana isteach in ionad sé blian. Dubhairt sé a lán ach níor bhfiú leis tagairt don scéal san in ao' chor. B'fhéidir go raibh an ceart aige. B'fhéidir go bhfuil fá fé leith ann nár mhaith leis é a nochtadh. B'fhéidir nach bhfuil aon fá leis. Ach níor dhéin sé aon tagairt don sgéal san chó maith agus is féidir liom d'fheiceal. Is fíor gur lughaide comhacht an tSeanaid an téarma oifige a chiorrú. Is fearr é sin don Dáil agus is fearr é don náisiún, do réir mo thuairime. Tá súil agam go míneochaidh an t-Uachtarán, no Aire éigin, cad tá i gcoinnibh sé bliana mar théarma an tSeanaid. Ní bheadh morán costais ag baint leis an togha agus tá a lán Teachtaí nach bhfuil ar an dtaoibh seo——

B'fhéidir go mhíneochadh an Teachta an tairbhe a thiocfadh as laghdú an tSeanaid.

Ní dóigh liom gur ceart iad d'fhágáilt annsin go ceann 9 mblian gan faic le dhéanamh acu. B'fhearr liom gan iad do bheith ann in ao' chor ach, má tá siad le bheith ann, is fearr 6 bliana mar théarma ná 9 mbliana.

Again I contemplate the absence of participation in this debate by the members of the majority party, and express regret that they do not feel it either commensurate or desirable to give to this House or to their constituents the reasons which animate them personally in voting for a Bill of this kind. It is not by any means the most important Bill of the series of Bills which have been offered to us, but it does raise rather interesting mathematical possibilities. You have the Dáil of 153 and the Seanad of 60. Now the period of tenure of office by members of the Seanad does decide the speed with which any given composition of the Dáil will alter the present composition and orientation of the Seanad. I have been working it out. It is rather a complicated formula, but the upshot of it is this—I do not want to be controversial—I think it will be assumed that at present the Seanad does represent a definite orientation, and that it is related as positive and negative to the two different outlooks in this House.

And that they do no work.

If the Dáil is constituted in this proportion—106 antagonistic to the Seanad and 46 in favour of the Seanad, and no time and under no condition will this Dáil be able to alter the constitution and orientation of the Seanad. Now that is a very remarkable proposition. If the Dáil is returned by the country in proportion of two to one in favour of an attitude of mind for which the Seanad does not stand, at no time, as far as I can see, will it be able to alter its composition. But the first couple of years after the first couple of elections there is a very slight change, but you get on the flat of the curve and remain permanently in that position. I wonder if the House contemplated that when this Bill was introduced?

If this House was constituted in any less proportion than two to one, 106 to 46, in favour of the present view of the Seanad, then, though there is continuously a majority, it might be of two—thirds of the Seanad, a process of ossification of the Seanad will develop I do not know whether that was under stood when this Bill was offered to us. The shorter the term of office of a Senator, the quicker will be the state of ossification. Perhaps the President did advert to that peculiar mathematical fact, and he may have had that peculiar mathematical purpose in his mind, but I think he ought to have explained to the Dáil why he chose a period of nine years as distinct from a period of six or five or ten years, and what proportion of the Dáil, returned in antagonism to the Seanad, he had envisaged as one necessary and likely to alter that change. What I am suggesting is that you have got a permanent sterilisation, except by a re-altering of the Constitution. I cannot conceive that any men in their senses deliberately would work out a formula of this kind—that a Dáil of two to one is permanently sterilised in relation to the Seanad, and that anything less than a Dáil of two to one will tend to the strengthening of the opinion in the Seanad which is antagonistic to the majority of the Dáil.

We certainly would like to see the period of tenure of office of the Seanad reduced until it did consist of—what the Minister for Local Government said it did consist of—sixty vacancies. But, as we cannot get it down to that state, we would rather the period was reduced. We see no particular virtue in the six years. If there was some arrangement in relation to the voting in this Dáil for the constitution of the Seanad, so that a majority of the Dáil —I mean a bare majority of the Dáil, or a majority in proportion as it exceeded a bare majority of the Dáil— would be capable of altering the constitution of the Seanad, then this matter of the period of office would be a matter of very great importance. But the Government have deliberately stacked the cards, deliberately and knowingly. I have either to accuse them of stupidity, or turpitude, and frankly I would rather accuse them of stupidity, because anybody can be stupid; I would rather imagine that they did not advert to the fact that in this method of election they do deliberately sterilise a two-to-one majority of the Dáil in relation to any capacity to change the nature of the Seanad. But, if they do not accept the standard of stupidity, we must assume that they deliberately did intend that the one thing that was to be left outside the purview of the popularly-elected members of the Dáil was the constitution of the body which they were empowering to hold up legislation for from twenty to thirty-four months. A two-to-one majority in this Dáil sterilised not merely now, but for all time.

The Seanad is in a position not merely to reproduce itself, but to strengthen itself against this Dáil at anything less than a two-to-one majority in this Dáil against them. That is important, as I say; that does raise the question of the period. If the period is five years, then they can more rapidly ossify the Seanad. If the period is nine years, they can do it a bit more slowly. So that really it looks to me as if, having regard to all the other sort of things they have done, to the sort of mess they have put us in, to the fact that it is unlikely there will be permanently in this House a Dáil which is constituted two-to-one against the ideas of the Seanad, the lengthened period does give a certain amount of protection. From that point of view, in so far as it fits in and, to a certain extent, neutralises the evil of their other courses, they do seem to have provided a certain argument for the nine years. Our objection to the nine years is the Our objection we have to any single year in which membership of that Seanad shall be allowed to hold that position which it now holds under the Acts which they have passed, or attempted to pass, of being able to control the Dáil. The point I want to get out quite clearly is that they have stacked the cards now so that if, even at the next general election, and the election after that, and the election after that again, the country returns a majority of two-to-one against everything that the Seanad stands for, the Seanad is the one thing which, under this Bill and under the other Bills which they have passed previously, is utterly immune from the influence of this Dáil to change its complexion in any way whatever.

As Deputy Flinn has pointed out, we are rather in an ignominious position here, because we have a certain number of Bills presented to us, each one of them dealing with a special point in relation to the Constitution, and we have not the advantage of having the mentality or the purpose of the Government clearly before us to make it clear to us what exactly they are aiming at in all these measures. I do not know whether in the discussions which have taken place during the past six weeks it has been made clear to the Government that this precipitate action would not, in the long run, be beneficial to the country, and that to whatever extent legislation is being rushed through this House now, with the aid of certain devices which a majority can command, ultimately, in spite of that legislation, if there is a tide or a feeling in the country that wants to express itself in a certain way, that wants to alter the Constitution to make it more flexible and more amenable and to respond more fully to the wishes of the people, that legislation cannot hold. The Government, as has been already pointed out to them, are simply building up dams which, by virtue of the very fact that they are so ridiculous and so ignominious in the way they treat the dignity of this House by limiting its power, and the manner in which they have been introduced, cannot stand, and will not stand, before the rising tide of opinion when the people get clearly to understand such a point as Deputy Flinn has just pointed out, which is a very serious and very important one, that if, at the present time, it suits the majority who are in power to change the Constitution in certain ways, to enlarge the powers of the Seanad, and to leave its term of office at what seems to us the unnecessarily long period of nine years, these considerations do not seem to have been based on the fact that they were, at the same time, putting the Seanad in a position where it will be extremely hard and almost impossible for the Dáil afterwards to change the legislation. I have no doubt that the legislation in general is against the wishes of the population, that no attempt is being made to defend it on democratic or national grounds, and that it is absolutely unjustifiable. We have the unfortunate position that, by the shortsightedness of this majority, we are finding ourselves daily driven into certain positions under which, if a future Executive should attempt to change or modify what is done, it will be almost impossible to extricate ourselves, and there will be no remedy.

Surely on this whole question the Government ought to have recognised sufficiently during the last few months that this is not the time to take the action they are taking to sterilise the Opposition Party and the aspirations of the people, so that they will not be able to advance in the way they want to advance; surely they should have learned a sufficient lesson and heard enough speeches and arguments to make them realise that the present time, even if it is necessary to introduce certain measures to deal with the election of the Seanad, is not the right one to make these changes. When you have a new Opposition which has only familiarised itself with the procedure of the House, when you have not had the whole question of your Constitution dealt with in a broad and detached way, it is most unfortunate and unfair and not, I think, playing the rules of the game, to come along now with this Bill and pretend that as a kind of penance for their previous sins that the Government have done some little thing to recommend them, however much they have sinned in the past, to our kind offices in thus reducing the period to nine years. That is simply nothing in comparison with the things already done. It must be taken in relation to measures already passed, measures for the abolition of the Referendum and the Initiative and measures for the extension of the powers of the Seanad. It must be taken, above all, in relation to the fact that, no matter how parties may change, it will be almost impossible to change from the new position; that however things may go, the measures the Government have passed will be such that they will enormously strengthen the Seanad, that the Seanad will be a great deal beyond the power of the Dáil. We are doing that, not because we have any real reason to believe that the Seanad has justified itself in the past, not because we have a kind of belief in the future, like the President has, that certain things are unlikely to happen. Surely we must not take things for granted. We must consider the people of the country whom we represent and ask ourselves whether it is fair to pass measures which we are not clear about ourselves and which have not been examined even from an elementary point of view.

A particular constitutional amendment might be quite clear, might be debated very extensively and everyone might understand its provisions and objects, but when we have a whole number of them suddenly cast on us, when we must examine each one anew in the light of the others which have been passed, then obviously we do not know where we stand. The Government Party do not favour the election of the Seanad by the direct vote of the people. I think had it happened that the Seanad were elected by the direct vote of the people for example, there might have been some justification for leaving the period at nine years, but the Seanad will be responsible to nobody. A certain number outgoing may even elect themselves. They will have power in the next election to vote for themselves. Those gentlemen will find themselves in a much stronger position if they succeed. They will not be responsible to any constituents. They will be, perhaps, persons who in their own estimation represent important aspects of the nation's life. They will represent certain class interests. From our experience of the Seanad in the past and from the complete failure of the Government to justify its position or say how in actual personnel the Seanad will be improved, how more highly qualified and better trained men will find a place there, we must only conclude that men of the type I referred to, the old Unionist type will eventually get in. Surely the time is opportune to start the whole thing afresh, either by a vote of the people's representatives or the people themselves. If we found that these two roads were not open to us then we ought simply to have gone on with the Seanad election in the ordinary way, making whatever changes were absolutely necessary and ought not to have interfered any further.

But we ought to bear in mind the other side of the picture, that the shortening of the period is no quid pro quo in relation to the powers given to the Seanad. There is no justification whatever for giving the Seanad twice as long a period of office as the ordinary members of the Dáil. There is no doubt that members of the Seanad will line up with certain political parties and become associated with them. You will not have and cannot have an aristocratic class which the country will recognise should have representation there and which, whatever its political opinions may be, would, in the long run, give value to the country by reason of the improvements it will make in legislation. You will not have that, but you will have the position that a certain political party will get a majority, we will suppose, at the next election for the Seanad, and they will remain in that position for nine years. The Government, having their own future alone in view and not caring about the consequences to the Constitution in doing what they are doing at present, will be quite satisfied that their majority should hold the Seanad for the next nine years. We should not take that point of view. We have not the advantage of being as intimately associated with the machinery of the State as they have been for the last five or six years, but if we had I think we would have had more regard to certain democratic and national principles which were so freely expounded in 1922, and instead of looking at this thing from a party point of view, we would, in the new circumstances, take a step in the right direction.

This is a further step in strengthening what might be called Rip Van Winkle government. Everyone must be over 30 years of age before it is possible for him to be elected to the body and he will be elected for nine years at a time.

That means, of course, that the limitation must not be taken in a literal sense, because it creates an atmosphere in which the whole attitude adopted is that the people should be conservative in temperament, be above a certain age, supposed to be quite beyond the age when they indulge in follies of radical ideas, to be settled down, more or less, and to be fixed in some vested interest. The vested interests in this country are, unfortunately, all on one side, and because of that it makes it very difficult for people having the opposite point of view who want to change things. And people who want to change things in this country will always be nationally inclined, and will always represent the vast majority of the people, who are the small farmers and workers in this country. This is a stay upon the progress of this class in the community. It is all very well to compare nine years with twelve years and to say that nine years is better than twelve years. But when the Seanad was created first it was worse than the present Seanad in some ways, and in other ways it had less powers, less powers to interfere with legislation. The nine years period of election given by this Bill means the lifetime of two Parliaments. It means that the whole personnel of the whole body will only begin to change in about ten to fifteen years. It will be about ten or fifteen years more before it would begin to change its personnel properly.

In any case the forces in this country who are hostile to real national progress are now reaping while they have the harvest. This is the period when the national spirit is weak as a result of what has happened in the past, ending in the civil war. They are taking advantage of this period when that spirit is weak in order to dig themselves in. They are digging themselves in here by nine years, and in the other Bill, to which I need not refer, to such an extent that the younger generation will come to the conclusion that it is a much better thing to brush the whole thing aside. There is not any hope in the way the machine is being framed. From a strictly national point of view the process is as absurd as if the Germans after the war, or if you suppose the Belgians after the war, were to create a Senate in which the German element in Belgium was to have the upper hand and was to be glorified in a Second Chamber.

Mr. HOGAN

Is there a German element in Belgium?

There is.

Mr. HOGAN

Where?

Do you want to discuss European politics?

Mr. HOGAN

No; but you started it.

There is, as a matter of fact, in certain parts of Belgium a strong German element.

Mr. HOGAN

I do not think so.

I beg your pardon there is. In any case in this country you accept people in this country as if they were citizens of this country without having gone through any process of naturalisation. Up to this you have not set up any machinery for naturalisation. You have set up no machinery by which to judge tomorrow a man who makes a claim and says "I am an Irishman, and always was an Irishman. You can accept me if you like." I know cases of men who do not want even to accept nationality of the Free State but who have actually voted in the elections. I do not know how they voted, but I know they voted.

The whole situation from the point of view of nationality in the strict sense is in a state of chaos and we are simply placing our enemies in a position of privilege. I am not in any way intolerant towards the British element in this country, but I think the basis of anything in the Constitution should be frakly to recognise them as having a very particular outlook and to prevent them being dangerous to the State as a whole. If that were the attitude taken up they certainly would not be put in control of a machine which they can control for ten or twenty years and be enabled to prevent legislation by delays, which are provided for in other parts of the Constitution. In the long run it will not succeed in the sense that the worse the Constitution is the better, because if the Government would only make it sufficiently bad, it would hasten the time when the country would be so sick of it—and indeed they are getting pretty sick of it at present— that some other line of action would be considered. The nation has solidified recently very much against the Seanad, when it looks at a body consisting of sixty men all drawing salaries, and with nothing to force them to attend. They draw their salaries for nine years and they hardly ever attend at the Seanad meeting. At least, you should provide for the absentees so that in regard to those who would be absent for a certain period, a year, or two years, you should be able to get rid of them altogether if you are going to make the body efficient. The public opinion outside is that the Seanad is a complete farce. Perhaps nothing has caused more discredit amongst a certain section of your own Free State opinion than the feverish and anti-national activities which you are displaying in regard to these Constitution Amendment Bills.

took the Chair.

Question—"That the words proposed to be deleted stand part of the question"—put.
The Dáil divided; Tá, 54; Níl, 49.

Tá.

  • Alton, Ernest Henry.
  • Beckett, James Walter.
  • Bennett, George Cecil.
  • Blythe, Ernest.
  • Bourke, Séamus A.
  • Byrne, Alfred.
  • Byrne, John Joseph.
  • Carey, Edmund.
  • Collins-O'Driscoll, Mrs. Margt.
  • Conlan Martin.
  • Connolly, Michael P.
  • Cooper, Bryan Ricco.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Craig, Sir James.
  • Crowley, James.
  • Davis, Michael.
  • Doherty, Eugene.
  • Duggan, Edmund John.
  • Dwyer, James.
  • Egan, Barry M.
  • Esmonde, Osmond Thos. Grattan.
  • Fitzgerald, Desmond.
  • Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
  • Haslett, Alexander.
  • Hassett, John J.
  • Hennessy, Thomas.
  • Hennigan, John.
  • Henry, Mark.
  • Hogan, Patrick (Galway).
  • Jordan, Michael.
  • Keogh, Myles.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • Mathews, Arthur Patrick.
  • McDonogh, Martin.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • Mongan, Joseph W.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Murphy, James E.
  • Murphy, Joseph Xavier.
  • Myles, James Sproule.
  • Nally, Martin Michael.
  • O'Connor, Bartholomew.
  • O'Mahony, dermot Gun.
  • O'Sullivan, Gearoid.
  • O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
  • Rice, Vincent.
  • Roddy, Martin.
  • Sheehy, Timothy (West Cork).
  • Thrift, William Edward.
  • Tierney, Michael.
  • Vaughan, Daniel.
  • White, Vincent Joseph
  • Wolfe, George.

Níl.

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Anthony, Richard.
  • Blaney, Neal.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Boland, Patrick.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Buckley Daniel.
  • Carney, Frank.
  • Cassidy, Archie J.
  • Coburn, James.
  • Colbert, James.
  • Cooney, Eamon.
  • Corkery, Dan.
  • Crowley, Fred, Hugh.
  • Crowley, Tadhg.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Everett, James.
  • Fahy, Frank.
  • Flinn, Hugo.
  • Fogarty, Andrew.
  • French, Seán.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Goulding, John.
  • Holt, Samuel.
  • Houlihan, Patrick.
  • Jordan, Stephen.
  • Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
  • Kerlin, Frank.
  • Killane, James Joseph.
  • Kilroy, Michael.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick John.
  • Maguire, Ben.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Moore, Séamus.
  • Morrissey, Daniel.
  • O'Connell, Thomas J.
  • O'Hanlon, John F.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • O'Reilly, Thomas.
  • Powell, Thomas P.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Sexton, Martin.
  • Sheehy, Timothy (Tipperary).
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Walsh, Richard.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and Conlon; Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.
Question declared carried.
Question proposed—"That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Now that the amendment which was proposed by Deputy de Valera has been disposed of, and we have an opportunity of discussing the Bill itself, I would like to submit some arguments which may convince the additional two or three Deputies who are necessary for the purpose of securing its defeat that the Bill is a bad one.

Call a vote now before the rest of them come in.

They can come in on both sides. There has been during the course of the discussion on this Bill practically no sound argument advanced in support of the proposal to leave Senators in their office for a period of nine years. The fact that the Government has recognised that the period of twelve years at present provided for in the Constitution is too long is in itself an indication that they were thinking on the right lines. Unfortunately, however, they do not appear to have studied the matter sufficiently seriously or given it the attention which a matter of this magnitude requires, or they would have, I think, realised that as a change was to be effected a much shorter period than a period of nine years would, in fact, have been better. It is quite obvious that a person elected for nine years must feel himself independent of public opinion. A Deputy elected to this Dáil, knowing that the maximum period of his office will be five years, feels himself bound, if he wishes to secure re-election at the end of that period, to devote himself to the interests of his constituents, to pay attention to his duties, to attend regularly here at the meetings, and to take an active interest in the business of the House. A person, however, elected for a longer period, say, nine years, would feel that the period in itself is sufficiently long to enable him to neglect any of the work of the assembly which he was elected to do except, perhaps, if he wishes to secure election again, during the last two or three years of his term of office. We have had already raised for discussion in this House the question whether or not Senators are elected as a reward for the services rendered or because they are the best men to do the work which it is the duty of Senators to perform. It is becoming more obvious as the discussion on these Bills proceeds that the attitude of the Government is that individuals are elected to the Seanad, not because they serve a useful purpose there, but because it is the most convenient form of rewarding them for actions which they took in the past in support of the Government, or in support of the party that sent the Government here. Those who have examined the conditions prevailing in the country and who have glimpsed some of the difficulties under which the present Government are endeavouring to work must realise that one of the major difficulties with which they are faced is the fact that they have been forced to place into responsible positions, not merely in the Government, but also in the administration, individuals who are unfitted for the posts, but who had to be provided for at the behest of the organisation which elected the Government.

We have had what were called indications of appreciation placed into various positions and when there now exists, and it is proposed to continue, an institution the very purpose of which is to provide an easy means for giving political awards to supporters of the Government, we think it is up to those in this House who have some respect for the machinery of democratic Government to protest. The Seanad has been under discussion from various angles here lately, and we must consider the proposals contained in this Bill in relation to the proposals contained in the various other Bills which came before us and which will come before us in the following week. The men whom it is proposed to have elected for a continuous period of nine years will exercise considerable power in relation to the Acts passed by this House. They will have power to suspend legislation for a period of over twenty months, and when we consider that the men who will exercise that power are men elected in this manner, as a reward for services rendered, we must say that we are taking liberties with the structure of the State that may lead to very serious consequences. If it was proposed to have the Second Chamber composed of experts in various subjects, of highly trained men, of men capable of seriously considering Bills passed by this House and pointing out defects in them, some argument could be advanced in support of that, but when instead we are proposing to give that power to a House, the only justification for whose existence is that some easy means must be provided to the Government for rewarding their friends, then it is obvious we are doing something which represents a victory of expediency over sound governmental principles.

That House of Senators, independent as they are of public opinion and elected for a period of nine years, might very easily interfere seriously with the interests of the Irish people by holding up Bills which this Dáil considered necessary to be passed in the interests of the people. We must remember also that the system of election is probably the most undemocratic system which could be devised, election in part by the Seanad itself. The combined votes of the members of the Dáil and Seanad are to decide who are to compose that Chamber. Those outgoing Senators who may be re-nominated will have the right, if they so wish, to vote for themselves, to vote themselves back into office for another period of nine years. Even if this proposal to give a period of nine years of office to Senators was combined with the proposal to alter the system of election so that the will of the people could act directly on the Assembly there might be something to be said for it, but not merely is the election by the Seanad to take place in that undemocratic manner, but those who will be placed into the Seanad will be placed there for a time which will make them independent of those who put them there, and members of this Dáil, who will have the responsibility of putting a number of them into office, should ask themselves seriously whether they can select a group of individuals on whom they could rely for a continuous period of nine years to give close attention to their duties and carry out the wishes of those who gave their votes to them. I do not think we could.

We have, I think, enough experience, learned in the recent history of the country, to realise that there can be very few men in the State who can be trusted to go straight in the interests of the State for nine years. Why then take the risk of giving these powers to people who will have a very strong temptation to act in a manner that would not be in the best interests of the State? The Bill itself is similar to other Bills which were introduced here recently. It is drafted in the most involved manner possible. It provides for the insertion in the Constitution of one section which will cease to have effect practically after the next election to the Seanad is concluded, and it seems to us that if the Government had any respect for the Constitution they would not be putting into it purely temporary provisions of this nature. They would have provided that the term of office for Senators elected this year would be fixed by law, for example, so that those who wish to get some idea of the structure of the State and who would read the Constitution for that purpose would not have to wade through a lot of dead Articles for the purpose of discovering it. The attitude of the Government in relation to all these Bills is shown very clearly. They think no more of the Constitution than, in fact, we on this side of the House do. It is something which they maintain when it is useful to maintain, and something which they alter when it is necessary in the interests of their Party that it should be altered.

So long as the Constitution is something which gives them power to work their will with the people they support it. If and when the Constitution becomes an impediment to their progress, then the Constitution will go by the board. We think perhaps that in the particular circumstances of this nation, and particularly with relation to the very nature of the Constitution, it is useful that the Seanad should be regarded in that manner, and no other, as something that should be kept so long as there is no harm in keeping it and as something to be abolished by the enactment of law when it is necessary to abolish it. If the Constitution was a representation of the traditions and ideals of the Irish people and if it could be regarded seriously as the fundamental law of this State, even these frivolous alterations of it could be regarded as of importance, but as it is not we must regard amendments to it as we would regard amendments to any other Act, something to be discussed on its merits and, in this case, to be rejected on its merits.

I would like to ask members of Cumann na nGaedheal in this House whether they do not think that much better service would be secured from members of the Seanad if they had to justify their work in that House once every five years, for example. Do they not think that even in their own interests it would be better to reduce the period of office from nine years? They want a Seanad and they profess that they want a good Seanad. They even pretend to believe that the Seanad is capable of serving some useful purpose. Arguing from that basis, I think that they will be able to see for themselves that the utility of the Seanad would be greatly increased if this Dáil retained to itself a greater measure of control over them than this Bill would indicate that the Government wishes it to have. If we could remind Senators that, if they neglect their duty, their period of office is likely to conclude at the end of the four or five years for which they would be elected, it would be, perhaps, possible that they would be more attentive to their duty, but when Senators know that they cannot be interfered with for the entire period of nine years, they can afford to laugh at any representation which would be made to them by the Dáil, because the Dáil that elected them will have gone out of existence long before their period of office will have concluded. The members of the Dáil who will elect Senators here next November may not be here at all when the term of office of these Senators expires. It is quite possible they will not. A great many changes have taken place in this country during the past nine years and there is still ground for hope that even more important changes will take place during the next nine years.

In that connection it might be no harm to say that it is rather unfair to those who will go forward for election to suggest to them or leave them under the impression that they may be in office for a period of nine years. They may make business arrangements calculating upon that fact. They may alter the tenor of their lives to provide for the fact that they will be in a certain position for nine years, when every Deputy in this House knows that long before that period of nine years has expired, there is bound to be an alteration in the majority of this House and consequently a termination of the Seanad altogether. In fairness to those individuals who are so busy canvassing in the Lobbies for some time past, it would be no harm to remind them that, no matter what the Bill says, their period of office is much more likely to be less than the nine years mentioned here. I would suggest seriously to members of Cumann na nGaedheal if they do want to keep the Seanad there, they ought to constitute it in such a way that they will be able to convince those who vote for them in elections that it is worth keeping there. They will not be able to convince them of that if they are going to make the Seanad a place of rest, as it has been described by some Deputies, for discredited politicians. I have seen Senators who, no doubt, take their duties very seriously. We meet them in the Lobbies carrying attache cases, containing probably several back numbers of the "Irish Times" and looking as if they took their duties seriously, but there are several Senators whom we have never seen here.

It would be no harm if a list of attendances at the Seanad were provided. If that was done we would find that there is a very large number of them with less than 10 per cent. attendances. It is to people like that that we propose to give continuity of office for nine years. When you have elected them, when next November you elect 20 of these individuals to that House, you will not be able to interfere with them, by any means or under any power under this Constitution, for the full period of nine years. The only way you will be able to get rid of them will be by voting for Fianna Fail at the next election and I know that there are some opposite who would rather cut off their right hand than that it should have to write No. 1 after the name of a Fianna Fail candidate. You may be faced with the situation in which that may be the only way out of the difficulty; think of the horror when such a drastic step would have to be taken in order to undo what you are proposing to do this evening. I hope therefore that the small majority by which Deputy de Valera's amendment was defeated will be reversed when the vote on this Bill takes place and that there will emerge at long last from the ranks of Cumann na nGaedheal two or three honest individuals who will realise where the Government is going and who will be prepared to call a halt by voting against this Bill.

I do not know how far the statements of Deputy Lemass with regard to the merits or demerits of the Seanad are relevant to this particular motion.

I would not like to have to give a detailed answer to that question.

Mr. O'CONNELL

At all events, I only propose to deal with what is in the Bill before us at the moment. The principle of the Bill, as set out in the title, is to amend the Constitution by reducing the term of office of the members of Seanad Eireann and to make consequential alterations. The principle, therefore, involved in the Bill, as I see it, is to reduce the term of office of Senators. The Fianna Fail Party are proposing to vote against the principle of the Bill and hope, I suppose to defeat it on Second Reading. Suppose they do succeed in that, what will be the position?

That the Government will resign.

Mr. O'CONNELL

I am voting on the merits of the Bill, irrespective of whether the Government stand or fall. If the Second Reading of the Bill is defeated, the position will be that the term of office of Senators will continue to be twelve years. We do not stand for that. We believe that that term of office should be reduced, and accordingly we propose to vote for the Second Reading of this Bill. We would be glad, if the Second Reading of this Bill were passed, that the term of office were further reduced to six years. If, on the Committee Stage, Deputy de Valera puts forward an amendment to have the term of office reduced from nine years to six years we should certainly support that amendment. But, in order to get a chance of doing that. we must vote for the Second Reading of this Bill. If the Second Reading is not carried, then we will have the position as it is at present, a twelve years period. We are prepared to vote for the Second Reading of this Bill, on the principle that it reduces the term of office of members of the Seanad. I think it was Deputy de Valera who said that if we must have a Seanad, then we ought to restrict its powers as much as possible. On that principle, I think that he, too, should vote for the Second Reading of this Bill.

That is a nice way out of an unpleasant situation.

This Bill got a considerable amount of discussion—

Is the President concluding?

I think there are some other members of our Party who wish to speak on this Bill.

In reference to what Deputy O'Connell said about the twelve years, what struck me from my little knowledge of vital statistics—no person is allowed to become a member of the Seanad until thirty-five years of age, at least that is the present arrangement, though it is proposed to change the age to thirty years—and from the evidence of our own census, the average life of a man in this country is forty-four. Therefore, according to that, there are going to be very few Senators who will last the nine years. You are putting a strain upon these men that they may not altogether be able to meet. Arguing from the medical point of view, I think it is hardly fair to expect men to put up with the duties that they are called upon to perform in that particular assembly and to last out for the nine years. I quite recognise, of course, that they will do it, as a number of them have done for the last few years, by attending, as Deputy Lemass said, ten per cent. or twenty per cent. of the sittings, though the total number of sittings of the Seanad is not very heavy, as we know. I do not know if there is much in what Deputy O'Connell says, that by throwing out this Bill we will be going back to the twelve years period. I think that having objected to the nine years term, we cannot very well vote for the Second Reading of this Bill in which the nine-years term is contained, and the only way in which we can express our dissatisfaction with the nine-years term is to vote against the Second Reading. If we are beaten on that, we will naturally attempt to put in some amendments on the Committee Stage to reduce the term. I think that we are only acting logically in trying to defeat this Bill on Second Reading.

I was rather surprised to hear the sort of arguments that were put up against the Second Reading of this Bill. I always understood that the greater contains the less. If we object to nine, then we must be in favour of twelve. If nine goes, you can reduce it to six, but you cannot reduce twelve to six, because apparenly you are standing for twelve as against nine on this measure. That is not the point that I am really concerned with. The fact of the matter is that Deputies opposite have not considered one of these series of Constitution Amendment Bills. Let us at least be candid with one another. Surely Deputy Lemass was not serious during the whole course of his speech. Did the circumstances of this measure warrant a fifteen or twenty minutes' speech? Did they warrant Deputy Flinn's speech a few moments ago? What are the facts? What are we dealing with in these matters?

Deputies opposite wish a continuation of the Seanad. They see, as they have been seeing for the last five years, everything in the country against them and that everything is going to be against them. They are incapable of seeing any way out; they are forestalled by people greater than themselves. Deputy Flinn was speaking of the impossibility of altering the Seanad. He made up his mind that it had to be altered, but he does not know how it is to be done. Deputy de Valera does not know how to alter it. He has not the faintest conception of how he would alter it suppose he had to. He does not concern himself in the least about it, and he is only concerned because this is a measure proposed by the majority Party who have an ulterior purpose. The Party opposite look at everything brought before this House through coloured spectacles, and the leader of the Party asks members of his Party who are tired and spent to get up and speak against the measures.

Why have twelve years instead of nine?

Twelve is objected to. Few people stand for it. The Deputy's objection to a reduction in the number of years is not sufficient. "Let us not pass this Bill," he says, "and obviously we are not in favour of altering the twelve, because twelve is what is there." I think Deputy O'Connell put the thing in a nutshell. He is in favour of reducing it to nine, and reducing it still further, but in order to get out of twelve we have to put in something else or the twelve remains.

Why not put in six?

The whole pother is about three years; that is the whole trouble. Deputies opposite a few moments ago did not know what they wanted. One Deputy wanted one thing and another Deputy wanted another. The question to be decided is whether the period should be twelve years or nine. When we have got the nine Deputies can make it only one if they so desire. That is too laborious a procedure for men of that calibre. The whole thing is foolish. Deputies opposite have the inferiority complex, and they will find it out. They think we are misleading them. We are not. We are asking them to look at this and every other measure with a view to its improvement, no matter who will be here in a couple of years' time, in the best interests of the country. If you want a Seanad for six years there is a method of getting it, and that is by passing the proposal for nine years and then reducing it if you so desire.

Question put and declared carried.
Committee Stage ordered for 10th October.
Barr
Roinn