Let us have one figure to argue on. If the Deputy wants the figures for 1945 we will get them. Will he now tell me, if 1945 had a bigger yield or if 1945 had a better acreage, why was the forecast for 1950-51 made out and sent to the European Commission as 247,000 acres? Why did the people around the Deputy advise the Government to forecast to the Food and Agriculture Committee that the acreage would be reduced to 247,000 acres? That apparently was their plan. It is all very well to talk about the plans for the Irish Mercantile Marine and for turf and cement and to put forward complaints that Fianna Fáil plans were not carried out. Here, in any event, was a target that they set for themselves. Their target was 247,000 acres, and that is the figure I bear in mind when I hear any complaints about reduced acreages for certain crops.
Some Deputy went so far as to suggest that the numbers in live stock were down. Cattle numbers are up. In the figures here, in the calculations made in January in each of the years 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951, there is an increase from 3.7 million cattle to 3.9 million cattle Sheep also show an increase. Pigs show a slight decrease from 1950, but a definite increase from 1947. Poultry show a decrease from 1950, but a definite increase from 1947. In all these increases of live stock, making a comparison with the last year of the Fianna Fáil Government, there has been an improvement in every grade. There have been ups and downs with regard to sheep, pigs and poultry, but in all cases the figures are well over the returns for January, 1947.
There was another complaint voiced in the House. It has been made often and it was made as recently as the 28th February this year in the Seanad when Deputy Corish, the Parliamentary Secretary, was speaking there on the Rates on Agricultural Land Bill. I think it worth while to put the figures on record here. Deputy Corry stated during the debate here that an effort was being made by the Government to transfer a lot of the burdens that were previously paid for by the Central Government on to the local authorities. Certain figures were given by the Parliamentary Secretary, Deputy Corish, on the 28th February, in the Seanad—column 474 of the Seanad Debates—and I will mention a few of them.
He said that in 1947-48 the total rates collected amounted to £9,111,000 and State grants were £8,230,000. I am taking that as the last Fianna Fáil year. The rates exceeded the State grants by about £1,000,000. In 1948-49, the total rates collected were £9,500,000 and the State grants were £10,749,000. In 1949-50, the total rates collected were £10,900,000, but the State grants came to £13,649,000. The Parliamentary Secretary summed that up by stating that it meant, in effect, that the State grants equalled only 60 per cent. of the total rates collected in 1939-40, and in 1949-50 they equalled 120 per cent. of what was taken from the ratepayers.
Deputy Corry, speaking here and hurriedly flying from the House the moment the Minister for Agriculture rose to reply to him, made the burden of his song the money which is being taken by customs and excise duties on certain matters connected with motoring, the money collected through the revenue derived from petrol and the road tax, as it is known. The burden of the complaint was that not all these moneys went to the local authorities. So far as I remember, his calculation was that there was about £2,000,000. There was a sum of money collected in the various ways I have mentioned which exceeded by £2,000,000 the amount provided for the roads by the Central Government, the Road Fund, say, and by the ratepayers. In that the calculation is about right, but Deputy Corry goes on the assumption that the duties levied on petrol were put towards the roads. They never were, neither were the customs and excise duties on tyres, etc. They never went towards the roads. The only thing that went towards the roads was the produce of what is called the road tax.
That road tax was increased in the Supplementary Budget of 1947. The duties on mechanically propelled vehicles were increased in that year. In that year, introducing the Supplementary Budget, the then Minister for Finance, Deputy Aiken, said:
"The Government have decided to provide additional subsidies for the purpose of reducing the prices of flour, bread, tea, sugar and fertilisers and to meet the cost by imposing the necessary taxes."
One of the necessary taxes was to increase the road tax on cars so that the tax on an 8 h.p. car became £12, on a 10 h.p. £15, on a 12 h.p. £20. The Minister added that it was proposed to appropriate the additional yield for Exchequer purposes. Deputy Corry, speaking in the debate on the 15th October, said:
"There is no doubt that the attempt made by the Government in this Budget for the relief of the ordinary wage earner in this country will be welcomed by all."
Twice the Deputy marched into the Division Lobby in order to support the Minister in carrying that particular Budget. It was quite clear from the statement of the Minister for Finance in those days that the road tax, amongst other taxes, was intended to provide the Minister with money for the payment of the subsidies which were then introduced. Speaking in particular of the road tax he said—I am quoting from the debates of the 15th October, 1947, column 395:
"——and appropriate the additional yield for Exchequer purposes."
Deputy Corry now tries to put the bluff across on his colleagues of the Cork County Council that he is against the appropriation of any part of the road tax to the Central Fund.
This matter of who stopped the turf schemes and when they were stopped has often been debated in this House. I am not going into it again in detail, but it was a matter which agitated the mind of the Minister for Local Government and Public Health of the last Government as early as the year 1946. There are many memoranda which proceeded from the Department that year. Towards the end of 1946, on the 18th October, the Minister for Local Government writes to his Cabinet colleagues in this way:—
"The Minister would not merely object to any enlargement of the scope of the functions of his Department and of country councils in regard to turf production but also to any intention of continuing beyond the current year his present responsibility for turf production through county councils. The principle of making local authorities responsible for turf production came into existence only as an emergency measure and it would seem proper that local authorities should be informed as soon as possible that they have been released from these exceptional responsibilities."
In fact, as we know, a letter went on the 18th August, 1947, from the Custom House to the secretary of each county council, telling the county councils not to participate in the production of turf after the 31st December.
When the matter swung over to the Department of Industry and Commerce with a view to seeing how Bord na Móna was to be helped, we come on to the meeting, to which I have already referred of the 12th February, 1948. There were three items on the Agenda dealing with turf. One was a complaint about the quality of turf supplied to the Department's offices. The second was the turf development programme for 1948. I read from the minute and I shall give the decision afterwards.
"In connection with the preparation of the Estimate for the Department for 1948-49, a decision was requested as to whether provision should be made for hand-won turf production in 1948. If the Bord na Móna scheme were not proceeded with, no unemployment would result as the workers would be absorbed in the machine-won scheme or other schemes. It is not known, however, what the effects of a cessation of hand-won turf production by the county councils would be."
Note the date—12th February, 1948. a rather critical date. The clouds were gathering round the heads of the the Government. They seemed to be pretty certain of their doom but they were hoping against hope that the consolidation of Parties which was then taking place would not hold together. The decision was that no provision should be made in the 1948-49 Estimates for a Bord na Móna hand-won turf scheme and that the question of the discontinuance of hand-won turf production by the county councils should be further examined.
The Local Government Department had already written down to the county councils to say that the scheme was finished but apparently, on the 12th February, in the critical situation which was then about to develop, it was thought well to say: "Well we shall have a look at that then", but, one thing certain was, that there was going to be no provision made in the 1948-1949 Estimates for Bord na Móna hand-won turf. In face of that, how anybody can say that the last Government had decided to go on with the hand-won turf scheme beats me.
Deputy Aiken and his colleagues have often given many excuses with regard to the Government Buildings that were proposed for Dublin. I think it fair to enumerate four of the excuses that were given. One was to deny that such a scheme existed at all. When the file was produced, and they were no longer in a position to deny it, we were told this scheme would give employment. We were later told—I think it was in an inspired utterance of Deputy Lemass—that there had been in the old Cumann na nGaedheal days a proposal lodged in the Office of Public Works for such a scheme. I have asked the Office of Public Works for any minute of that decision but so far they have not been able to discover any. The third excuse was that it would be nice to have such public buildings. Finally it was said that the scheme was not proceeded with because it was suggested to Leaders of other Parties that they might agree to it and that, on disagreement being registered, it was decided to abandon it. In any event, let us see what actually happened.
There was such a scheme. The deliberations started in January, 1936, and I have here a file which dates from that time. One of the memorandum deals with the scheme in the following terms:
"Before any such scheme becomes acceptable to the general public which will have to pay for it, and to put up, over a number of years, with the disturbance which it would necessarily involve, the Government would have to win the support of the Dublin Corporation which would be vitally affected and to gain the approval of the growing body of town planning opinion and of the professional associations interested in such a project."
Later on it says: "It might be even said in criticism of the scheme as a whole..." This I quote for the purpose of countering the argument that this was a plan more or less blue printed and left aside for the purpose of meeting a big unemployment period, unemployment in the building trade:
"It might be even said in criticism of the scheme as a whole that one effect of putting it into operation would be to postpone inevitably the solution of the problem of the housing of the working classes."
That was the choice. There is no doubt that would have been one effect, to postpone inevitably the solution of the problem of the housing of the working classes. That was weighed in the balance against this scheme for £11,500,000 and, having been weighed in the balance, it was decided to go ahead with, at least, the deliberations for the scheme.
When I hear complaints in this House about projects for which I have asked to be allowed to borrow £12,000,000, I can only reflect on how insincere these complaints may be rated, coming from a side of the House which supported a Government that proceeded to deliberate on a scheme of that kind. It is there very definitely to be seen in the memoranda of that time:
"Before, however, any decision is taken on the points enumerated in the preceding paragraph, there are certain of the financial implications——"
which are referred to here.
The memorandum goes on:—
"It is obvious that the necessary funds which, as shown in paragraph 6 would, at a minimum, be in the neighbourhood of £3,000,000, would have to be found by borrowing."
That, of course, was a very meagre scheme, but, at a later part, it became a scheme of £11,500,000. It was then £3,000,000. What is said here with regard to the £3,000,000 scheme applies with more effect to the £11,500,000 scheme.
"It is obvious that the necessary funds which, as shown in paragraph 6, would at a minimum be in the neighbourhood of £3,000,000 would have to be found by borrowing. A loan floated specifically for the purpose of the scheme which, in effect, is merely the provision of palatial buildings for housing Civil Service staffs would scarcely be attractive from the point of view of investors in so far as the asset created would be regarded as entirely unproductive."
That was the sober comment, that the asset was regarded as unproductive. Yet, that was considered a good project for the flotation of a loan, even though the asset was to be so unproductive. Some years later, in 1944, the figures as to cost were given, but with this warning that the figures of the cost to the State must be purely conjectural. The following figures may be taken as an indication of the size of the project: acquisition and compensation for disturbance, £2,500,000; demolition of sites acquired, £500,000; building works, £7,500,000; furnishing and equipment, £1,000,000. These figures give a tot of £11,500,000. Just after that was proposed, there is a record of a conference with the Taoiseach and the then Tánaiste in Government Buildings. A difficulty which emerged at that time, one of the matters that was under consideration, was that there were so many buildings that would have to be exempt or excluded, and the board were to reconsider the whole problem. Here are some of the buildings that were going to be demolished or, if not, they would either have to be exempted or excluded from the scheme: Holles Street Hospital, St. Stephen's Church, the convent chapel at Merrion Square and Fitzwilliam Street corner. There was also the fact that it was recognised that Merrion Square itself had been spoken of as the site of a new cathedral, and the people considering that were not sure whether the ecclesiastical authorities might not still have the cathedral project in mind.
That is the scheme which was to cost £11,500,000 and which it was recognised was not going to be of a very attractive nature for the public. It certainly could be criticised on the grounds that it was going to result in an entirely unproductive asset. Yet it was contemplated, a scheme leading in the end to the extravagant sum of £11,500,000.
At the end, of course, it came to a different point. The difficulties about building in Merrion Square had by that time been discovered to be serious. At that point the architects in the Board of Works were switched over to the Phoenix Park and to the possibility of siting these Government Buildings in the Phoenix Park. That was brought under consideration in 1945. In the end, the Board of Works got one of its architects to prepare a layout which is rather humbly stated "to have some merit." That is all set out here, the building of an enormous new House of Parliament and a whole block of Government offices in the Park. The question then arose as to whether it was proper to deprive the people who enjoyed certain amenities in the Park of those amenities. The further extravagant idea was then mooted that the great thing to do in return for the taking away of certain of those amenities in the Park, as described in the layout for the proposed buildings, was to provide extra acreage elsewhere. That led to a grand scheme going up the river from Kingsbridge to Chapelizod, the taking of land on either side of the river, stripping it of buildings and putting into it some sort of playing fields and then handing it over to the public in return for the amenities of which they had been deprived in the Phoenix Park.
Will people remember that the Government which considered that, and which was prepared to go on with it, are now, as members of the Opposition, severely critical of the plans to embark money on houses for the people, on electrical development and all other sources of investment which Deputy Lemass said the people desired to have, but still they are critical of that being done by borrowing? They intended to borrow £11,500,000, and the figure was only conjectural, for the provision of these particular amenities.
The second big matter under discussion in the House was the question of the Order freezing prices. That has been criticised on a variety of grounds. It was said to be a panic Order. It was said, first of all, that it was not meant seriously, and was not to be taken seriously. Secondly, it was said that it was a drastic Order, that it was a setback for every trader and industrialist in the country, that they could not find it possible to make forward purchases, that they were entirely hamstrung in the way of making extra provision against an emergency ahead, and that the whole thing was iniquitous. It was particularly iniquitous for that reason. The burden of the waspish attack that was made on the Supplies and Services Bill was to the effect that it was completely unconscionable to ask traders to produce records of their business and allow anybody to look at statements which would show if they were making profits or what profits they were making.
