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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 6 Nov 1962

Vol. 197 No. 3

Official Secrets Bill, 1962—Report Stage (Resumed) and Final Stage.

Debate resumed on the following amendment:
12. In page 6, line 7, after "which" to insert "in the opinion of the Court".
—(Deputy McGilligan.)

As Deputy McGilligan explained, the purpose of this amendment is to bring the courts into Section 9 by providing bluntly in the Bill that where any matter comes before a court, which under this section is a matter touching on the question of the security or safety of the State, it should be so if the court so finds. The section as worded lists a number of matters in respect of which if information is given in a manner prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State, an offence is committed. It sets out in subsection (1) four or five particular matters which are to be regarded as touching on the safety or preservation of the State and then in No. (v) it sets out "any other matter whatsoever information as to which would or might be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State". The earlier matters referred to in the section are matters which are, so to speak, defined in the section, matters such as munitions of war, the operation or projected operation of any of the Defence Forces, any measures for the defence or fortification of any place on behalf of the State, but No. (v) in that subsection is a very general power—"any other matter whatsoever".

It is in particular in relation to that general kind of omnibus clause imported into the Bill that Deputy McGilligan suggests the Minister should make it quite clear that the people who are to determine whether or not it might be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State are the courts. If my memory serves me aright the Minister's view, as expressed on the last occasion when this was discussed, was that this was unnecessary, that the Bill as it stands does mean that the court must adjudicate on the matter and come to a conclusion that the particular matter referred to, the subject matter of the charge, is prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State. Deputy McGilligan's point of view is that that is not clear and that, in any event, it is not any harm, even if the Minister's argument is right, and that it is not detracting from the Bill to include the words "in the opinion of the court".

Deputy O'Higgins has interpreted my mind correctly. In my opinion, the insertion of these words is unnecessary. Whether we put in the words or not, it would still be a matter for the court to decide whether or not the safety or preservation of the State is involved. Indeed, there would be a danger in putting in the words in this particular instance because their insertion here might be regarded as a precedent. One could visualise a court subsequently looking at some other Act of Parliament and saying: "Well, in the Official Secrets Act, it was considered necessary specifically to insert these words. Therefore, we read from their absence in this Act that the opinion of the court is not involved." It is important not to create such a precedent by inserting these words which are not necessary at all.

Amendment put and declared lost.

I move amendment No. 13:—

In page 7, to delete lines 5, 6 and 7 and insert: "that the publication of any evidence or statement to be given or made during any part of the hearing would be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State, that that part of the hearing should be in camera, the”.

On Committee Stage, the Leader of the Opposition and Deputy McGilligan argued in regard to Section 12 that once the prosecution made the case that the publication of any evidence would be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State, the prosecution could then compel the court to hold any part of the hearing in camera, not necessarily the part relating to evidence, the publication of which would be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State.

It seems to me that that view of the words by the Leader of the Opposition is straining them very considerably. Nevertheless, I have asked the draftsman to put the matter beyond all doubt and to remove any possibility whatever of ambiguity. It is for that reason that the amendment is proposed. As the House will see from the wording of the amendment, it makes what we have in mind crystal clear.

I think the amendment covers fully the point raised.

It is another example of my extreme reasonableness.

We will test it out now.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 14, on behalf of Deputy McGilligan:

In page 7, line 8, to delete "shall" and substitute "may."

As the Minister himself used the expression when moving his amendment, I do not suppose he will resent my using it now. This section enables the State to compel the court, whether the court thinks it proper or not, in certain circumstances to hold a hearing or part of a hearing in camera. The section as it is worded, even allowing for the amendment which the Minister has introduced, provides that if the State makes an application to the court and bases that application on the statement that the publication of matter concerned with the trial would be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State, once the application is made, it cannot be refused under this section. The court may think it is the greatest nonsense, that it is an effort by the State or a Minister of the State to cover up something they do not want published, because it might not suit them to have it published. They may feel the safety or preservation of the State has nothing, good, bad, or indifferent, to do with the matter. But if the application is made and if it is based on a statement by the State that the safety or preservation of the State is in question, then the court must make an order either determining that the entire hearing will be heard in camera or whatever part the State makes the application in respect of should be heard in camera.

The suggestion in Deputy McGilligan's amendment is to try to remedy that to some extent by making the section permissive to the court rather than mandatory on the court. Deputy McGilligan suggests that instead of using the words in this section " . . . the court shall make an order to that effect," the word "shall" should be deleted and the word "may" substituted instead. I believe it is important that the Minister exercise the reasonableness about which he boasted a few minutes ago in connection with this amendment. To my mind, and to the minds of a number of other Deputies on this side of the House, this whole Bill is a very dangerous measure. It is a measure which, as I said earlier, if wrongly used, either by this or any other Government, could be fraught with extreme danger for individual citizens of this State.

Time after time, in section after section of this Bill, the discretion is taken away from the courts to deal with matters which are offences under this Bill in a manner which they might think these matters should be dealt with. The courts are not allowed to decide what or what is not to be regarded as official information. The courts are being compelled to accept as conclusive evidence a certificate by the Minister that a particular matter is official information. Here again in Section 12 there is no question of the courts—after all, they have been set up by the State and their function is to interpret the laws and administer justice on behalf of the State—being allowed any discretion to do their job as it ought to be done. They are being told by the Minister in this Bill that, whether they like it or not, they will have to make an order simply on an application being made by the State.

I feel that is dangerous. This whole Bill is dangerous, particularly in the matters I have mentioned. We have already discussed a section in this Bill which enables the State to arrest a person thought to be guilty of an offence under a section of this Bill, to put him in jail and to keep him in custody without ever bringing a charge against him. The only safeguard is that further proceedings under the Bill, when it becomes an Act, cannot be taken without the consent of the Attorney General. The person may be arrested, lodged in jail and kept in jail without the consent of the Attorney General or anyone else. Now we have added on to that the fact that when eventually he is brought before the court, presumably with the consent of the Attorney General, the State may on its own decision compel the courts to have the case heard in camera, simply on a statement made on behalf of the State that the subject matter of the prosecution or that information which may come out during the trial may be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State.

The State are not required to give any evidence of that. There is no authority under the Bill to anyone to have the Minister or the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána or anyone else go on oath in the witness-box and express their opinion that the statement made on behalf of the State is correct. There is no machinery at all for any kind of proof being brought before the courts. An application is simply made by counsel or solicitor on behalf of the State and the court must, under the terms of the Bill if it is allowed to go unaltered, make an order providing for the hearing of the entire case or whatever part of the case is referred to in camera.

I would urge the Minister even at this late stage to have some regard to the position of the judiciary and to their responsibilities. I suggest he should take the view in this matter that the judiciary are a responsible body of men; and if they have an application made to them of the sort envisaged in the section, they should be allowed exercise their own discretion and intellect to decide whether or not the safety or preservation of the State is in fact involved or whether the situation might not be that the hearing of a case in camera might have undesirable consequences, not only for the State but for the individuals affected by the section.

I know Deputy O'Higgins will not regard me as flattering him when I suggest he is a much more reasonable man than his colleague, Deputy McGilligan. It is for that reason I feel I can appeal to him to see my point of view in this matter. I want to emphasise to the House that this section deals exclusively with a life and death matter of the safety or preservation of the State and offences connected with that.

The section merely sets out to stipulate that where the prosecution indicates to the court that the publication of a particular piece of evidence would be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State, then the court shall direct that that particular part of the trial shall be held in camera. I think that is a perfectly reasonable proposition. I cannot see that anybody's life or liberty is going to be adversely affected by it. Essentially, it is the Executive who must decide in a matter of this sort. It is the Executive or the Government who are entrusted with the preservation of the safety and security of the State and it must be left to them to decide whether the disclosure of a particular piece of evidence would be prejudicial to that trust and it should not be left to the discretion of the court. Only the Executive, in my opinion, are in a position to decide such a matter. I think it is reasonable that, where the Executive stipulates to the court that the very existence or the safety of the State is involved in a particular piece of evidence, the hearing of the relevant part of the case shall be held in camera. The section does not stipulate anything about the manner in which that part of the case shall be conducted but merely that it should be conducted behind closed doors and not in public for the whole world to see, to the detriment of the safety of the State.

I appeal to Deputy O'Higgins to see what I think is the utter reasonableness of that proposition and to leave the section as it is; in other words, to leave it to the prosecution to be able to insist that a particular part of the case shall be held in camera where the Executive are of opinion that anything else would be to the detriment of the very existence or safety of the State itself.

I can see from the point of view of the Executive it is perfect to have this kind of power but I think the Minister's duty, when he brings a Bill like this to the House, is to look at it not merely from the point of view of the Executive but also from the point of view of the citizens. I think the Minister would concede that the whole argument against the amendment was onesided if one looked at the matter through the eyes of the Executive. Only in looking at it from the point of view of the citizens——

The safety of the State is the safety of the citizens.

The safety or preservation of the State as defined by a member of the Executive and not as found so by the court. I may tell the Minister, although I do not set myself up as giving a legal opinion or being an expert on constitutional law, that as an individual Deputy, I have the very greatest doubts of the constitutionality of this section. What the Minister is doing is, in effect, arrogating to himself and his colleagues in the Government the right to decide when a matter is prejudicial to the safety and security of the State and taking it out of the hands of the court to decide it.

The Minister says this only refers to matters where there is a question of life or death for the State. It also refers to offences under Part II of the Bill. If the Minister comes to the conclusion that the offence under Part II of the Bill was committed in a manner which, in his view, was prejudicial to the safety and security of the State in Part II of the Bill, the part which the Minister himself found it necessary to tone down by amendment on the last occasion that this was discussed, Part II refers to the disclosure of official information and this goes back to the definition of official information which is information designated as being official by certificate of a Minister of State. So that we go right back the whole way to Section II of the Bill even though we are dealing with this section here——

That is not correct.

I shall apologise if I am not correct but Section 12 refers to proceedings for an offence under Section 9 or for an offence under Part II committed in a manner prejudicial to the safety and preservation of the State. Part II deals with official information and, in Part I, the definition section, subsection (3) gives the Minister of State power to decide what is official information and to enforce acceptance of his decision by the court simply by signing the certificate.

Yes, but not that it is committed in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the State. He cannot certify that.

No, but he can decide that in coming to their decision, he can direct the court to have the hearing held in camera. That is the power he is given under Section 12, so that it is, in fact, the Minister who is coming to a decision and forcing the court to accept that decision, even though it may be entirely wrong. That is where I quarrel with the Minister on the wording of this section and with the whole idea of making this section mandatory rather than discretionary so that it would be permissive to the court to make or refuse to make an order on the application by the State.

If the court is allowed discretion, as suggested by Deputy McGilligan's amendment, then the court retains the right to decide whether or not the particular matter is prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State: if the court is not allowed that discretion, then the Minister is arrogating to himself the right to make that decision and I should be very surprised if there was not a very strong argument, at any rate, that such a provision would be repugnant to the Constitution in that it allows the Minister to set himself up as a judge on this matter and takes it out of the hands of the court who are the people established under the Constitution to decide matters such as this.

Question put: "That the word proposed to be deleted stand."
The Dáil divided: Tá, 52; Níl, 25.

  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Blaney, Neil T.
  • Boland, Kevin.
  • Booth, Lionel.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Brennan, Joseph.
  • Brennan, Paudge.
  • Breslin, Cormac.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Burke, Patrick J.
  • Carter, Frank.
  • Carty, Michael.
  • Childers, Erskine.
  • Clohessy, Patrick.
  • Colley, George.
  • Cotter, Edward.
  • Crinion, Brendan.
  • Cummins, Patrick J.
  • Cunningham, Liam.
  • Davern, Mick.
  • Dolan, Séamus.
  • Dooley, Patrick.
  • Egan, Kieran P.
  • Egan, Nicholas.
  • Fanning, John.
  • Faulkner, Padraig.
  • Gallagher, James.
  • Geoghegan, John.
  • Gilbride, Eugene.
  • Gogan, Richard P.
  • Haughey, Charles.
  • Hillery, Patrick.
  • Hilliard, Michael.
  • Kennedy, Michael J.
  • Kitt, Michael F.
  • Lalor, Patrick J.
  • Lemass, Noel T.
  • Lemass, Seán.
  • Lenihan, Brian.
  • Lynch, Celia.
  • MacCarthy, Seán.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Medlar, Martin.
  • Millar, Anthony G.
  • Mother, John W.
  • Mooney, Patrick.
  • Moran, Michael.
  • Ó Briain, Donnchadh.
  • ÓCeallaigh, Seán.
  • O'Malley, Donogh.
  • Ormonde, John.
  • Ryan, James.

Níl.

  • Belton, Jack.
  • Clinton, Mark A.
  • Coogan, Fintan.
  • Corish, Brendan.
  • Cosgrave, Liam.
  • Costello, John A.
  • Coughlan, Stephen.
  • Crotty, Patrick J.
  • Dillon, James M.
  • Dunne, Seán.
  • Dunne, Thomas.
  • Esmonde, Sir Anthony.
  • Everett, James.
  • Flanagan, Oliver J.
  • Harte, Patrick D.
  • Jones, Denis F.
  • Kyne, Thomas A.
  • Lynch, Thaddeus.
  • MacEoin, Seán.
  • Mullen, Michael.
  • O'Higgins, Michael J.
  • O'Sullivan, Denis J.
  • Pattison, Séamus.
  • Treacy, Seán.
  • Tully, James.
Tellers: Tá, Deputies J. Brennan and Geoghegan; Níl, Deputies O'Sullivan and Crotty.
Question declared carried.

I move amendment No. 15:

In page seven, line 27, after "offence" to insert "under section 9".

The object of this amendment is to confine the operation of subsection (2) of Section 14 to offences under Section 9. If the amendment is accepted by the House the Bill will provide that it will only be in the case of persons charged with an offence under Section 9 that proceedings by way of arrest, or other preliminary proceedings, can be taken without the consent of the Attorney General. Deputies will remember that we had some discussion on this particular subsection on the Committee Stage. At that time I suggested to the Opposition that I would probably be prepared to make this amendment if it would meet their point of view. I am hoping that it will.

This does, I think, improve the section somewhat, but the position still is that a person who is charged with an offence, or who is going to be charged with an offence, under Section 9 may be arrested and jailed, and kept in jail, without the consent of the Attorney General. However, the amendment is an improvement.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment No. 16:

In page 8, line 26, to delete "Minister for Justice" and substitute "High Court ex parte in a summary manner and in camera.

This amendment has been put down by Deputy McGilligan. It is designed to allow the courts to have some say in this Bill. Section 17 is a section which gives extraordinary powers to chief superintendents of the Garda Síochána. I do not know if the people generally are aware of what the Minister is doing in this section. The section provides:

Where an officer of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence under section 9 has been committed and for believing that any person is able to furnish information as to the offence or suspected offence, he may apply to the Minister for Justice for permission to exercise the powers conferred by this subsection and, if such permission is granted, he may authorise a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of inspector to require the person believed to be able to furnish information to give any information in his power relating to the offence or suspected offence and if a person required in pursuance of such an authorisation to give information fails to comply with the requirement or knowingly gives false information he shall be guilty of an offence.

This is a power which is being vested in chief superintendents, a power of obtaining permission from a Minister. If a chief superintendent has reasonable grounds for suspecting the commission of an offence he can go along to the Minister and get the permission of the Minister to require someone else, whom he believes may have information, to give that information. Even though the chief superintendent may be wrong in his belief, he can get that authority from the Minister: and, if the person confronted with the demand for information does not give it, he is guilty of an offence under this section.

I have no doubt the Minister will point out that this refers only to an offence under Section 9, in which the safety or preservation of the State is in question. That is so and, for that reason, we believe that it may be necessary certainly, from time to time, that drastic action should be taken, and that it should be taken immediately. Our suggestion to the Minister, however, is that he should allow the courts to have some say in this matter. We have made this suggestion, too, in earlier sections. If the Minister is agreeable, I think we might take these two amendments together because they are really part of the one amendment.

Amendment No. 17 is consequential on No. 16.

We are suggesting that, instead of having the chief superintendent put in the position of operating these powers on the permission of the Minister, he should be required to ask the High Court ex parte and in camera. He need not give any publicity to the fact that he is seeking the permission. We suggest he should apply to the High Court and state his reasons and the Court then, if it thinks fit, should be empowered to authorise the operation of the powers under this section. That is subsection (1).

Subsection (2) of the Bill deals with the case where a chief superintendent has grounds for believing that, in the interests of the State, immediate action is necessary. The subsection provides that he may exercise the powers conferred in subsection (1) without applying for, or being granted, the permission of the Minister for Justice. As the Chair has pointed out, the amendment suggested here is consequential on the earlier amendment. If the Minister accepts amendment No. 16 it will be necessary to alter in subsection (2) the words "Minister for Justice" and insert instead the word "Court". I do not think it is necessary to discuss the second amendment any further.

My defence of this particular proposal is, of course, on the same lines as my defence of the other matters we have been discussing. Briefly, my case is that we are concerned entirely in this regard with situations in which the safety or preservation of the State is concerned. For that reason we must be prepared to give to the police and to the Minister for Justice exceptional powers where they, in the exercise of their official functions, deem that such powers are necessary. I do not think it is difficult for any of us to visualise the sort of situation in which it would be necessary for the police to invoke the powers given to them here in Section 17.

I can see all sorts of difficulties, not the least of which would be technical difficulties, arising out of the proposal incorporated in Deputy McGilligan's amendment, but apart from the technical difficulties involved in this proposal, there is a question of principal and a question of policy also involved. Again, this is a case where the Executive must take the responsibility for deciding what should be done in the interests of the security of the nation as a whole.

I should have mentioned one point to the Minister. I should like him to deal with it. Is it not a fact that this section, as worded, would enable a chief superintendent simply on the Minister's say-so to require the defendant's solicitor and counsel to give information and, if they refused to break their client's confidence, they would be guilty of an offence?

I can do no more in that regard than indicate what the section spells out in so many words, namely, "Where an officer of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence under Section 9 has been committed and for believing that any person is able to furnish information as to the offence or suspected offence, he may apply . . . "

That would cover the defendant's lawyers.

I should not like to answer that.

The Minister emphasised that it refers to any person?

Yes, any person who has information. I am not sure whether the person would not be protected under some other statutory provision.

He would. If the guard had to go to the court, he would be protected on privilege. If he has only to go to the Minister, surely that protection is removed?

I do not think that would make any difference. If the professional representatives of the person are protected by some statutory or other provisions, I do not think there is anything in Section 17 to remove such protection.

I disagree with the Minister.

I also want to point out here that, insofar as the existing law is concerned, the police authorities already have this power. Indeed there is this difference that in the present situation they have this power without any brake upon them as proposed in Section 17. I am putting a brake on the police authorities in that they must go to the Minister for Justice of the day and get his permission before proceeding under Section 17. As the law stands at the moment, under Section 6 of the 1920 Act they do not have to apply to anybody. They can proceed on their own initiative.

Amendment put and declared lost.
Amendment No. 17 not moved.
Bill received for final consideration.
Agreed to take remaining Stage to-day.
Question: "That the Bill do now pass" put and agreed to.
Barr
Roinn