Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Thursday, 24 Feb 1994

Vol. 439 No. 4

Adjournment Debate - Remitting of Fines and Penalties.

Ms O'Donnell

The large number of fines and penalties being reduced by the Minister for Justice under the Criminal Justice Act, 1951, is of genuine concern to the public, the Judiciary and legislators. Section 23 of that Act gives the Minister the power to remit sentences and penalties imposed by the courts. Incidentally, the power of remission does not apply to a driving licence disqualification for drunk driving — this is excluded under section 19 of the 1968 Road Traffic Act. At the time sentences for this offence could be remitted, section 23 (5) of the 1951 Act provided that the details of such remissions should be published in Iris Oifigiúil.

It appears from statistics that there were 1,468 successful petitions between 1 January and 30 November last year and that during a recent two year period 8,500 petitions were successful. Last year 4,050 petitions to the Minister were finalised, 98 qualified for full remission of fines, 1,080 qualified for partial reduction and extra time was allowed for the payment of fines in 600 cases. The power to remit sentences is given under Article 13.6 of the Constitution. It is worth noting that this power can also be used to allow for early releases from prison. As we all know a common cause of early release from prison is lack of jail space.

I am not so much objecting to the use of this power by the Minister but the manner in which it is used. Until fairly recently this power was used in a much more sparing fashion and it was generally understood that it should be used only in exceptional cases and for good reasons. It was never envisaged that such a power should be used as a matter of routine, particularly if the person petitioning the Minister had not exhausted all the normal appeal procedures through the courts. It had also been the practice, until fairly recently, to consult the judge who had imposed the fine or sentence. The practice now seems to have developed where this power is being used with little or no consultation and petitions are routinely processed by civil servants.

The procedure whereby the names and details of those successful petitioners were published in Iris Oifigiúil was amended in 1961. This is very important because if we had a transparent system where the names of petitioners and the outcome of petitions were published and there was accountability there would not be so much public outcry at the remission of sentences. At present sentences handed down, including imprisonment, fines and penalties, are reduced or set aside without any transparency or accountability. This undermines the entire criminal justice system.

We recently debated legislation which provides for an appeals system for lenient sentences.

What is the point in debating such legislation when the practice of undermining sentences legitimately handed down is taking place on a daily basis? It should be remembered that when judges impose sentences they have already taken into account mitigating factors and in some cases have imposed minimum fines. If the law is to have any credibility this practice of wanton reductions in sentences and penalties must be curbed and brought back to a reasonable level, a level which was based originally on flexibility in exeptional circumstances and on consultation. To ensure we have transparency and ministerial accountability, the names of petitioners and the outcome of petitions must be published as before in Iris Oifigiúil. I do not understand why this is not being done.

Yesterday we passed all Stages of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Bill, radical legislation which introduces a whole panoply of new offences carrying fines. Are we wasting our time putting in place such legislation if the Minister can executively remit those fines as a matter of routine? Are we wasting our time picking our way through legislation, trying to get it right and putting in place fines so that people who do wrong can be punished only to have the whole process wiped out at the stroke of the Minister's pen? I would welcome her response on this matter.

Minister for Justice (Mrs. Geoghegan-Quinn)

Since the coming into operation of the Constitution on 29 December 1937 the right of pardon and the power to commute or remit punishment imposed by any court exercising criminal jurisdiction are vested in the President under the terms of Article 13.6 and 13.9 of the Constitution. Article 13.6 also provides for such power, except in capital cases, to be conferred by law on other authorities. Pursuant to this, such power was conferred on the Minister for Justice under section 23 (3) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1951 and the delegated Authority of Government dated 30 March 1951. Accordingly, the Minister for Justice is empowered, except in capital cases, to commute or remit, in whole or in part, any punishment imposed by a court exercising criminal jurisdiction, subject to such conditions as the Minister may think proper. This power has been exercised by each and all of my predecessors.

Any person convicted of an offence is entitled to petition and it is true that a large number of people in all walks of life do so. The petition is sometimes lodged by the individual, a solicitor, a journalist or a public representative. Deputies, in general, appear to appreciate and support the petitions procedure having regard to the number of petitions received from Members of this House on behalf of their constituents. Mitigation may cover full remission of penalty, proposed partial mitigation of penalty and extension of time to pay. I would stress that the number of petitioners who get away scot free under the petitions procedure is minimal and it is an outrage that Deputy O'Donnell should accuse me of wholesale undermining of sentences. I reject that. For example, of the 2,283 cases involving mitigation in 1993 only 98 obtained full remission of fines. The remaining 2,185 petitioners had to pay the full fine in 604 cases or a reduced monetary penalty in 1,580 cases.

I mentioned that Members of this House from all political parties, including the Deputy's party, clearly appreciate and support the petitions system and use it. The justification for the system lies in the simple fact that, for one reason or another, the judge, when deciding the penalty to be imposed is not always made aware of circumstances which on any objective criterion would call for mitigation — more often than not these circumstances boil down to an inability, for family or other domestic reasons, to meet the full penalty. Indeed circumstances can and do arise subsequent to a case which significantly reduce the offender's ability to meet the full penalty imposed. Appeal to a higher court would be beyond the resources of many of those who submit petitions and would be cumbersome and inefficient to operate by comparison with the more simple and straightforward expedient of bringing the penalty down to a level which more accurately reflects the offender's circumstances.

I will give an example of this. Some time ago a woman whose only income was a widow's pension and who had a large family was fined approximately £300 for non-payment of a television licence fee. Is it fair to expect that woman on a mere widow's pension and with a large family to pay the full amount of the fine? Would it be fair also to expect that woman to go to the huge expense of paying a solicitor and a barrister to take the case on appeal to a higher court? The interest of justice is much better served by the petitions system.

The average number of petitions received in recent years is approximately 4,300 per year, while the average number of cases in which mitigation is granted in one form or another is 2,400 or 56 per cent. In the light of this I am sure the House will agree that the suggestion there has been an increase in the number of fines and penalties being reduced is unfounded. I am confident that above all else this House will recognise that the proportion of cases in which mitigation involves total removal of the penalty is small and that it arises only where the case for it is beyond dispute.