Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Thursday, 7 Dec 1995

Vol. 459 No. 5

Ceisteanna—Questions. Oral Answers. - UN Conduct in Bosnia.

Desmond J. O'Malley

Ceist:

3 Mr. O'Malley asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs the Government's view of the abandonment of the so-called safe haven of Srebrenica in Bosnia by the United Nations on 11 July 1995, which led to the murder of an estimated 8,000 Bosnian men and boys by the Bosnian Serb Army, under the personal command of General Ratko Mladic, and to the massacre of thousands more men, women and children who were killed attempting to escape through hostile territory; if he will raise this matter with the EU Council of Ministers; if he will support the calls for a full investigation into the role of the UN in peace-keeping in Bosnia-Hercegovina; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [18338/95]

Mary Wallace

Ceist:

11 Miss M. Wallace asked the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement regarding the recent disturbing reports in the Irish and international media as to the role of the United Nations in the events leading up to, during and after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995, taken together with the content of the letter of resignation subsequently submitted by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights. [18322/95]

Mr. Spring

I propose to take Questions Nos. 3 and 11 together.

In July, unimaginable brutality took place during and after the capture of Srebrenica. The events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica represent the darkest chapter of the brutal war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. There is overwhelming evidence that thousands of those who fled Srebrenica were murdered by Bosnian Serb forces. The actions of these forces were utterly condemned by the Government. The European Union Council of Ministers strongly condemned the Bosnian Serb attacks on Srebrenica and demanded an immediate halt to this offensive and an end to the bombardment of Zepa.

In light of the tragic events at Srebrenica and Zepa, I well understand the feelings of despair which led Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki to resign his post as the UNCHR's Special Rapporteur on human rights in former Yugoslavia. The international community owes him an enormous debt for his untiring efforts. His successor in office, Ms Elizabeth Rehn of Finland, has my full support in exposing human rights violations in the region. I believe the hopes expressed by Mr. Mazowiecki in his letter of resignation that the appalling events in July would constitute a defining moment have been realised.

As it transpired, the horrific events at Srebrenica in July did, in fact, represent a defining moment for the United Nations in Bosnia-Hercegovina. At the London Conference which was held after the fall of Srebrenica, the United Nations, major troop contributors and NATO decided that, rather than deploy UNPROFOR personnel to the isolated safe areas, the increased use of air power would be the most effective deterrent.

The crimes committed after the fall of Srebrenica must be fully investigated. The fate of the thousands of missing persons must be established. I hope that the provision in the Dayton Agreement which commits the parties to cooperating fully with the ICRC in determining the whereabouts and fate of those unaccounted for will be honoured in full.

Following the London meeting, detailed arrangements for the protection of the civilian population of the other safe areas were elaborated. The subsequent action taken by NATO on behalf of the United Nations reflected the outrage and the strong desire of the international community to ensure the protection of the civilian population of the safe areas.

There can be no doubt as to where the responsibility rests for the events in Srebrenica and Zepa. It is with the leadership, both political and military, of the Bosnian Serbs. I welcome the fact that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has recently issued a number of indictments against Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic in connection with their involvement in the crimes which took place in the eastern enclaves.

The United Nations peace-keeping operation in former Yugoslavia was mandated by the Security Council. It has been the largest UN peacekeeping mission ever deployed. The Security Council was kept fully informed by the Secretary General on its work and the overwhelming difficulties which it was encountering in discharging its mandate.

With regard to UNPROFOR's specific role, that force was, in addition to its basic peace-keeping duties, mandated to deter aggression against the safe areas, but not to defend them. The Secretary General had recommended some 35,000 additional troops to protect the safe areas. Only 6,500 were forthcoming. UNPROFOR's largely symbolic presence in Srebrenica and Zepa was therefore unable to prevent the fall of these areas. Its inability in this regard can also be attributed in considerable measure to the manifest absence of the cooperation of the belligerents on which the safe areas concept was predicated.

Following a review of developments in September, the Secretary General reaffirmed his opinion that it was impossible to entrust a United Nations Peace-keeping Force with a mandate which would require it to take enforcement action against parties whose co-operation it required to enable the force to carry out its basic peace-keeping functions. The Secretary General therefore recommended that the Security Council should authorise an ad hoc coalition of member states which would implement a peace agreement in Bosnia, with an expeditious transfer to that force by UNPROFOR.

The Secretary General also underlined the limited capacity of the United Nations to manage large-scale operations, especially those established under Chapter VII of the Charter with a potential enforcement role; the severe difficulties which the United Nations has in obtaining sufficient military, police and civilian personnel for the conduct of large-scale operations; the difficulties of co-ordinating operations of military personnel with different chains of command; and the serious difficulties which arise when a peace-keeping force is also tasked with actions of an enforcement nature.

The Secretary General's conclusions also coincide with the assessment of many other parties who were deeply engaged in the search for peace in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The ongoing efforts to establish an implementation force reflect these conclusions.

Many lessons need to be drawn from the United Nations peace-keeping presence in former Yugoslavia, including by the Security Council which elaborates peace-keeping mandates. In particular, great care needs to be taken to ensure that peace-keeping forces have clear mandates and sufficient means to discharge them.

I believe, however, that sight should not be lost of the fact that the United Nations peace-keeping forces have saved many thousands of lives in Bosnia-Hercegovina, prevented a second Serbo-Croat war in Croatia and prevented the conflict from spilling over into a more deadly war in the southern Balkans.

Mr. O'Malley

Would the Minister agree that it was shameful that thousands of UN soldiers, particularly Dutch soldiers under the UN command, were present during the events on 11 July, that they saw them happen, that they did not intervene, that they took video films of what was happening to the non-Serb Bosnian men and boys who were being murdered in their thousands, and that the video films which they took were subsequently confiscated by the Dutch authorities so that evidence of what happened would not be forthcoming? Would the Minister like to comment on what seems to me to be a very shameful episode indeed? Would he like to reconsider his remark that the UN peace-keeping forces did not get the co-operation of what he called the belligerents when the non-Serb Bosnian people who had gone to Zepa and to Srebrenica had done so at the invitation of the United Nations, who assured them that if they did go there they would be safe and would be defended?

Mr. Spring

There is no doubt that July of last year was the darkest chapter in the brutal war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The operation of the UN peace-keeping mission is kept under continuous review by the Secretary General and by the Security Council by whom it is mandated. Since the deployment of the UN peace-keeping forces to former Yugoslavia the Secretary General has reported regularly to the Security Council on the work of the peace-keeping forces, including the substantial difficulties which they encountered in discharging aspects of their mandate. The Secretary General expressed his concern for a period of time with the inability of UNPROFOR in Bosnia to discharge tasks which were given to it by the Security Council without sufficient resources to discharge the tasks. He was also concerned by the difficulties which arise for the UN peace-keeping forces when they are required to carry out tasks of an enforcement nature.

I understand that the Dutch authorities undertook an extensive debriefing of their troops who were present in Srebrenica at the time of its fall, and this report was to be made available to the Secretary General of the UN. The report showed that the hope that a largely symbolic presence in Srebrenica would deter aggression was tragically a vain one. The report stressed that the co-operation of the parties, on which the safe areas concept was based, was not forthcoming in this case. The tension had been heightened by sorties by Bosnian Government forces in and around the Srebrenica area. The report concluded that the UN peace-keepers had attempted to carry out their military and humanitarian duties to the best of their ability. Above all else that report concluded that the responsibility for the tragedy rests squarely with the Bosnian Serb forces.

Mr. O'Malley

Are the Bosnian forces and the Bosnian Government to be blamed for seeking to defend their own people when they are the subject of a massacre in a so-called safe area? Why does the Minister persist in trying to lay the blame equally on both sides when patently it is not in accordance with the facts and when the aggression and the breaches of human rights are very predominantly on the Serb side? Does he think that partitioning Bosnia now on what is essentially the ethnic cleansing basis which the Bosnian Serbs sought to achieve from the start is the best way to achieve peace in this area?

Mr. Spring

The Deputy will appreciate that the best endeavours of the European Union and the United States failed to bring any resolution of the horrific conflict in the Balkans region which we have had for the past four years. Due to enormous effort by the United States, and by Assistant Secretary Holbrook in particular and the European Union under the leadership of Carl Bildt, we now have an agreement signed in Dayton, Ohio. The Deputy was not in the House when I gave Deputy Burke details of this very complex agreement which will require the best efforts not only of the parties on the ground but of the European Union and the United States and other countries like Japan and the ASEAN countries in terms of resources and personnel for the reconstruction and redevelopment of the region. It may not be perfect. We recognise that it is a very fragile agreement which has enormous complexities and difficulties, but it is the best hope.

The opportunity is there now, if the parties on the ground are prepared to accept it, to work with the European Union and the United States and the international force that will be there. Sixty thousand ground troops will be required if this mission is to have a prospect of success. One of the major weaknesses of the UNPROFOR mission was the Secretary General's inability, despite his best efforts, to obtain the requisite number of troops necessary for success. A lesson which must be learned is that when inadequate numbers of troops — whose mandate for peace enforcement under Chapter 7 is unclear — become involved in hazardous missions, completion of them becomes impossible and they should be avoided in the future.

Mr. O'Malley

The Tánaiste did not reply to the first part of my series of supplementary questions about what occurred on the date to which I referred. Does the Tánaiste regard it as ideal that this entire situation was becoming uncontrollable until NATO's intervention? Would he agree that, had NATO not intervend by way of military action, the situation would have grown considerably worse and Bosnia would have been overrun by the Serbs? Does the Tánaiste accept that, in the event of facing an aggressor of this kind, it is necessary to meet force with real force? Would he agree that this is the only way to end such a conflict? Would such thinking pervade the approach of the European Union in the future if a sitution erupted in Kosovo, or any other part of the former Yugoslavia, similar to the awful one which occurred in Bosnia? Is it not correct that the Serbs will only be stopped by the use of superior force against them?

Mr. Spring

The UNPROFOR mandate was not specific enough and there was a lack of sufficient numbers to implement it. It was only through robust action on the part of NATO that the aggression was deterred. There is a lesson to be learned in this issue and its nature is obvious.

An Ceann Comhairle

The time for dealing with Priority Questions is exhausted. However, I can and will take replies to Questions Nos. 4 and 5 in accordance with the new procedures of the House.