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JOINT COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 29 Mar 2006

Scrutiny of EU Proposals.

We are dealing with scrutiny of EU documents, proposals on nuclear safety which are at various stages in Europe. Copies of the Commission documents have been circulated to members, together with original briefing documents from the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and from the Oireachtas policy adviser.

Officials from the nuclear safety section of the Department will make a presentation on these proposals and take questions on them. I welcome the officials from the Department, Ms Renee Dempsey, principal officer, nuclear safety section, Mr. Vincent Lowe, higher executive officer, nuclear safety section, and Mr. Christopher Hone and Dr. Tom Ryan principal scientific officers, Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland. I thank them for attending the meeting of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Environment and Local Government today.

Before the presentation commences, I draw attention to the fact that, while members of the committee have absolute privilege, the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. Members are also reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

Ms Dempsey may commence the presentation. I understand she will also address COM (2006) 42 referred to earlier.

Ms Renee Dempsey

The representatives of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland are pleased to be here today at the committee's invitation to make a short presentation on a number of proposals emanating from the European Union on nuclear safety. After our presentation, we will be happy to respond to questions.

The committee will have received information notes from the Department on all of the proposals made. I will start by taking the European Commission's proposals embodied in COM (2005) 119, COM (2005) 444, COM (2005) 445 and COM (2006) 42 as all four relate to the proposed seventh framework programme of the European Atomic Energy Community, also known as EURATOM, of Community assistance for nuclear research and training activities in the years 2007 to 2011. The seventh framework programme is the latest in a series of multi-annual programmes for the provision of assistance by the Commission for nuclear research and training activities in the European Atomic Energy Community and will cover the period 2007 to 2011. The sixth framework programme runs until the end of this year.

The EURATOM Treaty, to which all EU member states are a party, facilitates investment in and encourages ventures to ensure the establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear energy facilities in the European Community. In this connection, under chapter 1 of the treaty, the Commission is responsible for promoting and facilitating nuclear research in member states and complementing it by carrying out a European Community research and training programme. The legislative basis for the programme is Article 7, chapter 1 of the treaty, under which EU research and training programmes are determined by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission. The basic principle of the programme is to stimulate, organise and exploit co-operation in nuclear research, ranging from joint EU projects and networks to national research programmes, large technology initiatives and infrastructure with an EU dimension.

The framework programme as proposed in COM (2005) 119 has been adopted by Council, apart from the articles dealing with funding provisions. The programme is organised into two specific programmes detailed in COM (2005) 444 and COM (2005) 445, one of which covers research in nuclear fusion, nuclear fission and radiation protection, while the other covers the activities of the Joint Research Centre operated by the Commission. While the programmes have been discussed in the Council working group, they have not yet been adopted by the Council as they must await budget allocations which await finalisation in the coming months in the context of the financial perspectives of the European Union. In the Commission's proposals, as set out in COM (2005) 119, a budget of some €3,100 million was proposed for the overall programme, comprising over €2,150 million for nuclear fusion research, €400 million for nuclear fission and radiation protection research and €540 million for joint research centre activities. The rules for the participation of undertakings, research centres and universities in activities eligible for assistance under the programme and the dissemination of research results are set out in COM (2006) 42. Depending on the nature of the project and body or organisation being assisted, the level of assistance under the programme can range from 40% to 100% of the cost of the research activity.

The Commission sees nuclear fusion as having the potential to make a major contribution to the realisation of a sustainable and secure energy supply for the European Union and worldwide and believes its successful development would provide energy which was safe, sustainable and environmentally friendly. Most member states share this view. Assistance under the framework programme will be directed towards developing the international thermonuclear research reactor, known as ITER, an experimental fusion reactor to be located in France. It will also be aimed at developing the knowledge base for prototype fusion reactors. The ITER project is an international one promoted by the European Union, the USA, Japan, China, South Korea and the Russian Federation. However, it is not possible at this stage to say when exactly nuclear fusion will provide a viable energy source. It could be 30 years or more away.

In regard to nuclear fission and radiation protection research, the objective of the framework programme is to promote the safe use and exploitation of nuclear fission and radiation in industry and medicine in accordance with the EURATOM Treaty. Assistance will be aimed at ensuring operational safety of existing and future nuclear installations, assisting research into the safe management, including disposal, of radioactive waste, and investigating and assessing the potential of advanced reactor systems such as generation IV, particularly their safety, proliferation resistance and waste management aspects. I will refer again to generation IV reactor systems as such systems are the subject of COM (2005) 222.

The Joint Research Centre, JRC, activities covered by the programme include research into medical applications, the development of effective solutions for the management of high level nuclear waste and the safety of existing and new nuclear fuel cycles, as well as western and Russian designed reactor types. The programme will also cover the JRC's role in co-ordinating the EU contribution to the international generation IV reactor research and development programme.

Overall, financially, a large proportion of the programme is devoted to nuclear fusion which makes use of a fuel source, of which essentially there is an unlimited supply and which would avoid many of the difficulties associated with nuclear fission, in particular, with regard to safety and the generation of long-life radioactive waste. Ireland has, therefore, not objected to continuing EU research into nuclear fusion but considers that EU funding in this field needs careful monitoring, given that the reality is that nuclear fusion is still a long way off.

In regard to nuclear fission, while some assistance will be directed at researching the potential of future reactors, the over-riding emphasis in the programme is on nuclear safety, something to which the Government does not object. Similarly, we do not object to the radiation protection activities which it is envisaged will receive assistance under the programme.

COM (2005) 222 relates to a Council decision which will authorise the Commission to negotiate the accession of EURATOM to the international framework agreement among the members of the generation IV international forum in the field of nuclear-related research. The decision was adopted by the Council on 21 December 2005. The generation IV international forum initiative was launched by the United States at the beginning of 2000. Its aim is to facilitate international co-operation in the field of research and development on the next generation of nuclear energy systems capable of providing a reliable supply of energy while satisfactorily addressing nuclear safety, waste, proliferation and public perception concerns. Several European countries — the United Kingdom, France and Switzerland — as well as Japan, Korea, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and Canada have joined in this effort. To this end, they have signed the charter of the generation IV international forum known as the GIF.

The Commission decided in November 2002 that the European Atomic Energy Agency should adhere to the charter which was subsequently signed on behalf of EURATOM on 30 July 2003. Essentially, it is a political agreement with no financial implications. In November 2004 the United States produced a draft framework agreement which, effectively, translated the provisions of the charter into a legally binding framework which would enable research and development work at project level, in addition to the sharing of results. In its decision of 21 December 2005 the Council gave the go-ahead to the Commission to negotiate Community accession to the agreement.

The objective of the generation IV project is to develop nuclear systems with advanced nuclear safety, improved nuclear non-proliferation resistance, physical protection and minimised radioactive waste features. Generation IV reactors include a range of reactor designs which have the potential to burn nuclear fuels much more efficiently than current reactors, thus extending the life of nuclear fuel reserves, and to produce smaller quantities of high level radioactive waste. The various fuel cycles proposed for the reactors are also intended to minimise the risk of diversion of nuclear materials for clandestine purposes.

Given its opposition to nuclear energy, Ireland had concerns about the accession of EURATOM to the international agreement. It, therefore, voted against the proposaI. However, as the concept of qualified majority voting applied and there was no blocking minority against it, the proposal was adopted.

The Community's financial input to the generation IV project will be via the EURATOM seventh and subsequent framework programmes. As I mentioned, Community assistance for the project is essentially aimed at assessing the potential of future reactors in terms of safety, non-proliferation and waste management.

I turn to COM (2005) 673, a proposed Council directive on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. The directive is still under discussion at the Council working group. It is intended to update and replace Council Directive 92/3/EURATOM of February 1992 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste between members states and into and out of the Community. While it will apply to radioactive waste, it also proposes to extend the scope of the 1992 directive to include spent fuel, something Ireland welcomes.

The existing 1992 Council directive has given rise to uncertainties in that spent fuel for which no use is foreseen is considered to be radioactive waste and shipments of such materials are subject to the uniform control procedure laid down in the directive. On the other hand, shipments of spent fuel for reprocessing are not subject to such a procedure as such fuel is not regarded as waste for the purposes of the 1992 directive. This issue is addressed by the inclusion of spent fuel, whether it be for reprocessing, within the scope of the proposed new directive. The matter is still under discussion at the working group.

The Commission considers that the modifications to Directive 92/3 are justified to ensure consistency with the latest EURATOM directives, in particular, Council Directive 2003/122/EURATOM of 22 December of 2003 on the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources. Furthermore, it sees a need for consistency with other international provisions which have evolved since the 1992 directive came into force, in particular, the International Atomic Eenergy Agency's joint convention on the safety of spent fuel management and the safety of radioactive waste management, to which the Community acceded on 2 January this year. The proposed new directive does not set out the standards of safety that will have to be adhered to in the shipment of radioactive waste or spent fuel. Operations involved in such shipments, by whatever mode, are subject to a number of requirements under existing Community and international law for the safe transport of radioactive materials.

Given that Ireland has no nuclear power or nuclear fuel cycle facilities, the proposed new directive will have little, if any, direct implications for us. Leaving aside the proposed inclusion of spent nuclear fuel, whether it be for reprocessing, within the scope of the new directive, it will update and reinforce the system of control and prior authorisation of shipments of radioactive materials as established under the 1992 directive and is, therefore, a positive and welcome development from the safety viewpoint.

I welcome the officials from the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland. Under the Freedom of Information Act, as applied within the Department, since it was changed by the Government, I find it impossible to identify or obtain copies of correspondence either within or between the RPII and the Department and also between the Minister and his counterparts in Britain, Norway and Sweden. It is sad that of 122 documents identified in my freedom of information request I was refused 89, mostly on the grounds that the security of the State would be endangered, which I found very strange. While I appreciate that the officials have to apply the law — I very much regret that it has been changed — what we need is openness and transparency, particularly in regard to the genuine concerns expressed about the plant at Sellafied, nuclear safety, and what Ministers and Departments are saying to each other. I would like to see much more openness and transparency in the application of the Freedom of Information Act by the Government. It is a closed shop. The incident that took place at Sellafield last year, the subject of my freedom of information request, was very serious. Departmental officials cannot tell me what they or the Minister said and did or did not do. As I understand it, the Freedom of Information Act does not yet apply to the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, although I understood it was to apply to it some time ago. If we do not have openness and transparency, we will not be able to get to the truth on the fundamental issues that concern us.

I wish to make a couple of points about the regulations which have been brought to our attention today. Perhaps the delegation would explain the difference between nuclear fusion and nuclear fission and why it states it does not have a problem with research continuing. How will the new regulations impact on the ability of the State to invigilate or further scrutinise the transport of radioactive waste to and from the plant at Sellafield, as well as the operation of the plant and any other new plants which may be proposed by the British Government in view of its policy on energy?

Ms Dempsey

I do not wish to comment on the Deputy's FOI request but I will bring the minutes of the meeting to the attention of the Minister to make him aware of the points the Deputy has made. It is my recollection that the RPII will be brought under the ambit of the Act in May. I hope that will help to allay the Deputy's concerns in due course.

On the difference between nuclear fission and nuclear fusion, I am delighted to say the RPII delegation will be happy to explain it. I will then come to the point on our ability to invigilate and scrutinise transports.

Will Ms Dempsey answer my questions? What is the difference between nuclear fusion and nuclear fission? How will these documents improve the capacity of the Department to invigilate what is happening? Will they strengthen Ireland's hand in looking at what is happening at Sellafield in terms of the transport of radioactive waste, the storage of such waste on site, the potential for an accident to occur and the view Irish Governments have consistently held that the pressure should be kept on British Nuclear Fuels Limited?

Ms Dempsey

I apologise to the Deputy. What I said was that I would allow the question on the difference between nuclear fission and nuclear fusion to be answered and that I would then come back to the points the Deputy had made.

I am sorry, I misunderstood. I thought Ms Dempsey was referring the question.

Ms Dempsey

If the Deputy prefers, I will deal with that aspect first and then refer the question of the difference between nuclear fission and nuclear fusion.

That is what I would prefer.

Ms Dempsey

The directive will not change in any way our capacity to invigilate the transport and management of waste at the Sellafield site. We are in a particular position vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, on which I will elaborate. What the directive proposes to do is make transports safer. It provides for a particular methodology for notifying countries through the territories of which materials might pass by road rather than by sea and enabling people to be aware of the content of transports, timings and so on. It enhances the amount of information exchange, in other words, the knowledge of the number of transports that might take place where the materials are being transported through individual countries. Because the materials transported to or through the United Kingdom would be on the land mass of the UK, in which case there is no particular difference — they do not impact specifically on Ireland in the sense of their transporting and because seaborne transports are already subject to much regulation and so on — there is no particular addition in terms of the invigilation. There is, however, an increase and a widening of the materials that are required to be notified, in particular the spent fuel. That is the addition in this, and there are other updatings but the fundamental ability to invigilate continues to be in place.

As the Deputy is aware, through the process of legal actions we have engaged in an approved co-operation process with the UK and consequently, while these are European Acts, we have bilateral arrangements in place with the UK through which we are more aware than previously of what goes on in Sellafield. For example, the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland has visited the site in Sellafield in the past 15 months or so and a full published report on that matter is in the public domain. The Garda has been allowed access to the Sellafield site to assess the extent to which security procedures there match international best practice and while its reports are confidential for security reasons, we are assured that nothing untoward has been found by the Garda in the processes employed at Sellafield in securing the site. We have other methods by which our improved relationship with the UK enables higher levels of communication and, by inference, higher levels of competence in the way that site is run.

The Government signed a bilateral agreement in December 2004 for early notification of nuclear accidents or incidents that could have an impact on Ireland. Furthermore, we have what we call real-time access to the RIMNET system, which is the monitoring stations placed around the island of the United Kingdom that would identify changes in radioactive activity and which would be signalled instantaneously both to the UK authorities as well as to us at the same time. There are other ways, therefore, in which we invigilate, so to speak, and we continue to press to improve that.

One of the issues I was trying to get to the bottom of was the way the Department became aware of the last incident at Sellafield. If I remember correctly, BNFL published it initially in one of its journals and indicated that, on a scale of one to seven, it was a zero event. It took some days then for the Department to be notified. I understand that the information the Department was given subsequently was not correct and that because the volume of the liquid was no longer contained but was still retained within the protective envelope outside the actual structure, it was deemed to be the highest level of incident without it becoming an accident. The response reported in The Irish Times from the Department basically agreed with what BNFL said, namely, that on a scale of one to seven, the event was a one but it turned out to be three or four on the scale. The type of communication the Department got was poor and the comments it made were erroneous in that it believed what it was told. I am concerned about that. Before the Department made its statement it ought to have got more information. I make that point in the context of the potential danger of a very serious accident. What would happen in the case of a serious accident?

Ms Dempsey

I understand the point the Deputy is making and what is driving his concern. We may be moving somewhat away from the actual subject matter of today's meeting but——

Does Ms Dempsey not want to answer that question? I want her to answer the question.

Ms Dempsey

I am simply saying that the seventh framework programme is some steps away from the issue about which we are speaking.

This is the first opportunity I have had to address the Department directly on this issue other than through the Freedom of Information Act.

Ms Dempsey

In so far as I can communicate with the Deputy within the parameters of the restrictions necessarily imposed on me, I can tell him that we got early notification through the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland which got the notification, in written form, from not one but two sources who are organisations of similar status in the United Kingdom. They were early indications. As is the case with any event or accident, it is a matter of some time before one can scope the full scale of any accident or event.

Ms Dempsey

We would be of the view, therefore, that we got prompt, timely information in accordance with the information available to the UK authorities at that time and as the information developed, we were also privy to that. We would not deem ourselves to have been inadequately advised or advised with undue delay of the event. It must be said that the event was totally contained. The Deputy is correct that it was a significant event and one that has exercised the Minister greatly, such that he made a special visit to the Commission five or six weeks ago and left Commissioner Piebalgs, the energy Commissioner, in no doubt about Ireland's concerns. What it signalled to us was not just that it was an event but that it was a drip that had gone on for some considerable months before it was observed and notified and therefore we came into the information loop, as did other authorities, but prior to that it would appear that people had a certain attitude about the measurements being given or whatever, such that they did not signal to us a high safety culture. That is something the Minister, on behalf of the Irish people, has made clear both in his meetings with the Commission and to the UK authorities whom he met only last November. From the point of view of the way in which the leak happened, we are deeply unsatisfied. From the point of view of the way in which material and information was conveyed to us as soon as the authorities knew and understood it, we are happy that they informed us promptly within the spirit and the concept of the improved co-operation and co-ordination relationships.

I want to express my concern because I am not happy that what happened was properly reported to the Department. The information it was given was not accurate in that it was a much more serious issue. I will not labour the point.

The committee has visited Sellafield and we put many of these questions to the various UK organisations.

This is the first time we have had the opportunity to put them directly to the people who represent us.

I do not want to dwell on the matter. I appreciate the Deputy taking the opportunity to ask questions.

I am happy to make my point and to allow the meeting continue unhindered but I want to express my concern to the Department representatives. My biggest concern is that I cannot get the facts. The representatives are not allowed to give them to me because the Minister has changed the law. That is the problem.

We will now hear from the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland on fusion and so on.

Mr. Christopher Hone

I thank the Deputy for the question. One can create energy using nuclear power in two different ways. One is by fission, where atoms are split; that is how the conventional nuclear reactors work. The other is by fusing atoms together, which is how the sun and other stars work.

In terms of the safety issues related to both kinds of situations, fission produces large quantities of long-lived radioactive wastes which gives rise to the problem of safety in the reactors. Fusion also produces some radioactive waste but not as much. It does not produce the kind of radioactive waste, for example, that would be of prime interest to terrorist groups. Also, there is an intrinsic safety feature in fusion reactors in that to make a fusion reactor work, we have to contain the fuel which is in the form of an ionised gas or plasma with large magnetic fields, which in turn require large electric currents. The reaction can be stopped simply by flicking a switch, which terminates the reaction. There is not a possibility, therefore, of a runaway reaction such as the one at Chernobyl. That is the difference.

I welcome the personnel from the nuclear safety section of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and thank Ms Dempsey for her presentation. Has the Government's position on the development of nuclear power changed? One hears different opinions from Ministers on the issue. Perhaps Ms Dempsey will clarify it because it is an important issue that concerns all our citizens.

I agree with Deputy O'Dowd's statement about the manner in which information is received from the authorities in the United Kingdom on the Sellafield plant. I have visited the site on three occasions but our visits were stage managed. I am sure it was the same for the Department's officials. We have to listen to and believe what we are told rather than bring our own inspectorate personnel to investigate what is happening there. I presume it is the same when gardaí visit — they are told what is happening rather than investigating the situation themselves. This concerns me.

There is a huge demand in this country, due to the increase in cancer incidence, particularly in the north east, that this facility be closed. Is the Government applying ongoing pressure for its closure? It should be, rather than issuing a statement every time there is a leak. The closure of the plant at Sellafield is an issue which should be raised daily with the British authorities.

I have a linked question, although we are straying from the proposal before us. Following the recent decision of the European Court of Justice, are we preparing a case on the Sellafield plant to be advanced through the EU institutions and, if so, at what stage is it?

Ms Dempsey

I will give priority to the Chairman's question. We do not have a result from the European Court of Justice. It was the Advocate General's opinion which is deeply influential and would signal, in our view and that of those who know these things, the likely outcome from the ECJ. It appears that the court where we should exercise our rights and present our concerns will be the European Court of Justice. The Government is committed to continuing, through all legal means at its disposal, to pursue Irish policy concerns about the closure of the plant at Sellafield and/or the improvement of its current status. The European option is not specifically set at this time but it is certainly in mind if the ECJ case concludes as we expect. That opens the question of where the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea tribunal resides. Therefore, there are other legal questions that must be dovetailed. It is the intention of the Government and the Attorney General to continue to pursue cases.

Senator Bannon asked if there had been a change in nuclear energy policy. I am not here to speak on the energy dossier but the Government's position, as articulated in the programme for Government, is that the plant at Sellafield poses a threat to Ireland and should be closed and that every diplomatic and legal effort towards that end will be used. That remains the instruction I have in my section and it remains the way in which we seek to pursue our business. I agree there are signals that there is a softening of approach in a number of areas — the Netherlands certainly softened its approach recently — but whether the nuclear energy debate will widen remains to be seen in terms of how other countries approach it. However, countries have a sovereign right to pursue the energy options they prefer, including nuclear power. That sovereign right is embedded in the treaties.

As a sovereign nation, we have chosen and decided by law that we will never use nuclear power. It is enshrined in legislation — I believe in the 1998 electricity supply Act — that we will not develop a nuclear power capacity. That has not changed. As an official, I have seen no indications on the horizon that it is changing. I have certainly never heard any Government or Opposition politician suggest we should change. From that point of view, we remain resolutely opposed to nuclear power and I do not envisage any change.

What allies does Ireland have in the European Union in its position on nuclear energy?

Ms Dempsey

That is an interesting question. Where the atomic energy working group is placed is different from what would normally be the case for a committee such as this. Energy matters, for example, are handled by the energy directorate but that is not where atomic questions are discussed. They are discussed at the General Affairs and External Relations Council. There are subtleties because the EURATOM Treaty is considered by that Council. Therefore, the debate is not held at the energy Council. Forming an alliance, therefore, is a little different. The Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government has responsibility for nuclear matters in Ireland but it is the Minister for Foreign Affairs who carries the atomic portfolio at the Council. It is not a mismatch in policy, just that there are different personalities.

Traditionally, we have an ally in Austria which is a non-nuclear country and has neighbours which have nuclear power. There is a high degree of similarity between its concerns and ours. However, as it is not a coastal state, it does not share all our concerns. There are also Luxembourg and Denmark from time to time. Most of the other countries either have or rely upon nuclear power as a source of energy. While they might not generate nuclear power, they import it through interconnections. It is a small alliance and smaller since enlargement.

Should we consult any other groups or organisations in this country about these proposals? Obviously, the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland is being consulted, as is this committee.

Ms Dempsey

Not specifically. The interest in matters to do with radiological protection predominantly resides with the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland which advises the Government and the Department. In terms of the impact from a political or policy point of view, this committee represents a good cross-section of interests. No lobby group has come to our attention or seeks information from us that would fit into the category the Chairman suggests. Obviously, it is public information and it is available if people seek it.

I thank each member of the delegation for his or her contribution to the meeting and assisting us with our examination of these proposals. The meeting has served as a useful exchange of views. Is it agreed that each of the proposals — COM (2005) 119, COM (2005) 222, COM (2005) 444, COM (2005) 445, COM (2005) 673, as well as COM (2006) 42 — has been sufficiently scrutinised and that we should ask departmental officials to keep the committee briefed if there are any developments on this issue? Agreed. The clerk will prepare the report of the joint committee on each proposal to be laid before the Houses.

No. 5 on the agenda is a presentation by the Chief Fire Officers Association on the Building Control Bill 2005.

We should have a discussion about the emergency plan.

Whom does the Deputy suggest we should invite?

The RPII and the Department should be invited to appear before the committee to ascertain whether the plan needs to be reviewed, whether they are happy with it and what needs to be done.

It will be a few weeks before we hear back.

It will be after Easter but that is okay. I would like it to be placed on the agenda in the near future.

Is it agreed the committee should consider the emergency national plan in this context? Agreed.

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