JOINT COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 11 Mar 2009

Document Fraud: Discussion with Criminal Assets Bureau and Irish Fraud Bureau.

Chairman

This meeting will discuss with the Criminal Assets Bureau and the Irish Fraud Bureau the falsification of documentation to obtain loans from financial institutions. I welcome the delegates from the Irish Fraud Bureau: Mr. James Tracey, chairman; Mr. Greg Connell, managing director; and Mr. Paul Johnson, commercial director with BusinessPro. I welcome also the delegation from the Criminal Assets Bureau: Mr. John O’Mahony, detective chief superintendent; Mr. John McDermott, detective superintendent; and Mr. Frank Cassidy, legal officer.

Members are reminded of the parliamentary practice that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against any person outside the House or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. I draw attention to the fact that while members of the committee have absolute privilege, this same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before it. Members are also reminded that all inquiries concerning the general operation of the Criminal Assets Bureau must be channelled through the Garda Commissioner, and the Garda representatives present today are not in a position to provide details on any current or live cases, either under investigation or before the courts.

I ask the Irish Fraud Bureau to make its presentation, which is to be followed by that of the Criminal Assets Bureau.

Mr. Greg Connell

I thank the Chairman for the invitation to address the joint committee on the issue of false identity documents being used to obtain financial services.

The Irish Fraud Bureau, IFB, is sponsored by BusinessPro, the operators of the Consumer Credit Bureau and Stubbs Gazette. Customers use the bureau’s services to manage credit risk, identify fraud and other related exposures. For example, a lawyer might check with the bureau to ascertain how many unpaid judgments there are against an individual before litigating on behalf of a client.

Last year the clerk to the committee approached the IFB requesting information on the use of false identity documentation to secure loans and related financial services. Obviously, this was an area of special interest and particular relevance to the IFB and its members. On that basis a survey was conducted in December 2008. There were 12 respondents, all of whom were senior executives with responsibility for compliance and risk management in the financial services sector, fraud prevention specialists and practitioners. As they were senior managers, the IFB could assume they had a good understanding of the impact of fraud on their businesses. They comprised management in banking, insurance and pension companies.

The survey was designed to address the subject at a high level but also to consider several aspects of the way in which fraudulent identity documents might be used, including frequency of use, the costs associated with fraud, detection rates, prevention strategies and any other trends that seemed to be emerging. Up to 66% of respondents confirmed their organisations had detected the use of false identity documentation such as passports, driving licences and identity cards. Those who did not report the use of false documents may have had low exposure or poor detection. Some 25% of respondents confirmed that current detection levels saved their organisations over €1 million a year. It must be borne in mind that this relates to the use of false identity documents, not all falsified documents. Half of the respondents reported savings of over €100,000 per annum. These figures only refer to detected fraud; it is harder to determine figures for undetected fraud. Some 58% of respondents confirmed that some false documentation had gone undetected and only 25% were certain that no false identity documentation went undetected. How much an organisation is losing in undetected fraud is an open question. However, 25% of respondents confirmed that undetected false identity documentation had cost their organisations over €500,000 a year. The majority were unable to answer the question.

A key component in the armoury against avoiding fraud is an organisation's anti-money laundering procedures. It is good to note that 75% of respondents confirmed their staff had been trained in these procedures and the KYC, know-your-customer, requirement. With the forthcoming legislation on money laundering, we expect that figure to rise to 100%. Some 83% of respondents confirmed KYC requirements were audited at least once a year. It must be stressed, however, these are procedures and cannot eliminate human error and high quality forgeries. At a recent IFB-sponsored forum a speaker brought along a driving licence purchased over the Internet which none of the fraud specialists was able to detect as a false document.

The survey also confirmed that 33% of respondents used the market leader, Keesing Reference Systems, for document verification. However, only 58% used some form of identity document verification. This leaves a degree of exposure, particularly considering the quality of forged identity documents available over the Internet. Only 58% of respondents confirmed the use of false identity documents was one of the top three fraud risks facing financial services organisations. Only 8% considered the position on the issue of individuals presenting false identity documentation could be judged to be improving, in other words, reducing in volume, with 25% convinced it was getting worse. From the classifiable elements of the survey, it shows there is a real problem.

The IFB believes the introduction of the new anti-money laundering legislation will encourage the wider use of false documentation. It may also drive up the quality of such documents as the requirements against money laundering become more stringent.

The survey also contained some unclassifiable material, quotes from personnel, which may be of interest to the committee. One respondent stated that although current verification processes were rigorous, legacy accounts might have been opened with undetected false documentation. Accounts opened up to 2002 might have been opened with false documentation. It may be prudent for organisations to review their existing account base rather than focusing on new accounts. Another recurring statement from respondents concerned the industry's willingness to accept documentation which was easily falsified such as a driver's licence. I have already referred to the quality of documents that are actually available. There needs to be some additional level of verification to ensure that what somebody is handing over as a vehicle driving licence can be authenticated against something else, and at the moment that does not exist.

There was widespread agreement that data protection rules are generally unhelpful in the prevention of identity fraud. When I questioned in more detail what they meant by that, in particular it referred to the consent to share data. Typically the industry standard for gaining consent to share data, in the same way that banks might share data with, for example, the Irish Credit Bureau, is through a personnel data clause in a contract one signs on applying for financial services. The Data Protection Commission has indicated that this might not constitute consent in that it is not necessarily freely given since one would not get the services if one did not sign up to that particular agreement. Therefore, this is making people very reticent as regards the sharing of fraud data. A couple of things tend to understate fraud, one of which is the tendency for it to get classified as something else, such as a credit loss. Another factor is that when it is identified, nobody is entirely happy to declare it as fraud and share it as such.

An indication of something that I am sure Mr. John O'Mahony will be very conscious of, is the fact that some individuals are incorporating limited companies and using false names as a front. Having got a limited company, one in effect has an employer and can then falsify employee references, PAYE documents and so on. The company in itself is just a shell, of course, and the names of the individuals are entirely fictitious, but once again they have credible false documentation. I hope that was helpful and I shall now hand over to Mr. O'Mahony.

Mr. John O’Mahony

I should like at the outset to thank the Chairman and members of the joint committee for the invitation to discuss the issue of documents being falsified to obtain financial loans. This has arisen in the context of a questionnaire circulated by the Irish Fraud Bureau to a targeted audience including the Criminal Assets Bureau on behalf of the committee. The committee will understand that it would be inappropriate for me to discuss or comment on specific cases during the course of this hearing.

The primary role of the Criminal Assets Bureau is the identification and confiscation of assets believed to represent the proceeds of criminal conduct. The bureau's investigations therefore focus on the assets rather than the individual. In pursuance of this objective the bureau has two specific powers of investigation, a warrant pursuant to section 14 and a production order pursuant to section 14A of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996.

The availability of such investigative powers, focused exclusively towards the identification of assets obtained from criminal conduct, gives us a perceptive insight into the full range of the financial transactions of persons who are targets of the bureau. This is particularly true in relation to the financial loan transactions associated with such people.

The Criminal Assets Bureau in its investigations works closely with the Garda bureau of fraud investigation, which has primary responsibility for the criminal investigations into these types of financial fraud. To this effect, the bureau coordinates its operations within the overall Garda policing plan. While encountering many different kinds of financial fraud in its daily work, the most prevalent type encountered is mortgage fraud. Mortgage fraud is defined as: "The obtaining of mortgage facilities/loans as a result of the submission of false/falsified documentation or misleading documentation in support of a mortgage application."

It might at this point be useful to highlight to the committee the most common methods by which mortgage frauds are perpetrated in this jurisdiction. One involves ad hoc applications. This is where an individual submits false documentation or other false details with a mortgage application. The individual is usually acting alone and there is no link to a broker. This is less common as the financial institutions are generally more diligent when dealing with individual applicants. However, it can and does occur. The suspect in such a case is relying on the institution not checking his or her documentation thoroughly.

A second method is through the means of organised fraud structures. This is where a mortgage broker or mortgage introducer submits falsified documentation on behalf of a client with or without his or her knowledge, with a view to obtaining a mortgage for the client for a fee, or for the commission paid by the financial institution. This is a more organised crime, in that the fraud is achieved through the broker who either coaches the applicant or provides false documentation to ensure that a mortgage application is approved. In most cases the broker is known to the financial institution, or is an agent of the institution, and therefore a level of trust may prevail. Where further documentation is required to substantiate an application, the broker often has access to like-minded professionals who provide the requisite documentation. In other cases the broker liaises with fraudsters who can supply him or her with false documentation such as P60s, driving licences, etc., which mislead the institutions in their subsequent checks.

Another method is solicitors' undertakings. A solicitor's undertaking is a document signed by a solicitor where he or she undertakes to do certain things for the benefit of the financial institution. This undertaking becomes the institution's main security when paying out a loan. This system evolved in the 1990s and is directly related to a desire by financial institutions to speed up the process of buying and selling property, and the issuing of associated loans. The old system was cumbersome and loan cheques would only issue when every last piece of paperwork was in place. However, by getting the solicitor to undertake responsibility, in writing, for completion of tasks associated with the property transfer, the institution was getting a guarantee that all these necessary undertakings associated with the property transaction would be completed in the future.

Unfortunately, this trust also created a scenario where solicitors had the power to delay the registration of property mortgages, if they so chose. This meant that any title or charge searches conducted on behalf of another institution for a loan application on the same property would show no charges existing on that property, and therefore no reason to refuse a new loan. Some solicitors have utilised this as a means of obtaining multiple mortgages on the same properties.

Since its inception the bureau has noted that criminals are becoming more adept at concealing the proceeds of their criminal conduct. Rather than simply lodging their proceeds into deposit interest-bearing bank accounts, or utilising normal current accounts, they have been turning to the raising of mortgages. Such mortgages are generally serviced by cash lodgements of funds resulting from their criminal conduct. Not only does this approach serve to disguise or conceal the origin of these moneys, but especially in a rising housing market, it constituted an excellent investment. Furthermore, on many occasions once the transaction had been in place for some time, and had come to appear legitimate, the original mortgages were discharged by a number of large cash lodgements, following which a new mortgage was raised. The resulting funds, raised on a basis of a bank mortgage charged on a property which appears to have been legitimately obtained are, in effect, now clean. The process has become known as "laundering by substitution". This process has the dual purpose of providing a laundered lump sum while allowing the process to continue on the second mortgage. Many of these mortgages are raised despite the fact that the persons involved are primarily career criminals and have no legitimate source of income.

In its most basic form, the persons applying for the loan simply give false information in terms of earnings and occupations to the financial institutions. This is often backed up by false P60s or wage slips in the name of fictitious companies or from other associates who are involved in businesses. The type of documentation produced is often of good quality and would be difficult to detect as false, unless there was good systematic follow-up inquiry by the financial institutions.

In recent times, the Criminal Assets Bureau has identified a number of individuals who are involved in the provision of very sophisticated documentation to support loan applications, in addition to producing entire false identities for people. The type of documentation now being used includes false driving licences, false passports, false bank statements and false utility bills. We have replicated some examples of false documentation which has been uncovered in the course of our recent investigations.

Mr. John McDermott

We have these documents on a slide. The first example is an AIB current account statement, and it looks very real and would easily pass as the genuine article. The next example is a Bank of Ireland current account statement, and it has all the ingredients of a genuine document, and would be very difficult to detect. The next example is an Ulster Bank current account statement. Unfortunately, we see these detailed documents on a more regular basis. The next example is a Permanent TSB statement, and it contains all the necessary information which appears correct in every detail.

Another document used is an NTL bill, which can be used for opening an account. It contains all the requisite documentation, and the information contained is correct. The following example is a tax assessment document, which again contains all the necessary information. While this is a copy of the forgery, the actual forgery is very real. We have inspectors from the Revenue Commissioners working with us in CAB. They find it very hard to tell the difference, such is the quality of these forgeries. We also have a perfect example of a false payslip and a false driving licence. Photographs can be taken down from the Internet and put onto these driving licences. We looked at them and they are very difficult to detect.

The last document was recovered from a computer and it was in the process of being generated, with pieces being moved around. It is very skilled, but it is very genuine and would be very difficult to detect as anything other than a genuine document.

Mr. John McDermott

There are two documents which committee members do not have before them about the type of fraud committed. We would be anxious to talk to them about these documents. They deal with money laundering through mortgage fraud. In our presentation, we have simplified issues so that No. 1 represents mortgages applied for using an alternative identity or false documents. No. 2 represents the financial institution that approves the mortgage and issues payment. No. 3 explains that mortgage payments are met using cash lodgements, sometimes via different bank accounts. No. 4 explains that the cash lodgements coming from criminality are the proceeds of crime. This gives members an idea of how the most common mortgage fraud takes place.

A relatively new phenomenon is next on the slide.

Deputy Joan Burton

On the previous example, are we talking about criminals who get relatives to buy a house in their name? Is that the kind of thing that is going on?

Mr. John O’Mahony

Yes. They get a P60 or some docket from an employer. When we go to the employer, he or she knows nothing about it, even though it might state that the person is earning €100,000 per annum.

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

Would the title be in the relative's name?

Mr. John O’Mahony

Yes it would. However, as these criminals have total control in the way they operate, they effectively control the property as well.

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

Could the purchase have gone through without the title being registered in the name of the relative?

Mr. John O’Mahony

No. The property is in the relative's name, but is in the control of the criminal.

Deputy Joan Burton

What happens if the drug dealer gets killed?

Mr. John O’Mahony

I cannot talk about specific cases, but we are dealing with the asset and we target the asset rather than the individual.

A relatively new phenomenon is builder bail-out fraud. With the downturn in the economy, we have noticed this occurring recently. We are carrying out several investigations on this. The slide shows a fraudster creating false documentation using a computer. He checks the bank accounts on the Irish Payment Services Organisation website, which is an open source website. By the process of elimination, he can obtain a bank account that is in funds. He will use that bank account number in his application.

The second slide shows two individuals working to put together the mortgage application using false documents for the brokers. The mortgage application is processed and approved by the financial institution, and funds are transferred to the false identity via solicitors. The mortgage funds are paid to the false identity. The builder receives payment for the property and the original fraudster receives a certain sum of money for his services. This is occurring since the downturn in the economy began. Financial institutions must be very conscious of this.

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

Who is paying who at the end?

Mr. John O’Mahony

As a builder, I might have a number of properties and I cannot get rid of them. Therefore, I hire the services of a fraudster. He will create a false identity to buy the property, with a driving licence, passport——

Deputy Richard Bruton

Is a payment ever made to the bank?

Mr. John O’Mahony

He never makes a payment to the bank, but the builder has his money and the fraudster has his money. The bank pays out the money but when it comes to the first mortgage repayment, nothing happens.

Deputy Joan Burton

The bank then owns the property.

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

It owns a property with a mortgage.

Mr. John O’Mahony

We often find that the houses are being sold for an inflated sum.

The persons involved in such activity generally have access to sophisticated IT software and hardware, which allows them to produce high quality documents. These people are often associated with organised crime gangs. In order to combat this, the Criminal Assets Bureau and the Garda bureau of fraud investigation work very closely with other agencies within the national support services, which includes the national bureau of criminal investigation, the Garda national drugs unit and the special detective unit. This combined approach is required as the people involved are engaged in various types of criminal activity, including drug trafficking and armed robberies.

The bureau has identified a need to develop measures to counteract the more ingenious methods of concealing the proceeds of criminal conduct. To this end, the bureau analysis unit was established within the bureau. The addition of international best practice in the area of forensic analysis and the use of enhanced training has worked to the advantage of the bureau by assisting in the identification and tracing of such assets and in the presentation of expert testimony before the court.

For the assistance of the committee, the bureau has conducted an analysis of its proceeds of crime applications involving property purchase which have been brought before the High Court in the past three years. We note that in these cases, forged or fraudulent documentation had been used in every case. We also note that among these cases were instances where multiple properties were purchased.

As we have seen, mortgage fraud is quite prevalent. The fraudsters are becoming increasingly sophisticated and organised. While we have the ability to investigate such offences, we believe it is vital that more be done in terms of prevention. To this end, there is a need for close co-operation between the various financial institutions and law enforcement agencies. Achieving this goal will require the following: close formal and informal contacts between financial institutions and gardaí; close attention to emerging patterns, technologies and methodologies of financial fraud; continued use of suspicious transaction report mechanisms; rigorously applied know-your-customer procedures; enhanced due diligence which is risk-based and extended from the customer to intermediaries and professionals; greater use of analysis of trends and patterns, and enhanced use of investigative techniques and tools; and training and awareness.

I trust this presentation is of assistance to the committee. I cannot discuss individual cases but I and my colleagues are willing to answer any questions the committee may have.

Chairman

I thank the speakers for their presentations. We will now open the meeting to questions. I have two questions. First, Mr. O'Mahony concluded his presentation by highlighting that it is vital that more be done in terms of prevention and he went on to outline the requirements to achieve this goal. Do the witnesses feel there are legislative changes that could or should be made to help to crack down on fraud and to help prevention?

Second, with regard to solicitors' undertakings, in light of the well-documented cases and abuses that have been highlighted recently, do the witnesses believe solicitors' undertakings should be re-examined to bring trust back into that area? If so, can they give their views to help the Government in this area?

Mr. Greg Connell

One measure would be practical and helpful. Under current legislation, the use of the full electoral register is restricted to electoral purposes only. We would like to see the permitted use extended to include credit checking and fraud checking to help avoid fraud and credit losses. It is a practice that works very well in the UK and other countries which have strict rules governing use of the electoral register. While they exclude marketing, they do allow for the use of these data.

Another measure that would require statutory change would be to provide real-time access to the Department of Transport register of driver and vehicle licensing details so that the details that appear on the falsified document can be verified against a central database. If the database has a Greg Connell, 22 Hollybank Avenue, Ranelagh, with the date of birth being 20 March 1952 and the driving licence has the date of birth as being 1962, there is a fairly obvious discrepancy that would warrant further investigation. This would be a very helpful addition.

The solicitors' undertaking is something Mr. Tracey and I have discussed. One of the issues we discussed openly with the banks, but on which we do not have a quorum of supporting bankers is that we believe it would be possible to hold a loan register so that nothing fell through the gaps. When one extends a loan on a property, it would be entered on a database that would be searchable by all the members and all participating members would add data. If the search were to come back with no charge but Ulster Bank had just extended a €2 million mortgage on a property in Ranelagh, clearly there would be an obvious further course of investigation. All that is required is that the banks would have to register their secured loans so, effectively, it would be a secured loans register. One could have the streamlined system today but with the safeguard that it would much more difficult for something to fall through the cracks, assuming everybody were to register and everybody were to check.

Mr. John O’Mahony

I will ask Mr. Frank Cassidy, who is our legal officer, to deal with the legal questions.

Mr. Frank Cassidy

First, the bureau's focus is much more on the prevention of money laundering as opposed to the banks' focus which is on avoiding a fraud on themselves. Very often in the cases we encounter, we have seen a particular offence occurring but because the mortgage continues to be paid, albeit with moneys we believe to have been obtained from criminal conduct, it is not a problem for the bank even though a fraud has been committed.

Second, the bureau is not especially keen to focus specifically on recommendations. We have available to us liaison with both the Office of the Attorney General and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, and regular suggestions we have regarding legislation are considered in that regard.

There are two issues that occur to me in regard to legislation. I am aware a third money laundering directive is being considered by a pilot or focus group in the Department of Finance. Perhaps legislation within that area is well recommended at this stage. The third money laundering directive seems to focus on watching funds coming in but it does not necessarily focus on the use of modern mortgages to hide funds coming in. Perhaps consideration of mortgages as opposed to specific funds coming in might be worth considering.

There is another issue on which I agree with Mr. Connell. We find that the data protection legislation creates difficulties for us in our investigations. Very often, in compliance with directions from the Data Protection Commissioner, banks will destroy documentation after a certain period. Such documentation is very useful to our investigations and we are often investigating cases that are more than six or seven years old.

On the issue of solicitors' undertakings, from experience I remember the three-way closing and how complex and difficult this was. It is a shame people from my profession have been found not to be sufficiently trustworthy. The suggestion of a simple register would be very effective and useful.

Deputy Chris Andrews

I thank the delegation for an interesting presentation. Is it the case that, as with drug-using athletes, the system is playing catch-up all the time and the bad guys are always one step ahead of the good guys, as it were? Is it known from inquiries the extent of the exposure of our banks and financial institutions? I understand there was a reference in the Irish Fraud Bureau presentation to a figure of €1 million.

Mr. Greg Connell

There is a certain reticence on the part of the financial institutions to offer a specific figure. One of the issues is that a good deal of fraud is classified as credit losses. One must also take into account the understating of fraud that inevitably happens. One could not arrive at a total on the basis that 25% reported the amount involved as more than €1 million. Currently, the banks are not prepared to provide the data.

Deputy Chris Andrews

In other words, there is no precise figure, only a guesstimate.

Mr. Greg Connell

The total would certainly run into tens and, possibly, hundreds of millions if one took all bank fraud into account, including all credit card fraud where there was recourse to the retailer.

Deputy Chris Andrews

The Criminal Assets Bureau is aware of criminals using fraudulent documents. How extensive is this practice? Are investigations taking place on an ongoing basis? Can the Criminal Assets Bureau recover money from clients who have obtained mortgages under false pretences? If so, does it have a successful track record in reclaiming these moneys? Has the Criminal Assets Bureau or the Irish Fraud Bureau made any proposals for further regulations and checks by institutions to ensure these activities are not so easily engaged in?

Mr. Greg Connell

Unfortunately, as I said, we cannot mention individual cases, which would be helpful in answering the Deputy's questions. One clear course of action any financial institution can take, but which most do not, is to check the unregistered and registered judgment database for consumer judgments, commercial judgments and directors' at-home addresses. Undertaking these checks before granting loans or opening accounts would identify glaringly obvious credit risks, where, for example, somebody has two or more judgments against them in the last two years and clearly has more debt than he or she can service. Equally, these checks will identify patterns where there are 19 or 20 judgments or perhaps even several hundred judgments that can be linked through family members, which would point to extremely suspicious transactions.

We are advocates of a multi-bureau approach. The Irish Credit Bureau does a wonderful job but it will not pick up when there is a judgment against an individual. Therefore, there is a dearth of information for the institutions granting credit and opening accounts.

Mr. John O’Mahony

Deputy Andrews addressed several questions to my colleagues and me. It is true that the bad guy is always catching up. Once we identify one loophole, criminals are forced to find another way of obtaining their ill-gotten gains or getting rid of the fruits of drug dealing or armed robbery. That is why it is important for us as a law enforcement agency to review continuously what is happening in the environment. As sure as night follows day, what is happening in the United States today will happen here shortly. Therefore, we have close liaison with international law enforcement bodies such as Europol. We have also worked closely with the FBI on several cases in the last two years. We are starting to encounter activity which is already well established in other jurisdictions. It is important not to underestimate the ingenuity of criminals. They will find new ways of getting money as soon as we become aware of or close off one of their identities.

It is difficult to quantify the exposure of the banks to this type of fraudulent activity. As I said in my presentation, in all the cases we have brought before the High Court, we have found there was mortgage fraud. We are undertaking a considerable number of investigations in this area and have the legislative facility to recover the properties involved. For example, we have taken High Court orders in several cases. In such cases, once the bills are paid, including any outstanding mortgages, any remaining moneys go to the Department of Finance. These sums are outlined in our annual report.

In regard to further regulation and checks, as Mr. Cassidy stated, we have systems open to us. We are looking continuously at what is happening in the environment. As soon as we see a problem, we have mechanisms in place to review and address it.

Mr. Frank Cassidy

Deputy Andrews has asked whether we can recover money from clients who have obtained mortgages under false pretences. The answer to that question is yes. In most cases, however, the criminality we are alleging may be a prime criminality such as drug trafficking which originally brought the target to our attention. As a backup — it has been successful and useful to us on occasion — we might point out that the individual applying for the mortgage has committed, for instance, two offences under sections 4 and 28 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. This is a useful option which has worked well for us in the past.

Deputy Chris Andrews

Is there evidence that builder bail-out fraud is becoming something of a boom business?

Mr. John O’Mahony

I am not sure whether "boom business" is the appropriate term.

Deputy Chris Andrews

It is if one is perpetrating the fraud.

Mr. John O’Mahony

It is something we have found recently in our investigations and clearly it is driven by the downturn in the economy. Until a short while ago, builders had no difficulties in selling their properties. Now that has all changed. Builders could not engage in this activity without the fraudsters and criminals who are willing to produce false documentation for them.

Senator Marc MacSharry

I thank the delegates for their informative presentation. The Government is now inextricably linked with the banking system as a result of the guarantee scheme, capitalisation and so on. The delegates referred to access to judgments as one means of countering fraudulent activity. Can we further reduce the credit risk to the banks? I was particularly taken by what was said about solicitors' undertakings. In regard to some of the high profile cases, should it have been possible for the banks to identify sufficiently the risk involved in going down the road of substantial lending to particular individuals for multiple properties? This may be slightly off the point but I am interested in the delegates' view.

Clearly there are issues with the Data Protection Commissioner and the relevant legislation. What can be done in the short term to improve the position in order that more can be done to reduce the level of identity fraud?

Mr. Greg Connell

I will recap on the issues we believe could have made a difference. We have mentioned checking the judgment database. There have been incidents involving two high-profile solicitors. Although their names are in the public domain, I will not mention them out of caution.

It would have been apparent that both solicitors had judgments against them, thereby alerting anyone granting credit to the fact that further investigation was required. While it is possible that a person could end up with a judgment against him or her through temporary cash flow problems, if that judgment was not satisfied or if it subsequently became a registered judgment, it is a clear indication of a question mark that requires further investigation. I am sure that had this been the case, the financial institutions that were lending many hundreds of millions through these two individuals might have given far closer scrutiny to the matter. Equally, had a mortgage register been in place, the same issue would have been much easier to detect because it would have been apparent that two, three, four or more mortgages were occurring on a single property. It would have made it immediately obvious, probably to the second person to check and, at the very least, to the third person to check, that the aforementioned two solicitors were not necessarily registering the charges at the Land Registry.

Mr. Frank Cassidy

I have been asked to address the second part of the Senator's question because it is an issue of law. As the first part refers to specific people, I will not address it if that is all right with the Senator and the Chairman. While the Data Protection Act creates some difficulties for the Criminal Assets Bureau, it also gives us some protections. Under section 5 of the Act, we have wider rights of access. For instance, we can apply and seek data for the purposes of preventing or directing or investigating offences. Data also must be protected and we can get them when we are seeking information in respect of the collection of tax. However, it does not apply in respect of investigations under the Proceeds of Crime Act, primarily because the Act was not in existence at that time and probably did not conceive of it. That does not create a huge problem for us. Perhaps an amendment to enable the inclusion of such investigations might be of some assistance and we have discussed that with the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. However, it would be of great assistance, although this is inconsistent with the direction in which European jurisprudence is moving, were certain institutions, such as banking institutions and perhaps solicitors and accountants, to have a responsibility to retain and archive such documentation for a certain time. This would be highly effective and useful evidence for us and we would love a period of ten years, although that is a very long time. If the Criminal Assets Bureau had any suggestions, that would be it.

Deputy Richard Bruton

The presentations were highly intriguing and I thank the witnesses for them. I was struck, particularly while viewing the witnesses' little diagrams, by the extent of the offences and the penalties for the various facilitators along the line. Is part of the problem that some of those who facilitate such activity can play the arrant fool by claiming they received what appeared to be legitimate documentation? Does a difficulty arise in respect of the burden of proof when pursuing those who were facilitating such transactions? Some facilitation took place in the case of most of them. Is the legislation drafted in a way that makes it difficult for the witnesses to pursue the intermediaries?

Almost implicit in the witnesses' presentations is the suggestion that there may be a risk-return issue for the banks and financial institutions in that it is no skin off their noses if people are laundering their money and keeping up their payments. Alternatively, is a risk management failure involved when such things happen? Certainly, one got the impression that the present problems with the financial situations are due in part to it all being about pass the parcel and that no one really cared what the parcel contained. Is this an element of the problem in this regard? For example, have the witnesses had discussions with the Financial Regulator about seeking to impose greater onuses or obligations on financial institutions to undertake the measures they mentioned, such as pooling their registration data or checking judgment cases? Should such measures simply be imposed on financial institutions by regulatory rule or would that be excessive?

For clarity and because there always are two sides to everything, have the witnesses spoken to the Data Protection Commissioner in respect of the perceived defects from which they are suffering? What response has the commissioner made to such concerns? Finally, do the witnesses have hard numbers in respect of the number of offenders or the amount of money involved in money laundering, solicitors' multiple mortgages or the organised elements of this activity? Are there hard data on the number of offences, detection and conviction rates and so on by which to judge the scale of this issue?

Mr. Greg Connell

Certainly, at a high-level simplistic level, the members of the Irish Fraud Bureau would like to be able to classify all suspicious transactions to indicate what level of suspicion might be attached to them and to link with such suspicious transactions the details of the individuals and intermediaries involved. Consequently, over time and using simple and basic data mining tools, it would be possible to find out which intermediaries kept coming up with the same kind of incidents. We have spoken to the Data Protection Commissioner and the question that was thrown up in that regard was that one would be obliged to have the freely-given consent of all of the individuals. In other words, it would be a totally unencumbered consent, in which one would be unable to stipulate that people would not get the service without signing the personal data clause permitting and sharing of data. No one in the industry believes that this is practical.

We also discussed with the Data Protection Commissioner whether there was any way in which the electoral register could be used for the detection of fraud and for credit checking. Although we detected some sympathy for the approach and that it could be beneficial overall for the economy and good for Ireland, the advice was that this measure would require primary legislation and would require someone in government to sponsor such a change of use to encompass another purpose that was beyond the strictly electoral.

Mr. John O’Mahony

I refer to Deputy Bruton's first question on the courts and whether the manner in which the legislation is drafted makes this difficult. I remind him again that as the Criminal Assets Bureau requires a civil level of proof, we do not encounter that difficulty. We have undertaken quite a considerable number of investigations and have been successful in them. The criminal area primarily is an issue for the Garda bureau of fraud investigation. Obviously, the issues there pertain to getting sufficient proofs to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. While people such as the various intermediaries who are helping out in this area will plead innocence, each case must be taken on its merits.

With regard to the risk-return issue for the banks, it is appreciated and Mr. Cassidy has referred to it. Such people invariably pay their mortgages because they are not interested in being rumbled in any way and probably are some of the best payers. If any institution deals with this type of person, there is always a risk. When criminals deal with institutions, they will do as they please and walk away from bail-out fraud or the other types of fraud mentioned when it suits them.

We were asked whether we held discussions with the Financial Regulator. We believed that the committee would address the matter with the regulator if we highlighted it in the questionnaire.

I have referred to the number of offences. A considerable number of investigations are ongoing. Some have just begun, the files on others have been forwarded to the Director of Public Prosecutions and other cases are before the High Court. From a criminal perspective, the fraud squad has a large number of investigations ongoing. I will ask Mr. Cassidy to address the comments on the Data Protection Commissioner.

Mr. Frank Cassidy

When I initially identified the loss of the data for which we were looking, I addressed the difficulty with the commissioner via telephone. He referred me to section 2(1)(c)(iv) of the Act, which states that data “shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose”. These are data that the banks are required to keep for their own records. If an account is closed, there is little need, for a bank’s purposes, to keep the data, although there might be a need for my purposes.

I did not pursue the matter with the commissioner much further. However, I held a helpful meeting with the Irish Banking Federation, IBF, an association with which all banks liaise. I explained my difficulties. Detective Sergeant Corcoran of the fraud squad was also in attendance. Although the IBF understood our problems, I have not heard much from it in the two years since.

Senator Feargal Quinn

I thank both parties for this eye opener. When we used to interview people in my business, we never told them how it was possible to cheat. We believed that this meant we could trust them better. Much later in life, we discovered that it was better to tell them that we knew all of the various ways in which it was possible to cheat because it deterred them from cheating. While I am concerned that the information provided to the committee has told us how to cheat or defraud others, it has been an eye opener, as I did not know those ways.

In this meeting, we are limited to discussing documents being falsified to obtain loans, but there seems to have been few prosecutions for insider trading and so on. Is there sufficient expertise in the Criminal Assets Bureau? The criminals seem to be getting smarter, but I am sure that CAB is also getting smarter. Given technological developments, smarter questions and answers are necessary. If CAB does not have sufficient expertise, on whom can it call?

Mr. Connell's points, especially those on data protection, were interesting. Is new legislation necessary to make the information required from the Data Protection Commissioner available or could his office change its rules?

I was concerned by the statement that new money laundering legislation might result in more problems. Will our guests touch on this subject? If we try to solve one problem and only open the door to others, we are not benefiting the community.

Mr. Greg Connell

I will take the data protection point first because the answer is simple. The issue of consent is a firmly held opinion of the commissioner. It is not prescribed in legislation. Rather, it is an interpretation of the Act and would not require a change in primary legislation.

Mr. O'Mahony touched on the issue of anti-money laundering legislation. One struggles to stay one step ahead of the fraudster. When chip and pin requirements were introduced in the Republic, all of the stolen Irish credit cards started to be used in Italy, Australia and other countries that had not yet embarked upon chip and pin. The fraud moved on. With the advent of chip and pin in Ireland, there was an explosion in card not present fraud. Instead of trying to use credit cards in stores, fraudsters used them over the Internet. Generally, they had everything that was required for that type of use. The fraudster adapts.

We are supportive of anti-money laundering legislation, which is a vital part of the armoury of protection against fraud. However, we predict the criminal response to be a more frequent use of falsified documentation to meet the new anti-money laundering requirements. Today's documents are of high quality, but the suspicion is that there will be falsified documents of an even higher quality tomorrow. A real-time opportunity to verify whether documentation is correct would be helpful. For instance, one could access the Department of Transport on-line. If the Government negotiated similar arrangements with other EU member states, foreign nationals living in Ireland could have their driving licences validated. Otherwise, the decision might be left to a credit union counter clerk who has discovered that the last two licences on which he or she had decided had been taken from the Internet. To stay ahead of the criminal, technology needs to be more powerful. A criminal will adapt to a wider use of documents.

Mr. John O’Mahony

On teaching people how to cheat, a downside of the Internet is that it is readily available and criminals are willing to use it. For this reason, law enforcement must use the Internet. We must also use our contacts with foreign law enforcement agencies to identify trends and patterns in various areas and to identify new methods of addressing them.

In reply to Senator Quinn's question, we have sufficient expertise. We have evolved. When the Criminal Assets Bureau commenced in 1996, the types of investigation conducted were different than those conducted now. Even the types of investigation being carried out when I entered CAB two and a half years ago are done differently now. In the past three to four years, we have developed our expertise in the area of analysis. To this effect, we have employed three analysts as additions to our forensic accountants. The analysts and those who follow the traditional policing methods of the hard slog work closely together. This is necessary or otherwise we would not keep up with what is occurring.

I am sure in the near future we will need to deal with systems that are being developed by criminals somewhere in the world today. It is a matter of keeping our finger on the pulse. We have sufficient expertise to meet today's challenges, but the situation is constantly evolving and it is important that we keep abreast of it.

Since taking over in CAB, I have found that a multi-agency approach is important in respect of asset seizures. It has been considerably beneficial. It is the envy of law enforcement agencies in countries that are examining our systems and methods. It is not just about dealing with the proceeds of crime, it is also dealing with social welfare fraud, Revenue matters and evading the payment of taxes. It is important to do this as these matters continue to evolve.

Senator Feargal Quinn

I refer to insider trading. Does this come within the bailiwick of CAB?

Mr. Frank Cassidy

There is new legislation on this matter and insider trading comes within the concept of market abuse. If there is appropriate evidence and target assets are available to us we will have the required legal and forensic expertise necessary to follow it. Clearly, we need some proceeds of crime or assets and some evidence of corrupt conduct or market abuse. We do not need to prove it beyond reasonable doubt but we need some form of evidence. We have appropriate liaison with the people investigating this. If the evidence and assets are there, we will target it and we also have the appropriate expertise.

Senator Feargal Quinn

To the best of my knowledge, there has never been a case, other than a civil case, of insider trading in Ireland and I wondered whether the ambit of CAB is part of the reason.

Mr. Frank Cassidy

I am not sure of the full extent of it but the case of Fyffes——

Senator Feargal Quinn

That is a civil case.

Mr. Frank Cassidy

I am not aware of any criminal prosecution.

Deputy Joan Burton

Like other members of the committee I found the presentation very interesting. In the case of a criminal who has a relative or friend assist in the purchase of a house, those of us who represent constituencies on the edges of cities are familiar with extraordinarily large houses with stables and courtyards popping up among the hedgerows and people coming and going from them. Does the CAB have a programme to examine these extraordinarily rich properties that crop up on the northern and western fringes of Dublin? At the height of the Celtic tiger period, some seemed extraordinary and do not seem to have any ordinary activity in them. Does the CAB liaise with local gardaí or other sources of local information or with the Revenue Commissioners and the banks? If someone develops a six-bedroom, six-bathroom house with stables, is there a check on whether this is reasonable? The same might apply to expensive yachts or cars. Does the CAB have oversight of exceptional purchases open only to those with access to a great amount of cash?

People who buy property and open bank accounts normally have access to professional advisers, such as solicitors and accountants. What is the relationship between the CAB and professional bodies in respect of the risk of people in various professions becoming bent? It is a nightmare for many professionals who get a dream client who turns into a nightmare. Is there some system whereby a solicitor or an accountant who feels unhappy with a new client because he or she cannot understand the source of the client's wealth can approach the CAB in confidence? I do not refer to whistleblowing as such. Some people who appeared before the courts got in over their heads with something that seemed like a great business at the time but was not.

Given the downturn in the construction industry, there is great fear about the collection of bad debts from companies in construction. I refer to the cascades and chains of bad debts. Stories are going around about various gangs, some from Ireland and some from eastern Europe, purchasing bad debts and collecting them from debtors. Is that receiving attention? It is certainly causing much fear. It has been reported in some newspapers — is that fanciful or real?

When young people are out at night in some pub or restaurant in town and their credit cards are skimmed and transactions on the credit card emerge via the Internet or the cards appear around the world, is this the work of Irish gangs or international gangs targeting Ireland? We are coming into the tourism season. Is it a matter for a fraud investigation or does the CAB have an interest in this if it is the work of organised gangs?

I refer to laundering diesel and other activities along the Border. There is an equivalent organisation in Northern Ireland. Is there co-operation between the two agencies? What progress has been made on the money that comes from subversive rackets such as diesel laundering? It seems to be still there. I am sure people bank on either side of the Border. Is there an integrated task force that might try to address this matter conclusively on an all-island basis?

Mr. John O’Mahony

As Deputy Burton describes properties on the south and west side of the city I can see where they are.

Deputy Joan Burton

I drive past many of them regularly.

Mr. John O’Mahony

The CAB is a national unit and is quite small in terms of resources. We have developed a system of working with divisional profilers in Revenue, customs and the Garda Síochána. We have 115 profilers in Garda divisions around the country as well as 12 Revenue and customs profilers. We work closely with them and they are trained by the CAB. When training they work for a week in the CAB so that they know what we are looking for. When we have inquiries or investigations in that district or division we work in conjunction with the local chief superintendent in working with these people. There is a constant exchange of intelligence. We work closely in targeting organised crime and the properties to which Deputy Burton refers are occupied by some of the people involved in this.

We have a number of operations with the other national Garda units, such as the Garda national drugs unit, and with the national bureau of criminal investigation. Those investigations are ongoing. I cannot go into specific detail on these but in some cases it takes a considerable amount of time to build evidence and a considerable amount of properties may be involved. We work regularly on these to ensure we bring them before the courts and that we have sufficient evidence to meet the bar required for the courts.

There is no doubt that these people have access to professional advisers. We must be very conscious as to how these people operate and whether it is under duress. We have found that some people are operating under duress and have been blackmailed. A number of avenues are open to these people to speak with us and discuss in confidence anything that will assist us in our investigations. There is the official avenue of suspicious transaction reports which are confidential. In a number of cases, and I do not want to go into specifics, we have received information and intelligence from across all strata of society on our inquiries which has assisted us in identifying assets which criminals have tried to conceal.

With regard to the collection of bad debts, I have seen the media reports on criminal gangs. Criminals will attempt to make money or avail of every situation. There are instances where criminal groups have been used to collect bad debts. We pass any intelligence to the national bureau of criminal investigation and local district and divisional units.

The matters raised with regard to credit cards involve criminal offences and as such would be dealt with by the Garda bureau of fraud investigation. We have constant liaison with this bureau and in any cases where criminal assets are identified, we conduct a joint investigation with it.

With regard to the laundering of diesel, since the inception of the Criminal Assets Bureau we have had a considerable number of investigations on the Border, the vast majority involving laundering diesel. Where there are discrepancies between the prices of fuel or taxes paid on either side of a border, there will be criminals who will take an opportunity and a chance. To this effect, an organised crime task force is in operation in Northern Ireland and we and the customs service actively participate in investigations. A number of investigations are ongoing in this regard.

Deputy Joan Burton

Presumably, many of the international gangs operating in Ireland on their own or in conjunction with Irish gangs take their money offshore. What powers, if any, does CAB have or need to pursue them?

Mr. John O’Mahony

We have difficulties in this area which we examine and address constantly in the context of Europe. We have received much help from the CARIN network, which is an informal network of asset recovery agencies, the European Commission and Europol. We are lucky in this country to have civil and non-conviction based forfeiture. This is not the case in other countries and sometimes it is difficult to get information from other countries. However, we are addressing this at international fora.

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

I thank the members of CAB and the Irish Fraud Bureau for attending the meeting today. If CAB is involved in a matter then fraud has been perpetrated and it is property related. With regard to the Financial Regulator and the financial institutions, what practical measures would CAB like to see? Normally in the banking sector documentation is required to be retained for a period of six years. Would CAB like to see it being retained for longer?

Most cases of fraud involve collusion. Detective superintendent McDermott made reference to false documentation. Are people getting hold of software with regard to P60s and bank statements? Has coming up with a form of technology which would have clearly identifying markers been examined? Anyone processing a P35 will receive a number of P60s. This is wide-open to falsification of P60s. The person will also have an original P60 from the Revenue Commissioners in his or her hands.

What is the number of cases under investigation by CAB? What is the average length of an investigation? What is the number of staff involved in terms of accountants, solicitors, members of the Revenue Commissioners and the Garda Síochána?

In Limerick, we have a particular difficulty with criminality. The powers of CAB are restricted to examining assets which involve criminals. One of the biggest issues we have is the number of petty criminals involved with large gangland criminals. How would CAB view its powers being extended to examine these petty criminals to catch a fraud before it is perpetrated?

At this stage can a case be made for a formal national identity card? Would this in any way go towards preventing fraud? The difficulty is that we have false documents and collusion. It was known at the time that when we changed from Irish pounds to the euro, many properties were bought with Irish pounds to ensure people were not caught with the currency after the conversion to the euro.

Mr. John O’Mahony

I am slightly impeded from commenting on the number of staff. However, our last annual report was issued for the end of 2007 and at the end of 2007 the total number of staff in the bureau was 59. We have six teams, each of which has an average of approximately 50 live investigations at any time, so that is approximately 300 investigations. That includes all our investigations, not just mortgage fraud. We have completed some investigations in as little as a week, but the bureau exists since 1996 and some of the investigations initiated then are still active. Mr. Cassidy mentioned specific legal areas and I have highlighted the issues we need to deal with, namely prevention. We need to work together and keep abreast of the changes and the changing environment

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

What about extending CAB's powers? The bureau is fighting crime.

Mr. John O’Mahony

We are targeting assets and the powers we have are quite extensive and are sufficient to deal with what we are confronted with. The Deputy suggested extending our powers to petty criminals or linking to the gang criminals. I am probably returning to hitting them through social welfare. The divisional profile system is working well on that. Without being specific, I know the Deputy is talking about Limerick and a number of divisional profilers are working full-time in Limerick with our CAB people. Not a week has gone by without somebody from CAB being in Limerick working hand in hand with the profilers there. Quite a number of investigations are ongoing there into social welfare issues and a number of actions have been taken.

Technology is constantly changing and the technology we have is probably the envy of most other law-enforcement agencies. We have the best technology but it needs to be constantly updated and we constantly need to be on the alert to ensure we have——

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

It is more preventative because CAB produced the bank statements that are being provided.

Mr. John O’Mahony

It is very difficult. There was a day when one knew these items were being bought in a specific shop in Dublin, Limerick or wherever, but now they can buy from the Internet and it is very difficult to police that. As soon as these items are available they can be bought on the Internet and we are finding a great deal of that. It is a difficulty.

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

Could any control mechanism be put in place so the P60 would be a stand-alone document?

Mr. John O’Mahony

It is difficult to see on screen, but some of those documents we have shown today have very sophisticated watermarks. These fraudsters have put in tedious work to replicate them. The Irish passport was traditionally very difficult to replicate.

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

How does CAB overcome this?

Mr. John O’Mahony

By being constantly vigilant. We exchange information with the various agencies involved. It is expensive and tedious work but these are the difficulties we are faced with. The formal national identity card is a legal issue.

Mr. Frank Cassidy

I will mention two specific legal issues about it. The committee asked us to specify under the Data Protection Act the sort of time we would like and I said ten years because in certain cases we have lost information we were aware was there but which was gone by the time we got the orders because people were complying with a direction from the Data Commissioner. However, such an approach is inconsistent with the European norm which is reducing the time limit for retaining documentation. The concept of a formal identity card is difficult to address as a matter of law. It would get a fair amount of criticism from the Irish civil liberties authorities which view it as "big brother". Our view is that the banks are presented with much documentation. They are in difficulties with the quality of documentation presented but on occasions some of our investigations indicate that some investigations behind those documents would have shown possible frauds. I might agree with Mr. Connell that certain questions may identify a number of them.

Deputy Kieran O’Donnell

There is a need for procedures.

Mr. Frank Cassidy

Yes, procedures.

Senator John Hanafin

I thank everyone who attended this committee. By virtue of their work, the CAB representatives are brave men to be congratulated and commended. I am not certain whether we are speaking with BusinessPro or the Irish Fraud Bureau; I am probably misreading it. The non-payment of previous loans will appear in an Irish Credit Bureau report, although a judgment mortgage or settlement judgment may not. I worked for 17 years in a financial institution. Surely that would be a clear indicator. Does Mr. Connell consider that the credit crunch will assist? In the recent past there was much off balance sheet lending meaning, for the first time ever, financial institutions did not know their customers. In the middle past there was an expectation that one would have a track record of making deposits before being considered by a bank or building society, and that could take many years to build up. Only in the recent past could a person go in cold, bring up the information on documentation and be accepted for a loan.

My second question is for Mr. O'Mahony on the builder bail-out fraud. There are no smart criminals but the basic principle of qui bono applies. If somebody takes out a mortgage, absconds and leaves the money behind it is obvious the person who has the money is the one perpetrating the fraud. If a robber goes into a bank, takes money, leaves it with somebody else and runs off, I would question the person who was left the money. It seems simple. If this is happening it is extraordinary because it is so easy to identify. These are the times in which we live.

Mr. Greg Connell

I will begin with the point on the Irish Credit Bureau having the loan defaults. There is a difference between what is going through the courts and what is going through the Irish Credit Bureau. Going through the Irish Credit Bureau are all the loans from the major banks, but there are still 500 credit unions which have extended loans of some €7 billion in the Republic of Ireland, and that data will not generally be with the Irish Credit Bureau. There are also mobile phone companies, the other utilities and those who use the courts but do not participate in the Irish Credit Bureau.

I do not have absolutely precise research figures for the Republic of Ireland but I did a close comparison with the position in Northern Ireland where the name of the plaintiff is revealed in full in all judgments. What was apparent from the research in Northern Ireland was that only half of all judgments were accessible through the sharing of loan default data. The other half came from sources which did not share data. That is why we advocate strongly the use of both default data at the ICB and default money judgments that could be for a multitude of debts outside the scope of the sharing of data.

On the question of whether the credit crunch will solve some of the problems in terms of the introduction of much stricter lending criteria, I predict that fraudsters will raise the bar once again. What is more likely to come about is that the identities of very prosperous and successful people with good credit and track records will be stolen. It has not yet occurred in a big way in the Republic of Ireland but it is a very significant problem in the United Kingdom. There is also the tragic example where the identities of the deceased are stolen to commit fraud. A person may adopt the identity of somebody who for many years may have led a blameless life from a credit perspective and have a good track record. However, it will get harder, as there will be less money to lend but financial institutions are still willing to make loans available to individuals to whom they think they can loan money profitably. Credit unions still have their doors open for business. We cannot be less vigilant because there is a little less money around.

Mr. John O’Mahony

With regard to the builder bail-out we discussed, there are a number of active investigations into what we have found. Anybody found to be involved, if there is sufficient evidence of criminality, will be dealt with through the courts, no matter who they are. I gave this as an example to raise awareness.

Deputy Chris Andrews

Are discussions ongoing between the CAB, the IFB and the Department of Finance on fraudulent claims? Is there a process or system in place to ensure contact with the Department of Finance on the need for legislation?

Mr. Frank Cassidy

There is a group of which I am aware within the Department of Finance. It is a money laundering guidance group — I do not have its exact name — and I have sat in with it occasionally. A member from the Garda bureau of fraud investigation sits in all the time. If there is anything of interest to us, I tend to be told about it.

Deputy Chris Andrews

Is there any liaison between the investigation bureau and the Department of Finance?

Mr. John O’Mahony

We have constant dealings with the Garda bureau of fraud investigation; because of their nature, most of our investigations overlap. We can address issues that arise during the course of investigations through the bureau. We have mechanisms, if required, for dealing with directions also.

Chairman

I thank the representatives from the Irish Fraud Bureau, Mr. Connell, Mr. Tracy and Mr. Johnson; as well as detective chief superintendent John O'Mahony, detective superintendent McDermott and Mr. Frank Cassidy from the Criminal Assets Bureau for engaging in a very informative and comprehensive discussion of what will be an increasingly important and serious issue. I thank them sincerely for their contributions and replies to the many questions put to them.

Before concluding, I remind members that the select committee is scheduled to consider the Ombudsman (Amendment) Bill 2008 at 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 25 March.

Deputy Joan Burton

At the time of nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank the Taoiseach and the Minister for Finance gave us an assurance that Mr. Donal O'Connor, the new chairman of the bank, would be happy to meet this committee to speak about the bank. I request that the committee extend that invitation and that we arrange to do so quickly.

Chairman

Is that agreed? Agreed.

The joint committee adjourned at 4.05 p.m. sine die.