I put down a question on Wednesday week to the President, and it was given to the Minister for External Affairs, asking whether he had received an invitation from the Government of the United States of America for the Saorstát to become a party to the proposed Kellogg treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, and whether the terms of the British reply to the United States had been communicated to the Executive Council before the reply was sent; and also what was the attitude of the Executive Council towards the reservations to the general principle of the pact indicated in the following paragraph of the British reply:—
"The language of Article 1, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new Treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect."
I put down this question to get information mainly as to the attitude of the Executive Council on these reservations. The Minister replied in the affirmative as regards the receipt of the invitation, and as regards the Executive Council having seen the terms of the British Note. His answer to the latter part was this:
"The Deputy will observe from the text of his own question, and also from the final paragraph of the British Note with which it deals, that the views embodied in these paragraphs are expressed on behalf of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain only, and do not purport to represent the views of, and cannot therefore in any way commit, the Government of Saorstát Eireann."
I think I express the view of a number of members of our Party in saying that we are not satisfied that it in no way commits anybody but the British Government. If we look at the final paragraph of the British Government's reply we have reason to think otherwise, to say the least of it. The paragraph as a whole is:
"Your Excellency will observe that the detailed arguments in the foregoing paragraph are expressed on behalf of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain. It will, however, be appreciated that the proposed Treaty, from its very nature, is not one which concerns His Majesty's Government in Great Britain alone, but is one in which they could not undertake to participate otherwise than jointly and simultaneously with His Majesty's Government in the Dominions and the Government of India. They have, therefore, been in communication with those Governments, and I am happy to be able to inform your Excellency that as a result of the communications which have passed, it has been ascertained that they are all in general agreement with the cordial principle of the proposed Treaty. I feel confident, therefore, that on receipt of an invitation to participate in the conclusion of such a Treaty, they, no less than His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, will be prepared to accept the invitation."
It was as a result of that Note that the invitation to become an original party to the Treaty was sent to the Executive Council, and although we were told here by the Minister for External Affairs, a short time ago, that our representative in Washington had an independent status—that was really the substance of what he said—that he could not be regarded as an attaché to the British Embassy there, we have the United States Minister in this Note taking particular care to remind the Executive Council that it is on account of the request of Sir Austen Chamberlain that an invitation has been issued to the Free State to become a party to this original Treaty. Relating what was in the British Note he says: "Accordingly I have been instructed to extend to His Majesty's Government in the Irish Free State this invitation."
The point we are interested in particularly is, as to what is the attitude of the Executive Council to the British reservations. When the British reply was sent it was published within a day or two. My plea for urgency over a week ago was not listened to, and the very thing that I had hoped to forestall took place in the interval, namely, that a reply was sent by the Executive Council without taking this House in any way into its confidence. I think that we should get to-night. without any further delay, a general indication of what the Executive's policy is in the matter. I understand, of course, that there are sometimes difficulties with an Executive that is responsible for negotiations of one kind or another in taking the whole House into its confidence. In the initial steps of negotiations very often it might interfere with its hopes of success by talking freely on these matters. But if every there was a case for open negotiations this is a case. These notes have been published. It is an attempt to arrive, by open negotiations, at an open covenant, and if there is to be any good in such a covenant it will only be by having behind it the support of the peoples that the Governments are supposed to represent. So that I claim that there ought to be no plea by the Executive Council for secrecy in this particular case. We ought to be open and above-board about it. This Executive has a very bad record so far as presenting Deputies here with accomplished facts, a record that ought to make individual Deputies very suspicious of their action when, without any real necessity for it, they try to surround themselves with a veil of secrecy. I hope, therefore, that the legitimate suspicions that are abroad will be dispelled by the Executive Council telling us their policy openly to-night. If there was some matter of secrecy that it might be inadvisable to communicate generally, they could have taken the House, if necessary in a secret session, into their confidence.
This matter is a very big one for our country. These reservations imply a right on the part of Britain to say that wherever British interests, whereever British imperialism is affected, wherever they have interests, that they shall have a right to use war, that that right should be recognised by us, and by every other signatory to this proposed pact, that the right of the British to use war as an instrument of their national policy in any part of the world —which is what it practically amounts to—in any region where their interests can be affected shall be recognised. It generally develops in this way: There is a certain area which no outsider must touch. They say: "You must not interfere there. These are our lines of communication. These are particular places where our interests are very closely involved. We are vitally affected there, and no stranger must touch that." Then it goes further, and it is used as an excuse by imperialistic nations to go in and interfere with the domestic affairs of these countries. It is simply a cover for wars of aggression, for imperialistic wars, and I think that our country, which has suffered from such, ought, in the most definite and explicit manner possible, to indicate that it does not stand for anything of that particular kind.
When the idea of starting a League of Nations was abroad in 1919, it will be remembered that, with regard to Article 10—and it is a rather odd coincidence that it should be Paragraph 10 of the British reply also—we protested in the best way we could against giving any recognition whatever of the right of empires to hold subject peoples unwillingly in their grasp. Some of us went over to the United States as representatives of this country, and we asked the people of the United States not to become members of the League of Nations so long as that particular Article was there, because it would be a recognition of the right of the British to hold Ireland, to interfere in Egypt, to hold India and interfere in China, or wherever else they wanted to get markets or spheres of influence, or to protect their lines of communication. I think it would be a shame if, when we ourselves were protesting against that, we should now become a party to a Treaty of the same kind. It would mean that if these reservations are accepted every single signatory to this pact will be recognising the right of empires to hold subject peoples against their will. We, as a nation that has suffered from that in the past, ought not to become a party to it by accepting these reservations. If this is to be a treaty to outlaw war, let it be a decent treaty to outlaw war.
Most of us know how this particular proposal started. It started by M. Briand sending a Note to the American Secretary of State, suggesting that there should be an Arbitration and a Renunciation of War Pact between France and the United States. The United States sought to broaden it, and said: "If this would be a good thing for France and America, why not make it broader?" But the moment it was suggested that it should be made broader, we had reservations of various kinds coming in.
It was then narrowed down that it was not to apply to aggressive war. Then when it came to the British they added, as I say, this express reservation from which we in this country suffered and are still suffering. We know perfectly well that the Treaty which was imposed upon this country was made through a threat of force, and is maintained as such through a threat of force.
